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Preface
In the Sepik Basin, which was the ethnographic crucible for everything 
Donald F. Tuzin wrote, ritual culture was dominated by what became known 
in Tokpisin as the Tambaran—a (male) tutelary spirit that anchors the ritual 
life of many lowland New Guinea societies. Incarnated in a particular location, 
geographic feature or item of ritual patrimony, its voice might be heard in the 
cry of bamboo flutes or the boom of water trumpets. In return for gifts, the 
Tambaran spirit would serve as the guardian or patron upon whom groups of 
people under his aegis might rely as they made their way through life. To those 
of us who knew him, Donald Tuzin was a decidedly generous—rather than 
a punitive or misogynistic—Tambaran and this book can be seen as a ritual 
prestation, or at least a piece of one, to his abiding spirit and voice.
Tuzin passed away unexpectedly in 2007 (see Chapter 1), so our gift is a mortuary-
related prestation. It is a commemorative volume rather than a festschrift in 
honour of a living scholar. Although the essays commissioned for and collected 
herein are partly intended to answer our grief, we do not offer them by way 
of ending our mourning and so return to daily life. Nor are they a symptom of 
melancholia by which we cling ambivalently to the memory of our colleague, 
teacher and friend in order to avoid doing so. We recognise this kind of project 
cannot replace the man, intellectually or personally. Indeed, though the volume 
responds creatively to central ethnographic and theoretical themes as well as to 
stylistic motifs in Tuzin’s work—to masculinity in Melanesia, to the relationship 
of culture to the subject, to his ethos qua author and fieldworker—we readily 
concede that it does not address the entire career of his interests.
At the same time that the gaps in this volume must signify his irrevocable 
absence (particularly to we who knew him), it does succeed in another way. 
It responds to the implicit threat that premature death poses to our sense of 
mortality and intellectual vitality by asserting that coherent, critical dialogue 
and collegiality not only remain possible in the face of shocking loss, but also 
perhaps become more precious. 
With regard to this latter sentiment, we are grateful to acknowledge the 
biographical help we received from Beverly Tuzin, his widow; a reading of our 
introductory essay by Melford Spiro, his senior colleague in the Anthropology 
Department at the University of California, San Diego; the support provided by 
Kathryn Creely, the librarian who worked with him in the Melanesian Archive 
there; advice from Elfriede Hermann, Wolfgang Kempf and Margaret Jolly, who 
pointed us to the ANU E Press as an ideal outlet for the volume; and excellent 
comments on a previous draught from two anonymous reviewers.
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Introduction: Donald F. Tuzin,  
An Anthropologist’s Anthropologist
David Lipset and Paul Roscoe
In 2007, Donald Francis (Don) Tuzin died at the age of sixty-one. We who knew 
him as students and colleagues or simply admired his work from afar lost an 
anthropologist’s anthropologist—a kind that has gone out of fashion, to say the 
least. He combined the interests of a generalist with the skills of an experienced 
field ethnographer. His work drew from and contributed to archaeology as well 
as reflexive anthropology. Driven by methodological individualism and a strong 
commitment to comparativism, he focused on social control, dreams, politics 
and art, cannibalism, food symbolism, the psychodynamics of masculinity, 
the origins of religion, sexuality and childhood. At the same time as the depth 
of expertise and sheer creativity he brought to these and a great variety of 
other subjects broke new ground and won him publication in distinguished 
disciplinary venues, he influenced large swathes of subsequent research. He 
was among a wave of international ethnographers who in the late 1960s began 
to focus belated attention on the Sepik Basin of Papua New Guinea, and he 
emerged as their dean. In this introductory essay, we sketch out Tuzin’s life and 
discuss the main themes in the essays that make up this commemorative volume.
Background
Tuzin’s maternal ancestry had deep American roots. His mother, Thelma Louise 
Smith (b. 1920), grew up in rural southern Illinois, where her father, George 
Wesley Smith (1895–1949), owned a small vegetable farm in West Vienna. 
Although she never attended university, Thelma grew up dreaming of higher 
pursuits and read incessantly. For many years, she worked on a historical 
American novel involving Native Americans, and this interest might have later 
drawn Don to anthropology. Thelma had three brothers, one of whom, Donald, 
was killed in Japan in 1944, the year before Don, her son, was born. She died at 
the age of fifty-four. 
Tuzin’s patrilineage was made up of working-class immigrants. His father’s father, 
Fanzieshek Tuzinkiewics (later Francis [Frank] Tuzin), came to the United States 
from Poland in the first decade of the twentieth century. In Poland, the men in 
his family had worked as bakers (‘tuzin’ is Polish for ‘dozen’), and Frank owned 
a bakery on East Fourteenth Street on the Lower East Side of New York until his 
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death in 1951. His son, Constantine (Con) Francis Tuzin (b. 1917), grew up as an 
apprentice in the bakery, before enlisting in the army in 1942. He was stationed 
in Springfield, Illinois, where he met and married Thelma in October 1943. 
Subsequently, he was posted as an instructor in the Quartermaster Subsistence 
School in Chicago, and it was there that Don Tuzin was born on 14 June 1945.
Tuzin’s initial acquaintance with Chicago was brief. His father was moved to 
an army base in California, and, following demobilisation in 1947, the family 
moved to the river town of Winona, Minnesota, where Con began work as a 
manager in the Federal Bakery and where Don, as he would later recall, enjoyed 
Huck Finn-esque childhood adventures on the banks of the Mississippi. In 
1959, his father was hired by the Kitchens of Sara Lee Incorporated, and the 
family returned to Chicago—first to the suburb of Norridge and then eight 
months later to Sauganash, in the city itself. Here, Tuzin attended Von Steuben 
High School and met his future wife, Beverly Chodd, who lived just two houses 
away. In Chicago, the Tuzin family’s prospects took a marked turn. Con invented 
several of Sarah Lee’s best-known recipes, including layer cakes and brownies, 
and eventually rose to become vice-president in charge of overseas corporate 
expansion. He retired from Sara Lee in 1977 and died just two years later at the 
age of sixty-one—the same age as would his son almost 30 years later.
Becoming an Anthropologist
Tuzin attended and received his BA from Western Reserve University in 
1967, shortly before its merger with Case Institute of Technology. It was here 
he became interested in anthropology and participated in the excavation of 
Native American archaeological sites left by the Mound Builders. Olaf Prufer, 
a Harvard-trained archaeologist at the Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 
had an adjunct lectureship at Case and recalled coming to know Tuzin well as 
an undergraduate: 
I think it was I who made him decide on becoming an anthropologist 
(although he was not fond of dirt, dust and heat)…Don was with 
my operations during the summers of 1964 and 1965…in the hills of 
southern Ohio, where he valiantly sought a professional identity. He 
shared, in 1965, our rage at [President Lyndon] Johnson’s destructive 
decision to go whole hog in Vietnam by committing the army to this 
hopeless venture…During the…regular academic year, he opted for 
some coursework with me at Case…His work was excellent. I still must 
have his paper on the kinship structure of rural Ross County. (Prufer 
2007; see also Prufer 1965) 
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In 1967, after receiving an MA from Case Western Reserve, Tuzin boarded 
the Queen Elizabeth II and went for postgraduate studies at the University 
of London with the intention of doing research in East Africa. Mary Douglas 
became intellectually important there (Robbins and Leavitt 2008), and, although 
he would later reject her theoretical vision, Tuzin recalled her keen intellect and 
early mentoring with fondness. While in London, Tuzin also met the Australian 
social anthropologist Phyllis Kaberry, who nurtured his interest in the Sepik 
region of Papua New Guinea. ‘Kaberry’s…vivid descriptions of the Abelam 
[were]…captivating, and [they]…drove Africa quite out of my mind…I was 
irrevocably attracted not only to Melanesia, but to the Sepik region’ (Tuzin 
2001:x). At the suggestion of Anthony Forge, Tuzin decided to do fieldwork in 
Ilahita, a village of Arapesh speakers in the East Sepik District in what was still 
the Australian Territory of New Guinea (Tuzin 2001:xi). Reo Fortune tutored 
him in Arapesh language in Cambridge, UK, and Margaret Mead, who had 
worked with Fortune among the Mountain Arapesh to the east, also supported 
his work, visiting him in the field and later writing the foreword for his first 
book. Beverly Tuzin recalled two details of Mead’s 1971 visit to Ilahita. First, 
she was certain that the people ‘felt’ palpably Arapesh. And second: ‘she 
brought us whiskey—as etiquette-informed visitors to anthropologists-in-the-
field should—and told us stories under the pounding rain on our tin roof, while 
tossing back shots. Then she fell asleep in the middle of Don’s response. Don and 
I were befuddled about what to do—keep talking or not, keep drinking or not, 
wake her up, go to bed, etc. Finally, we just sat there until she woke up. Then we 
all went to sleep.’ (Beverly Tuzin, Personal communication, 13 September 2009.)
The following year, Tuzin transferred to the doctoral program in the Anthropology 
Department of the Research School for Pacific Studies at The Australian National 
University (ANU) in Canberra, which was ‘to New Guinea anthropology what 
the University of London was to African anthropology’ (Tuzin 2001:xi). It is 
perhaps an early indication of Tuzin’s social capacities that, despite his emerging 
relationship with Margaret Mead, Derek Freeman agreed to become his advisor. 
The two developed a close working relationship that lasted until Freeman’s death 
in 2001. Freeman’s influence shaped Tuzin’s longstanding interests in criticism 
and scientific method, the subject and individual choice in culture, and the 
integration of biological and social anthropology. In the near term, of course, 
Freeman supervised Tuzin’s doctoral fieldwork, which began in September 1969, 
and Beverly Tuzin recalled that Freeman ‘was extremely supportive during and 
after fieldwork. In addition to anthropological counselling during fieldwork, 
he sent Don books to read at his leisure (outdoor adventures of guys achieving 
great feats—mountain climbing, conquering the Antarctic, etc).’
Tuzin’s research focused on issues of social organisation, law, ritual and 
symbolism. A resourceful fieldworker, he collected fine-grained material on 
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many topics. In March 1970, taking a field break after six months in Ilahita, 
Tuzin went to Sydney and married Beverly Chodd, his high-school sweetheart. 
Beverly recalled that the wedding 
was arranged by the missionaries Don had befriended in Ilahita, due to 
the fact that our original plans to be married on a ship had been foiled. 
The bridesmaids were elderly missionaries. Don’s father was the next 
youngest person there (other than Don and me). He happened to be 
there, supervising the building of a Sara Lee factory, but he was the only 
family/friend in attendance. 
Shortly thereafter, the newlyweds left for New Guinea. Or, as Tuzin once put it, 
without any trace of guile: ‘Right after we got married, I jumped straight into 
the bush.’ 
Figure 1 Don and Beverly Tuzin in Ilahita after being married in Sydney. 
‘When we returned to Ilahita,’ Beverly recalled, ‘the small-plane pilot 
dipped his wing as we passed over the village. The people of Ilahita 
decorated the path to our house and our house with colorful crotons, etc. 
They also lined the path and welcomed us.’
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After a good Malinowskian period of 22 months in the field, Tuzin returned 
to Canberra in 1972 and started to write up his dissertation. Michele Stephen 
remembered the impressive figures he and Beverly cut in those days: 
Very tall and straight, over 6’4”, he never allowed even a trace of an 
academic slouch to lessen his imposing stature, always carrying himself 
with a kind of nonchalant elegance. His black hair, brilliant blue eyes, 
olive complexion and classical features added up to movie-star good 
looks, which he perhaps tried to disguise, but failed, with a heavy beard. 
Soft spoken with just the hint of an appealing diffidence of manner, he 
nevertheless could be firm and even intimidating for all his charm. Don 
and his tall, equally elegant wife, Beverly, made a stunning couple…
on the campus of the ANU, two tall, almost impossibly beautiful young 
Americans. Both might have been Hollywood actors playing the role of 
the dashing anthropologist and his lovely companion.
Tuzin saw his time as a graduate student at ANU as ‘idyllic’, Beverly recalled. 
‘His office window opened onto an enclosed courtyard with trees and grey and 
pink galahs…He valued his…animated discussions during the regular morning/
afternoon teas [and in] departmental seminars, which often included…heated 
arguments.’ Edenic as Canberra might have been in the early 1970s, Tuzin now 
had to think about getting his first job. He recalled a crucial role that the South 
Asianist Paul Alexander, who was part of his cohort at ANU, played in this 
process: 
Around September 1972, we were both a few draft chapters into our 
theses…Paul …[had] a copy of the American Anthropological Association 
Guide to Graduate Departments in his hand. He had found just the 
department for me. UC San Diego had all the scholars I admired. I must 
write to them, Paul demanded. ‘But I don’t know if they’re even hiring,’ 
I responded. ‘Never mind!’ Paul said, in terms that were probably a 
little more colorful than that. Thereupon, he REFUSED TO LEAVE MY 
OFFICE until, then and there, I wrote to the department to introduce 
myself. One thing led to another, and now, thirty-three years later, I’m 
still at UC San Diego. I literally do not know where I would be, without 
Paul. (Quoted in Feil 2005:233)
In 1973, Tuzin left Australia for a job interview in San Diego. While getting 
dressed at the hotel to meet faculty, he put on a tie for the first time in several 
years and felt several lumps in his neck. Upon returning to Canberra, he 
declined to go for a check-up and biopsy, his wife recalled, until he had finished 
his dissertation. Once he did submit it to his committee, he got the diagnosis. He 
had contracted Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, although the stage of its development was 
not immediately determined. Now, he refused treatment until after the thesis 
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defence. He defended successfully, and he and Beverly proceeded that very 
same afternoon to hospital. Tuzin underwent a splenectomy, and the disease 
was then staged at 2a, meaning all the cancer was above the diaphragm. He 
received one month of radiation treatments in Sydney, before leaving Australia 
for southern California to take up an assistant professorship at the University of 
California, San Diego (UCSD). He was twenty-eight.
La Jolla Years
Tuzin began to undergo weekly doses of chemotherapy at the UCSD Medical 
Center in Hillcrest and had to wrestle with their side effects as he began his 
new job. In addition to nausea, he became anaemic, weak and paranoid. Beverly 
recalled how certain he was that his colleagues hated him and how convinced 
he became that his teaching was going poorly. Marc Swartz, the political 
anthropologist who was then chair of the UCSD department, remembered 
holding quite the contrary view. He recalled Tuzin ‘lecturing on kinship. 
I thought I knew about kinship, but I didn’t know as much as Don did. He 
was absolutely brilliant’ (quoted in Kinsman 2007). The treatments left him in 
remission and perhaps with a Johnsonian sense of urgency and concentration. 
During these first years in La Jolla, his sons, Gregory (b. 1976) and Alexander (b. 
1980), were born and in quick succession his Ilahita material began to burst out.
In the early 1970s, Ilahita village, where Tuzin conducted the bulk of his 
fieldwork, had a population of nearly 1500 people, making it one of the largest 
villages in Papua New Guinea. Given that Ilahita society was acephalous, Tuzin 
raised a classic structural-functional problem that would have made Meyer 
Fortes proud: how could the village hold together in the absence of formal 
leadership? His first book, The Ilahita Arapesh: Dimensions of Unity (1976), 
sought to answer this question and raised issues that would intrigue him for 
the rest of his career. Ilahita village society was divided into a dual organisation 
in which ‘moieties, sub-moieties, initiation classes and age-sets’ crosscut and 
overlapped one another to produce an ‘intricate web’ of solidarity among 
villagers (Tuzin 1976:xxiv–xxv). Derek Freeman had interested Tuzin in the 
project of combining Popper’s (1950) version of methodological individualism 
(cf. Hayek 1952; Weber 1968) with historical explanation: how did the elaborate 
sociology that held Ilahita village together come about? Arguing against Levi-
Strauss’s (1963) claims that dual organisation arose from the structure of the 
human mind, Tuzin claimed that it derived instead from individuals making 
mundane choices in the face of recurring situational demands. The book applied 
this analytical framework to a historical reconstruction of how this complex 
social organisation might have arisen.
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A companion volume, The Voice of the Tambaran, which appeared four years 
later (1980), went in a different theoretical direction. The ethnographic goal 
was to portray rituals of initiation into the Ilahita male cult. During fieldwork, 
Tuzin himself had observed several stages of this complex rite, and with his 
considerable literary skills he was able to convey the vitality of its ethos with a 
nuance that few in the Melanesian literature had achieved. In addition, the book 
sought to interpret the symbolism of a wide range of phenomena: myth imagery 
and cult-house construction—from anchor posts to bark painting facades. As a 
whole, Tuzin argued, the cult defined moral order for Ilahita men, although its 
influence upon women remained obscure.
While influenced by Derek Freeman’s strong bio-cultural vision, Tuzin’s interest 
in cultural theory in relation to emotion and other psychological capacities was 
also guided by the distinguished Freudian Melford Spiro, the founder of the 
UCSD Anthropology Department, and another psychoanalytically oriented 
colleague there, Robert Levy. For example, in his article ‘The Breath of a Ghost: 
Dreams and the Fear of the Dead’ (Tuzin 1975), he examined how Arapesh dreams, 
and their interpretations, draw upon individuals’ relationships with loved ones. 
Dreaded dream visits from the ghosts of deceased parents were said to resonate 
with ambivalent feelings of mourning. Similarly, a subsequent contribution 
to Herdt’s (1982) well-known anthology Rituals of Manhood explored how 
individual men reacted to having to sponsor their sons’ subjection to terrifying 
ordeals in male-cult rituals. In another quite original piece, entitled ‘Miraculous 
Voices: The Auditory Experience of Numinous Objects’ (1984), Tuzin argued that 
‘numinous’ or ‘religious’ feelings that have often been documented as preceding 
an epileptic seizure might illustrate how patterns of brain activity could produce 
an existential response that might be culturally appropriated as ‘religious’. The 
resonating sounds of the Arapesh ‘voice’ of the Tambaran cult spirit produced 
by bamboo flutes being blown into the base of wooden drums could, through 
simple acoustics, produce brain-wave patterns and ‘numinous feelings’ that 
individuals would then interpret as religious awe. Similar dynamics might be 
related to sounds produced in religious contexts more generally. Through these 
and other essays drawing from his Ilahita material, Tuzin developed his own 
thoroughly bio-psychosocial perspective on culture. 
He remained interested in Ilahita’s historical experience. In 1983, he co-edited 
a collection with the social anthropologist Paula Brown Glick, The Ethnography 
of Cannibalism (Brown and Tuzin 1983). His piece in the volume analysed vivid 
stories told by Ilahitans about the desperation of Japanese soldiers who were 
said to have cannibalised villagers in the last days of the New Guinea campaign. 
By this time, too, events were moving him towards a return to Ilahita. Following 
the lead of Bateson and Mead in the 1930s, Tuzin had thought to undertake a 
second project to be located somewhere in rural Indonesia. In 1979, he spent 
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six weeks exploring Bali, Java and Sulawesi looking for an appropriate field 
site. Unhappily, he could not win grant support for this research project. Three 
graduate students at UCSD, Karen Brison, Stephen Eyre and Steven Leavitt, had 
decided to do doctoral fieldwork in Papua New Guinea, and Tuzin wrote and 
submitted a grant in support of a comparative project that was to be focused 
on middle childhood in contiguous cultures in the vicinity of Ilahita (Leavitt, 
Personal communication). In 1985, he received National Science Foundation 
funding for the project.
Tuzin, Beverly and their two sons returned to Ilahita for 11 months in 1985–86. 
There, he found a community in disarray, at least from a culturally conservative 
point of view. A year earlier, many villagers had converted to evangelical 
Christianity and during church service confessionals had revealed the secrets of 
the male cult to women and children in the community, exposing the knowledge 
that flutes were not the voices of the spirits but were ‘actually’ men blowing 
them.
Figure 2 Tuzin’s informant Tomi insisted that his two boys plant coconuts 
on his land so that they would have a conditional link to him. Ilahita, 
1986. 
Photo: B. Tuzin
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On the basis of his research into the meaning and consequences of these events, 
Tuzin published an ethnographic masterpiece, The Cassowary’s Revenge: The Life 
and Death of Masculinity in a New Guinea Society (1997). The centrepiece of the 
book was the destruction of the Ilahita male cult at the hands of the very men who 
once had treated it as axial in their lives. In the opening chapter, Tuzin wrestled 
candidly with the angst he felt about what had happened, and he reflected on 
how he had himself figured in people’s thinking. At the centre of his inquiry was 
a clever argument that the myth of the cassowary had come to be understood 
as having foretold the death of the male cult, the end of which was enabled by 
its having been culturally exogenous to Ilahita in the first place. The male cult 
of the Tambaran, he argued, had been adopted from the neighbouring Abelam 
as a result of the latter’s military superiority. The misogyny that accompanied 
it, Tuzin argued, had never sat well with traditional Ilahita notions of male–
female relations (relations that indeed recalled Mead’s famous characterisation 
of gender among the Mountain Arapesh as uniformly nurturant (Mead 1935; cf. 
Fortune 1939; Roscoe 2003). The coming of evangelical Christianity provided 
a constituency of Ilahita men with an excuse to do away with the cult, the 
cult whose values they had not endorsed. What resulted, Tuzin believed, was a 
masculine tragedy. Tuzin’s book is a portrait of sad betrayal, domestic violence 
and ritual confusion as well as other more material afflictions. The Cassowary’s 
Revenge quickly became a modern classic in Melanesian ethnography as well as 
in the study of masculinity amid cultural change.
In the aftermath of the mid-1980s Ilahita fieldwork, Tuzin occupied himself in a 
series of smaller projects. He wrote two energetic papers on sexuality. In one, he 
traced anthropological interest in the topic back to Malinowski (Tuzin 1994); in 
the other, he argued that the study of sexuality would benefit both conceptually 
and empirically from a focus on what he called the ‘excluded middle’ that 
was constituted by the interaction of practice and cultural discourse (Tuzin 
1991:872). 
Together with Thomas Gregor, he also organised a major Wenner-Gren 
symposium that resulted in Gender in Amazonia and Melanesia: An Exploration 
of the Comparative Method (Gregor and Tuzin 2001). This volume used gender 
in these two distinct geographical areas as a focus for reconsidering the utility 
of the comparative method in anthropology—a method that Tuzin refused to 
surrender despite growing hostility in mainstream cultural anthropology. In 
their co-authored piece, Tuzin and Gregor compared male cults in Ilahita and 
Mehinaku, not as an assertion of patriarchy or even male–female interdependency 
but rather as an anguished attempt to sustain the integrity of an otherwise 
ambivalent, frail masculine subject. Tuzin also published Social Complexity in 
the Making: A Case Study Among the Arapesh of New Guinea (2001), which was 
written to augment a sequence of courses in which he participated at UCSD 
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called ‘The Making of the Modern World’. In this book, he returned to and 
expanded notions of cultural evolution and change that had run through earlier 
work. At the time of his death in 2007, Tuzin was full of enthusiasm for a 
biography of Derek Freeman on which he was working with Peter Hempenstall, 
the emeritus Pacific historian. The project was to be called ‘Truth’s Fool: Derek 
Freeman and the Future of Anthropology’. 
In addition to his scholarship, Tuzin’s further legacy to the Melanesianist 
community is large. He founded the University of California Press series 
Studies in Melanesian Anthropology and served as a senior editor of the series 
from 1984 to 1994. He was also on the boards of the journal Oceania and the 
allied Oceania Monographs. But perhaps his greatest contribution to Melanesian 
scholarship lay in his role as co-founder, long-time academic advisor and 
honorary curator of the Melanesian Archive, housed in the Geisel Library at 
UCSD. Fitz John Porter Poole and Tuzin started the archive in 1982. Working 
with UCSD librarians, they secured two large Title IIC grants for the project 
from the US Department of Education. Created to staunch ‘Ethnographic Loss 
and Scatter’, the archive collects fieldnotes and other unpublished materials of 
anthropologists who work or have worked in Melanesia, together with patrol 
reports and other government documents from the region (Tuzin 1995:24). 
Along with dissertations, MA theses, microform sets of archival materials held 
by other institutions, and book and journal holdings related to the region, the 
archive Tuzin and Poole founded—and which Tuzin worked hard to maintain—
made it the world’s largest depository of materials on the cultures of Melanesia 
and made UCSD an outstanding resource for research. As Kathryn Creely, the 
Melanesian Studies Librarian at UCSD, commented: 
[T]he Archive could not exist without Don’s contributions—intellectual 
and personal. His vision for building the collection, his intellectual 
curiosity, his wonderful relations with colleagues internationally in 
the field of Melanesian anthropology, and above all, his own kindness, 
courtesy and humor were all essential ingredients in the our endeavor. 
(Quoted by JaCoby 2007) 
In addition, the archive provides copies of materials to libraries in the Pacific—a 
feature of which Tuzin was proud. In honour of his commitment to Melanesian 
scholarship, the archive has recently been renamed for him.
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In addition to a productive scholarly career, Tuzin was active in administration 
at UCSD. Joel Robbins, one of his colleagues in the Anthropology Department 
there, recalled how Tuzin ‘believed that UCSD was the most exciting university 
in the world, and he gave his time and heart to it accordingly’ (quoted by 
JaCoby 2007). He twice served as chair of the Anthropology Department, 
helping it through a politically difficult period of expansion into a prominent 
four-field department. From 1990 to 1993, he served as Associate Chancellor of 
the university under Richard Atkinson. Atkinson recalled asking Tuzin to move 
with him when he became President of the University of California system, 
hoping to groom him as a chancellor or university president himself. Citing his 
commitment to scholarship and teaching, however, Tuzin declined to leave San 
Diego. In 2004–05, he served as the elected Chair of the UCSD Academic Senate. 
In these administrative roles, he proved able, and had an ability to listen with 
patience and make decisions that were deemed fair. At UCSD, he is and will 
be remembered as a substantial figure in the history of what is still a young 
university.
Because it conveys something about the austerity and selfless dedication that 
possessed him, we want to end this biographical section (which recalls his initial 
cancer treatment) with a word about the process of his passing. In 2001, Tuzin 
was visiting Machu Picchu during a family vacation in Peru, when he suffered a 
bout of nausea and shortness of breath that he imagined to be altitude sickness 
(his wife later suspected it was a blood clot that had broken). From that time 
on, his health slowly deteriorated, his energy declined, and his doctors were 
unable immediately to diagnose why. Over the following year, he again suffered 
acute shortness of breath. Upon return to La Jolla, he began to receive various 
treatments. An unnecessary pacemaker was implanted in his heart. He suffered 
thyroid damage. Beverly recalled this period of their lives as involving ‘a lot of 
waiting for test results’. During the summer of 2006, however, he was promoted 
to Distinguished Professor in the UC system—its highest rank. That autumn, 
he received a diagnosis of pulmonary hypertension, which his doctors thought 
was related to scatter effects from the cruder, less pinpointed form of radiation 
he had received 33 years earlier, in 1973. By early winter, he was no longer able 
to walk to the library, and, in November, he went on oxygen 24 hours a day, 
which depressed and scared him. Until then, he had carried on with everyday 
life, working as normally as possible and complaining to no-one. Indeed, most 
people had not even realised he was ill. ‘Basically,’ Beverly said, ‘he was able to 
fake it pretty well.’ Donald Tuzin died on 15 April 2007, intending to undergo 
preliminary evaluation so as to become eligible to join a waiting list for a heart–
lung transplant. 
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The Essays
In the aftermath of Tuzin’s unexpected and decidedly premature death, our 
instructions to contributors were sparse: engage an aspect of his work. The 
chapters in the resulting volume thus engage a variety of topics, differing also 
in ethnographic texture and, of course, methodological orientation, but they all 
respond to Tuzin’s principal interests in the Sepik: masculinity and epistemology. 
In addition, some authors, such as Birth, Knauft and Robbins, while making 
a theoretical point, adopt a somewhat more personal tone. Others, including 
Lipset, Roscoe and Stephens, write more formally as they focus on a particular 
analytical topic. We note these rhetorical differences and let them stand. They 
are, we think, useful expressions of the loss from which this volume emanates. 
In all, we have grouped the chapters according to the following four themes: 
1) Sepik prehistory, history and contemporary Melanesian masculinities; 2) 
culture, the agent and methodological individualism; 3) comparativism; and 
lastly, as might be appropriate to a commemorative project of this kind, 4) 
Tuzin’s style as a fieldworker and author. 
History, Masculinity and Melanesia
A major project in Tuzin’s first volume, The Ilahita Arapesh (1976), was the 
reconstruction of village prehistory, and he returned to archaeological issues in 
his last book, Social Complexity in the Making (2001). Lamenting anthropology’s 
continuing contempt for social-evolutionary inquiry, Tuzin held up the value 
to archaeologists of communities such as Ilahita for understanding processes of 
social transformation (2001:5–10). Drawing from several types of data, Tuzin 
argued that, beginning in the late 1800s, Ilahita exploded from a community 
of 100–200 people to almost 1300 under the pressure of large-scale migrations 
northwards from the Sepik River of dense populations of Abelam people. This 
process of expansion was eventually halted by the ‘pacification’ of the region 
in the 1940s, but by then the village had already become one of the largest 
in New Guinea. The conceit of an Abelam ‘invasion’ is a longstanding one 
in Sepik anthropology, but in his contribution, Paul Roscoe counters that it 
never occurred, or at least not as it is usually represented. The characteristics 
of the Abelam–Arapesh region commonly taken as evidence for such a mass 
migration, he argues, are better explained as the product of localised ecological 
conditions. The formation of Ilahita village was no different to standard 
processes of village formation elsewhere in the area, and the unusual size to 
which it grew is better attributable to the village’s unusual topography rather 
than to prehistoric immigration. This being the case, Roscoe concludes, Tuzin’s 
description and analysis of the strategies that Ilahitans adopted for coping with 
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their conurbation assume a far greater relevance than he might have imagined. 
Rather than being sui generis, as Tuzin thought, they are applicable to village 
formation and maintenance processes throughout the Sepik region.
Whether or not warfare was a major factor in the rise of Ilahita village, the 
male cult, or the Tambaran, became an axis of interest in subsequent work, 
which culminated in his account of the ‘death’ of the Tambaran—for example, 
its collapse in 1984 amid millenarian expectations fomented by a ‘Christian 
revival’, and fostered by Ilahitan interpretations of Tuzin’s own 1969–72 
fieldwork there, and the promise of his return. With the public exposure of cult 
secrets to women and children, male domination—the very meaning of ritual 
masculinity—collapsed, as Ilahita sought to pivot towards a new, globalised 
future. Among the Abelam—eastern neighbours to the Ilahita Arapesh—and 
about the same time as Tuzin, Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin experienced a series 
of developments that marked a similar, radical cultural transformation and 
ultimately led her to surrender her Abelam field site.
As Tuzin did in The Cassowary’s Revenge, Hauser-Schäublin seeks to understand 
the processes that effected this transformation. She does so with an elegant 
analysis of the Abelam string bag, a seemingly mundane artefact that actually 
illuminates two conjoined, systemic principles upon which Abelam culture 
appears to be based. On the one hand, there is the structure of these bags—
manufactured by a looping technique from a single piece of twine. On the 
other, there is their semi-transparent surface—an artefact that both conceals 
and reveals what is inside. Abelam men’s knowledge in the ‘pre-modern’ era, 
Hauser-Schäublin proposes, was organised on the same two principles. Referring 
to a reality beyond the world of everyday life, of routine processes and practices 
controlled by human agents, this hierarchically structured knowledge and the 
manner in which it was disbursed involved an interplay between revealing 
and concealing and an inter-looping of the two modes. In a new era shaped by 
colonialism, Christian proselytisation, political independence and the advance 
of a capitalist economy and globalisation, the ‘death’ of the Abelam Tambaran, 
as we might call it, involved a determination to put an end to the ‘pre-modern’ 
era and the principles represented in the string bag of the Tambaran. The values 
fostered by and embodied in the bag, with its continual loops of concealing and 
revealing, no longer sufficed as a model for identity. 
David Lipset and Bruce Knauft also focus on Tuzin’s interest in masculinities 
in contemporary Papua New Guinea but suggest that their transitions do not 
necessarily conform to the tragedy that befell the Ilahita male cult in the mid-
1980s. Lipset deploys Lacanian semiotics to do so. For Lacan, the subject’s 
position in culture is based in eternal desire, which is attracted by metaphorical 
substitutions for, rather than negations of, past loss. The phallus, moreover, 
is the privileged signifier of both desire and loss. Lipset therefore opines that 
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Tuzin’s view of Ilahita masculinity in the mid-1980s was one-dimensional. 
Instead of tragedy, ritual masculinity was observed making multiple kinds of 
substitutions that combine the presence and the absence of the phallus into an 
equivocal register. 
Knauft, relying on a historical methodology, arrives at a similar conclusion. 
Among the Gebusi of the Highlands fringe, he argues that the trajectory of ritual 
masculinity is unpredictable, rather than uniformly negative or disparaging as 
in Ilahita or Abelam. In 2008, he found Gebusi men less violent than they had 
been during earlier years. What is more, in the wake of post-colonial devolution, 
they had revived central masculine institutions: the longhouse, male initiation 
and traditional dancing. It is too easy, Knauft avers, to misjudge the future of 
Melanesian men.
Culture, the Agent and Tuzin’s Methodological 
Individualism
The basis of Tuzin’s dynamic view of Ilahita as well as his tragic view of ritual 
masculinity lay in a Popperian conception of the actor in society. The four 
chapters in this section all respond to aspects of this interest in culture, the 
agent and the recursive relationship between the two. Drawing on vernacular 
reactions to ‘strange’ occurrences he observed during research in Trinidad 
in 1996, Kevin Birth elegantly discusses the uncanny through the Vichean 
approach that Tuzin adopted towards it. As Birth points out, the uncanny 
disrupts Cartesian dualism—the division between the mental and the material 
world that undergirds the more naive epistemologies of science. Although it is 
founded on observed particulars, the uncanny evokes the mysterium—a sense of 
something behind the world of perception. To avoid this dilemma, Birth informs 
us, Tuzin invoked Vico’s critique of Descartes’ dualism and his distinction 
between verum (truth: that which is created by the human mind and which, 
for this reason, we can know) and certum (certainty: our acquaintance with and 
beliefs about the physical world). Along with Langer’s approach to aesthetics 
and Morris’s pragmatism, the concept of verum galvanised Tuzin’s study of 
such phenomena as the Ilahita Tambaran cult, directing him towards the active 
process of meaning creation. For Tuzin, the uncanny was a vital component 
in this process. By focusing on (‘subjective’) apperception rather than on 
(‘objective’) perception, Tuzin appreciated that the ‘strange’ coincidence—the 
symbol apperceived to have intrinsic import—acted as a socially creative force, 
prompting the collective imagination and creation of truth and playing a vital 
role in religious experience. The Vichean approach that Tuzin adopted towards 
the uncanny, Birth suggests, has wide-ranging use for the study of post-




If Vico, Langer and Morris influenced Tuzin’s theoretical approach to symbolism, 
Popper’s methodological individualism provided him with theoretical inspiration 
for understanding society. In a trenchant examination of the entire sweep of 
Tuzin’s work—from his first to his last book—Don Gardner finds that a sense of 
the complexity of the total human person rather than any conceptual privilege 
attached to the individual was what drove his analysis. In light of the daunting 
metaphysical issues that lurk in the wings of methodological individualism, 
Gardner suggests, Tuzin might have been better served if he had set his 
Popperian prescriptions aside. His interests in an interactionalist approach to 
social life and his concern with comparison would be better advanced, Gardner 
continues, by the considerations evident in Weberian analytical practice or by 
Philip Pettit’s ‘explanatory ecumenism’.
Drawing from Tuzin’s view that culture should be seen as arising from the 
contingencies of individual action and subjectivity, Stephen Leavitt finds 
reminiscences about childhood told by a Bumbita Arapesh man to be an 
empirically useful expression of the rhetorical relationship between narrator, 
as actor, and cultural norms. He carefully analyses a case in which an informant 
recalled incidents that involved childhood adventures with classificatory 
siblings who would rather not have shared the fruits of their foraging exploits 
in the rainforest. Insisting that they do so, he threatened to tell on them. As his 
father had died prematurely by the time he spoke to Leavitt, the informant was 
expressing anxiety about achieving full status in the patrilineal community.
In his contribution, Joel Robbins offers an elegant assessment of the convergence 
of his own holist, or realist, concept of society with Tuzin’s methodological 
individualism, to which, he suggests, Tuzin became less of an adherent in later 
years. Following up a point made by Derrida, Robbins distinguishes between 
what he calls the ‘messianic promise’ (a hint of a new time) and messianism (a 
wide-ranging belief in a specific future) and goes on to reflect upon an incident 
in which the Urapmin people of Papua New Guinea showed a willingness to 
acknowledge the former while going on with their day-to-day lives. That is, 
action and temporal order are shown to coexist in complicated ways. As if to 
express his own grief, Robbins laments, in a poignant conclusion, how cultural 
anthropology as a discipline has closed itself off from this kind of subjectivity. 
The allure of the other, which interested Tuzin and himself, has diminished in 
favour of the allure of universals, of human rights, capitalism, science and the 
postmodern subject. 
Introduction: Donald F . Tuzin, An Anthropologist’s Anthropologist
17
Comparativism,	Psychoanalysis	and	the	Subject
Robbins’ nostalgia returns us to the subtitle of this introductory essay. While 
hardly narrow, pedantic, unimaginative or incurious, Tuzin was not theoretically 
chic. Tuzin was a strong proponent throughout his career of comparativism, 
particularly with a psychological bent, notwithstanding the severe attacks it 
began to sustain in the late 1980s from mainstream anthropology and most 
especially its postmodern critics. The core of his position was to be found in 
the introduction he co-wrote with Tom Gregor in their edited volume on gender 
in Amazonia and Melanesia: ‘Without comparison, we risk miring our work in 
exotica and in the description of the particular…For, without comparison—
without systematic observation, classification, and generalization—
anthropology will become nothing at all’ (Gregor and Tuzin 2001:7–8). 
This section includes four comparativist essays that follow this methodological 
persuasion. Tuzin’s pursuit of an interactionalist paradigm, so Gardner points 
out, led him into the burgeoning literatures of developmental psychology 
and cognitive science in the latter part of his career, and he came to share a 
sense of incredulity with such scholars as Sperber and Boyer at mainstream 
anthropology’s lack of interest in widely dispersed or universal psychological 
characteristics. 
Michelle Stephen, picking up on the thread of a discussion she once had with 
Tuzin, argues for the value of Melanie Klein’s psychoanalysis in comprehending 
these parallels and themes. A younger contemporary of Freud, Klein viewed 
emotional life in terms of the mother rather than the father. For Klein, prior to 
the unconscious Freudian guilt attached to a fantasised patricide were envy and 
paranoid fears aroused by a fantasised matricide. In her approach, masculinity 
and femininity are shaped against a mother image of such terrible power that 
both genders feel themselves damaged by the struggle. The results, Stephen 
demonstrates, are particularly evident in the terrible images of the Balinese and 
Hindu Durga, as well as in other fantasies of violent mothers.
Although Tuzin was well read in the psychoanalytic literature, his notion of 
psychological development was neither Kleinian nor Freudian but harked back 
to his adherence to methodological individualism. As we mentioned above, in 
the mid-1980s he won a National Science Foundation grant to do comparative 
research on middle childhood based on the view that socialisation into culture 
takes place in and through experience with peers rather than with adults, and 
that this experience is creative not rote. In her contribution, Karen Brison, 
who was a member of that project, argues that rural preschoolers in Fiji play in 
mixed-age groups that are informed by hierarchical norms of superiority and 
inferiority. In urban Fiji, in contrast, kindergarteners are taught by powerful 
teachers in same-age groups. The play of the groups, as she observed them, 
Echoes	of	the	Tambaran	
18
differed. The former played in terms of hierarchical relations. The latter made 
up fantasies of monsters and superheroes, as well as about consumption, and, 
as they did, were learning to be autonomous individuals who would have to 
devise and use strategies to deal with the inequalities they would encounter in 
adult life. 
The final pair of essays in this section returns us to Melanesian ethnography. 
Thomas Gregor and Gilbert Herdt take up the issue of ritual masculinity, 
and subject it to a comparative framework, albeit of quite different kinds. In 
a meditation about ritual violence against male initiates that relies on Herdt’s 
Sambia work and Tuzin’s Ilahita Arapesh studies, Gregor goes back to the 
question of why good people might do bad things to each other. After reviewing 
some of the more egregious practices—which he likens to torture—that were 
staged against male youth, together with the misogynist ideology that justified 
them, he goes on to ask whether there are any data to suggest that what boys 
had to endure was resisted by any or all of the stakeholders, such as the boys 
themselves, the initiators, their fathers, or the boys’ mothers. There is, Gregor 
finds, and he cites evidence of defiance, which he locates in the disconnection 
between domestic and ritual values in these societies. 
Herdt contrasts the repression of discourse about sexuality in Sambia culture 
with a Freudian model and the Foucaultian notion of state-based power/
knowledge/norm. Among Sambia, secrecy about desire and pleasure was 
functionally integrated with the maintenance of the male cult but also with 
conjugal relations and the body. Boys could not become successful men if they 
betrayed elders’ secrets about ritual intimacies that had gone on. They must 
never talk either about having been an object of desire or about desiring others. 
These kinds of issues, Herdt concludes, have been difficult to study because 
ethnographers carry the biases and categories of their backgrounds to the field, 
which also restricts discourse about sexuality. 
Tuzin’s Style
Having begun this volume and this essay with biography, this final section comes 
back to qualities of Tuzin’s style as a fieldworker and author. Among his many 
other personal virtues, observes Alexander Bolyanitz, Tuzin was unerringly 
gracious and polished. He was gentle in the way he corrected those in error 
and generous in deflecting indignity from deserving targets. Tuzin epitomised, 
Bolyanitz observes, the courtesy that is the hallmark of anthropological method 
in the field, and he uses this insight to reflect on an issue that has been rather 
neglected in anthropology’s postmodern turn and its reflexive attention to the 
morally charged dynamics of fieldwork: the implications—for the fieldworker 
and the ‘fieldworked’—of returning to the same group of people.
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To be an ethnographer, Bolyanitz points out, fieldwork method demands that 
one be polite (in local terms). If data are to be gathered, one can ill afford 
to disparage what one is told. When Tuzin showed interest in the story of 
Nambweapa’w during his first fieldwork, for example, he did not of course 
believe it, but ‘courtesy and method’ discouraged him from expressing doubt 
about the tale. Methodological interest, in other words, dictated courtesy. The 
more often ethnographers return to the field, however, the more they become 
implicated (or complicit) in local affairs, and the more this connection between 
courtesy and method undergoes metamorphosis. As they become better known 
as a person in the local community, as they come to know better what it is to be 
a person in local terms, their behaviour becomes more polite and civil—method 
contributing more to courtesy than courtesy contributes to method. In Tuzin’s 
case, his uncritical acceptance of the foundational mythology of the Tambaran 
was to help bring about its downfall 15 years later. For Bolyanitz, the results 
might have been less ironic, but no less personally profound in comprehending 
the effects of repeated returns to the field on his persona.
In her contribution, Diane Losche focuses on Tuzin’s rhetorical talents to draw 
attention to a broader and neglected issue in the analysis of ethnographic 
representation. Debate about construction, she points out, has concerned itself 
principally with issues of truth value—how faithfully ethnographic ‘facts’ 
represent what is ‘really’ going on—and, subsequently, with the rhetorical 
narrative modes by which ethnographers constitute themselves in their 
texts as ‘authorities’. But what also deserves commentary is a more nuanced 
interpretation of the voice of the anthropologist, of tone that colours the many 
different types of cultural forms that an ethnographic work describes, and 
the manner in which this voice varies from one ethnographer to another and, 
sometimes, between texts by the same author. 
In most of his work, Losche notes, Tuzin’s voice is magisterial, authoritative and 
dramatic—a tone that creates the sense of a grand narrative of great historical 
moment. In this respect, the voice is similar to that of Margaret Mead’s in her 
earliest work on the Mountain Arapesh—cultural congeners of the Ilahita 
Arapesh. This is a most effective voice for creating a canonical text about a 
cultural system—one that sweeps away the confusions and ambiguities of a 
cultural life observed and truncates methodological doubt about the accuracy 
of what is represented. In her later work on the Mountain Arapesh, however, 
Mead uses a very different voice—one of hesitation and uncertainty—to which 
Tuzin also resorted in The Cassowary’s Revenge. 
***
By design, the essays that make up the four parts of this book address the 
issues and methodologies with which Tuzin worked during his career. While 
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they neither adhere to nor necessarily advocate his theoretical positions, they 
do reflect upon the majority of his topical interests and accurately portray, 
we think, the distinguished, if rarefied, disciplinary lineage to which Tuzin 
belonged. Notwithstanding the rise of post-structuralism, textual cultural 
concepts and the focus on cultural difference, his work remained more or less 
rooted in British social anthropology on the one hand, and in North American 
bio-psychological anthropology on the other. The present volume is meant to 
show that both carry on—in part because of Tuzin’s gifts.
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1. The Abelam ‘Invasion’ and the 
Rise of Ilahita Revisited1
Paul Roscoe
Introduction
With a 1959 population of not quite 1300, the Arapesh-speaking village of 
Ilahita in the East Sepik Province was by no means the largest of New Guinea’s 
villages. This honour belonged instead to several coastal fisher-forager groups. 
The Kawenak Asmat village of Ayam was found to have 1409 inhabitants in 
its first reliable census, in 1960; in 1930, 1702 inhabitants were counted in the 
census in the Waropen village of Nubuai; and the two village complexes that 
made up the Koriki ‘tribe’ in the early 1920s had 3960 inhabitants between them 
(Roscoe 2006:40). Even in the Sepik, Ilahita was only marginally larger than the 
fisher-forager, Kambot-speaking village of Kambaramba, which had a mid-1950s 
population of about 1100 people (Roscoe 2006). 
What set Ilahita apart from its rivals, however, was its subsistence base: it 
was by far the largest village of any cultivating society in New Guinea. By 
Tuzin’s own account, it was Ilahita’s size that induced him to make it his field 
destination and the analytical focus of his first major book, The Ilahita Arapesh: 
Dimensions of Unity (1976).2 The Ilahita Arapesh was a remarkable work, not 
least because, to explain Ilahita’s rise and continued functioning, it adumbrated 
practice theory several years before practice theory became current in English-
speaking social science. Tuzin himself claimed to have adopted methodological 
individualism as his approach, but close readers of his text noticed that he was at 
pains to emphasise what methodological individualism (and its anthropological 
counterparts, action theory and interactionism) commonly took for granted or, 
worse, cast as nothing but patterns emergent from the actions of individuals 
(see Evens 1977): the social and cultural context that constituted the grounds of 
an agent’s action. Tuzin perceived that a focus on the individual as a motivated 
and strategising agent had to be tempered with attention to the cultural context 
in which that agent is enculturated and must operate and which he or she 
1 For comments on previous versions of this chapter, I am extremely grateful to Terence Hays and two 
anonymous reviewers.
2 Subsequently summarised and integrated with the findings of his second volume, The Voice of the 
Tambaran (1980), as Social Complexity in the Making (2001).
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reproduces or transforms—the recursive linkages that became the heart of 
practice theory (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Ortner 1984; Sahlins 1981; see 
also Gardner, this volume).
The main purpose of The Ilahita Arapesh, however, was to deploy this 
framework to account for the rise of an extraordinarily large village of 
cultivators and to investigate the strategies that its members had developed to 
cope with the resulting problems of scale. In this chapter, I want to critique the 
former explanation in order to bolster the importance of the latter. Drawing 
on an argument that still holds force in Sepik anthropology, Tuzin attributed 
the rise of Ilahita to the northwards migration from the Sepik River of dense 
populations of Abelam-speaking people—a demographic momentum that 
provoked intensified fighting to Ilahita’s south, a flight of refugees northwards 
to Ilahita, and the consequent explosive rise in Ilahita’s size. This proposition is 
untenable, however; given the facts that Tuzin reported, immigration from the 
south is an implausible explanation for Ilahita’s growth; as I shall try to show, 
the Abelam ‘invasion’ never occurred, at least as it is commonly represented; 
and the dense Abelam populations to the south of Ilahita were the product 
instead of unusually favourable local ecological conditions. Why then was 
Ilahita so large? Far from a historical accident, I shall argue, the village simply 
represented an unusually large exemplar of standard village formation processes 
in the area. The consequence of these conclusions is that the second, major 
aspect of Tuzin’s argument—his investigation of the strategies that enabled 
Ilahita to function—should be taken not as a sociology of a unique village but 
as a generalisable theory of how villages in the Ilahita/Abelam region adapted 
to the demands of large-scale social organisation.
The Abelam Invasion and the Rise of Ilahita
The hypothesis that the Abelam represented a southern group intrusive on 
Torricelli-speaking peoples to their north derives from two sources. The first 
was Donald Laycock’s (1965) pioneering linguistic work on the Ndu language 
family, of which the Abelam are members. From his survey of languages in 
the region, their lexicostatistical relations and the manner in which they were 
distributed across the landscape, Laycock had deduced that speakers of the Ndu 
language family must have migrated northwards from the Sepik River region 
many centuries before contact, eventually intruding on the Torricelli peoples of 
the Prince Alexander and Torricelli mountains and their foothills. At contact, 
the Abelam had reached no further than these foothills (Figure 1.1), but to their 
east, Laycock’s linguistic data indicated, the Ndu-speaking Boiken had managed 
to push their way even further northwards, across the foothills and mountains 
to the coast of the Bismarck Sea. Laycock also drew attention to another feature 
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of the linguistic distributions in this area, what we might call the Maprik 
‘bulge’—the aneurism-like protuberance of Abelam speakers around Maprik 
Government Station into Arapesh-speaking, Torricelli lands (partly visible, top 
right of Figure 1.1), which suggested that migrational pressure exerted from 
the south by Abelam people had created a localised ‘blow-out’ into Arapesh 
territory. 
Figure 1.1 Ilahita village and the Abelam–Arapesh region
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The second body of evidence used to advance the notion of an Abelam ‘invasion’ 
was the region’s ecology—specifically, the juxtaposition of the rolling grasslands 
of the Sepik Plains, which stretch from the Sepik River to the foothills of the 
coastal mountain chain, and the forested foothills themselves. Whereas the grass 
plains are thinly populated by the Ndu-speaking Sawos languages, the foothills 
are thickly populated with Ndu-speaking Abelam and Boiken populations. 
To explain this unusual situation, Haantjens et al. (1965) proposed that the 
grasslands had once been forested but had then been over-cultivated, leaving 
an exhausted, terminal-succession grassland. Anthony Forge, Tuzin’s doctoral 
advisor, voiced the logical conclusion that tied the two bodies of evidence—
linguistic and ecological—together (Forge 1965). Dense populations of Ndu 
speakers had moved northwards from the Sepik River, propelled forward by 
their over-cultivation of the land, leaving the grasslands in their wake. As far as 
the Abelam were concerned, Forge (1965:24) suggested there had been a
jostling together of large, fairly densely packed Abelam villages, 
fighting each other and gradually moving as a whole in a northerly and 
later westerly direction…[U]p till the imposition of government control 
this process was still going on, especially in the west of the Abelam 
area, where the Abelam of the Wosera were pushing back the [Ilahita] 
Arapesh to the north and the Gawanga [that is, Kwanga] to the west 
[Figure 1.1].
It was to this scenario that Tuzin contributed a chronology of the Abelam 
‘invasion’ of the North Wosera–Arapesh region and a hypothesis concerning 
its social consequences for Ilahita. In Tuzin’s telling, the ur–Torricelli-
speaking inhabitants of the Wosera–Arapesh area had started out as small-scale 
communities similar to those that Margaret Mead had described in the 1930s 
among the Mountain Arapesh to the east. 
There seems little doubt that these people were once distributed 
sparsely across the face of the Torricelli and Prince Alexander foothills. 
They lived in movable communities of not more than 100 to 200 persons, 
subsisting on sago and the products of hunting and gathering. What 
horticulture they may have practiced would have been rudimentary and 
marginally productive by today’s standards. In fact, groups of precisely 
this description still inhabit large areas of the Torricelli Mountains 
and also the hills south of the Sepik River in its upper reaches. (Tuzin 
1976:82–3)
In the Ilahita region, according to Tuzin, this situation prevailed until about 
1880, when the impact of the Abelam incursions into the North Wosera began 
to make itself felt. Pressing northwards against the Torricelli speakers, the 
wave of Abelam newcomers began to intensify competition and warfare over 
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land in the North Wosera. The Abelam held the advantage in this fighting. 
As a predatory, village-based people, supported by intensive yam cultivation, 
they easily prevailed over the small, mobile, hamlet-based communities of the 
Arapesh. Those of the latter who were not exterminated in these confrontations 
had little alternative but to flee north to areas of lower population pressure and 
less intense fighting.
In these hapless refugees, Tuzin detected the grounds of Ilahita’s extraordinary 
size and the transformation of social organisation in the region. Ilahita’s size 
stemmed from the military interest that speakers of the Ilahita dialect of 
Arapesh had in the refugees fleeing from the fighting in the North Wosera: by 
incorporating them into their villages, they could add to their military ability 
to resist the encroaching Abelam threat to their south. As a result, population 
densities and group sizes among the Ilahita Arapesh increased rapidly. Ilahita 
village was especially favoured by these migrations and incorporations, however, 
because it had an abundance of land in its gift. As Arapesh villages to the south 
of Ilahita grew larger, they reached a point at which they were unable to accept 
more immigrants and were obliged to pass them on northwards to Ilahita. With 
resources to spare, Ilahita could afford to wax ever larger to their rear until, 
about 60 years after the onset of the Abelam encroachment, it had reached some 
1200 in size.
To contain and control these increases of scale, Ilahita dialect speakers were 
obliged to transform their social organisation. They did so by consolidating their 
hamlet-based society into the village-based organisation of their Abelam enemies 
and adopting Abelam cultural devices for integration such as the Tambaran 
cult. The ironic result was an eventual stalemate: the Abelam intrusion into the 
North Wosera was eventually brought to a standstill by communities of a scale 
and organisation that ‘were indirectly the creation of the Abelam themselves’ 
(Tuzin 1976:74). No group was forced to transform itself more extensively than 
the Ilahita giant, however, and after ‘pacification’ had frozen the system in 
place, these social and cultural innovations were to become the other focus of 
Tuzin’s inquiries. 
The Rise of Ilahita
Perhaps the most pressing difficulty with Tuzin’s scenario for the rise of Ilahita 
is the extreme brevity of its chronology. By absorbing successive refugees, 
according to Tuzin, Ilahita had gone from a population of ‘not more than 100 
to 200’ (Tuzin 1976:82) people to a population of 1200 or more in the space of 
just 60 years (1880–1940). In support of this conjecture, his inquiries in Ilahita 
identified a significant immigrant population. Three clans (of a total of 39) and 
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two wards (of a total of six) identified themselves as immigrants (Tuzin 1976:72, 
92, 162), indicating that some 41 per cent (7.7 per cent plus 33.3 per cent) of 
Ilahita’s population were immigrants or descended from immigrants. To be 
generous, let us say that half of Ilahita’s population in 1940 were immigrants 
from fighting further south—yielding a ratio of one ‘immigrant’ for every one 
‘indigenous’ resident. 
A moment’s reflection will reveal how low a ratio this is to explain such a large 
population expansion in so short a time if it was indeed driven by immigration. 
If immigration was the principal cause of Ilahita’s unusual size then we should 
expect a ratio more in the neighbourhood of 1:5 or 1:11 (depending on whether 
Ilahita’s original population was 100 or 200).3 What the actual ratio of 1:1 tells 
us is that about 50 per cent of Ilahita’s growth must have come from natural 
increase, not immigration. To complicate things further, one of the two wards 
that Tuzin listed as immigrants, Ilifalemb, was descended from refugees from 
fighting not in the North Wosera to the south but among the Bumbita Arapesh 
to the north-west of Ilahita (Tuzin 1976:72, Table 3, 77, fn. 2). Accordingly, if 
we remove Ilifalemb—about 17 per cent of Ilahita’s population and about 40 per 
cent of its immigrant population—from the calculation, the ratio of immigrants 
to aboriginal Ilahita population falls to about one in three. In this scenario, 
about two-thirds of Ilahita’s expansion has to be attributed to natural growth 
rather than immigration.
What makes these calculations so problematic for Tuzin’s argument is the 
conclusion to which they lead: whether we remove the Ilifalemb immigrants 
from the calculation or retain them, natural growth over the period 1880–1940 
must in itself have contributed markedly to Ilahita’s size. Indeed, to take the 
analysis one step further, we need hardly invoke immigration at all to explain 
Ilahita’s size! Under Tuzin’s scenario, to achieve a ratio of 1:1 for the immigrant 
and autochthonous inhabitants of Ilahita, natural growth rates would need to lie 
between 2 per cent and 3 per cent, depending on whether the 1880 population 
was 100 or 200.4 And here is the problem: at these rates, an aboriginal population 
of 100–200 would reach 1200 within just 80–90 years. (If we remove Ilifalemb 
from the calculations then the ratio of immigrants to indigenes falls to 1:3. To 
achieve this ratio, natural growth would need to be 2.5–3.75 per cent—rates 
that by themselves could achieve an end population of 1200 in just 65–70 
years.) Given Tuzin’s description of the immigrant/autochthonous composition 
of Ilahita in 1940, in other words, it would take an original population of 100–
3 If the original population was 200, then roughly 1000 members of the end population—that is, one 
in five—would have to originate from immigrants. If the starting population was 100 then roughly 1100 
members of the end population—one in 11—would have to be descended from immigrants. 
4 The relevant equation for the precise ratio, R, by which immigrants should outnumber Ilahitans is given 
by: R = (1200 – Po x e
60r)/(Po x e
60r), in which Po is the population of Ilahita in 1880 (‘no more than 100 to 200’) 
and r is the natural rate at which this population grew in the 60 years from 1880 to 1940.
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200 people between just five years longer and no more than 30 years longer to 
reach 1200 through reproduction alone than if its growth also incorporated the 
proportion of immigrants that Tuzin documented in Ilahita.
If Tuzin’s figures for the composition of Ilahita village in 1940 are correct, in 
sum, his explanation and chronology for the rise of the village are trapped in a 
vicious circle. There is no way to attribute Ilahita’s rapid growth to immigrants 
fleeing fighting induced by an Abelam intrusion without also requiring that 
Ilahita’s natural growth rate be so high as to make immigration almost irrelevant 
as an explanation for Ilahita’s growth! 
Perhaps, then, the chronology is wrong? It might be significant that Tuzin 
deduced from his informants that Ilahita’s growth began in 1880. In the late 
1960s, when he conducted the fieldwork for The Ilahita Arapesh, this would have 
been the generational period just beyond the memory of the oldest of Ilahita’s 
living denizens—a potential fracture line that facilitates ‘telescoping’ in orally 
transmitted chronologies. Among the Yangoru Boiken, 45 km to the east, I found 
this same period—between the penultimate (woranga) and ultimate (andeka) 
generations of the kinship terminology—to be a temporal dumping ground for 
all sorts of legendary events, some of which, on historical evidence, could have 
occurred only scores if not hundreds of years earlier. Perhaps, then, the Abelam 
invasion, the fighting in and flights from the Wosera, and the growth of Ilahita 
all occurred as Tuzin claimed, but instead of beginning about 1880 they were in 
train an unknown number of generations earlier?
On current evidence, there is nothing to gainsay this scenario. The problem is 
that the more we push the beginnings of Ilahita’s growth back into prehistory, 
the more plausible it becomes to attribute that growth to reproduction alone 
rather than immigration. If we suppose that the process started in 1800 instead 
of 1880, for example, Ilahita could have grown from 100–200 to 1200 people 
under natural growth rates of between 1.2 per cent and 1.7 per cent. If we 
suppose the process started 200 years before it terminated then natural growth 
rates of just 0.9–1.2 per cent would have been sufficient. Growth rates such as 
these, though, are so typical of ‘tribal’ societies that we should then be surprised 
if Ilahita’s emergence were not the result of natural growth. So perhaps there is 
no reason to invoke an Abelam ‘invasion’ to explain Ilahita’s size? Perhaps there 
was no dense jostling of Abelam villages fighting their way northwards? But 
how then are we to explain the distributions of languages and the variation in 




Rethinking the Abelam ‘Invasion’
There is considerable evidence that a population speaking one or more proto-
Ndu languages once lived in the region of the Middle Sepik River and, at some 
point in the past, spun off migrants who did indeed begin to move northwards, 
eventually intruding into territory controlled by speakers of Torricelli-phylum 
languages. In addition to Laycock’s lexicostatistical evidence (cited above), 
settlement histories from villages throughout Abelam, Boiken and Sawos-
speaking territories relate movements from the southern parts of the Sepik 
Plains northwards into the Torricelli and Prince Alexander foothills (Roscoe 
1994:56–61). Subsequent to the publication of The Ilahita Arapesh, in fact, geo-
archaeological evidence suggested a possible explanation for these migrations. 
Some 6000 years ago, the Middle Sepik and the swamplands to its south were 
covered by a large inland sea that extended at least as far west as the Chambri 
region, due south of Maprik. Subsequently, this shoreline began to progress 
eastwards due to sediment infilling from the Sepik River, eventually reaching 
its modern position some 1000 years ago (Swadling 1997; Swadling et al. 1989). 
If modern environments and social systems are any guide, many of the 
populations living along the shores of this ocean embayment would have been 
fisher-foragers with densities in the region of 3–7 people/sq km and settlement 
sizes in the hundreds (Roscoe 2005). As the shoreline retreated to the east, 
however, these populations would have experienced significant transformations 
in their ecological relationships as open ocean became lakes, then marshlands, 
and finally dryland. In the initial phases of this transformation, the environment 
might have become temporarily more productive rather than less, since tidal 
lakes and marshes are commonly more food rich than salt or freshwater alone 
(Roscoe 2006). As these changes progressed, however, and the land began to dry 
out even more, subsistence likely became more difficult, and it is not difficult to 
imagine migrants occasionally spinning off in search of better fortune elsewhere 
(Roscoe 1989).
All of this accords with Forge’s and Tuzin’s hypotheses of an Abelam intrusion 
into the Torricelli populations north of the Sepik Plains. What we should doubt, 
however, is that the refugees spun off by the environmental transformation 
of the Middle Sepik advanced northwards at anything like the densities that 
Tuzin and Forge envisaged. The idea that the Abelam advance involved a dense 
population seems to have originated, at least in part, from a desire to explain the 
extraordinary densities of Abelam populations in the Maprik and Wosera areas. 
From at least the 1960s, commentators have designated these densities as the 
highest in New Guinea outside the Highlands. If my calculations from census 
registers are any guide, in fact, the densities of some Abelam communities 
might have been the highest anywhere in New Guinea, reaching well more than 
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200 people/sq km (Figure 1.2). Be that as it may, a mass intrusion of migrant 
populations from the south was one way of accounting for the region’s unusual 
demography. It is not, however, the only way to account for the situation, nor 
is it without its problems. 
To begin with there is the ecology of the Sepik Plains themselves. These 
days, the plains are covered with little but kunai sword grass—a vegetational 
cover that Haantjens, Forge, Tuzin and others have taken as evidence that the 
plains were once home to populations so dense as to exhaust their soils (see 
above). What this overlooks, however, is evidence that the plains were always 
relatively infertile. To begin with, they are sparsely watered. On the standard 
topographic map, watercourses are absent from scores of their square kilometres. 
This compares with the heavily populated foothills to the north, where barely 
a square kilometre of mapped land is not transected by a stream or river. 
Compared with the foothills, in other words, populations, crops and vegetation 
on the plains would have encountered significantly greater difficulty procuring 
water. Tellingly, perhaps, the few contemporary settlements that exist in the 
plains are all to be found in narrow bands of gallery forest along the rivers 
that bisect the plains. Nor is it clear that the soils of the plains could ever have 
supported intensive cultivation. Today, they constitute clay soils, and there is 
no reason to believe they were ever otherwise. Rather than having been farmed 
to exhaustion, in sum, the plains to the north of the Middle Sepik might have 
been no different from those of the Sandaun Province to the west. To the best 
of our knowledge, the Sandaun Plains have never had to support dense farming 
populations, yet their grassland and gallery forest ecology is remarkably similar 
to that of today’s Middle Sepik Plains.
As for the distribution of languages in the Abelam–Arapesh region, this is 
certainly congruent with a hypothesis that Abelam is intrusive on the Torricelli 
languages, but it provides no reason to suppose any large-scale ‘invasion’. For 
one thing, it is unsafe to interpret the Maprik ‘bulge’ as some kind of linguistic 
aneurism caused by the pressure of Abelam migrants bursting through into 
Arapesh populations (cf. Laycock, see earlier). Rather, it appears to be an artefact 
of topography: the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains, which generally lie on 
an east–west axis, swing sharply to the north-west in this particular region. 
What appears to be a bulge on the linguistic map is simply a band of Abelam 
settlement following the curve of the foothills until it meets southern Arapesh 
territory. 
Migration, moreover, is not the only—nor even, perhaps, the prime mechanism—
that determines the distribution and spread of language boundaries. People can 
maintain their residences and yet import speech forms from their neighbours 
through relationships of exchange, trade, religious movements, and so on. 
People can also move and yet leave their speech forms behind; in the small-
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scale, patri-local communities that characterise much of New Guinea, wives are 
the classic example—moving to the settlements of their husbands and, if their 
husbands speak a different language, assimilating it. Wives who are linguistic 
immigrants can also serve as potent vectors of linguistic change because, as the 
primary enculturators of their children, they might mix their natal language 
with that of their husbands’, thereby transforming it. Thus, as I have argued 
elsewhere, differences in marriage rules might be as important as migration in 
explaining the distribution of the Ndu languages (Roscoe 1994). 
In sum, the Abelam might have intruded on the Torricelli languages of the 
southern foothills, but there is nothing in the available evidence to compel a 
conclusion that they did so en masse, as a ‘migration’. What proponents of an 
Abelam intrusion seem to have overlooked, in fact, is that, under favourable 
ecological conditions, humans can achieve high population densities in a 
surprisingly short time purely through natural population increase. The 
important question, then, is this: were conditions in the Abelam–Arapesh 
region sufficiently favourable to natural population growth to account for their 
high densities? A comprehensive response to this question is difficult given the 
limited ecological data currently available, but there is good reason to believe 
they were. 
The general distribution of population in the hinterlands of the Sepik coast is 
one of moderate densities along the coast, low densities in the peaklands of the 
coastal ranges, and comparatively high densities along the southern foothills 
of the chain. This population distribution is quite consistent, in fact, with 
how we would expect the density of cultivating peoples on this kind of gross 
geomorphology to vary. To consider the peaklands first, there are two reasons 
their slopes are less fertile—and hence less densely populated—than those at 
their base. First, they are steeper; second, rainfall erosion continually carries soils 
from higher elevations to lower altitudes. Thus, along the Prince Alexander–
Torricelli mountain chains, the soils of the peaklands are thin and difficult to 
farm, subject to rapid erosion, and largely unreplenished with sediment from 
elsewhere. As a result, population densities in the mountains themselves are 
low; indeed, several extensive sections are effectively unpopulated. 
In contrast with peaklands, the lower flanks of mountain chains are more 
favourably positioned to support population: their slopes are more moderate, 
and they are dissected by multiple waterways carrying eroded sediments out 
of the mountains. The most favourable environments of all, in fact, are those 
at the immediate base of the ranges. Here, as the steep slopes of the mountains 
transition to flatter lands, the sudden change in the angle of outflow causes 
waterways from the mountains to deposit especially heavy loads of their 
suspended sediments, creating a band of exceptionally rich, shallow-sloping 
alluvial soils. On the ocean side of the Sepik’s coastal range, this transition is 
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very abrupt and the band of rich soil is comparatively narrow; on the southern 
flanks, however, the transition extends over several kilometres and the band of 
rich soils is considerably broader. 
Figure 1.2 Population densities in the Arapesh–Abelam region
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The consequence of this geomorphology can be seen in the top right-hand quadrant 
of Figure 1.2, which plots the distribution of population in the Arapesh–Abelam 
region shown in Figure 1.1. The band of higher population running diagonally across 
this quadrant from upper left to lower right marks the region where the mountains 
to the north flatten out towards the lower foothills and plains to the south. Within 
this band, the area of especially high population density marked as Area 1 nicely 
illustrates the link between geomorphology and density (Figure 1.3). Villages in the 
high foothills and mountains (for example, Nungalimb, Maputma, Sahali), where 
slopes are steep, support comparatively low population densities (9–39 people/sq 
km). Villages in the low foothills removed from the mountains (for example, Apangai, 
Bongiora, Yamelikum, Neligum and Cheragum) have similar to somewhat higher 
densities (10–60 people/sq km). The highest densities, however—between 87 and 124 
people/sq km—are found in several of the villages located right at the immediate 
base of the mountains (for example, Kuminibus, Kukwal, Gwoingwoin and Wamsak), 
where the mountain slopes break sharply into the lower foothills depositing rich loads 
of sediment. 
What this suggests is that Abelam populations in the southern foothills of the coastal 
mountains are dense, first and foremost, because they happen to inhabit a band of rich 
environmental resources. There is no reason, in other words, to evoke some massed 
immigration in the past to account for their density; they would be just as high if 
a sparse aboriginal population had a couple of centuries or so to increase through 
natural growth alone. 
The same line of argument can be applied to the high densities of the Wosera region, 
which Tuzin saw as critical to explaining Ilahita’s size. Here, though, the ecological 
advantage derived from the three major rivers: the Amuk, Screw and Nanu, the largest 
in the entire region between Yangoru and Dreikikir. The lower quadrants of Figure 
1.2 show the distribution of population density in relation to the Abelam–Arapesh 
border (dotted lines; cf. Figure 1.1). The first thing to note from Figure 1.2 is that 
the distribution of population does not fit well with a hypothesis that the Abelam 
were ‘bulldozing’ Torricelli speakers northwards. If this were the case, we should 
expect the highest densities to lie along the Abelam–Arapesh border, where the 
‘bulldozing’ was actually taking place. In fact, they lie from 2 to 7 km south of it. 
What Figure 1.2 suggests instead is that the high densities in the Wosera are related 
to its ecology. As can be seen, the core of the Wosera—demarcated in Figure 1.2 as 
Area 3—lies where the Amuk, Nanuk and Screw rivers converge. Tumbling from their 
headwaters in the Torricelli Mountains, these waterways course through the foothills 
along incised channels, and then debouch into the Wosera core. At this point, their 
gradients become shallower and their banks lower, allowing large sediment loads to 
be deposited over substantial areas, especially during wet-season flooding, to produce 
rich alluvial soils and significant stretches of productive wetland. Not surprisingly, 
the Maprik Agricultural Surveys of the 1960s found these to be the most agriculturally 
productive soils in the entire survey area (TPNG 1965).

























































Areas of exceptionally high density on Figure 1.2 are possibly artefactual, but 
they occur where local ecological peculiarities would lead us to expect them: 
where river gradients change suddenly or where wetlands occur that can be 
exploited with high-yield yam varieties. Area 2, for example, marks a set of 
villages located at the base of the foothills where the Ninab and Screw rivers 
join before immediately debouching onto flatter land. The arc of higher density 
population running from approximately 12 to 3 o’clock in Area 3 represents 
several villages that overlook an extensive area of wetland to their east. The 
exceptionally high-density area at 9 o’clock in Area 3—the Stapigum–Gulakim–
Sarakim region—is at the base of the low foothills and overlooks an expanse of 
wetland to its south. And the area of higher density at 7 o’clock borders the 
same wetlands.
Rethinking the Growth of Ilahita Village
Where does all of this leave the question that motivated The Ilahita Arapesh? 
If, as I am suggesting, there was no Abelam ‘invasion’, if ecology rather than 
migration accounts for the distribution of population in this region, and if the 
growth of Ilahita village had little to do with the historical contingencies of 
immigration and emigration then what does explain the variations we observe 
in the size of Abelam and Arapesh villages, and in particular the inordinate 
size of Ilahita? To address these questions, we need first to consider a more 
fundamental question. What is a village? This issue has largely been overlooked 
in anthropology; the fact that humans create spheres of sociality tends to be 
taken as a given, as self-evident, when in fact it needs to be explained. It is here, 
I believe, that the real value of The Ilahita Arapesh lies. Whatever the merits of 
his migrational hypothesis for the rise of villages in this region, Tuzin’s crucial 
insight was to link warfare to the development of social groups. Specifically, he 
cast these villages as defensive responses to particularly intense warfare. Now, 
his particular interests were the communities of the Abelam–Arapesh border 
region. But it is possible radically to generalise his proposition. At contact, 
warfare was endemic throughout the Sepik. Consequently, it is but a small step 
to suggest that defensive responses to war were responsible for the formation 
not just of especially large villages, but of villages everywhere in New Guinea.
As I have argued elsewhere at much greater length (Roscoe 1996, 2009), the 
formation and reproduction of Sepik villages were motivated primarily by 
defensive concerns with the threat posed by surprise attacks. According to 
Tuzin, this was the case for Ilahita Arapesh villages, and in the case of Ilahita 
village itself defence was the only occasion when its members ‘unanimously 
convened’ (Tuzin 1976:56, 59). Likewise among the Abelam: ‘strong forces work 
towards village cohesion…In pre-contact times there was the mutual need to 
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defend the village against aggression and even now the village lands have to 
be defended against rival claims in the [law] courts’ (Lea 1964:48). The Abelam 
village, according to Forge (1990:162) was ‘a defensive but not necessarily an 
offensive unit’. ‘Western Abelam villages are clear-cut political units with 
boundaries defended by all the villagers’ (Scaglion 1976:82). 
This role of village groups as defensive units was not limited to the Abelam–
Arapesh region but was found throughout the Sepik. Among the Yangoru 
Boiken (Roscoe 1996, 2009), the village was a mutual defence unit against 
the threat of attack at night. Likewise among the Iwam of the Upper Sepik, 
‘the main function of the village as a whole is defense against an attack from 
outside’ (Rehburg 1974:221). According to Harrison (1993:6), the component 
descent groups of Middle Sepik River villages could, and often did, act quite 
independently of one another in launching war, but ‘a village acted as a 
unit only for defence’. For the Anggor, ‘the ultimate manifestation of village 
solidarity is encountered in warfare, when co-villagers stand together to defend 
their community against violence and destruction’ (Huber 1974:214). Villages 
were the important defensive units in other parts of New Guinea as well, but 
in many places different kinds of units emerged that constituted the security 
group. In the Central Highlands, the clan (and in a couple of places perhaps also 
the ‘tribe’) appears to have been the defensive organisation; in south-west New 
Guinea, it was sometimes the men’s-house group; and in yet other areas it was a 
longhouse or hilltop hamlet (Roscoe 2009:80–8).
The threat of attack not only motivated the formation of villages as mutual 
defence units, it also exerted pressures to enhance their military strength by 
increasing their size. The physical properties of space and time coupled with 
particular subsistence and topographic circumstances, however, exerted 
countervailing tendencies that differentially constrained the compass of village 
boundaries. And in these circumstances lie the explanation for the varying sizes 
of villages in the Abelam–Arapesh region and elsewhere. For a mutual-defence 
group to function, its members must live sufficiently closely together to be able 
to render one another effective military aid in the event of an attack. There is 
little point in forging defensive relationships with people who live so far distant 
that, by the time they arrive to render military aid, the attack is over and done 
with. One factor affecting how many people can live in close enough proximity 
to render mutual military aid is population density. The more people that 
subsistence productivity can support per unit area of land, the more people can 
live sufficiently closely together to provide effective military support. As noted 
already, population densities in the Abelam–Arapesh region were among the 
highest in New Guinea, providing a ready explanation for the large mean village 
sizes that Tuzin remarked upon and attempted to explain. My best estimate of 
contact-era density in the environs of Ilahita Village, for instance, is about 44.2 
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people/sq km. Density in the Stapigum region—one of densest in the North 
Wosera—was about 89.6 people/sq km. These figures are far above those for 
most of the Sepik beyond Maprik.
In foothill regions such as those of the Abelam–Arapesh area, however, 
topography is a second determinant of village size—one that is especially 
important in imposing variability about the general mean. In rugged terrain, 
dwellings located on the same ridge complex are better able to render one another 
military aid than settlements located equally closely together but separated 
by deep valleys that impede a speedy response. Ilahita vividly demonstrates 
the point. Ilahita’s topography differed significantly from that of its smaller 
neighbours, and Tuzin himself pointed out the implications:
In addition to its unusually large size, Ilahita is also somewhat atypical 
in its physical configuration. Most villages in the region are, following 
the north–south grain of the foothills, arranged linearly with hamlets 
strung out end-to-end for the entire length of the village. Other villages 
are formed on horseshoe-shaped ridges or are divided between parallel 
ridges. Ilahita, on the contrary is sprawled over a star-shaped system 
of ridges, with the several wards radiating out from a central hub. The 
effect of this is that…the village can grow large and yet remain relatively 
self-contained geographically. (Tuzin 1976:87, emphasis added)
Ilahita was so large, I suggest, not because of intense, migration-induced warfare 
but because of the defensive implications of this topographic peculiarity. With 
the exception of three outlier hamlets, the contact-era village occupied some 
4.5 km of a single, continuous ridge-top complex. Were this population strung 
out along a linear ridge, it would be far too elongated to constitute a discrete 
sphere of mutual defensive interest; only about 40 per cent of the inhabitants 
would live within 1 km of its geographical centre. Ilahita’s unusual star-shaped 
topography, however, concertinaed this length in such a way that about 80 per 
cent of the population lived within 1 km of its geographical centre, along ridge-
top paths (Tuzin 1976:57, 91). With so many warriors able to live so closely 
together, Ilahita was able to grow to an enormous size while still retaining its 
defensive raison d’être.
Conclusion
The Ilahita Arapesh: Dimensions of Unity amply demonstrated the elegance of 
Don Tuzin’s thought; it foreshadowed the influence his work would have within 
and beyond Sepik anthropology; and it is a bitter reminder of what we have 
lost with his passing. More than 30 years later, I continue to return to this 
volume, not just in admiration of the breadth and depth of its propositions 
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and insights but also to assess and retest what is perhaps the most remarkable 
sociological work that Melanesian anthropology has ever produced. In this 
chapter, I have tried to show that the first component of the book’s argument—
the explanation for Ilahita’s emergence—is difficult to sustain. Rather than 
the emergent product of historical contingency, Ilahita more likely arose from 
natural population growth in favourable ecological conditions, its atypical size 
reflecting the military implications of its unusual topography.
Rather than diminishing the value of The Ilahita Arapesh, however, my intent 
has been to elevate it. The main body of Tuzin’s volume was devoted not to 
Ilahita’s rise but to an exquisitely delicate dissection of the strategies that 
Ilahitans had developed to cope with the rivalries and conflicts engendered 
by life in such a gigantic conglomerate. Tuzin’s presentation of Ilahita as the 
product of historical contingency had the effect of limiting the applicability 
of this analysis; it implied that these coping strategies were associated with a 
social entity that, if not unique, was at least highly unusual. If, in contrast, and 
as I contend in this chapter, Ilahita represented but one tail in a distribution of 
social units in the Sepik, different in degree from other village groups but not 
in kind, The Ilahita Arapesh becomes a trenchant analysis not of one unusual 
Sepik village but of them all. The dual organisation that accommodated Ilahita’s 
putative growth by progressive structural subdivision and ritual integration—a 
system of mechanical solidarity that contrived interdependency among the 
parts of the community while simultaneously dissipating the hostilities between 
individuals and subgroups that otherwise might destroy the village—was one 
that we should look for in many other communities in the Sepik, if not perhaps 
in all small-scale societies (Roscoe 2009:89–101).
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2. The String Bag of the Tambaran: 
The fragile loops of concealing and 
revealing in Abelam culture
Brigitta	Hauser-Schäublin
Introduction
Some things only become clear with hindsight. This goes for my own fieldwork 
in the Sepik area (between 1972 and 1983), and it is probably true of other 
anthropologists as well, many of whom, as I gather from their writings, went 
through the same difficulties as I did. When I set out for Papua New Guinea, 
I took with me a pre-postmodern conception of ‘culture’, fuelled by the 
fascination for other, preferably still ‘autochthonous’ world views and agency 
in faraway societies. This predisposition often made it difficult to grasp what 
appeared to me in my understanding of ‘culture’ as seemingly precipitate and 
unexpected actions by the people I was living with, and to reflect on them and 
class them in terms of scientific concepts. 
I was reminded of this when reading Don Tuzin’s The Cassowary’s Revenge 
(1997); it brought back memories of events during my fieldwork among the 
Abelam (between 1978 and 1983), which at the time had shocked and scared 
me. I came to realise that a new era had begun in Papua New Guinea, an era and 
setting in which I no longer wished to conduct fieldwork—nor was I any longer 
willing to take the risk. 
Against the background of the socially disruptive events that Tuzin describes 
for the Ilahita Arapesh, complemented by three personal experiences of my own, 
I set out in this contribution to develop and describe a systemic principle upon 
which I believe Abelam culture is based. At the risk of falling prey to a ‘lurking 
functionalism’ (Roscoe 1995:4) or, even worse, a furtive structuralism, I shall 
address the issue of cultural aesthetics—similar to what Anthony Forge (1966, 
1970, 1973) attempted for the field of art. I focus on the Tambaran cult1 as still 
1 By Tambaran (Tok Pisin), the Ilahita Arapesh describe everything ‘that men do’. Tuzin calls the Tambaran 
cult a ‘cult of war and human sacrifice’ with a ‘misogynistic (“woman hating”) rhetoric’. Tambaran refers to 
all initiation grades and the ritual paraphernalia used as well as the spirits associated with the cult (Tuzin 
2001:11–15). In contrast with the Ilahita Arapesh, the Abelam use the term ‘maira’ to cover everything 
mysterious, secretive and sacred. I shall use Tambaran in this contribution in the sense of a lingua franca term 
common in the Maprik area.
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practised by the Ilahita Arapesh and the Abelam in the 1960s and 1970s from 
an eccentric perspective, concentrating mainly on the structural foundation 
of these male cults, which hinge on the notion of secrecy and concealment. 
The starting point of my analysis is the string bag (Abelam: wut, Tok Pisin: 
bilum), a ‘typical’ Abelam product that is manufactured by women. I go on to 
show that the string bag conjoins two systemic principles: on the one hand, 
its structure, involving a looping technique that relies on the use of a single 
twine; on the other, its texture, with its transparent character that reveals 
only a partial view of the inside—that is, of the string bag’s contents. I argue 
that Abelam men’s knowledge, which, at the core, is founded on secrecy and 
concealment, is organised on the same two principles. The interplay between 
revealing and concealing and the inter-looping of the two modes characterise 
the hierarchically structured body of social knowledge; at the same time, they 
relate to a reality that lies beyond the world of everyday life with its routine 
processes and practices that are, by and large, controlled by human agents. 
In making this argument, I see many similarities with the contributions 
by both Birth and Herdt (this volume), though these authors argue from a 
different theoretical perspective. The Tambaran’s string bag is located in male 
ritual secrecy, when men collectively create objects—string bags of a different 
quality—that are presented to the uninitiated as mysterium or, as Birth puts 
it, the ‘uncanny’. Thus, men create something new from that which exists out 
there in the real world (string bags manufactured by women), thereby producing 
their own truth and their own cultural reality. With the Tambaran’s string bag, 
men also aim at attracting or impressing women and, at the same time, keeping 
them out of their ritual domain (see Herdt, this volume). Whether they succeed 
is another question, with which I cannot deal in this chapter. 
As I hope to show, the string bag of the Tambaran bundles the socially 
hierarchically structured knowledge and governs social access to it. I argue 
further that the mode of handling knowledge—probably typical for the Maprik 
area as a whole—and the way the keepers of this knowledge revealed it to 
specific groups, step by step, were linked to the specific social and historical 
conditions of Maprik cultures that I define as the ‘pre-modern’. This situation 
was superseded by a new era shaped by colonialism, Christian proselytisation, 
political independence and the advance of a capitalist economy and globalisation. 
As Tuzin describes so well in The Cassowary’s Revenge, the people of the Maprik 
area were determined to put an end to the ‘pre-modern’ and to usher in a new, 
completely different era, which was to be played by new rules and in which the 
old string bag of the Tambaran had run its course.2
2 Where not noted otherwise, I rely on ethnographic data that I collected mainly in Kalabu (Hauser-
Schäublin 1989a).
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The Shock of Other Modernities
Essentially, there were three separate episodes that left me shattered in my self-
understanding as an anthropologist and prevented me from conducting further 
fieldwork in Papua New Guinea once I had finished my research among the 
Abelam. I was simply no longer prepared to take the risk. The first episode 
refers to an evening-long discussion with a young man (from the hamlet we 
were living in) who came to visit us at our house. In the course of our talk, he 
described in full detail—but retaining an utterly friendly, chatty tone—how 
he and a group of young men, all of them out of work at the time, had once 
killed a man and, on a second occasion, a woman during a stay in one of the 
coastal towns, for absolutely no reason, and not in anger, simply because they 
felt bored. The murders were never solved. The young man whom we knew 
otherwise as a gentle-minded young Abelam man showed absolutely no remorse; 
he was simply telling us his stori (‘story’), albeit a little different to the accounts 
we otherwise heard from old men about the ‘earlier days’ (Tok Pisin: taim bipo).
But why was he telling us all this? Was there a faint touch of threat in his words? 
Would he be capable of murdering us too one night, again for no apparent 
reason? In the other two episodes, we were involved directly. 
In 1979 we went with two old men to a neighbouring village that we had 
visited several times before. The people there were planning to stage a bride-
price ceremony, and I wanted to document the event that was being held at the 
ceremonial ground. I was sitting on the floor, concentrating on what was going 
on, making sound recordings and taking photographs, when, suddenly, I found 
a group of young men standing in front of me. Their leader addressed me in 
English. He ordered me to pack up my tape recorder and all my other equipment 
and leave immediately. I found myself surrounded by about a dozen young men 
whom I had not noticed before because I had been concentrating on the adult 
men and the elders who were responsible for the ceremony. The speaker of the 
group was wearing boots, long trousers and a white long-sleeved shirt and stood 
before me, threateningly. There was no doubt: the situation was serious. None 
of the others understood what he was saying, but from his harsh tone they must 
have realised what was going on. After many months of speaking Tok Pisin only, 
I found it hard to switch to English, but in stuttering words I tried to explain 
to him why I was here and what I was doing. He did not, however, accept the 
argument that I was documenting traditional knowledge and oral traditions still 
known to the old people in order to safeguard it for future generations. ‘We 
need roads, economic development, the opportunities to earn money, to grow 
cash crops,’ he answered coarsely. ‘We know how the old folks used to live, and 
what they know we have known for a long time. What are you doing for us?’ he 
asked provocatively. ‘Your work will be full of lies just like that of that English 
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woman and that German man who were here before you,3 and it is not going 
to help us in any way. We don’t need you Whites! Piss off! Pack your things or 
otherwise we’ll destroy them!’ He took a threatening step towards me in his 
heavy boots.
It was a close shave but the situation was resolved when I called for the village 
councillor who had the power to decide whether a person should leave the 
village or was allowed to stay. He told me to stay, after which the group of angry 
young men dispersed (see also Hauser-Schäublin 2002).
In the second episode, together with a group of artists from Kalabu, we were 
on our way to the Arapesh village of Yamel to visit a location in the mountains 
that was one of the main sources of the white pigment (sabyo) used by Abelam 
artists. The Abelam had obtained the pigment there since times beyond memory, 
and the arrangement was part of the reciprocal relationships between the two 
villages. When we arrived in Yamel, a few old men waved to us, nodding in 
agreement when the Kalabu men told them what we had come for. A few younger 
men got up from the group and accompanied us to the location we were heading 
for. We finally arrived at the steep mountain slope and, after the painter and his 
helpers had selected a few chunks of raw, white earth-pigment, the young men 
from Yamel suddenly confronted us, demanding money. When one of the Kalabu 
elders objected, maintaining that this was going against an age-old agreement 
between the two villages, one of the young men rebuked him, saying that the 
age of the old men was over and that now was the ‘time of money’ (‘taim bilong 
ol lapun i pinis, nau mani i tok’). From now on, the men would have to pay for 
the pigment. The young men from Yamel owed no duty of respect to the Abelam 
elders, so none of them dared to object. There was a long moment of silence. 
Finally, my husband got out his wallet and paid the demanded fee. We returned 
to Kalabu immediately without stopping off for the usual polite exchange of 
compliments.
In both episodes, young men had unmistakably demonstrated rejection, 
resistance and renunciation: rejection of white people, resistance against the 
rule of the old men, and renunciation of the traditional ways. These were 
clear signs of a profound cultural change and the beginning of a new, post-
colonial era in which young people (especially young men) looked to the future 
with high hopes and bright expectations. The traditional Abelam beliefs and 
practices that had governed the relationships with the old powers and the forces 
that had, until then, shaped people’s lives and doings, including exchange with 
the ancestors and other supernatural spirits, no longer met the demands of life 
3 He was referring to the British-Australian anthropologist Phyllis Kaberry, the first researcher to do 
fieldwork among the Abelam, in 1939–40, and the German ethnologist Gerd Koch, who undertook a collecting 
and documentation expedition through the Maprik area in 1966.
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in a young nation-state and fell far short of what young people associated with 
it. High on the agenda now were economic and political goals that could be 
achieved only through Western concepts of education and development (see 
also Sahlins 2005 on this issue). New identities were in demand, and these called 
for new points of reference.
It is only with hindsight and through drawing on the more recent, general 
anthropological discourse—the global/local issue, identity and modernities—
that I came to realise that these young men were caught up in the difficult 
process of acquiring a new identity and shaping their own view of modernity 
(see also Gewertz and Errington 2004; Goankar 1999).4 There was no room left 
for traditions and their keepers (see also Jourdan 1996); these were simply 
blocking the road to the future.
Don Tuzin was not a man to shy away from the challenges that cultural 
change engendered even though at times he found it difficult to bear, having 
experienced the fascination of the Tambaran culture during his first fieldwork 
among the Ilahita Arapesh. In The Cassowary’s Revenge, he wrote about Ilahita’s 
renunciation of the Tambaran, with which he had been confronted during his 
second stay, from 1985 to 1986. He describes how the Ilahita Arapesh ‘killed’ the 
Tambaran cult in a public display. It was on the occasion of a Christian revivalist 
church service on a Sunday in 1984 that the men publicly gave away the secrets 
of the Tambaran to the women and other non-initiated people, telling them that 
the male cult had been based on deceit and that the only secret was that there 
actually was no secret at all (Tuzin 1997:1). Tuzin discusses what social and 
psychological disruptions this, in his opinion, deliberate and planned public 
execution, carried out in an atmosphere of millenarian expectations, had on the 
people. What impressed me about his book, apart from its thick description, was 
the way in which the author questioned and reflected on his own involvement in 
this ‘Greek tragedy’ (Tuzin 1997:64) and on what role his American foreignness, 
his long, first sojourn in Ilahita between 1969 and 1972, his departure, but also 
his promise to return had possibly had on the irreversible events. Tuzin not 
only admitted his indirect involvement, he was also prepared to take over co-
responsibility for what happened; at the same time, the book clearly expresses 
the anthropologist’s sorrow and dismay about the loss of culture.
According to Tuzin, one of the gravest consequences this killing and radical 
abolishment of the Tambaran had was that the men had robbed themselves of 
the foundations of their masculinity (Tuzin 1997:26,181). With the Tambaran 
gone, they had lost their means to exert power over women and keep them in 
check. They had toppled themselves from the throne and were now facing their 
4 In his first two monographs, Tuzin did not use the term ‘modernity’. Hirsch (2001) rightly asks: ‘When 
was modernity in Melanesia?’
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own vulnerability at the hands of the previously powerless: ‘We now know in 
some detail what happened during the ensuing months, with the Tambaran 
dead, custom repealed, and the women ecstatically seizing control’ (Tuzin 
1997:161). The myth of the cassowary woman (Tuzin 1980:11) tells the story of 
how once a man stole the feather coat of a cassowary woman who was bathing 
naked in a nearby pool, thus bringing her under his control. Many years later, 
the woman discovered her feather coat hidden away and was able to escape—
back in her shape as a cassowary. Tuzin (1997:176) equates the betrayal of the 
Tambaran to the women with the return of the feather coat to the cassowary 
woman—in other words, the setting free of primordial female power and the 
gaining of independence from male domination. This regained autonomy, which 
found expression in various new forms of women’s behaviour towards men, 
Tuzin interprets—as the title of his book tells—as the ‘Cassowary’s Revenge’.5 
As Tuzin goes on to show, however, this newly won freedom has not made the 
male–female relationship any easier or better. On the contrary, it has merely 
led to increasing brutality and more domestic violence (Tuzin 1997:177); at the 
same time, mothers still treat their sons with harshness.
According to Tuzin, Ilahita village and its culture grew from the interaction 
between various Abelam and Kwangga groups that successively moved into the 
area and mingled with the resident Arapesh people, influencing their culture 
lastingly (see Roscoe, this volume). The Tambaran cult as such, or at least its 
higher initiation grades, and the ideals of manhood associated with it originated 
among the Abelam people (Tuzin 1997:4, 84), who began moving into the 
area about 1870 (Tuzin 2001:15). In fact, the Ilahita initiations as well as the 
associated Tambaran spirit beings and ritual artefacts (including the ceremonial 
house) correspond with Abelam ceremonial practice in many respects. In the 
following, I take my own Abelam data as specific variant of a general Maprik 
culture that overlaps ethnic groups and languages, with the aim of offering a 
comparative description. I do not know whether comparable public ‘executions’ 
of the Tambaran occurred in other villages of the Maprik area; there are certain 
clues that suggest similar actions, but maybe not in such radical form.6 Between 
1995 and 1999, the Maprik Council, the assembly of village councillors—that is, 
the elected village representatives (Tok Pisin: kaunsel)—decided 
that wild pigs should be hunted down and either exterminated or driven 
away from the village to the back of the mountains. Semi-domestic pigs 
were to be put behind fences and could no longer be left wandering 
around the village or in semi-liberation, or they would be killed too. 
(Coupaye 2004:150–1) 
5 Apparently, and to the dismay of the men, the women were not surprised by the men’s ‘revelations’.
6 To this, Scaglion (1999:211) says: ‘From the Abelam perspective, real change can only occur cataclysmically 
via a total restructuring of the world.’ The Ilahita Arapesh appear to have fully shared his view.
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In 2001, Coupaye did not see one garden that was fenced in as had been the 
custom in the old days to keep the pigs out and away from the crops. The ban on 
pigs was explained on hygienic and safety grounds (aggressive boars) and with 
the argument that the pigs were reducing productivity by ravaging gardens. 
This form of utilitarian reasoning ignores the pivotal significance that pigs had 
in ceremonial life as ritual gifts and sacrificial animals. Coupaye reports that in 
Nyelikum, his fieldwork site, all the people had become practising Christians7 
and there was no trace left of traditional ceremonial life, and no ceremonial 
house.8 In Kalabu and in all the other villages of the Maprik area that I used 
to visit during fieldwork, the sacrifice of pigs used to be a prerequisite for the 
building of a new ceremonial house and preceded all rituals associated with the 
cultivation of long yams and/or with initiations.9 Even though the Tambaran 
had not been eradicated as dramatically in other parts of the Maprik area as it 
had been in Ilahita, the ban on pigs brought an end to all forms of Tambaran 
activity, since one of the main ceremonial requisites—the sacrifice of pigs—
could no longer be fulfilled.
The Technology of the String Bag
As described elsewhere (Hauser-Schäublin 1996), the Abelam are a typical 
representative of a ‘non-cloth culture’ in Oceania.10 Line, streak, string and frond 
are the constituent elements in all forms of artistic expression, be it painting or 
the adornment of human beings, yams, pigs or string bags of various shapes 
and sizes. In their form-giving and form-defining capacities, the line and string 
respectively are of central significance (see also Ingold 2007). In Abelam, they 
go by the same term: maindshe. Maindshe is white, or at least light, if we wish to 
apply our Western colour criteria to the beige-coloured thread used for making 
string bags. String is made from the bast fibre (Tok Pisin: mangas; Abelam: sibe) 
of various plants, preferably from the bark of the yitinbin tree. The bark goes 
through a number of processing steps until the fibres are twined into string. 
The Abelam were not familiar with textile techniques other than string bags 
and plaited mats.11 String bags are produced by a looping technique relying 
7 Ludowic Coupaye, Personal communication, 2007.
8 Google Earth reveals only two or three ceremonial houses left in the entire Maprik area (July 2008).
9 During Coupaye’s fieldwork, ceremonial (long) yams were still being grown in Kalabu; for some of the men, 
they provided an opportunity to gain prestige.
10 Despite the cultural change described briefly above, I shall stick to the ethnographic present when 
referring to the period between 1978 and 1983. I chose not to use the past tense because I do not know which 
aspects of the issues I describe are really ‘past and gone’ and which are still relevant. The ethnographic present 
reflects a snapshot of things.
11 Abelam men also produce plaited ceremonial mats (these decorate the lower part of the front of the 
ceremonial house and the projecting roof). Plaiting is based on a different technique (vertical and horizontal 
elements that are interwoven) to looping; one should therefore distinguish between the two techniques (for 
example, Coupaye 2004:Ch. 7).
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on so-called hourglass looping. Only one string, or thread, is used, to which 
‘extensions’ are attached continuously (see MacKenzie 1991:75–80). Loops 
are added one by one until the entire fabric, the string bag, is completed.12 In 
contrast with other textile techniques, the string bag displays the following 
features: 
The structure of a looped string bag is differentiated from that of a 
basket in that it is flexible and laterally expansive. It differs from a 
woven textile because it requires only one element, simply interworked 
with itself, to form the fabric, whereas all woven textiles are constructed 
from two component parts, a warp interlaced with a weft. (MacKenzie 
1991:209)
An empty string bag is of almost two-dimensional, trapezoidal shape to which 
a carrier strap of differing length is attached. When suspended from the apex 
of the strap—women carry their string bags with the strap passing over the 
forehead, while men carry their small personal bags over the shoulder—a string 
takes on an almost triangular shape. But when filled, a string bag becomes 
an impressively bulgy container that covers its contents like a skin (see also 
MacKenzie 1991:Plate 89). The term ‘wut’ describes repositories of different 
size and fineness, all depending on what they are used for. String bags are 
always based on the same technology: string looping; this gives the bags their 
distinctive texture—they are soft, pliable and extremely sturdy. Women carry 
their babies in string bags, just as they do piglets that have been freshly weaned 
and which women carry around on their backs in order to accustom them to 
their new, human environment as a first step in domestication. The large string 
bags used for carrying firewood and field crops are made of more coarse material 
and are left undecorated. The finest and most artistic pieces serve to hold the 
more personal items that men and women carry on them (such as betel-nuts and 
betel pepper and small lime containers). They are decorated on the front side 
with the help of red and black-dyed strings displaying patterns of horizontal 
lines, squares or triangles, and trapezoids respectively, connected by diagonal 
lines.13
The Paradigmatic Character of the String Bag
A special technological feature of string bags is that they are translucent, 
providing a partial view of their contents. Men also produce artefacts in the 
12 Decoration is added by the simultaneous use of differently coloured threads or by twining such a thread 
onto the main ‘white’ thread (Schuster 1989:375).
13 On string-bag patterns from the Iatmul, Kwoma, Sawos and probably also Abelam areas, see Schuster 
(1989:376–8).
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looping technique (mainly insignia and decorations such as kara-ut, boar-tusk 
pectorals, and headbands), but they use a needle (made of cassowary bone), 
which allows them to thread the plied string through very tight meshing. The 
distinctive texture of the different objects—open versus closed loops—is based 
on the same technique but follows a gender-specific division of labour (see also 
MacKenzie 1991:Plates 34 and 35). One also finds this type of ‘closure’ on the 
small plaited bags that older men make for themselves, which are also opaque. 
They use them for their personal belongings; at the same time, they serve as 
male insignia indicating that the owner has almost completed the full initiation 
cycle.
In everyday life, the Abelam frequently take advantage of the transparency of 
string bags. For instance, it shows who presently is in possession of betel-nuts—a 
much sought-after natural stimulant, which are chewed with betel pepper and 
lime powder. Among kin and friends, it is absolutely normal to ‘feel’ a person’s 
string bag to see whether he or she is carrying any betel-nuts. Should this be 
the case one can ask for one—a request that may hardly be turned down. This 
means that carrying around a string bag always implies having to be prepared 
for inquisitive looks and demands.
As Forge (1966, 1971, 1972) and Losche (1995) have shown, wut is also the term 
used to designate the painted initiation chamber that is constructed within the 
ceremonial house and into which initiates are taken during initiation ceremonies. 
The commonplace term for painted palm-leaf sheaths (Tok Pisin: panggal), 
outside any sacred context, is ‘mbai’. The same term—mbai literally refers to 
the actual palm-leaf material—is also used to designate the large triangular 
painting facing the public meeting ground on the facade of ceremonial houses. 
These facade paintings are never called wut even though they always include 
images of string bags and string-bag patterns.
Wut is used as the term for the painted, triangular palm-leaf head decorations 
that, according to contexts, either the initiates or the novices wear for dances 
on the ceremonial ground. Here, wut is an allusion to the initiation chamber 
within the ceremonial house where the novices are kept prior to their public 
appearance. Wut conjoins several different meanings and contexts. The string 
bag is the ‘prototype’ of all things visible and female and references what men 
keep concealed and secret; the two aspects—open and hidden—are co-present. 
Non-initiates, however, also know that each initiation grade has its own specific 
string-bag pattern that serves as its emblem. Women who enjoy making string 
bags know all these patterns and manufacture string bags for their husbands 




With regard to technique, string bags and paintings have one thing in common, 
and that is maindshe, the ‘string’ or ‘white line’, respectively. The facade 
painting on a ceremonial house, for example, is based on an interconnected 
network of white lines. The head artist starts drawing a white line at the apex 
of the triangular-shaped facade, which has been primed with black paint and 
is lying flat on the ground. In the process of painting, further similarities to 
string-bag production become apparent: the white line is drawn unbroken from 
top to bottom so that in the end the surface is covered, and thereby structured, 
by a network of white lines (Hauser-Schäublin 1989b).14 The actual painting 
of the facade is done in horizontal bands equivalent to those formed by the 
looping technique used in making string bags.15 The bands have no centre point 
and no sides; actually, they are bands of ornament-style painting (see Stevens 
1996). One of the main differences between string bags and painting is that, in 
painting, the large-sized motifs show figurative representations while on string 
bags the patterns consist exclusively of lines and geometric shapes (Hauser-
Schäublin 1989b). Furthermore, painting is the work of specialists—that is, 
male artists—and is always kept secret from women and non-initiates, while 
string bags are manufactured by women, anywhere and at any time. 
It is on the technological level—the creation of a network with the help of a line 
or a twine—that the analogy between painting and string bags becomes evident, 
but the two differ in terms of conditions of production and nomenclature; and 
this in turn references the significance of concealing and revealing in men’s 
knowledge management.
The term wut also designates the womb—in other words, the ‘bag’ that contains 
the foetus (see also MacKenzie 1991:143–4). What all the concepts of wut have 
in common is that they represent containers of some form or another: string 
bags, a woman’s ‘bag’ (in the sense of womb) and the initiation chamber. In 
its capacity as container, wut has the singular power to transform its contents 
(see also Losche 1997): a fetus grows to become a child in its mother’s womb; 
an untamed piglet becomes a domesticated pig; in initiations, living men catch 
glimpses of the wondrous world of the ancestors and return ‘impregnated with 
the beyond’, while novices are transformed into knowledgeable men. None of 
these creatures comes out of wut the same as they went in; they all go through 
a condensed process of irreversible maturation and change. Wut possesses an 
agency, a generative power that transforms all creatures. In the secret male 
rituals staged in the ceremonial house, wut is again associated with femaleness. 
The association between the most important male spirits, nggwalndu, which are 
14 The helpers contribute the red and yellow contours to the white lines, or fill them in.
15 The difference between the string bags of the Iatmul and those of the Abelam is that the former manufacture 
them by producing closed rings to which a new ring is then added, while the Abelam manufacture them in a 
continuous, spiral-shaped process (Schuster 1989:374).
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shown to the initiates in the painted initiation chamber, wut, and the string bag 
in the sense of womb—in Tok Pisin, both concepts go by the term ‘bilum’—is 
also made by the Ilahita Arapesh (Tuzin 1980:244–5). There it is even stated 
explicitly that the bilum of the nggwal ‘contains the children of all creatures, 
crying to be born’ (Tuzin 1980:244).
In summary, one could say that the power of wut lies in the magic of 
transformation, the capacity to change irreversibly. This power is definitely 
female (see also Forge 1966:26); this also applies to the initiation chamber within 
which the novices transcend to a higher level of knowledge and attain a new 
social status; among other things, this transformation finds expression in the 
new name that the initiates receive when re-entering the secular realm of the 
village. What the adult men retain is, however, the social control over the whole 
process; this is shown in mythology, but, above all, it becomes evident in the 
incessant play of concealment and revelation.
The Language of Concealing and Revealing
The looping technique and the visual penetrability it produces—typical 
features of the string bag—create opportunities for the play of concealment 
and revelation. The two principles are also played out in a different field of 
Abelam culture—namely, in language and speech. Speaking in metaphors is a 
practice that enables people to keep ritual secrets concealed but hint at them 
all the same. In Tok Pisin, metaphorical speech is referred to as ‘tok piksa’; in 
Abelam, as ‘andsha-kundi’. Andsha-kundi is a ritualised form of speech that men 
use during ritual events held on the ceremonial ground (for example, mortuary 
feats, feasts held in the context of the yam cycle or during the construction 
of a new ceremonial house). Speakers revert to a wide range of metaphors to 
reference events and persons, but which only those informed are able to fathom.
As a speech form in its own right, andsha-kundi displays a specific structure. 
Similar to the looping technique in string-bag production, here ‘loose ends’ are 
twined and then looped into consecutive speech figures. Without announcement, 
the speaker begins with a seemingly meaningless sentence, hooks the next one 
on to it that makes just as little sense as the first, and so forth. It is only when 
these separate pieces are linked together that a meaningful speech figure begins 
to take shape. Here is an example of a song-speech performed by men (M) and 
women (F):16
16 Performed during a wake on 10 February 1979 at the ceremonial ground of Ndusaki in Kalabu. It is the 
song of Lake (Numbunggen hamlet, Kalabu). When these songs are performed, the women often contribute 
only the refrain; here they actually actively participate in creating the speech figure.
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M: You tell me to tie it up, and I tie it up.
F: You tell me to carry it, and I carry it.
M: These men are called Katu and Imagwate. They tie up a pig and carry 
it away.
F: These men Katu and Imagwate catch a cassowary and tie it up.
M: I have lucky hands.
F: Katu and Imagwate often catch pigs and cassowaries. They have lucky 
hands.
(Hauser-Schäublin 1989a:157)
The verse begins with an action—tying up—that someone has given orders for. 
In the following line, a second action–carrying an unnamed object—is added to 
the first. In the third line, the names of the actors are given; they refer to a pair 
of male ancestors (nggwal; in Tok Pisin: tambaran). By revealing their names, the 
speaker-singer discloses his identity as a member of the ritual ward associated 
with the two nggwal. At the same time, the listener hears what has been tied up 
and carried away: first a pig, and then a cassowary. The singer-speaker describes 
himself as a good hunter (‘lucky hands’). In the two final lines, the singer 
reflects this self-portrayal onto his two nggwalndu, thus bringing to expression 
that the last were well disposed to him. At the same time, he is conveying the 
message that he is acting as the nggwal’s proxy.17 Next to its specific texture, the 
constant back and forth between inside and outside and between concealing 
and revealing (see also Hauser-Schäublin 1992) plays a major role in this speech 
form.
In tok piksa, the metaphor of the string bag is a recurrent theme; it not only 
references a ‘thing’ or an ‘object’, it also actually refers to a complex interlinkage 
of actions. Let me explain this with a further example. On the occasion of the 
opening of a new ceremonial house in Kalabu in 1978, the men, in alternation 
with the women,18 struck up a song (nggwal mindsha) in honour of the most 
prominent nggwalndu of Kalabu, called Sagulas, in which they used the metaphor 
of wut to tell of his deeds.
M: I am under the water on earth. You may beat the slit-drum and call 
me. Then I shall set out to come and see you.
F: You must beat the slit-drum, then I shall appear in the village.
17 With this song-speech, the singer is promising the deceased that he will sacrifice a pig to honour him.
18 The men performed inside the ceremonial house while the women who sang the refrain stood outside, at 
the foot of the house’s roof (Hauser-Schäublin 1989a:237–40).
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M: Sagulas is making a string bag.
F: I know, Sagulas is making a string bag with which one can catch the 
fishes kavi and mara.
M: When he is making the string bag, many men come to watch him at 
work. When he has finished the string bag, all are welcome to come and 
see it and rejoice in it.
(Hauser-Schäublin 1989a:237)
The song begins at the home of the nggwal Sagulas: a pool in the bush where 
he rests at the bottom.19 When the men start beating the slit-drums in the 
village (to start a ritual), he awakens and follows their call to the settlement. 
This is more or less the standard opening to all songs of this kind. Following 
this, two strands of action are inter-looped: the men sing of the nggwal who 
is making a string bag, which is then picked up and continued by the women 
who sing of manufacturing nets for catching fish. What the men really mean 
with the metaphor of making string bags is that Sagulas—that is, the men 
themselves—is busy producing secret things; in other words, painting ritual 
objects in preparation for an initiation. The women pick up this motif but give 
it a different turn, as men do not ‘produce’ string bags in the literal sense of the 
term. They describe the string bag as a fishing net. But, as one man explained, 
this phrasing actually means catching fish with one’s bare hands and is a hidden 
reference to the final act in an initiation where the men indeed have to catch 
fish without the help of a net in a dammed stream. To what extent this reflects 
the men’s interpretation of the wordage and in how far the women deduce the 
fish catch from the fact that Sagulas resides in water, I am unable to say with 
certainty. The constant back and forth between hinting at and then concealing 
again goes hand in hand with the reciprocal enactment of knowledge and not 
knowing between men and women.
The Loops of the Tambaran and his String Bag
In this section, I go on to show how the principle of concealment and revelation 
is enacted in the ritual life of men. I shall also address the problem once raised 
by Anthony Forge (1966) of the unresolved relationship between visual form, 
the names of single motifs in painting and their meaning in initiations, which I 
discuss from the perspective of the systemic qualities of the string bag. Forge’s 
respondents gave him three different designations for the motif of the spiral: 
19 As in the case of the other spirits, wale, the nggwalndu are said to reside in hidden pools and waterholes 
deep in the bush; these pools are regarded as passages to the world beyond, where the sun shines when it is 
night in the human realm.
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swirl in the water, leg of pork and fern frond. What Forge wanted to find out 
was: what did this heterogeneous terminology mean in the context of initiations? 
Why have three so completely different meanings, and, raising the question 
to the next level, is it actually possible to translate the visual into language, 
and what is the relationship between the two forms of communication (Forge 
1970:289; see also Losche 1995, 1996, 2001)?
In a figurative sense, this type of partial visual penetrability that one encounters 
in string bags—the ‘empty spaces’ between the looped string—is also found 
on the facade painting, actually on the entire front of a ceremonial house. In a 
sense, the face of a ceremonial house, too, is not ‘opaque’; it contains ‘empty 
spaces’ that allow ‘glimpses’ as well, thus reflecting one of the basic principles 
of the Tambaran cult among the Abelam. By this I mean, in analogy to the 
translucency of the string bag, the interplay between outside and inside. The 
elements shown on the front of a ceremonial house (including the motifs of the 
actual facade painting) function as hidden references to the various initiation 
stages and the secrets they incorporate, and thus operate in a similar manner to 
tok piksa, the metaphorical speech I described above.
In order to make this interplay between concealing and revealing clearer to the 
reader, I shall briefly outline the various initiation stages and the rituals that 
go with them—actually the only ritual events that are staged inside the cult 
house. At the time of my fieldwork in Kalabu, initiation among the Abelam 
consisted of an entire cycle of ranked grades; the completion of a full cycle 
could last up to several decades.20 Initiations always go hand in hand with the 
cultivation of long, ceremonial yams, the festive display of the finest tubers and 
the sacrifice of pigs. The first initiation grade is for young boys; the final stage 
is attained only by very few old men. Each initiation grade includes (apart from 
a series of rituals that the novices go through and, at times, week-long periods 
of seclusion) a cult scene that the initiators create inside the ceremonial house. 
The first grade is called nggumaira (nggu: ‘stagnant water’, maira: ‘miracle’, 
‘secret’, often translated in Tok Pisin as tambaran). The created imagery consists 
of a hole that the men dig inside the ceremonial house and fill with water.21 
The waterhole is covered with a layer of white foam (produced by triturating a 
special plant) on which the artists create a concentrically shaped picture with 
flowers and strips of leaves.22 The novices—all young boys—are escorted to 
the nggumaira in single file; after taking a brief glimpse at it, they are led away 
again and told to turn their backs on the ‘miracle’. In the meantime, the men 
20 At the time of my fieldwork, some initiation grades had not been staged for many years. My husband 
and I were able to witness some in neighbouring villages to which Kalabu men had been invited as guests. I 
shall continue to use the present tense when describing the different cult scenes although, as mentioned, these 
initiations are no longer performed.
21 The scene is based on the notion that the spirits reside in pools.
22 The strips are also referred to as maindshe, ‘string’ or ‘streak’.
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cover up the image by throwing earth on it, making it look as if the ground has 
‘swallowed’ the picture. Then the boys are told to turn round and look—the 
miracle has vanished!
For the second grade (ulke), double-sided carvings called ulke are lined up flanked 
by standing anthropomorphic male and female carved figures (wapinyan). Ulke 
is the term for predominantly female spirit beings, which are also associated 
with pools in the bush. The material secrets of nau, the third stage, consist of 
bizarre-shaped bamboo roots that are displayed upside down. The root ends 
often have the shape of birds’ heads; the figures are frequently embellished by 
painting and adding feathers to them. Nau are considered to be female beings 
and are often decorated with women’s adornments. Bamboo flutes (transverse 
flutes) represent the voices of the nau and are called nautagwa (nau: women). 
The female nau spirit beings live in treetops and have power over game animals 
(wild pigs, cassowaries), either driving them into or leading them away from the 
men hunting them.
Both grades—ulke and nau (by the time of my fieldwork they had been conflated 
into one single grade)—deal with female spirit beings associated with the ‘wild’ 
forest. The wood used for their representative carvings is taken from the lower 
ends and roots of plants, respectively.
The next two initiation grades are subsumed under the term ‘nggwalndu’;23 
their constituent parts are called nggilenggwal (‘black’ nggwal) and naranggwal 
(‘decorated’ nggwal). Nggwalndu are male ancestor spirits. Although each 
nggwal has a name of his own, individuality is of no significance; they are not 
distinguished in terms of outer image or behaviour. A nggwalndu initiation 
demands the staging of a feast with long ceremonial yams—namely, with the 
type called mambutap. Yam and nggwalndu stand in close relationship to each 
other. The yam tubers that are put on display each receive the name of a specific 
nggwalndu. The long yam is one of the many embodiments of these powerful 
spirit beings.
The nggwalndu initiation scenes are highly elaborate. The spirits are represented 
by massive carvings. In nggilenggwal, these consist of large faces to which 
occasionally a chest part is added. The carvings are placed upright and have 
tent-shaped backs attached to them, which are covered with plaited and 
painted mats. Nggilenggwal have neither arms nor legs. The figures are covered 
above by a mat-roofing called nggilut (‘black string bag’). In front of the figure 
(occasionally there are several figures), the men lay out shell rings in a semicircle 
and stick bone daggers in the ground (both items are associated with stars). The 
semicircle is referred to as ‘hole in the ground’ so that, in fact, each nggilenggwal 
23 Nggwalndu refers to ancestral spirits associated with the village as well as with a specific ceremonial 
ground and clan. The same term is used for ‘grandfather’ and ‘stomach’.
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is shown sitting before, or even in, a waterhole. The voices of the nggilenggwal 
are sounded by singing into bamboo tubes sticking in a wooden cylinder (kundi 
ure). Naranggwal focuses on huge male figures cut from tree trunks. They are 
placed next to each other in the ceremonial house, reclining on a rack that 
has been erected parallel with the longitudinal axis. Above them is a painted 
canopy made of palm leaves sewn together. Above the canopy there is a hidden 
floor where the initiators take up position. The walls are also made of painted 
palm leaves, thus creating a fully decorated initiation chamber. It is called narut 
(‘decorated string bag’). As in the case of nggilenggwal, here, shell rings are laid 
out in a semicircle in front of the figures; here, too, they indicate stars.
The name of the last initiation grade is puti. At the time of fieldwork, this grade 
had not been performed for something like 30 years. It is also called bikna, 
which is the name of a bird that lives and nests predominantly on the ground. In 
the past, this level was reached by only a few old men—partly for demographic 
reasons, but also because of the tremendous amount of pigs required for sacrifice. 
A man who had passed this grade enjoyed special status in his ritual moiety and 
his clan as well as in his ward and the village as a whole; he became a so-called 
numandu (‘big-man’). The cult scene for this grade consists of a single figure 
that is placed—again, in the longitudinal axis—at the centre of the ceremonial 
house. Like nggilenggwal, it has a carved face; its body is made of a tent-like 
frame over which a finely plaited mat is laid and painted red, black, yellow and 
white. The outer surface of the tetrahedron-shaped body, which has the same 
shape as the ceremonial house itself, is decorated completely with shining white 
shell rings and likened to a bright, starlit sky.
The front side of the seated puti figure is fitted out with angled and raised 
arms and bent legs, made of banana stems. In its hands it holds spears, while 
its feet are equipped with the hoof-shaped claws of a cassowary. In front of 
the figure, again, shell rings are laid out in a semicircle. In contrast with the 
nggwalndu stages, here, there is no initiation chamber since now the interior 
of the ceremonial house as such is looked upon as puti’s house—his wut. The 
term puti means effectively the ‘empty one’, ‘he who has given everything’. The 
figure is compared with an old man sitting near a fire warming his skin in the 
ashes (see also Stöcklin 2004:Cover plate).
An experienced old man once commented on the initiation cycle with the 
words: ‘nggumaira opens the door, puti closes it.’ What he was saying was that, 
with puti, the world of mysteries and secrets has come to an end;24 there is no 
knowledge of what lies beyond; what is left at the end of the journey is simply 
the void.
24 In his three monographs (1980, 1997, 2001), Tuzin describes and discusses the beings and their innate 
properties that the Ilahita Arapesh subsume under the term Tambaran, mainly with reference to myths. 
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The principle upon which the succession of the various stages and the 
relationship between the different grades are based always follows the same 
structure: the initiating members of one ceremonial moiety dramatically enact 
and visualise knowledge about the mysteries and terrors of existence for the 
initiates of the opposite moiety. After subjecting the novices to a series of often-
painful procedures and tests, the true nature of these mysteries and terrors are 
then revealed to them. In each stage, they are made to believe that this time they 
are going to encounter the real secrets and that they are about to take a next step 
into the intriguing world of the spirit beings who make the world go round and 
shape the fate of human beings. Consequently, with each stage, the scenes and 
ritual procedures become more complex—up to the end where a few men reach 
puti and encounter the void, the realm where all human knowledge ends.
The System of Relating the Outside to the Inside
Concealing and revealing are founded on the principle of ambiguity and 
implication—a system of signs that offers a broad range of interpretation. The 
signs themselves are not random in any way, and what applies to the Sagulas 
song-speech described above also goes for the constituent motifs of sacred 
imagery.
Many of the highly meaningful objects used in imagery are human-made 
and hand-shaped artefacts. These artefacts are ambiguous in the sense that 
they possess a public and a secret dimension—an ‘outside’ and an ‘inside’. I 
discovered the loops between the ‘outside’ and the ‘inside’—meaning the 
initiation grades—only when I began going through photographs of the Abelam 
collection from the Basel Ethnographic Museum whilst still in the field. After 
having worked for months with several old Abelam men—namely, artists—on 
the terminology and the meaning of the various objects, I suddenly realised 
that I had often recorded two terms. These terminological discrepancies first 
had me muddled. One of my closest co-workers, the artist (maira yagwandu) 
Kwandshendu, led me onto the right track when he explained: ‘When you 
have a carving on the outside of the ceremonial house it has a special term, but 
when you use it inside the house for an initiation scene, it has a different name.’ 
What Kwandshendu was describing was actually the visualised version of 
andsha-kundi (hidden speech); in other words, depending on the situation, the 
objects were referring to different action and meaning contexts and thus carried 
different names and significations. In fact, what Kwandshendu had explained to 
What the Abelam call maira—literally, secret and mysterious—actually refers more to what lies behind the 
Tambaran. Of nggwalndu (ancestors, ancestor spirits), they say they are maira; however, the term maira does 




me here—almost casually, in undramatic terms—was the relationship between 
the esoteric and the exoteric that becomes fused in the motifs of the facade 
painting and the various three-dimensional objects that adorn the face of a 
ceremonial house. This interconnection between the ‘outside’ and the ‘inside’ is 
known foremost to the maira yagwandu, the artists. 
What surprised me about this explanation was the fact that the Abelam 
conceptualise the principle of concealing and revealing as a system in which 
all the visible, outside elements of a ceremonial house actually refer to secret, 
‘inside’ contexts; and they put the system into practice knowingly. Until now, 
Melanesia specialists have usually assumed that it is up to the anthropologist to 
‘uncover’ such a system and its working order, ‘but [that it] does not involve 
the conscious corroboration by or intent of the users of the system’ (Losche 
2001:158). Kwandshendu’s explanation clearly shows that—notwithstanding 
anthropological qualms and speculations—the indigenous artists (and other 
‘big-men’) are fully aware of the linkage between motif and object, and 
between term and function. With this, he also provided an answer to Anthony 
Forge’s question. Meaning is defined by context, and terminology is therefore 
not determined by the object or the motif, but by the circumstances. When 
Kwandshendu went through the visible signs on the ceremonial house with 
us, it became clear that Abelam men ‘read’ the front of a cult house as a system 
of signs, which, at the same time, serves as a mnemonic device to register the 
single grades in initiation.
Painting is a self-contained part of this system. The single bands and the motifs 
shown on the facade serve as signs that have distinctive names and allow room 
for differing interpretations. In its total structure, a facade painting reflects 
the sequential order of the initiation grades and the way they are interrelated. 
A facade painting is created from top to bottom and this is also the way it is 
viewed and read: the topmost rows of motifs refer to cult scenes that are centred 
on the forest as the abode of mysterious creatures and spirit beings that live in 
pools or in treetops. The apex of the painting shows a flying fox (matmboi); it 
is classified as a female being that lives in the tops of trees and tries to confuse 
hunters below; matmboi serve as references to the nau initiation grades. Beneath 
the flying fox there follows a variegated array of spirals. This is the motif for 
which Anthony Forge noted the three differing terms (see above) and which 
had him rather confused and, later, inspired Diane Losche (1995) to venture 
new interpretations. In Kalabu, and in the context of initiations, the spirals 
are interpreted as the traces of water spiders scurrying over the surface of a 
pool or as ‘rippled water surface’ and ‘foam’, respectively. They reference the 
first initiation grade, nggumaira, where a foamy image is created on the surface 
of a waterhole, as well as ulke spirits and the pools where these female beings 
are said to reside. The next band of motifs shows female bats (kwandshe) with 
2 . The String Bag of the Tambaran: The fragile loops of concealing and revealing in Abelam culture
63
their young (kumbui) clinging to their breasts. These bats refer to female spirits 
that glide silently through the bush, not unlike witches, the people say; they 
represent the central figures in the cult scene of the ulke initiation grade. The 
band showing the black–red fruits and the pair-wise grouped spirals are also 
associated with the mysterious realm of the forest and its inhabitants; the latter 
represent birds (of the maintshe or baintship species, respectively). The band 
displaying the splendidly decorated dancers (the motif is called ndudama) is 
a reference to what the Abelam believe to be the most significant and greatest 
maira of all—that is, men in full ceremonial adornment. The dancers who have 
their eyes shut are described as having just returned from the mysterious and 
splendid world of the beyond, still mesmerised by the beauty and the miracles 
they saw there. Finally, the eye comes to the bottom row with its huge faces 
and the minute zigzagging bands that depict the figures’ arms and legs (the 
motif is called nggwalnggwal); the figures represent the nggwalndu class of 
ancestral spirits. The string bag patterns encompassing them are emblems of the 
nggwalndu initiation grade and thus also signify the painted initiation chamber 
in the naranggwal grade, called narut.
The facade painting is like a kaleidoscopic image consisting of rows of motif 
bands that can be conflated to create different images, all depending on who 
the viewers are, what their level of knowledge is, and what perspective they are 
viewing it from. Accordingly, the motifs refer to different things with alternative 
meanings to different viewers. 
Unlike the two-dimensionality of conventional painting, which relies on the 
consistent medium of colour, the visible face of a ceremonial house with all 
its ambiguous elements of different shapes and material constitutes a three-
dimensional work of art that intricately enacts the esoteric and the exoteric. As 
described above, the first initiation grade, nggumaira, involves only perishable 
material and is therefore not expressed by a permanent image on the outside 
representation. The only reference to this ephemeral cult scene is a narrow, 
waved band showing small, colourful fruits and leaves (mindshakuso) located 
below the carved crossbeam on the lower exterior. The same type of band 
encompasses the actual nggumaira image created over the artificial pool inside 
the ceremonial house.
All the other initiation grades that rely on comparably durable objects for their 
specific cult scenes are represented on the visible face of the ceremonial house as 
follows. The ulke initiation, including the homonymous carvings, is represented 
by the carved crossbeam located beneath the facade painting and described in 
this context as tikik. The nau initiation is signified by the birds’ heads made of 
bamboo roots and located on the inside of the protruding side walls—that is, 
the roof of the house; here they are designated vi warya. The tunnel-shaped 
entrance (korekore) to the ceremonial house references the entry to the initiation 
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chamber inside (atapine), while the carved pythons (ndua), which are usually 
located above the korekore, indicate the places of origin of spirit beings (wale) 
that play a role in several, different initiation scenes.
Nggilenggwal, or to be more precise, the plaited initiation chamber (nggilut), is 
represented by the plaited mat (kimbi) located at the lower end of the face of 
the cult house. The spears (vi) stuck into the projecting roof are also a reference 
to this grade. Inside the house, similar spears are placed over the corridor that 
leads to the initiation chamber, with their pointed ends aimed at the novices. 
Naranggwal, in which the colourfully painted initiation chamber (narut) plays 
an important role, is first and foremost referenced by the large facade painting 
(mbai) itself. During the naranggwal initiation, a raised—that is, suspended—
floor, actually the roof of the initiation chamber, is constructed where the 
initiators position themselves and imitate spirit voices (with the help of musical 
instruments). For its construction, the men use thick vines, which they refer 
to as samban in this specific context—that is, in the interior of the ceremonial 
house. Similar vines can be found on the outside of the cult house—to be 
more specific, winding themselves up on the inside of the extended walls and 
ending high up under the protruding roof peak. Here the vines are referred to 
as narkassa.
The last initiation stage, puti, described as an old man whose back is formed by 
the star-covered sky, the cosmos, is signified by the ceremonial house (korambo) 
as a whole. As such the ceremonial house also stands for the entity that contains 
all the secrets and miracles that the novices have come to see in kaleidoscopic 
imagery in the course of the initiation cycle over the past years. When a new 
ceremonial house is inaugurated, the front, matted, lower section of the house 
is decorated with shell rings; above them is exhibited a selection of the most 
beautiful string bags made especially for the occasion by the women. Puti and 
the ceremonial house stand in a microcosm/macrocosm relationship to each 
other. One should also add here that the ceremonial house with its sloping ridge 
(designated simultaneously as nyit, ‘sky’, and yapa, ‘father’) bears reference to 
the western realm of the cosmos and is aligned to the course of the setting sun.25
25 To describe the complex semantics and the cross-referencing between cult house and ceremonial ground 
and their specific decorative elements would be beyond the scope of this chapter (but see Hauser-Schäublin 
1989a:285–302).
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Concealing and Revealing as Hallmarks of the 
Unexplainable
The secrets that men conceal and then reveal in rituals relate to a transcendental 
mode of perception and understanding of phenomena that cannot be explained 
in any other way. The impressive images created by the assemblage of 
variegated objects and artefacts reference notions and concepts that lie beyond 
the boundaries of their own innate logic; they bear on matters that lie hidden 
away and will, in essence, always remain inaccessible and enigmatic. They 
address issues such as the diversity of existence in the world, the origins of this 
existence, life and death, as well as modes of regeneration to overcome death.
Concealment and revelation constitute an idiom of intimations, a form of 
communication that does not offer explanations, but instead provides glimpses of 
ever-changing combinations of single elements and phenomena in kaleidoscopic 
fashion. For the Abelam, the unexplainable has always been a part of everyday 
life: unexpected encounters in the garden, down at a stream or deep in the 
bush; a wild pig suddenly dashing out of the dense undergrowth a few feet in 
front of the hunter; a flying fox with outstretched wings gliding soundlessly 
over somebody returning from the garden in the twilight; a snake vanishing 
stealthily into an overgrown pool; shooting stars falling from the sky but never 
hitting the ground; small yam cuttings, almost withered away, growing to become 
magnificent tubers; a wife no longer issuing menstrual blood, and instead a 
child grows in her belly. Such and many similar phenomena are experienced 
as facets of a reality that, in the end, is not fathomable and will always remain 
a mystery. The people look upon it as a transcendental reality that shows itself 
only in bright but brief glimpses. Prism-like, the pieces join together to reveal a 
kaleidoscopic picture, an image, however, that keeps changing according to its 
innate properties as well as to the perspective of the viewer. 
Men sometimes dream of unexplainable phenomena and discuss them with 
others in meetings at the ceremonial ground in a joint search for answers to 
matters that do not immediately reveal themselves. They are looked upon as 
signs that point to hidden realms of being.
Ritual life and the ceremonial house represent specific forms of organising and 
shaping the relationship between humans and their transcendental reality. On 
this stage, the living play the part of the ‘non-initiated’ who are barred from 
discovering the ultimate secret, just as the women and children are excluded from 
the secrets of men, and, vice versa, the men are banished from the female realm 
of menstruation and giving birth (see Hauser-Schäublin 1995). This secluded 
world with its own logic and powers reveals itself only through signs and clues, 
which the old men try to catch hold of in cult scenes. What characterises the 
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relationship between the concealed and the revealed is the co-presence of both 
‘worlds’: the visible and the invisible. What lies concealed and reveals itself 
in fleeting glimpses and ephemeral images does not exist in a time frame that 
is separate from the here, now and then. Concealing and revealing constitute 
a mode of dealing with, and mediating, co-presence (Hauser-Schäublin 1997). 
In spatial terms, the cult house and the ceremonial ground create an interface 
between the realms of the visible and the invisible (Hauser-Schäublin 2003). 
This junction is a powerful and dangerous place and demands special modes 
of conduct. If people misbehave, no matter whether they are men, women or 
youths, the ‘old folk’ (golepa) impose sanctions; at least this is the way that men 
commonly explain unexpected blows of fate. 
Conclusion
During initiation rituals, the initiating men from the one ritual moiety often 
terrorised the novices of the opposite moiety, or at least put fear into them by 
threatening them with terrible ordeals; it was part of the ‘game’. In conjunction 
with the interplay of concealing and revealing, the knowledgeable were able 
to retain power over the unknowledgeable. The use of power and terror did 
not, however, split the world of men into durable categories of superiors 
and inferiors; instead, here again we encounter the principle of continuous 
looping—social looping, this time—since the novices of the one moiety later 
became the initiators of the neophytes of the other ritual half, and so forth, in 
an ongoing process of interchanging roles.26 The two ritual halves stood in a 
continuous, competitive exchange relationship that found expression through 
various channels such as yam and pig feasts, initiations and the construction 
of ceremonial houses. The representations that were created and enacted in 
initiations were not made for their own sake nor was the concept of concealment 
and revelation merely an instrument of social control based on multiple forms of 
‘deception’—hoodwinking the non-initiates—as the confession by the men of 
Ilahita might suggest. This would be taking a very short view of things.
Moreover, the mode by which the enigmatic was organised and mediated also 
served as the basis of the social system, relying on structures and processes—
so far, my initial hypothesis—that were also modelled on the principle of 
concealment and revelation. We have here a segmentary concept that creates 
nested divisions of knowledgeable and unknowledgeable on the basis of 
exclusion, integration and inclusion: the men were ignorant of the secrets of 
women; children and women had no knowledge of the secrets of men; and young 
26 See Losche (2001) on the interlocked ritual exchange relationships between the initiators of one 
ceremonial moiety and the novices of the opposite half.
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men—graded according to initiation level—were nescient of the knowledge of 
the older, enlightened men, with the enactment and mediation of knowledge 
oscillating between the two ritual moieties.
The relationship between human beings and the world beyond, and the mode in 
which the Abelam conceptualised and shaped this bond, created the screen on 
which the interplay between concealing and revealing was enacted as a means 
to create hierarchies of knowledge in society, while at the same time it formed 
the loops that held all the segments together. 
I doubt whether Ilahita Arapesh men were ardent nihilists or merely great 
theatrical actors attempting to keep the ignorant unwitting and under control, 
as a reader might infer from Tuzin’s (1997) description. When the men declared 
that the Tambaran had been nothing but lies and deception, they were in fact 
addressing only one aspect of representation—namely, the notion of concealment 
(and revelation) vis-a-vis women and children. In view of the findings presented 
here, one should really reassess the ‘killing of the Tambaran’ as recounted 
by Tuzin and also reconsider the two episodes described above where some 
young Abelam men voiced their protest against the ‘law of the past’. What the 
Christian revivalists described with hindsight as the ‘old men’s sleight of hand’ 
was only half the truth. In fact, the conceptual background upon which the 
principle of concealment and revelation was founded—the netherworld beyond 
that revealed itself in bright flashes and brief episodes—had simply run its 
course in the eyes of the revivalists (and others in the Maprik area), replaced 
with promises that the Holy Spirit was ready to deliver to believers instant 
salvation and riches. What yet stood in the way of Salvation was the old, ever 
co-present world of spirits that was considered evil (see also Reithofer 2006:Ch. 
4; Strong 2007), and for this ‘the Tambaran had to die’ (Tuzin 1997:64). The 
prophecies heralded an end to all toils and the advent of a paradisiacal world, 
not in distant days to come, but now, in the immediate future. The rituals staged 
by the Christian revivalists were geared to transforming the future into the 
present. Tuzin tells of a
tiny repertoire of maddeningly repetitive, largely tuneless hymns…
The blaring incessancy of the hymns quickly became for us a kind of 
torture…Continuing long into the night and resuming at first light, 
these hymns were sounding when we went to bed, sounding when we 
woke up, churning whatever sleep we achieved during the long hours 
of the service. (Tuzin 1997:222–3) 
It seems that the ‘second coming’ had to be sung into existence, that the 
tomorrow should become today.
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The group of believers included both men and women, headed by prophetic 
service leaders. The revivalists distanced themselves from non-believers or 
members of other denominations in a more general sense of the term, but drew 
a strict dividing line between themselves and the so-called ‘traditionalists’. The 
Holy Spirit’s cornucopia would not come in the shape of a string bag; instead 
it was to contain trucks and aircrafts (Tuzin 1997:149–50). The riches were to 
come as money and cargo, not as fertility and regeneration.
This new world of belief and thought rested on a completely different 
foundation; it was embedded in global relations and transactions, in ideas of 
progress, development and Western capitalism, and demanded from the people 
a completely new orientation and perspective (Sahlins 2005). The ‘confessions’ 
made by the revivalists in Ilahita and the demands that the young Abelam men 
confronted me with during my fieldwork actually show that people had begun 
to alter their orientation and to adjust to the demands of a changed and changing 
world. The values fostered by the old men and embodied by the string bag of 
the Tambaran with its incessant and systemic loops of concealing and revealing 
no longer sufficed as a canon on which people could model their identity.
The string bag had become riddled with holes; its loops had come apart. It 
was no longer able to contain what it had held before—neither the two co-
present ‘worlds’ nor the social order that relied on the segmentary principle of 
exclusion and inclusion and which was fuelled by concealment and revelation. 
The groups over which the agents of the Tambaran in earlier days had wielded 
power through the string bag—the young men and the women—firmly took 
possession of their newly gained freedom (as the opening passages of this 
chapter showed), moving into new fields of action, well beyond the reach and 
the ‘revenge’ of the cassowary.
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3. ‘Skirts–Money–Masks’, and Other 
Chains of Masculine Signification in 
Post-Colonial Papua New Guinea
David Lipset
This is our starting point: through his relationship to the signifier, the 
subject is deprived of something of himself, of his very life, which has 
assumed the value of that which binds him to the signifier. The phallus 
is our term for the signifier of his alienation in signification. (Lacan 
1977a:28)
Introduction: The Lacanian phallus in a post-
colonial setting 
With revision, the Lacanian phallus—qua concept of the subject in culture as 
based on a void of meaning—might also serve as a starting point for this chapter. 
Here, however, I do not intend to theorise the emptiness of the subject in an 
abstract, psychoanalytic sense. Instead, my conceptual and empirical focus is on 
a particular group of rural, post-colonial men. Specifically, this chapter concerns 
shifting signifiers of masculinity in the Sepik region in Melanesia, this being 
the issue and region that so vexed Tuzin (1997) in his magisterial account of the 
demise of the male cult in Ilahita village. To begin, I must briefly explain why, 
among all the decentred concepts of personhood and gender in society (see, 
for example, Dumont 1986; Durkheim 1933–97; Leenhardt 1979), I prize the 
Lacanian phallus. 
First of all, notwithstanding its masculine register, the Lacanian phallus does 
not stand for itself in any simple kind of way. It is, yet it is not, the male organ. 
Instead, the phallus is a symbol of symbols—a master signifier that nevertheless 
does not define reality/discourse in and of itself, as patriarchy might be said to 
do. It is a trope established by ‘desire of the other, not so much because the other 
holds the key to the object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be 
recognized by the other’ (Lacan 1977b:58). Initially, the phallus, qua signifier, 
comes into being as the object of maternal desire. ‘If the desire of the mother is the 
phallus, the child wishes to be the phallus in order to satisfy that desire’ (Lacan 
1977b:289). In other words, the Lacanian phallus is defined relationally (see 
also Strathern 1988) and its relationality is based on an impossible, unfulfillable 
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desire. For Lacan, the lack of the other leaves an indelible trace in the subject, a 
trace that constitutes yet subverts subsequent chains of signification in which 
persons and objects are substituted for, or superimposed upon, her absence and 
missing desire for her desire that motivates their meaning.
The entry into culture—for example, the domain Lacan calls the Symbolic—
basically arises from an oedipal injunction; a taboo, to be sure, but one that does 
not result from the intervention of the father himself. It results, according to 
Lacan, from what amounts to a semiotic substitution, a substitution of the ‘name 
of the father’ (1977b:67) for the love and desire of the mother. This substitution 
both is and opens up the world of language, law and social action. The Name-of-
the-Father, that is, is discursive rather than literal. With the symbolic lack of the 
imaginary object—the mother’s desire—the phallus is ‘castrated’ (1977b:289). 
The absence of the other makes signification possible, signification in which, 
like the male cult, the phallus might misrecognise itself, and be misrecognised, 
as a powerful and self-sufficient subject or as an illusory kind of gift, albeit one 
that can never be repaid, much less unilaterally possessed. The ‘function of the 
phallus is to pass for the signifier of the desire of the other’ (Nobus 1999:113). 
While its relational construction, its gender, detachability and ambiguous 
position as master-signifier make the Lacanian phallus a useful template for a 
reconsideration of masculinity in Melanesia, its most trenchant attribute is its 
irretrievable, yet ambivalent, dispossession from desire, its absent centre. The 
phallus is associated with the loss of pleasure. But the register in which Lacan 
casts this alienation is not single toned. The phallus is signified in people and 
things that represent both presence and absence at once. Again, like male cult 
spirits, the phallus is an emptiness that appears as a force in society, thus to 
divide, or subtract, women from men by virtue of its illusions. Its modality 
is one of combination, mixture and incongruity consisting of rupture and 
continuity, melancholy and optimism. ‘The phallic signifier’, as Žižek phrased 
this contradictory quality, is ‘an index of its own impossibility. In its very 
positivity it is the signifier of “castration”—that is, of its own lack…In the 
phallus, loss as such attains a positive existence’ (1989:157).
Post-colonialism, however—the condition of authority in societies emerging 
from the experience of colonisation (Mbembe 1992)—as distinct from post-
colonial critiques of hegemonic discourse (Said 1978; Young 2001), requires 
modification of the Lacanian phallus. Amid post-colonialism, everything—
every illusory signifier of legitimacy—is pluralised. Instead of a singular Name-
of-the-Father, multiple languages, names, cosmologies, laws, medical systems, 
currencies, and so forth coexist, perhaps in competition with each other, as 
rival signs of equivocal intervention. So instead of one Symbolic into which the 
phallus is castrated and exiled, I posit two Symbolics, both of which take their 
cut from the ‘very life’ of the subject, thus to ‘bind him to the signifier’. Two 
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Names-of-the-Father—that is, two discursive bodies—‘symbolically castrate’ 
the phallus, thus to doubly bind him to very different sorts of signifiers of his 
alienation. Together, the two Symbolics—the many pre-state, pre-capitalist 
ones, and that of modernity—give rise to unpredictable, complicated chains of 
signification. In my view, the former are not eliminated by the latter. Instead, 
the register of these chains is not just tragic, joyless and dismembered. However 
impossible or inaccessible they might be, the post-colonial scene remains full 
of objects of desire for the subject. Their circuit of meanings is positive and 
productive as well as empty. Of course, this is not quite how Tuzin viewed the 
fate of the male cult in Ilahita (and see also Knauft, this volume). 
Wither Masculinity in Ilahita?
Recall the ingenious trope at the centre of Tuzin’s argument in The Cassowary’s 
Revenge (1997): the myth of Nambweapa’w foretold the retaliation of 
(fundamentalist Christian) women against the deceit of the male cult! The voice, 
in other words, with which Tuzin identified was that of culturally conservative 
masculinity, rather than that of the Christians or with their particular male and 
female constituencies. For Tuzin, the deliberate revelation of the secrets of the 
Tambaran cult by millenarian evangelicals in 1984 devastated its members and 
led to anomie in society at large. Among the many consequences, the male cult 
lost its position as the object of desire in society. Men stopped planting long 
yams for competitive ceremonial exchange. They stopped building cult houses. 
They stopped initiating male youth. The quality of their oratory declined. With 
men deprived of their sacred rationale for solidarity, domestic violence between 
husbands and wives increased. No longer under the authority of cult elders, male 
youth entered into other forms of criminal behaviour as well. Meanwhile, female 
prophets accused men of being polluted by sexual infidelities. Expectations of 
how much money was appropriate in mortuary exchanges to honour the dead, 
and especially men, became ambiguous. Food production dropped. Disease 
spread through the community. 
A grim, melancholy picture, to be sure, but The Cassowary’s Revenge might 
also serve as an account of the relationship of the phallus to the two Symbolics 
I discussed above. If the Name-of-the-Father never totally severs the phallus 
from the other, but leaves him in an impossible state of desire in which objects 
create more desire to the extent that they inevitably fail to fulfil desire, perhaps 
the injunction against the Tambaran that modernity—represented by Christian 
revivalism—managed to occasion, might be interpreted in a less catastrophic 
register. A discussion of what subsequently took place would vindicate me—
for example, the revival of the male cult, in whole or in part. But I do not 
know what has happened in Ilahita since 1985. So instead of reanalysing The 
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Cassowary’s Revenge, I turn to the fate of ritual masculinity in another Sepik 
setting: the Murik Lakes in the estuary of the great river, where I have done 
research since 1981.1 In Murik, modernity has not ‘killed’ the male cult. Rather, 
men improvise improbable, unforeseen chains of substitution. 
So as to develop this rather abstract point ethnographically, I proceed as follows. 
I will first sketch Murik concepts of personhood. I then introduce the Gaingiin 
Society, a public, age-graded society in which rights to senior masks used to be 
exchanged in return for wives’ sexual services. In the next section, I go on to 
analyse a moment in 1988 when money was substituted for sexual intercourse 
during a grade taking. In conclusion, I argue that this substitution took place 
in a broader context in which the pre-state phallus is combining metaphorically 
with the modern, rationalised phallus in several ways rather than just the single, 
tragic modality that Tuzin reported in Ilahita.2
The Embodiment of Murik Personhood 
Domestic community consists of multiple cognatic lineages domiciled in clusters 
of households of siblings and their extended families. While persons define 
themselves and are identified in terms of and through kinship (see Lipset and 
Stritecky 1994), embodiment and the relationship of personhood to the body are 
distinctive and need to be spelled out in a little detail. 
Embodiment is based on three assumptions. One differentiates it through acts of 
nurture. Parents give food to children (Barlow 2010). They are then understood 
not to grow ‘big’ or ‘strong’ for having eaten but to become indebted to them 
both sentimentally and ritually for having benefited from their ‘hard work’ 
(Barlow 1985). A second indication of embodied identity is aesthetic. Gifts 
of ancestral insignia (sumon) are ritually bestowed. The body is recognised as 
possessing several important internal sites: its blood, stomach, semen for men, 
and the womb and breast milk for women. Rather than fixed at birth, however, 
the jural person is defined by an ensemble of shell and teeth ornaments, as well 
as other accessories, that decorates the body. Rank in the lineage is signified by 
conferral of an outfit of individually named sacra, one of which might serve as 
a metonym for the whole, usually its basket (sumon suun) and/or a medallion 
made of boars’ tusks and bird-of-paradise plumage. These insignia are entrusted 
to firstborn members of their senior sibling groups who bestow them upon kin 
during rites of passage and are otherwise obliged to protect them from exposure 
1 Tuzin himself had suggested that my ex-wife, Kathleen Barlow, and I might find the Murik Lakes an 
interesting setting to research.
2 It is commonplace to view post-colonial masculinity in Papua New Guinea as a historical tragedy (Brison 
1995; Knauft 2002; Robbins 2002; Wardlow 2006; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997). 
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to conflict, which pollutes the paraphernalia. The key point here is that the rank 
and identity are viewed as having to be presented to the bodies of kin. Of course, 
they are not given at random. They are transacted in return for the ritual work 
donors received from previous generations, which reciprocity defines the jural 
body (Lipset 1990). 
If its exterior is an object upon which personhood is bestowed, qua food and 
sacred ornamentation, then, to a certain extent, its interior is understood as 
a vehicle. The subject, in this latter sense, is said to be a spirit (nabran) in a 
canoe-body (gai’iin) carrying or transporting insignia. The entailed sequence of 
boarding, departing, passing through a kin or ancestor-based channel, travelling 
over the water, arriving, or coming ashore at the appropriate, kin-based dock, 
and disembarking from a vehicle all foreground the spatial mobility of the 
spirit-subject, but also its separability or detachability from the body—again, 
to invoke Marilyn Strathern’s (1988) phrasing of Melanesian embodiment. In 
daily life, when human spirits (nor) paddle across the Murik Lakes, or travel up 
the coast to Wewak, the town market, they put this schema—of movement, but 
also of their being in society—into practice. 
This concept of vehicular embodiment reaches beyond ordinary, daily life and 
is applied cosmologically. At the same time as people voyage, ancestor spirits 
venture through the lacustrine/marine space in their own zoomorphic canoe-
bodies, such as fish-canoes (tand gai’iin) or bird-canoes (pise gai’iin), among 
many others—canoe-bodies that they may board and then disembark upon 
reaching their destinations so as to return to their humanoid canoe-bodies 
(Lipset 2009:63). Similarly, when human spirits dream, they leave their canoe-
bodies to move about in other canoe-bodies with the spirits of other kin—
mostly dead—before returning to their human vehicles, say, at dawn when they 
get up from under their mosquito nets. That is, dream life is another instance 
of canoeing. In these and other ways, the Murik subject is viewed as composed 
of multiple canoe-bodies that people get into and out of for the purposes of 
travelling to and from kin and the market. 
There is another, occult meaning of the canoe-body. From a masculine point 
of view, but not necessarily a feminine one (see Barlow and Lipset 1997), the 
canoe-body is associated with the phallus. Outrigger-canoe logs are ritually 
transformed from female to male when they are cut down. Carving requires 
chastity that mystically empowers the canoe-bodies of the carpenters at work. 
Their chastity also safeguards the integrity of the wooden hull from sexual 
pollution by women. Canoe prows are intricately adorned with phallus-like 
motifs (see Lipset 2005). Overseas voyages of outrigger canoes were protected 
by the chastity of the helmsman’s wife (Barlow 1985). And, in the aftermath 
of a phase of male initiation, when a father learned that his son had stoically 
withstood the pain of having a sharp blade of a palm of sword grass inserted into 
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and yanked out of his urethra (to show him how to expel the impure feminine 
blood contacted during intercourse), he might exclaim: ‘Oh! My canoe has come 
shore!’ (Lipset 1997:280).
The embodiment of the person/subject in general, and the phallus in particular, 
is thus imbued with vehicular, spatial and transactional meanings; and, vice 
versa, canoes are informed with phallic embodiment. These ideas coalesce 
into a single image. When a son is born, kin are said to observe with relief, 
‘he will take his father’s place’ (yan kaban osangait). The image of ‘taking his 
place’ acknowledges that youth may and should succeed age in occupation of, 
or claim to, the latter’s status, rights and obligations. But it also acknowledges 
that this succession is contingent upon reciprocal agency: it must be given and 
taken. This view of reproduction as generational substitution is not, however, 
understood as reincarnation or biological regeneration. It is rather imagined in 
an idiom of kin-based expectation that further action will result in ‘replacement’ 
(cf. Weiner 1980). This idea has widespread application. The point is that the 
three images—of generational succession as ‘taking the place of’, the canoe–
body–phallus association and the bestowal of rank—combine to form a concept 
of action as the replacement of passengers travelling in decorated canoe-bodies 
through hereditary channels. A son or daughter thus becomes a metaphor in the 
social structure for his or her same-sex parent as actor and node of relationships 
for the parent. In Murik terms, a heir is sometimes said to be her mother’s or 
his father’s ‘canoe’. In this pre-state concept of personhood, the metaphor of 
reproduction is simultaneously the reproduction of a metaphor, of a heir who 
should take over steering a canoe-body. Simultaneously, it is a cultural assertion 
that substitution is not only possible, but is a solace. 
From a Lacanian viewpoint, of course, such an unequivocal view of reproduction 
is just half the story. In addition to relief, the appearance of a heir should also give 
rise to an expression of Non! by which the Name-of-the-Father metaphorically 
expels the phallus into the Symbolic or culture. For Lacan, culture cuts the 
phallus off from the desire of the other—a symbolic castration that motivates 
the subject’s commitment to language, convention and law, on the one hand, but 
also recreates this originary oedipal intervention and the eternal gap between 
the pleasure of maternal acknowledgment and the impossibility of its retrieval, 
on the other. We shall now see that the Murik do indeed value reproduction, 
which is to say, ‘replacement’, as both a consolation and a loss of the other. To 




The Gaingiin Society, or ‘The Name of the 
Father’ in the Post-Colonial Moment
The Gaingiin Society is an initiatory association (Bernardi 1985). It is a system 
of names, masks and rules that affords its members veiled agency in society. It 
is made up of seven age grades, and the membership of each consists of one or 
several cohorts (orub) of men who are said to have been born about the same 
time. Every grade is collectively named after the group of spirit masks (gaingiin) 
it holds. Adjacent grades are related through matrilateral kin ties. Mothers’ 
brothers have junior partners who are classificatory sisters’ sons. They refer 
to themselves, however, as ‘fathers’ of the latter whom they call ‘sons’. In pre-
colonial times, the ethos of which the masks still manifest, ‘the right to give 
battle…[was] retained…in severalty’ (Sahlins 1972:171). Intertribal relations 
were then self-governed, and each village was defended by its male cult. The 
Gaingiin Society, then, served the male cult and the community. It trained 
youth in the skills and defensive postures appropriate to the ethos of warre 
when ‘every man is Enemy to every man’ (Hobbes 1972:223), prepared them for 
the rigours of initiation, and instructed them in its organisation. At the same 
time, its masks asserted authority in certain circumstances in order to facilitate 
the accomplishment of specific ritual goals. In the past 100 years or so, the 
Gaingiin Society has persisted, but it has come to serve different functions, the 
community having long since conceded its reliance upon the military services 
of the male cult to the state and having been thoroughly influenced by petty 
capitalism and missionary Christianity.
In 1981–2001, the seven grades in the Gaingiin Society still possessed their 
masks. Each one had the right to make and don masks that concealed its wearer’s 
domestic identity, at least pseudo-anonymously.3 The masks went on being 
imagined as warrior spirits. As spirits, they are mute and bearers speak not a 
word while appearing in them. As warriors, they may attack anyone junior in 
grade to themselves. Young men in the entry-level grade, whose masks are called 
Gaingiin (see Figure 3.1), constantly stalked village avenues and plazas chasing 
and menacing uninitiated children with throwing sticks. Children would flee (in 
delight). Gaingiin is a well-loved, but earnest and scary, bogey who associates 
the public square, at least among children, to the aforementioned Hobbesian 
posture, made into an intense game of chase. Once in a while, a parent might 
hand over a toddler to the monster, who might be seen holding it up over its 
head, as the child screams in terror, struggling to be given back to its mother or 




father. When Gaingiin does so, the toddler will cling to the parent as if for dear 
life. Public space is alive with threatening spirits whose names mothers and 
fathers yell to bring children to heel when they do not listen. 
Figure 3.1 A proud, newly initiated Gaingiin grade
Photo: David Lipset, 2001
The Dimbwan and Bananain masks (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) belong to two of the 
top grades in the Gaingiin Society. As bearers of its senior authority, who 
oversee a measure of civitas, they have a right to install a community-wide taboo 
against the harvesting of coconuts. That is, the two spirits may (temporarily) 
supersede corporate property rights—a nontrivial privilege in pre-state terms. 
During the run-up to major feasts, such as end-of-mourning rites or initiations, 
ritual sponsors may oblige Dimbwan and Bananain to make property markers 
(jaba’iin) out of the midribs of sago fronds (saidug). Grade members beat them 
so that yellow streamers, which are 90 cm or more long, dangle from the stiff 
part of the midrib that is left. The two masks will then erect the jaba’iin at the 
openings of channels and footpaths leading to coconut groves, which are then 
said to become ‘their property’. If someone steals coconuts, the Dimbwan and 
Bananain maskers may chop down the coconut groves in which the theft has 
taken place and attack the village at large with spears. In addition, the two 
masks provide ‘security’. In 1993, for example, I saw Dimbwan ‘escort’ a group 
of women through the coconut groves to a waterhole and then bring them home. 
‘He’ did so, it was said, to make certain that no coconuts were stolen along the 
way. The two masks also have the right to suspend their taboo temporarily and 
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allow the gathering of coconuts, should a contingency arise, such as a drought 
or a funeral. When the Dimbwan grade agrees that sufficient coconuts have 
accumulated in ‘their groves’ to supply a pending feast, they will secretly adorn 
themselves with flowers in the bush and return to the village to declare by their 
appearance that final preparations for the feast should start.
Figure 3.2 Bananain
Photo: David Lipset, 1993
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Figure 3.3 Dimbwan 
Photo: David Lipset, 1993
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The taboo the senior masks install exerts a supra-social, yet indirect, kind of 
authority over the whole community in a flexible register that is named and 
masculine, but masked and numinous rather than human. The question is: 
authority over what? Over property represented as coconuts. Coconuts are 
property, to be sure. In Murik terms, however, they are also associated with the 
breast. That is, coconuts evoke the desire of the other prior to the intervention 
of the Name-of-the-Father. This connection is surely visible (and audible) in 
the way Murik people literally suckle coconut milk (dapag arum) out of them. 
It is made explicit in the effigy of a spirit woman called Namiit, who appears in 
a phase of male-cult initiation, her breasts then being represented by coconut 
half-shells attached to her torso. The reference is also made with grotesque 
inflection during a rite of reversal called noganoga’sarii. Following the death 
of a successful lineage head, women and men attack each other, armed with 
coconut half-shells filled with a fetid mixture of animal faeces and mud that 
they try to stuff in the mouths of affines (see Lipset and Silverman 2005). More 
data could be adduced about the maternal symbolism of coconuts (see Lipset 
1997:279). Suffice to say that the taboo forbidding their harvest begins to 
suggest an authority that might be likened to a Lacanian injunction tabooing 
the desire of the other revised in terms of a Melanesian semiotic—for example, 
the ethic of reciprocity and interdependency of a culturally particular variety. 
The compensation in return for promotion into the most senior grade confirms 
this interpretation. 
‘The Snake Caught Me!’
Until the 1960s, taking the Dimbwan mask demanded a ‘total prestation’ (Mauss 
1973:3) from the Bananain maskers. As I indicated above, each member of the 
senior grades has a junior partner in the adjacent grade who is his classificatory 
sister’s son, but who is ritually addressed as a ‘son’. The senior man’s ‘son’ 
eventually is granted rights to the mask. In order to compensate his ritual ‘father’ 
for grade taking, the leading ‘son’ had to permit his ‘mother’—for example, his 
wife4—to ‘marry’ his ‘father’ in the Dimbwan cohort. The provision of a wife’s 
sexual services was called ‘sending [lit. doing a] his skirt’ (dago’timariin) to his 
counterpart. That is, a husband would ask his wife to offer to engage in sexual 
intercourse with his senior masking partner. Should she agree, her expression of 
desire for the ‘father’ set further ritual exchanges in train that would culminate 
in the grade taking of the whole cohort.5 In 1981, the late Murakau Wino 
sketched out the sequence to me.
4 A wife may be addressed or referred to as ‘mother’ in Murik kin terminology. 
5 See Thurnwald (1916) and Fortune (1939) for two other accounts of the exchange of sexual intercourse in 
the context of warfare and male-cult ritual in the Sepik region. And see also Lipset (1997) for a discussion of 
wife lending in the context of the Murik male cult. 
Echoes	of	the	Tambaran	
84
Husbands and wives belonging to the Bananain grade would paddle 
across the lakes to collect sago frond midribs. Upon returning to the 
village, they would pile them up in an isolated, private spot in the 
coconut groves. That night, the leading member of the junior grade 
would ‘send his skirt’ to his ‘father’ (his classificatory mother’s brother). 
The provision of sexual intercourse by the junior partner’s ‘mother’ 
was said to ‘pick out the thorns of the sago frond caught in his feet’. 
The woman would go to him carrying a sago frond over her shoulder. 
Placing the base of the frond on his shoulder, the husband’s ‘father’ 
acknowledged her desire. 
The couple would go off together to the pile of sago fronds that were 
to be used to make the raffia-like cloaks of the new Dimbwan masks. 
The couple would have intercourse there. The woman would then 
return to her husband and declare: ‘The snake caught me!’ (Ma wakun 
tenangakum). The leader of the junior grade—that is, the man who had 
just sent his wife—would then gather the rest of the couples in the 
cohort together to prepare a feast for the whole senior grade who were 
to instruct them how to assemble the Dimbwan costumes. 
The phallus, or ‘the snake’, as I say, was not meant to inseminate the wife of 
the junior masker. That is, it was not meant to impregnate the woman; it was 
rather offered as a phallic pleasure given in return for the work he and the 
senior grade would do to prepare the masks for the initiates. Its reproductive 
significance was, rather, afforded transactional meaning. The wife’s/mother’s 
sexuality was imputed reciprocal use value; its pleasure, as well as the husband’s 
implicit resentment at temporarily having to relinquish (rights to) her, were 
compensation. By having intercourse with the junior woman, the senior masker 
became obliged to yield his and his grade’s paramount status in the Gaingiin 
Society. They would initiate the junior cohort and retire. Now symbolism in the 
grade-taking rite does indeed evoke birthing imagery, as we shall momentarily 
see, so in this sense, the formulation of sexuality as exchange, and the metaphor 
of replacement, becomes a culturally specific formulation of reproduction, 
which of course recalls the great Trobriand ethnography of Annette Weiner 
(1978, 1979, 1980). 
Weiner was concerned with expanding the temporal and material purview of 
cycles of reciprocal exchange. Her central point, however, stressed the importance 
of incorporating local concepts of exchange, wherein the Trobriand concept of 
reproduction as ‘replacement’ became her exemplar—‘replacement’ being their 
gloss for the elaborate and extensive transactions that result in sociological 
succession (Weiner 1980:78f). My interest in the Murik notion of ‘replacement’ 
in the Gaingiin Society in post-colonial Papua New Guinea obviously differs 
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from Weiner’s focus on exchange theory. I am interested in the relationship, and 
the connections, between pre-state and post-colonial meanings of masculinity 
that I compare and contrast with the Lacanian phallus. 
So as to petition entree into the senior signifiers in the Gaingiin Society, instead 
of being cut off from the desire of the other by the Name-of-the-Father, a junior 
masker would voluntarily give in to symbolic castration by conceding ‘his 
mother’s desire’. What is more, the senior man would not permanently taboo his 
ritual ‘son’ from maternal desire, but would rather return her desire to him. She 
goes back to her husband, happily celebrating his partner’s phallus; ‘The snake 
caught me!’ she would exclaim, the announcement of which brought with it 
the prestige and authority of her husband’s partner’s mask. The temporary 
transfer of conjugal rights opened the door of initiation to the junior grade. 
The dependency of the phallus upon their ‘mother’s desire’ could not have been 
made any more plain in this scenario. But instead of being colonised by her loss 
into the emptiness of the Symbolic, the door led elsewhere. It led to another 
phallus.
1988: Installing a coconut taboo 
Giving ‘skirts’ for the purposes of compensating initiators ended in the Gaingiin 
Society when a new gift—money—was substituted. In order to argue that 
money became a signifier of the pre-state phallus in this context, and eventually 
that this substitution belongs to a larger itinerary of the signified, I now return 
to the late 1980s, only a few years after Tuzin found Ilahita in the throes of 
a messianic revolution that had left cultic masculinity in ruin. At that time, 
Lissant Bolton, Kathleen Barlow and I had undertaken the Sepik Documentation 
Project, for which we were buying contemporary objects for, and documenting 
existing collections in, the Australian Museum (Lipset and Barlow 1987). As 
our concomitant theoretical aim was to investigate changing concepts of value 
in intertribal trade, we called on selected villages along the north coast and on 
the Lower Sepik and interviewed people about historical and contemporary 
exchanges, in addition to marketing and eliciting data about photographs of 
museum objects. When we got to the Murik Lakes in August 1988, we bought 
a Yangoron costume in Darapap village, the Yangoron masks being a family of 
spirits that belongs to a mid-level grade in the Gaingiin Society, which had been 
imported from Mushu Island up the coast to the west of the Murik Lakes. They 
appear in public from time to time dressed in coconut-bark capes and overalls. 
‘Father’ and ‘son’ masks are distinguished (from their ‘mother’) by big, erect 
phalluses that bounce up and down as they dance among bemused audiences 
who might serenade him (Figure 3.4). That is, the Yangoron family plays a comic, 
rather than a threatening, role in the community.
Echoes	of	the	Tambaran	
86
Figure 3.4 Yangoron (right) with his parents who are escorting him to the 
boat
Photo: David Lipset, 1988
In the course of negotiations to buy the ‘son’ from his grade, I went to a meeting 
in the male cult house. The men of the Dimbwan masks were then being tasked 
with the installation of a taboo forbidding the harvesting of coconuts in the 
run-up to a female-cult initiation rite that was pending (see Barlow 1995). As 
men waited for a feast that the rite’s sponsors were preparing, rather heated 
discussion arose.
The Dimbwan grade, a man called Ker began to complain, had not fed 
the Bananain masks [of which he was a member]. He did not want the 
masks of his grade to gather stalks of sago palm and pound out fringe 
from them (jaba’iin), so the senior grade might then erect them as taboo 
markers. Wapo, a senior man in the Dimbwan masks, offered [to sponsor] 
a meal for the junior grade in the name of his cohort, so that the taboo 
could be properly installed. 
The exchange, in which the junior masks should work for the senior masks 
in return for a feast and ritual support, is normative in Murik kinship. Youth 
expect that age will nurture them in return for which they will feel obliged to 
serve their elders. Ker was upset, in other words, that his grade was hungry. So 
why should they work?
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Ker stood. He demanded to be initiated into the Dimbwan grade and 
complained that too many junior men had been promoted ahead of him. 
A firstborn son, he went on to admit, could replace his father in the 
senior man’s grade, especially should he have grown old and his ‘wood 
had rotted’. Sitting next to me, Sivik, who was a generation younger 
than Ker, whispered that he himself had taken his father’s place in the 
Dimbwan grade just this way. Sivik pointed to Kaibong, younger than 
Ker, who had been promoted ahead of his cohort after giving his wife 
to his mother’s brother, and had taken the opportunity to bring several 
junior men along with him, but not Ker. 
Ker’s reproach—that he had been ritually ignored by the senior masks—
was based on an assumption, again coming from kinship norms, that needs 
to be made explicit. Not only are youth expected to be demanding, age fully 
acknowledges a desire to spoil them. But never vice versa. Age ought not ask 
anything of youth. To do so would degrade the self as ‘young’. Cooperation from 
youth may be had only indirectly through strategic acts of care and nurture. Ker 
might have been grumbling, in other words, but as he belonged to the junior 
mask, his grievance was culturally normative. In Lacanian terms, if discourse 
arises from the loss of the other’s desire, it signifies the empty phallus. From this 
standpoint, the generous presence that the youth would demand—expressed in 
age-differentiated norms of generalised reciprocity—recalls the other’s absence 
and arouses desire for her desire all the more. Initiation into the senior mask, 
however much of a deprivation it might require, must signify both the mother 
and the castrating loss of her desire, thus binding the subject to the signifier, as 
Lacan’s epigraph had it. The phallus—both symbolic and organic—is therefore 
never far to seek in the Gaingiin Society. 
To wit: promotion in the Gaingiin Society is not fixed by chronological birth but 
is negotiable. Why is grade skipping warranted and how is it indemnified? It is 
justified in terms of the phallus. The substitution of the firstborn son, or other 
youth, for an ageing father was meant to preserve the phallus, not as metaphor, 
but now as organ, as a literal recipient of the desire of a junior masker’s wife. 
It is also justified by the ambition of a junior man wanting to advance ahead 
of his cohort, which required sending his ‘mother’ to have intercourse with 
his ‘father’. Grade skipping denoted the phallus, albeit in a characteristically 
Melanesian register. The subject enters a new level of ‘the Symbolic’ not by 
having to give up the desire of the other to the Name-of-the-Father but rather 
by trading upon that desire with ‘him’.
Back at the male cult house, the co-sponsors of the women’s initiation rite, 
Kaibong and his co-wife Tasi, were serving a meal. Its purpose was to obligate 
the senior maskers to taboo the gathering of coconuts so enough would be 
available to fulfil ritual needs. A leaf-covered set of plates filled with rice or sago 
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pudding and garnished with fish was set out in the middle of the floor. Discussion 
continued about grade taking in the Gaingiin Society. Money, the men agreed, 
had replaced ‘skirts’. Having previously sent his wife to his mother’s brother, 
as I had been told, Kaibong had become the leader of the Dimbwan masks. In 
addition, to honour the retiring grade with a feast and aragen—the ceremonial 
porridge made of coconut milk and dried coconut meats—Kaibong now set the 
price for grade taking at K200.6
Kaibong (standing before the meal): ‘This little food [I now offer] is from 
my wife [and is meant to compensate Dimbwan] to set up the taboo 
markers (jaba’iin) in both Darapap and Karau [villages].’ 
Mathew Tamoane (a Bananain member) stood: ‘Our initiation [into the 
Dimbwan masks] should [take place] right away! It will take a bit of time 
to collect money from the members of the grade. We must take Dimbwan 
now and pay later!’
Kaibong (in anger): ‘You [Bananain masks] must pay us first!’
Murakau (as a senior member of Dimbwan): ‘Right!’
Ker (as Bananain leader): ‘Food is easy. We can give you food now. But 
money is a little harder. Can you give us a little time for it? The feast 
will be staged soon. If we want to get the money together, there will 
not be enough time to gather a lot of dry coconuts for the [ceremonial 
porridge].’
Wapo (a senior member of Dimbwan): ‘We won’t allow debt. We want the 
food and the money at once. Otherwise, we will just put the Dimbwan 
[costumes] together and wear them ourselves!’
Ker: ‘I will go to [town] and come back and get the jaba’iin [sago fronds 
for the coconut taboo and the costumes] and beat them with my grade.’ 
[The Dimbwan grade divided up plates of food among themselves and 
began to eat, acknowledging their obligation to set the taboo by doing 
so.] 
The standing of the Gaingiin Society was relatively uncontested in 1988. Even 
Seventh-Day Adventist men, unlike the revivalists in Ilahita, were clearly not 
out to disband it. Ker, Wapo and Mathew Tamoane, who advocated holding the 
grade-taking rite as early as possible, were all leading Seventh-Day Adventists. 
Neither did anyone dismiss the Gaingiin Society as a waste of time that could 
be better spent on modern pursuits, such as the villagers’ small-scale fishery. 
6 In 1988, PNG K1 = US$0.85.
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Instead, men assumed that the Gaingiin Society would and ought to go on. Their 
issue was how to reproduce it within the post-colonial context; in other words, 
how to convert the value of the phallus—for example, a ‘mother’s desire’—into 
money. How many PNG kina was a ‘skirt’ worth?
Grade Taking and the Metaphor of Money
The grade taking took place a few days later. Unfortunately, I had left Darapap 
by then to go back upriver to the Catholic Mission at Marienberg, where my 
Australian Museum colleagues and I were based. I did manage to collect one 
account of what took place when I subsequently spoke to Joshua Sivik, one of 
the retiring maskers, shortly thereafter.
The Dimbwan grade decided that K200 was too dear. We cut the price 
in half. K30 was then paid us, leaving the rest as debt. Enoch, Ker and 
[another man] each paid K10 and became leaders of the grade. Kowre 
and Sauma [two senior men] accepted the money. The rest of us were not 
paid. Sauma gave his share of the money to Kiso, his wife, because she 
had intercourse with his mother’s brother. 
In the history of the Murik phallus, this substitution had already taken place 
in several other contexts. Now it was confirmed once again. The currency 
of the post-colonial state replaced—and was thus held to be functionally 
equivalent to—sexual intercourse. Money became a metaphor in the sense that 
its association with ‘skirts’ was that between two separate domains of meaning 
(Lakoff and Turner 1989:103). Ethically, what kind of metaphor had money 
become? It did not tip a Weberian shift from an otherworldly sexuality into an 
erotic sensuality (1946, 1978). Nor did it tip the arrival of a modern subject–
object distinction. Inner life did not instantly become rationalised. From 
transactional and sociological viewpoints, the metaphor of money had not been 
exchanged between strangers. Although the Australian Museum did buy the 
Yangoron mask, the money for the Dimbwan grade taking was paid to mothers’ 
brothers who were clearly not out to maximise profit. The senior grade offered 
a ‘number two’ price because they wanted to help the junior grade rather than 
exploit them. The money, to put it plainly, was both a gift that signified the 
Murik phallus and the universalist and rational phallus of modernity. 
Let me finish discussing my informant’s narrative of the grade taking. The 
senior Dimbwan maskers gave way to their junior counterparts whom he called 
the ‘children’s grade’ (naje’orub). In the event, the ritual work of installing the 
coconut taboo was combined with the initiation of the Bananain maskers.
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They gathered sago palm fronds in a motor-canoe. Both husbands and 
wives of the senior grade then beat the fronds [for the cloaks of the 
costumes]. The men assembled about twelve Dimbwan costumes inside 
the Male Cult Hall. Classificatory mothers’ brothers made specific masks 
for their sisters’ sons. I made the mask called Saboganap for Komsing 
and made Dagodago for Luke. The Bananain grade presented a feast to 
the Dimbwan grade for this work. The Dimbwan grade then beat the 
junior grade as they crawled through a tunnel of their legs. 
Ker paraded through the village as Mwaraynor with the Mindamot 
lineage insignia (sumon) as a headdress. Coconuts were broken in his path 
to honor the insignia. The rest of the newly promoted Dimbwan masks 
followed him. They were trailed by two masks, called their ‘mothers’. 
The senior, retiring grade then made aragen, the ceremonial porridge, 
for the new Dimbwan grade to oblige them to begin the coconut taboo. 
Eight coconuts were harvested to prepare the porridge. Next day, six 
Dimbwan masks went to Karau village to install a taboo on groves there. 
The grade was well fed.
The relations of production between the grades, that is, had assumed anything 
but a ‘fantastic form of a relation between things’ (Marx 1990:165). Rather, the 
prevailing ethos was one of use value, domestic sociality and personification. 
The two grades were classed in patrifilial terms as ‘fathers’ and ‘children’. 
Married couples worked together to prepare the fringe for the costumes as a 
cohort of masked spirits. The Dimbwan masks were individually named, and 
one mask, called Mwarenor, was decorated like a firstborn initiate privileged to 
display lineage heraldry (Lipset 1990). The initiation of the junior grade by the 
senior masks mimicked a rite of passage in to the Symbolic, on the one hand, 
but on the other it also invoked a kind of grotesque birthing imagery. The ‘sons’ 
succeeded the ‘fathers’ by crawling through a gauntlet of legs. The transfer of 
the masks seemed to recreate the phallus desired by the other. 
The retiring Dimbwan maskers fed and were fed by their successors, who then 
installed the coconut taboo in two villages. When money replaced ‘skirts’, the 
relationship between people and masks remained relatively stable, in other 
words. The masks did not become governed by relations between people in 
a state of independence from each other. Nor had the ethical position of the 
subject suddenly become secularised. Outer life did not suddenly become de-
spiritualised. Nor had inner life suddenly become spiritualised. The masks of 
the Gaingiin Society had rather moved the subject into a neither/nor—not 
quite one, not quite the other—world between the Murik and post-colonial 
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Symbolics. How did the masculinity of the Dimbwan mask fit the broader 
register of substitution and enchained signification in contemporary, post-
colonial Murik culture? 
Recall that Tuzin regarded the actions taken by revivalist Christians against 
the Itahita male cult in the mid-1980s as a symbolic act of ‘murder’ that ‘killed’ 
ritual masculinity, not as a metaphor, or chain of signification, by which the 
two institutions continued to reference each another. Culture in Ilahita was 
then divided up between rival nostalgic and depressed post-cultic men and 
the revivalists, who were desperately preparing for the Second Coming. As 
such, the millennial time then in play permitted little other than a perception of 
rupture and masculine anomie. 
Facilitated by the cultural concept of replacement introduced earlier, at least 
two, interrelated chains of signification can be distinguished in Murik. The one 
dis-embeds and severs the cultic phallus from the Symbolic, by referencing 
nothing other than the commodity and the market, while the other makes a 
metaphor of the cultic phallus by associating modern ideas, objects and persons 
with it. These two chains of signification converge, I suggest, in a rather more 
complicated tone of masculine alienation than the tragic one Tuzin lamented so 
eloquently as having overtaken Ilahita. 
Conclusion: The phallus in post-colonial Murik
Like Sahlins’ Hawaiians (1985), as well as many Pacific peoples, the Murik began 
to call whites ‘yabar goan’, or children of the yabar spirits, at or soon after 
first contact, the yabar being a superior class of ancestor spirits who possessed 
great powers to transform the landscape and persons. In Durkheimian terms, the 
yabar were a collective representation of autochthonous mastery over space and 
society. In Lacanian terms, the yabar represented a lack, or a desire for the lost 
desire, of the other. The yabar spirits have long since disappeared from Murik 
animism, but the term yabar goan certainly remains in widespread use. Indeed, 
‘white man’ is the most commonplace meaning of yabar, although not with a 
presumptively racialised valence (cf. Bashkow 2006). I have repeatedly heard it 
in reference to PNG nationals. The concept of yabar would thus seem to denote 
the technological space of urban capitalism where punctual subjects work for 
salaries, purchase goods and travel in yabar ‘canoes’—cars, boats and airplanes—
regardless of skin colour. The resources of the yabar—both as space and as 
social category—are viewed as morally problematic, challenging and difficult to 
deal with. Although they recognise and appreciate its vigour and wealth, both 
villagers and peri-urban Murik complain that they are made uncomfortable by 
it, not provisioned, protected or advanced by its meagre attentions. The moral 
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agency of the yabar spirits might have exited Murik cosmology, but the contour 
of their enormous powers remains. Yabar has become a null signifier in their 
Symbolic. At the same time, yabar has come to refer to modernity. This semantic 
extension, I argue, exemplifies a chain of substitution that does not just signify 
rupture, but rather doubles the absent desire of the other, thus to build upon 
that archaic castration. 
Let me cite several substitutions—large and small—of this emasculating kind. 
Today, men will prevail upon any makeshift kind of sealable container—for 
example, glass jars or little metal tins—to hold the lime powder they use when 
chewing betel-nuts. In the past, they had gourds engraved with geometrical 
designs, which only initiated men used, and which they named for the overseas 
lover who had given it to them (see Figure 3.5). As metaphors of a phallus 
contingent upon the lost desire of the Murik other, the jars and tins no longer 
refer to ‘her’ lack. Now, they refer to a second lack, which figures men as poor 
and unsophisticated ‘grassroots’, in the national slang (see Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.5 Man with lime gourd
Photo: David Lipset, 1988
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Figure 3.6 Man with glass jar for lime powder
Photo: David Lipset, 1982
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In pre-state society, rival moieties used to consecrate the male cult house (taab) 
by competing to ignite fire by friction, the victorious side then taking the honour 
of relighting the hearth fires in the community, all of which were extinguished 
prior to the event. This was part of an elaborate ritual dialogic between male 
and female, in which the male cult asserted a claim on maternal nurture (and the 
female cult answered by attempting to shake down the whole building by its 
pilings). Today, men still talk about this moiety competition in these very terms 
in connection with the consecration of new cult houses that are being built. But 
the relationship of the male cult to women’s cooking and the illumination of 
the night, while still relying on firewood gathered from the Murik Lakes, have 
become mediated upon disposable butane lighters, kerosene, hurricane lamps 
and battery-powered flashlights. These commodities, as I propose, both do and 
do not refer to the male cult and ‘his’ absent other, the ‘skirts’ with which its 
moieties ‘fought’. 
In the contemporary technology of sleep, we might see a similar itinerary of 
the masculine signifier. Today, men and women sleep (with children) inside 
mosquito nets bought in town. Until the mid-1950s, the Murik slept in long, 
dark hand-woven bags (arug), together with the skulls of grandparents. In the 
morning, as they crawled out, they took the relics and ‘fed’ them cigarettes 
and betel-nuts. The interiors of mosquito nets do not demark spaces that have 
become completely disconnected from the lineage because people interact with 
ancestors in their dreams. But of course they are disconnected from the division 
of labour, the weaving of the bags having been women’s work. Today, moreover, 
people sleep on foam pillows. Pre-state pillows—headrests—were made of 
wood propped up by little bamboo legs. They were engraved with imagery of 
ancestor-spirits and their zoomorphic totems—pigs in particular. Only men 
manufactured and used headrests, which is why they expressed male desire. 
Foam pillows do not signify their ornate predecessors. Foam pillows are gender 
neutral. Qua metaphor, they do not signify the Murik phallus. They rather index 
(the low level of) Murik integration in consumer capitalism. Pillows, however, 
together with mosquito nets, butane lighters, kerosene lamps and flashlights, 
remain links in a signifying chain of masculine negation, or, in Lacanian terms, 
of symbolic castration.
Like the substitution of money for sexual intercourse in the Gaingiin Society, 
the chains of signification that circulate in post-colonial ritual exchange index 
a complicated, multi-level kind of masculine alienation. There is, for example, 
a category of valuables called mwaran that includes several kinds of prestige 
goods, such as tobacco, betel-nuts and pigs, as well as shell ornaments, and a 
wide variety of ritual services, the most important of which was the exchange 
of ‘skirts’. The Murik speak of hereditary feasting partners who donate ritual 
mwaran as belonging to the ‘valuables route’ (mwara yakabor). Today, toea coins 
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appear together with shells woven onto the aprons of loincloths they give male-
cult initiates. Instead of shell and teeth ornaments, appropriate mwara kin now 
place PNG bills on the chests of corpses soon after death for the deceased to use 
en route to the afterlife. In the past, the mwara kin used to give new loincloths, 
their apron panels painted with snake-phallus motifs (see Lipset 2009:57), to 
their partners as part of their provision of end-of-mourning services. Today, 
they give them new shirts, dresses and shorts. Disenchantment is certainly a 
reference of these clothes (Eisenstadt 1968), and use value is no doubt being 
dis-embedded by these commodities (Giddens 1990). They are, however, 
incorporated within, rather than displaced from, Murik social structure and its 
reciprocities, thus to evoke the symbolic castrations of the past in the present. 
Perhaps most indicative of this chain of masculine alienation are the fibreglass 
boats in which the Murik travel along the coast from the lakes to the market 
town of Wewak. These little vehicles replaced the lineage outriggers whose 
prows were protected by male ancestor spirits and whose construction process 
and consecration rites also convened dialogue about the relationship of the 
cultic phallus to the desire of the other (see Barlow and Lipset 1997). Wooden 
planks, connoting an outrigger platform, are laid down to cover the floors of 
these dinghies (Figure 3.7), planks on which cargo is stored and people sit, 
continuing to divide themselves by gender as they used to do when riding on 
outriggers where men sat near the prow and women sat aft. Outboard motors 
have long since replaced coconut-bark sails. And their steering arms have long 
since replaced the big wooden steering paddles helmsmen used to hold (Figure 
3.8), outboard motors whose power, of course, requires gasoline and clean 
sparkplugs rather than the desire of the other for the phallus (Lipset 2011:30–1). 
Now, a bus named for a lineage outrigger carries fare-paying passengers through 
the streets of the provincial capital (Figures 3.9 and 3.10). As a metaphor of 
masculine alienation, the fibreglass boats, outboard motors and the bus all 
reference the pre-state castration for which they are substitutions. These objects 
not only rationalise the Murik phallus. They add a new lack onto the lack for 
which the phallus stood. They shift its dependency on the desire of the other, 
as in the Gaingiin Society, and move that lack into modernity, where money 
denotes both the old lack and the new lack. Tuzin’s vision of ‘the death’ of 
masculinity in a millennial Ilahita finds a parallel in this chain of signification, 
to be sure. In this chapter, however, I have tried to show that the chain of 
masculine signification, the substitutions of local by modern values in Murik 
ritual exchange, material culture and semantic extensions might combine both 
continuity and discontinuity. The persistence of the phallus, as a paradoxical 
embodiment of deprivation in signification, suggests, rather than anomie, a 
rather equivocal picture of post-colonial masculinity, one that simultaneously 
fills out what is missing and represents its absence. 
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Figure 3.7 Man steering an outboard in a dinghy
Photo: David Lipset, 2008
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Figure 3.8 Helmsman with steering paddle in outrigger canoe
Photo: Franz Kirschbaum, 1908
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Figure 3.9 The outrigger canoe Diskum
Photo: David Lipset, 1982
Figure 3.10 The bus Diskum 
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4. Men, Modernity and Melanesia
Bruce M . Knauft
During the period of Donald Tuzin’s impressive fieldwork—from the late 
1960s through the mid-1980s—themes of traditional male cults and masculine 
assertion in Melanesia (MMM1) had special purchase in the anthropology of 
Oceania and more widely. By the 2000s, another triplicate—of mobile men with 
money (MMM2)—has gained particular purchase (for example, Lepani 2008), 
along with various other dimensions of modern masculinity. In many of these 
more recent treatments (see Taylor 2008), Melanesian masculinity is often seen 
through the lenses of guns, drunkenness and pronounced, often brutal, male 
violence.
In 1997, an articulation between the first of these emphases and the nascent 
academic awareness of the second was attempted in a powerfully provocative 
book by Donald Tuzin: The Cassowary’s Revenge. The present chapter takes 
stock of these trends on the basis of significant changes in masculinity that I 
have been able to document among the Gebusi of Papua New Guinea’s Western 
Province (Knauft 1985, 2002a, 2010). 
Donald Tuzin’s imposing documentation of Ilahita Arapesh male cults and 
masculine practices (for example, Tuzin 1976, 1980, 1997) harboured several 
themes. Parallel with the then-prominent focus on male warrior-hood and 
sexual antagonism in Melanesia (for example, Allen 1967; Herdt 1982; Herdt 
and Poole 1982; Langness 1967, 1974; Meggitt 1964), Tuzin posited a functional 
dimension to elaborate male secret-cult activity among Ilahita Arapesh: male 
cults cultivated, organised and brought coherence to male organisation—and 
violence—in ways that were both instrumentally productive and ultimately 
constitutive of its culture, including its beliefs, values and ethics. Tuzin’s first 
book (1976) documented how the elaborate dual organisation of Ilahita Arapesh 
society integrated diverse and, to some extent, refugee groups into itself in a 
Durkheimian manner—enabling a demographically large and militarily powerful 
extended community to repel the raids and incursions of neighbouring Abelam 
and other groups. In his second major book, Tuzin (1980) demonstrated the 
deep underpinning of the Ilahita social, organisational and masculine ethic of 
controlled violence—and misogyny—in the elaborate practices, rituals and 
myths of the multi-stage Tambaran male secret cult. In his third and most 
controversial volume (1997), he proceeded, based on ethnographic re-study, to 
document the demise of the Tambaran cult, the accompanying destruction of 
Ilahita Arapesh traditional culture and the death, as he termed it, of Ilahita 
masculinity itself (for example, 1997:181). Finally, Tuzin drew ominous links 
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between the alienation of Ilahita culture and the alienation of masculinity in 
the absence of all-male institutions that could offer ‘sanctuary’ (1997:Ch. 8). 
As such, he created a broad if not sweeping connection between masculine 
insecurities in Melanesia and what was then just coming to be seen as the need 
for a coherent ‘men’s movement’, organised by and for men, in California and 
other parts of the United States. As Losche (this volume) suggests, Tuzin’s last 
major book on the Ilahita Arapesh differs significantly from the rest of his work 
in having a different tonality—more personally engaged, emotionally open and 
provocative—that expands upon his overall corpus.
In the earlier literature of the 1960s through to the early 1980s, speaking 
broadly, anthropologists suggested that Melanesian male insecurity was fuelled 
by warfare and other threats to male corporate integrity—and that the male 
response was collective bonding through ritual and social cult organisations 
exclusive to men and, commonly, institutionalised sexual antagonism that 
collectivised men over and against women. Though the functionalist assumptions 
of this line of reasoning were highly open to critique from feminist perspectives, 
more recent social changes have created a set of conditions that transformed and 
also maintained these tensions (however they arose to begin with). In particular, 
Melanesian masculinity has been threatened by increasing social emphasis 
on, but also great practical impediments to, obtaining money and Western 
commodities. Without these, men’s status has been compromised, especially 
in relation to outsiders and the previous colonial presence (see discussion in 
Knauft 1997). 
Consistent with the fact that commodity goods and money are often or typically 
considered individual in possession in Melanesia—notwithstanding their 
additional possible use in, or conversion for, collective exchange transactions—
contemporary threats to masculinity in Melanesia have dovetailed with 
the de-collectivisation and individuation of masculine social life as widely 
reported in the literature on Melanesian social change, including male youth 
violence, criminal activity, opportunistic and/or extramarital sexuality and 
urban violence, including by so-called raskols (for example, Hart Nibbrig 
1992; Strathern 1993; Wardlow 2007; cf. Haley 2008). Rather than fuelling 
traditionally collective and institutionalised sexual antagonism between men 
and women within communities, the modern inflection of gendered tension 
has arguably resulted in more focused individual and domestic, rather than 
collective, gendered antagonism (for example, Wardlow 2009). With the demise 
of collective cult activities, central longhouses or their equivalent, and the 
mythic and ritual moral authority of elders, younger men (as reported by Tuzin 
and many others) have been less restrained in individual aggressive or violent 
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assertiveness towards women as well as with other men, including within the 
community, than they had often been before (for example, Sykes 1999). As a 
result: 
Male status remains culturally and morally dependent—in some ways 
more so than previously—on constraining female sexuality and limiting 
women’s wider cultural and economic relationships. Male insecurity, 
opposition to women, and the desire for male collectivity have been 
reinstated in new guises at the same time that they have disengaged from 
customary institutions such as the male cult, the men’s house, or the 
warrior society. At the same time, male social life involves an increasing 
proportion of transient and non-traditional affiliations, including work-
groups and the relation of male comradeship through leisure activities 
such as drinking or gambling, which require money. (Knauft 1997:250)
These patterns are not disjoined or disarticulated from previous trends so 
much as they draw upon them in new contexts and guises amid individualised 
pressures. As Lipset (this volume) puts it, one now has at a minimum two 
alternative, local ‘Symbolics’ in Melanesian societies such as the Murik—the 
one made up of pre-state institutions and the other consisting of modernity—
which together give rise to unpredictable, complicated chains of signification.
As pointed out by Holly Wardlow (Personal communication), an important link 
in reinforcing contemporary patterns of masculine insecurity and male violence 
is the threat posed not just by women in general but by the individualisation 
of women’s agency under contemporary conditions—including the active or 
potentially active participation of women as agents in church, markets, in town 
and city businesses—and as sexual agents, including as ‘wanton women’ or 
pasinja meri (Wardlow 2006). Resentment and constraint against women by 
Melanesian men, often accompanied by a palpable sense of violent backlash 
against them, are prominent themes in an important suite of papers edited as a 
special issue of The Australian Journal of Anthropology by John Taylor (2008). 
In this and other works, the link between gendered change, masculinity and 
locally and regionally modern challenges to men seems substantively born out 
and amplified. 
In significant respects, Donald Tuzin’s later work (1997) illustrates this pattern 
from within a local village context; he considers a detailed case of male alienation 
and frustration in the wake of the demise of a key, if not all-encompassing, 
male cult system. Beyond Tuzin’s premonition of deep anomie, however, he 
had little evidence or inkling of the extent and intensity of Melanesian male 
aggressiveness that were brewing in the modern Melanesian context, including 
in the nexus between alcohol, drugs and guns—nor of the great variations 
bequeathed from past traditions that were developing across Melanesia. 
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MacIntyre suggests for Melanesia that ‘[b]eer drinking and, to a lesser extent, 
marijuana use have become the quintessential ways that masculine sociality 
is expressed and they provide the means for expressing relations of conflict, 
aggression, and retribution’ (2008:190). Furthermore, 
its most negative social effect is the way beer consumption and use of 
guns have become behaviours that differentiate men with wealth and 
power from those who have none…The image of a ‘man with a gun,’ 
primed for action, is pervasive in PNG and connotes not only the state’s 
capacity to use force, but that of men to fight their own battles and to 
resist and subvert state control. (MacIntyre 2008:190)
Even among the Gebusi, who presently have a minimal rate of male violence, 
almost half of the schoolboys when asked to draw a picture of what they wanted 
to be when they grew up drew elaborate pictures of themselves as police officers 
or soldiers in the PNG Defence Force (Knauft 2002a:199-200).
Viewed in historical and cultural context, however, it remains important to 
consider current trends without positing them as a violent consequence of 
Melanesian modernities alone. For instance, as Bell (2006), Lipset (2006) and 
Halvaksz (Halvaksz 2006; Halvaksz and Lipset 2006) have illustrated, while 
the introduction and use of marijuana in Papua New Guinea connect with the 
perception of modern social ills, they also illustrate longstanding continuities 
of trade and exchange, substantialisation of personhood, and generational 
conflicts between senior and younger men. 
In many areas of Melanesia, rates of violence and killing during the pre-colonial 
era, including in societies with active men’s cult societies, were likely at least 
as high if not much higher than those presently evident (Knauft 1990). Though 
there is some truth to the suggestion that, prior to colonialism, ritualised male 
authority helped to channel and orchestrate male aggression from an intra to an 
inter-group focus, much of this functionalist reasoning is undercut by the fact 
that many forms of violence were more frequent and intense prior to colonial 
pacification. That ethnography grounded in structural-functionalist assumptions 
had its heyday during a period of relative late-colonial calm, during which 
social institutions from the past could be documented without experiencing 
the intensity of their prior violent actualisation, easily magnifies this sense of a 
‘palaeo-terrific’, in which Melanesian masculinity was functionally ordered on 
its own except as disrupted by external forces and influences. At any rate, as 
MacIntyre notes: 
Studies of the violence of men in marginalized indigenous communities 
have in various ways attributed contemporary emphases on aggressive, 
self-assertive individualism to the emasculating effects of colonialism…
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attributing contemporary violence to the breakdown of ‘traditional’ 
inter-generational authority structures…This historicist, exculpatory 
approach to the issue works at an abstract level but fails utterly as an 
explanation for any specific acts of violence. (MacIntyre 2008:187)
To concretise these issues in the present case—and to provide a complementary 
perspective—we can consider recent changes in masculinity and in violence 
among the Gebusi of Papua New Guinea. By 1998, Gebusi had experienced 
major changes that paralleled in some respects those documented by Tuzin 
(1997) for the Ilahita Arapesh. Longhouses had disappeared, initiations were no 
longer practised, indigenous costuming had been largely relegated to folkloric 
displays for government ceremonies, Christianity had supplanted traditional 
spirit rituals and seances, and communication with the unseen spirit-world 
forces was negligible. Among Gebusi as well as the Ilahita Arapesh, as Lipset 
puts it in his contribution to this volume, ‘cultic men lost their position as the 
object of desire in society’. The rate of Gebusi violence—which included a very 
high homicide rate that made up 32.7 per cent of all adult deaths, mostly the 
execution of accused sorcery suspects—dropped to a fraction of this and then 
to zero after 1989 (Knauft 1985). 
Along with these changes, and helping to account for them, was the post-colonial 
advent of Christianity, schooling for children, government development projects, 
a cash-based semi-weekly market, the mushrooming of small local stores, sports 
leagues and reliance on police to settle severe disputes and deal with the threat 
of significant physical violence (Knauft 2002a, 2002b). In terms of masculinity 
per se, I did not sense the anomie or alienation among Gebusi men that Tuzin 
reported for the Ilahita Arapesh but rather a decentralisation of male social life 
and an increasing modern ‘bravado’ of masculine speech styles, hortatory and 
urban-style dress and music, all of which contrasted with previous ritualised 
ways of asserting and maintaining masculine status, including through rituals 
of male initiation and traditional dancing (for example, Knauft 2010:Ch. 10). 
Upon returning to the Gebusi 10 years later, in 2008, I was concerned to know 
whether the previous pattern of locally modern but non-lethal masculinity I 
had found a decade earlier would be continued—or overthrown as patterns of 
modern frustration, resentment and lack of economic development continued 
in this out-of-the-way corner of Papua New Guinea. My concern was magnified 
during my re-entry to the area, as the local airstrip had been closed due to poor 
maintenance, government inefficiency and neglect, and virtually all government 
workers at the local Nomad Sub-District Office had consequently left for Kiunga 
or other towns or cities in Papua New Guinea. As a result, local government 
services—including the elementary school, police force, development projects, 
sports leagues and folklore celebrations and sponsorships—were all defunct. 
The subdistrict health centre had no doctors or medicines, and the Nomad 
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market had become desultory, affording few goods, fewer buyers and highly 
inflated prices for any outside commodities. Given that the region has no roads 
to other parts of the country and was highly dependent on the local airstrip, the 
closure of its airfield and the departure of the wage-paid government employees 
caused a collapse of the cash economy of the Nomad Subdistrict, including for 
the Gebusi communities within it. 
How did Gebusi respond to these difficult circumstances? Against my 
expectations, the Gebusi living in the communities of my past association and 
study—the constituent hamlets of Gasumi Corners—had developed a striking 
resurgence of customs and practices that had been moribund and, I thought, 
virtually dead 10 years before, in 1998 (see Knauft 2010:Ch. 12). By 2007, a 
new central longhouse had been built. Male initiations were once again held, 
and traditional dancing, with costumes identical to those in 1980, was highly 
in evidence (cf. Lipset, this volume, concerning the persistence of male-cult 
activity among the Murik). Collective male etiquette that included the sharing 
of home-grown tobacco smoked from long bamboo pipes, the collective drinking 
of locally prepared kava, and heightened male sexual banter, camaraderie and 
horseplay were all pronounced. In significant ways, Gebusi male ethos was more 
similar in 2008 to what it had been in 1980 than to what I had observed and 
experienced during the Gebusi’s locally modern phase in 1998. 
Subsistence patterns had also become more traditional. In 1998, the dominant 
local crop was sweet potatoes—both for local consumption and to sell to cash-
wielding family members of government officials at the Nomad market. Raising 
sweet potatoes required the Gebusi in Gasumi Corners to keep their pigs caged 
and fodder fed on the other side of the broad Kum River—that is, away from 
their root-crop gardens. Ten years later, in 2008, the domesticated pigs were 
back in the village. Root-crop gardens had been depleted and not replenished, 
and there was little incentive to cultivate produce for the Nomad market. 
In contrast, subsistence activity had returned more concertedly to the large 
expanse of the primary rainforest. In short, Gebusi resuscitated infrastructural 
as well as cultural patterns that were reminiscent of their pre-colonial past.
Some customs had not resurfaced or been rejuvenated. These included male 
spirit mediumship and men’s collective seance communication with indigenous 
spirits for advice and divination. So, too, the rate of active sorcery divination, 
accusation and violent attack or execution of sorcery suspects had never 
resurfaced to its previous extraordinarily levels; it remained low to nonexistent. 
No homicides had occurred in my communities of association or were known 
from other neighbouring Gebusi communities during the preceding 10 years. 
As such, the homicide rate among the 150-odd persons whose descendants I 
had known well since 1980 had continued to be zero between 1989 and 2008, 
despite an extraordinarily high homicide rate among their predecessors from 
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approximately 1940 to 1975. Though my stay was not long enough to effectively 
gauge changes in domestic violence or marital relations, the impressions I did 
have were that these were largely unchanged and were not more antagonistic 
than they had been either in 1998 or in 1980–82. 
In some selective ways, to revisit earlier ethnographic contributions, Gebusi 
changes reaffirm possibilities that I think Don Tuzin would have liked, even if 
he did not envisage or imagine them for the Ilahita Arapesh or more generally. 
On the one hand, a palpable male collective social life based on camaraderie and 
longstanding collective ritual expression has again become alive and well among 
Gebusi. On the other hand, some of the more troubling traditional concomitants 
of this ritual, spiritual and cultural system—including extremely high rates 
of violent sorcery attribution and homicide—have been effectively reduced to 
very low levels, and this pattern has continued for more than two decades, from 
the late 1980s to at least 2008. 
How and why Gebusi developed and are maintaining their present pattern of 
rejuvenated male social life but without significant violence—and after a period 
of intense locally modern adoptions during the 1990s (see Knauft 2002a)—
are both important and challenging questions. It cannot be easily claimed 
that Gebusi patterns are widely evident across Melanesia. Gebusi themselves 
suggested in 2008 that neighbouring Bedamini peoples to the east had significant 
problems with marijuana use, the quest for guns, a sense of cultural alienation 
and elevated rates of male aggression. 
In contrast with many peoples in Melanesia, Gebusi retain their distinct ability 
to return to the land and subsistence regimes that supported local populations 
for decades if not longer in the pre-colonial past. They have not been subject 
to significant wage labour, out-migration, cash cropping or the opportunities 
and challenges of connection by roads to other parts of the country. As such, 
they appear to have a particular potential as well as motivation under present 
conditions to rediscover or reinvent previous ways of being while also retaining 
introduced orientations, including Christianity, increasingly on their own terms. 
After being first contacted by Australian patrols in 1962–63, Gebusi were 
effectively bypassed amid the colonial effort to pacify the more populous and 
militaristic Bedamini people to their east. On the other hand—also in contrast with 
many other groups in Melanesia—Gebusi had been on the verge of becoming a 
remnant population incorporated by aggressive neighbours. Perhaps consistent 
with this, they have not had a strong sense of their own cultural history or 
elevated cosmological past, even among the senior generation, against which 
current developments are seen as morally abased or degenerated. This historical 
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and cultural context informs the Gebusi’s ‘presentist’ emphasis, including their 
strikingly robust orientation to new, locally modern ways of life during the 
1990s when these were most actively within their reach (Knauft 2002a). 
As several contributions to this collection emphasise, including those by 
Lipset and Losche, large-scale arguments all too easily generalise or stereotype 
Melanesian gender relations and features of masculinity in particular. From 
nineteenth-century images of bloodthirsty Melanesian savages and mid–
twentieth-century views of functionally controlled male ritual systems to early 
twenty-first-century views of male Hobbesianism—an almost Lord of the Flies 
perception of Melanesian male aggression—accounts have projected Western 
fears, or Western hopes, onto Melanesians (Knauft 1990; cf. Dinnen and Ley 
2000). Against the grains of truth or significance that have informed and 
undergirded such generalisations in each case, individual Melanesian societies 
and circumstances evince their own distinctive development. On the one hand, 
for instance, the challenging and often troubling current trends of Melanesian 
masculinity as documented in Taylor (2008) appear to have significant purchase 
in various parts of Melanesia. As an overall emphasis, however, this orientation 
risks ‘basket-casing’ Melanesia and threatens to put the region back in the savage 
slot to which it has been relegated for much of anthropology’s professional past 
(cf. Trouillot 1991). 
Against this, it is important to reassert the importance in cultural anthropology of 
taking local cultural and historical features at their face value. Notwithstanding 
globalisation, and indeed because of locally derived appropriations of 
modernity (Knauft 2002b), Melanesia’s diversity continues to belie generalities 
that derive primarily from a single group or a small cluster of societies, be it the 
Gebusi, the Ilahita Arapesh, the Enga, the Huli, the Lahiri people, the Murik, 
or others. Amid current economic retrenchment, the cutting back or collapse 
of rural government services and proliferating local ways of responding to new 
conditions across Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji—not to 
mention West Papua and New Caledonia—it is hard to imagine that the cultural 
diversity of Melanesia, and of Melanesian masculinities, will wither rather than 
widen. 
This suggests that a further emphasis in current perspectives is in order—an 
MMM3: a renewed awareness of our own continuing tendency, to misjudge 
Melanesian men. To historicise this misjudgment, we might recall the death 
of traditional Melanesian cultures that has been so sombrely predicted, 
inaccurately, since the mid-nineteenth century, including the widespread 
development of so-called ‘salvage anthropology’. It is important not to downplay 
either the persistence of longstanding patterns of Melanesian belief or the 
orientation or periods and even epochs of great cultural reorientation, change 
and transformation. Both of these patterns continue as beliefs and practices 
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from one period settle and morph upon those bequeathed from another. Some 
older patterns might never resurface while others lie dormant to be resuscitated 
in new guises of resurgence or rediscovery. In the mix, older patterns change if 
not transform even as they persist, while newer patterns establish continuities 
even as they break from the past. 
Rosier and darker views of Melanesian masculinities might be considered in 
this light. For several centuries at least, much of Melanesia has seen patterns of 
violent male behaviour along with elaborate—and wonderful—cultural systems 
of belief and orientation that both reinforce and transcend or outstrip them. The 
remarkable diversity of these patterns is likely to continue. Amid this trend, 
it is easy to overlook exceptions to dominant current perceptions, including 
specific cultural environments, segments of social life, and masculinities that 
seem relatively peaceful or at least non-violent and pro-social. The Gebusi in 
current circumstances appear to fit this last characterisation. 
In conclusion, I should register a limitation that the perspectives of Don Tuzin 
and I—our differences notwithstanding—have both in significant ways failed 
to transcend. This is the lack of an adequately articulated view of female-
centred perceptions, actions and beliefs to parallel that of men’s. Barlow and 
Lipset’s (1997) discussion of the complementary and also dialogic aspects of 
Murik male and female perspectives is particularly important and illustrative 
in this regard. The truism that gender relations are neither male nor female 
is still rather inadequately confronted in much contemporary anthropology, 
including both an emphasis on men to the relative exclusion of women and the 
tacit complementary assumption that gendered anthropology is largely in fact 
an anthropology of women or of femininity. As the work of Holly Wardlow and 
others attests (see Hirsch et al. 2009), the task of documenting and articulating 
Melanesian male and female orientations often yields great ethnographic and 
analytic benefit even though—and in some ways for the very reason that—it 
can be difficult for a single primary researcher to initiate and methodologically 
maintain such complementary gendered perspectives during fieldwork.
In their introduction to this volume, Lipset and Roscoe describe Donald Tuzin 
as an ‘anthropologist’s anthropologist’. In my own experience, this is especially 
true of Don’s ethnography. Tuzin’s three big books on the Arapesh—The Ilahita 
Arapesh, The Voice of the Tambaran and The Cassowary’s Revenge—are all 
marvels of intricate and nuanced ethnographic portraiture. By itself, detailed 
ethnography is not unusual; for a great number of world areas, one can find 
scores of rigorous scholarly monographs, however dry and tedious they might 
otherwise be. What sets Tuzin’s work apart is his writerly ability not just to 
make the wonderful nuance of ethnography come alive but to construct a larger 
portrait, configure a broader purpose and, in the process, tell a bigger story. This 
makes Tuzin’s ethnographic contributions endearing—and also provocative (see 
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Losche, this volume). Agree or disagree with his theoretical premise or analysis, 
the depth, richness and sheer power of his portrayals, mounting as they do 
towards crescendos of larger signification, force you to examine exactly how, 
when and for what reasons you might diverge from his view. Don Tuzin was 
both an ethnographer of cultural artistry and an ethnographic artist. Would 
that we could all be so lucky—or enjoy the process as much as Don himself 
always seemed to do. 
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5. Signs and Wonders: The uncanny 
verum and the anthropological 
illusion
Kevin Birth
As a Caribbeanist studying under Donald Tuzin, I was struck by the ways in 
which Don could make the implications of his ethnographic work relevant to 
my struggles with material from Trinidad. Often this involved delving into the 
ontological and epistemological relevance of ethnographic details, in order to 
create a context to relate Trinidad and New Guinea. This chapter is, in many 
respects, a continuation of some of those conversations.
An uncanny event is normally viewed as something unexpected and 
unexplainable. Even in anthropological thought, uncanniness is a 
phenomenological concept that serves as a catalyst for cultural meaning but 
eludes cultural control. Analytically inspiring, methodologically unplanned and 
ethnographically untamed, uncanny events gain significance for anthropologists 
and their subjects because of how they bind together a culturally constituted 
human quest to understand the vicissitudes of the world with anthropologists’ 
quest to understand human thought and behaviour. Throughout his work, 
Tuzin explored the nexus between uncanny coincidence and cultural efforts to 
craft significance. Informed by works such as Charles Morris’s Foundations of 
the Theory of Signs (1938), Susanne Langer’s Feeling and Form (1953) and Isaiah 
Berlin’s essay on Giambbattista Vico (1976), Tuzin confronted the uncanny in 
all its ontological obscurity and cultural salience. This chapter builds on this 
foundation to explore how the uncanny can be socially planned and culturally 
crafted rather than accidental.
An Uncanny Death in Trinidad
Soon before I returned to Trinidad in 1996, Constantine died. The circumstances 
of his death were disturbing. He had gone hunting with his dogs and several 
friends and, during the hunt, he became separated from his partners. When 
it was time to return home, he could not be found. The next day the hunters 
returned to look for him, and they found his body in a place where they thought 
they had looked the day before. Constantine’s body was being guarded by one of 
his loyal dogs in a part of the jungle associated with jumbies—the spirits of the 
dead. Such places are here and there in the forest where one finds indications 
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that somebody had once farmed—lone cocoa trees or fruit trees or stands of 
non-native species of tubers. Far from any current road or habitation, these 
places are disconcerting. They conjure up a spectral presence of human activity 
where none was expected. This is not merely a recent phenomenon: in his 1884 
book, Trinidad, L. A. A. de Verteuil mentions a survey of the forest conducted 
in 1849, approximately 40 years before the first official titles were given to any 
land in this part of Trinidad. De Verteuil says the surveyors found evidence of 
previous occupation: 
These gentlemen observed, on their route, several cacao-trees: were they 
accidentally planted, or are they the natural growth of the country? 
They fell in also with brush-wood, and a few lime-trees; such being 
evidence that, during slavery, the maroons or fugitive slaves resorted to 
that spot as to a fastness. (1884:331) 
Along with the occasional discovery of human bones in the forest, such places 
affirm that the jungle is a mysterious place with secrets. But the jungle is not a 
homogeneous space; only particular locations are spooky. Constantine died in 
one such place; his dog kept silent guard over his body in that place; and his 
body and dog eluded the efforts of his friends to find him for a day.
Significance was given not only to the place of Constantine’s death but also to 
the timing. Constantine had died at a moment in his life when he was unusually 
embroiled in local conflicts. He had been a highly respected man. After he 
retired, he was still robust and full of energy. In addition to devoting himself 
to his land and to his hobbies, he became a leader in local politics. He was of 
unchallenged character, and his suggestion that there was local-level corruption 
garnered attention at the same time as it cultivated bitter animosities among his 
political foes. Only a short time before his death, political passions had reached 
fever pitch in a hotly contested parliamentary election that had resulted in a tie. 
So Constantine had enemies. Death under such circumstances in a haunted 
place was a coincidence that evoked images of supernatural forces at work. As 
Khan (2004:109–18) has described for Trinidad, belief in such forces is part 
of the Trinidadian spiritual landscape, and these beliefs span the religious 
diversity of the island, which includes Christians, Hindus and Muslims. Obeah 
and ‘science’—both means of manipulating supernatural forces and spiritual 
agents—are employed to address small and large problems and to redress 
major and minor offences. Obeah and science are also parts of the folklore of 
Trinidadian politics. Particularly powerful political leaders are associated with 
having supernatural powers—such as the ability of the union leader T. U. B. 
Butler to elude police capture during the labour riots of 1937. The leaders of 
Trinidad have never gone to the extent of Françoise Duvalier (Papa Doc), the 
Premier of Haiti from 1957 to 1971, in actually dressing to mimic the image 
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of a spirit, as Duvalier adopted the dress and style of the Vodun loa Ghede—
the guardian of the cemetery—but there have been moments when Trinidadian 
leaders have engaged in public performances with supernatural implications, 
such as Prime Minister A. N. R. Robinson’s use of a bois while recuperating from 
injuries he suffered during the 1990 attempted coup d’état. A bois is ostensibly a 
walking stick, but it also has an association with obeah and the magic associated 
with stick-fighting. Robinson made no attempt to downplay this connotation 
that his new bois gave him magical strength, and in fact when convalescing 
posed for photographs with his new bois.
So the uncanniness of Constantine’s death was built on a foundation of local 
shared knowledge about the forest and shared ideas about the supernatural. This 
was a death that needed to be explained in terms that transcended the religious 
and ethnic divisions found in Trinidad. The uncanniness of the event spurred 
an inter-subjective, inter-ethnic, interfaith acknowledgment of the truth of 
spiritual forces. At the wake, Hindus, Christians and Muslims all agreed on the 
strangeness of Constantine’s death and displayed shared feelings, in response, 
that there is more to existence than the familiar. 
In fact, the discussions at the wake for Constantine were quite unusual. I have 
attended many Trinidadian wakes, and usually discussions about the cause of 
death are expressed in terms of either biomedicine or humoural medicine. Even 
unexpected deaths are explained in these terms, such as when a seventeen-
year-old died a few years before Constantine. In this case, the youth’s autopsy 
indicated that he suffered from an aneurysm, and the discussions at the wake 
focused on his engaging in ‘hot’ activities followed by taking a cold shower in 
the middle of the night that caused a blood vessel in his brain to ‘bust’. The 
uncanniness of Constantine’s death was not merely that it was unexpected, and 
not merely that he died in a part of the forest associated with jumbies, and not 
merely that his body was not found for a day despite his companions’ attempts 
to find him, but the combination of all these factors with the conflicts in which 
Constantine had been embroiled. The constellation of elements associated with 
his death pointed to forces beyond body humours and medical conditions, and, 
for that matter, beyond the religious differences between Hindus, Christians 
and Muslims.
The Uncanny and Cartesian Epistemology
In some respects, the feeling of the uncanny evoked by Constantine’s death is 
discussed in Freud’s essay ‘Das Unheimliche’. Cixous describes this essay as 
‘a commentary on uncertainty’ (1976:525), but its equivocations and elisions 
display signs of Freud’s own uncertainty, as well. In the essay, Freud occasionally 
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admits and recounts some of his own uncanny experiences and, in so doing, 
he generates a problem for himself. While he intellectually dismisses uncanny 
experiences as a problem of reality testing and repetition compulsion, his claim 
that superior rationality and reality testing allowed him to dismiss the uncanny 
becomes compromised by his admission of a certain reality to the uncanny:
We—or our primitive forefathers—once believed that these possibilities 
were realities, and were convinced that they actually happened. 
Nowadays we no longer believe in them, we have surmounted these 
modes of thought; but we do not feel quite sure of our new beliefs, and 
the old ones still exist within us ready to seize upon any conformation. As 
soon as something actually happens in our lives which seems to confirm 
the old, discarded beliefs we get a feeling of the uncanny…Conversely, 
anyone who has completely and finally rid himself of animistic beliefs 
will be insensible to this type of the uncanny…The whole thing is 
purely an affair of ‘reality-testing,’ a question of the material reality of 
the phenomena. (Freud 1976:639; emphasis in original)
For Freud, the uncanny creates uncertainty, and he seems unwilling to accept or 
believe that it has ontological implications. He assumes, a priori, that it creates 
an illusion grounded in the repetition of some unconscious anxiety. Yet, the 
phrase ‘actually happens’ haunts Freud enough for him emphasise it, and this 
phrase will continue to haunt the discussion here of the uncanny. Freud is 
caught in a dilemma: his idea of reality testing forces him to dismiss beliefs used 
to understand something that ‘actually happens’ and which, therefore, involve 
‘the material reality of the phenomena’. 
Freud’s dilemma emerges from his Cartesian epistemology. The uncanny often 
refers to events in the world that ‘actually happen’, but Freud can only address 
and eventually dismiss the interpretation of the events, not the ‘material reality’ 
of the events themselves. In the case of Constantine’s death, the place and time 
were not psycho-dynamically determined. One could argue that there was 
still no need to explain his death beyond natural causes, yet what disconcerts 
contemporary Trinidadians about the part of the forest that gave Constantine’s 
death its uncanny character also disconcerted de Verteuil in 1884 and surveyors 
in 1849. The uncanny is uncanny because, in Freud’s words, some aspect of the 
‘material reality of the phenomena’ in the world ‘actually happens’, and this 
material reality demands an explanation. 
In his separation of the mental from the material world, Descartes suggests that 
there are different methods of study for each. Descartes claims that we know our 
minds better than our bodies and that the knowledge of mind is due to ‘natural 
enlightenment’ (1983:6). The material world consists of ‘objective reality’ 
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outside human thought (Descartes 1980:70–1). But in Descartes’ discussion of 
his idea of objective reality one again finds the seeds of conundrum posed by 
the uncanny: 
[I]f we posit that something is found in the idea that was not in its 
cause, then the idea would get it from nothing; but as imperfect a mode 
of being as this is, by which a thing exists in the intellect objectively 
through an idea, it nevertheless is surely not nothing; hence it cannot 
get its existence from nothing. (Descartes 1980:72)
The Cartesian dilemma seems to be that the uncanny is either a part of objective 
reality or it comes from nothing. Freud’s solution is to attribute it to repetition 
compulsion; uncanniness derives from a previous objective reality being added 
to present perception. The problem of the anxiety about Constantine’s death was 
not due simply to memories and cultural ideas of jumbies but to coincidence: the 
‘objective reality’ of his death in a place with traces of long-disappeared human 
cultivation in purportedly virgin rainforest. 
Descartes’ division of knowledge led to an emphasis on observable and 
measurable facts in the social and physical sciences. Empirical research had 
to be contextualised as investigating a world of facts. As Poovey (1998) has 
shown, the ontological status of these facts is not as secure as many might 
hope. The definition of fact, she argues, has its roots in rhetoric—namely, in 
how information is represented as objective. She notes that the modern fact 
only emerged in an episteme that distinguished between observed particulars 
and theory so that these observed particulars could become evidence capable 
of supporting or disproving theories (Poovey 1998:92). Built upon Descartes’ 
division of knowledge, matters of spirituality lie outside of the realm of observed 
particulars. 
This creates a dilemma for the scientific study of religion as separate from 
theology, for it excludes the phenomenology of the spiritual from analysis on 
grounds that it is not observable evidence. Based on Descartes’ famous statement 
‘I think, therefore I am’ (1983:5), it also separates the study of matter from the 
issue of ontology; the ‘I am’ is a consequence of ‘I think’, and thought has an 
ontological status superior to that of the material world that would exist even 
if the body did not (Descartes 1980:18). In fact, the existence of the material 
world is simply taken for granted: ‘that there really is a world, that men have 
bodies, and other such things, concerning which no one of sound mind has ever 
seriously doubted’ (Descartes 1980:54). 
In this dualism, the uncanny is disruptive. The coincidences on which the sense 
of the uncanny are founded are observable particulars, but these coincidences 
serve as an indicator of mystical connections beyond observation. In this way, it 
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is similar to Otto’s exploration of mysterium—one component of his discussion 
of the idea of the holy. Mysterium involves a sense of something ‘hidden and 
esoteric, that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and 
unfamiliar’ (Otto 1950:13). But the ease with which the experience of mysterium 
can lead to the idea of the holy suggests a bridge across the Cartesian divide, 
and, as a post-Cartesian troll, Freud does not want that bridge crossed. Part of 
the Cartesian dilemma posed by the uncanny, then, is that it involves something 
that ‘actually happens’, which evokes mysterium. 
The Cartesian dualism thus places Freud in an uncomfortable if not untenable 
position. In response to the uncanny, Freud suppresses it in favour of a non-
spiritual, observable reality as determined by his preconceived notion that 
reality testing only includes observable particulars and therefore must exclude 
the spiritual. 
Donald Tuzin had no such problem. Tuzin invoked Vico’s critique of Descartes’ 
dualism as a means to avoid being impaled on the horns of the Cartesian 
dilemma of choosing between the spiritual and the material. He was particularly 
enamoured of Isaiah Berlin’s discussion of Vico in Vico and Herder. Berlin 
(1976:25) represents Vico’s view on Cartesian dualism as: ‘Descartes is the 
great deceiver, whose emphasis on knowledge of the external world as the 
paradigm of all knowledge has set philosophy on a false path.’ In contrast, 
Vico developed a distinction between verum and certum—truth and certainty. 
His idea of truth was that it was created by the human mind; according to 
Berlin (1976:13–14), only ‘where we make or design something out of literally 
nothing, can we be said fully to understand what we have made; for in that 
situation to create, and to know what and why we are creating, is a single act. 
This is how God creates.’ Certum, on the other hand, refers to the human mind’s 
relationship to the physical world. In this relationship, the world is perceived, 
not directly constructed. This gives natural scientific knowledge of the world 
an epistemological status different from that of truth. In contrast, the study 
of human efforts at creation—the study of history for Vico and the study of 
culture for Tuzin—allows a window into verum. As Berlin put it: ‘In history we 
are the actors; in the natural sciences mere spectators’ (1976:67). 
The concept of verum—the creation of truth—is an important dimension of 
Tuzin’s study of the Tambaran cult of the Ilahita Arapesh. Tuzin was not a 
simple Vichean, however. He coupled truth with illusion: truth ‘cannot even 
be known to exist—except through the medium of illusion’ (1995:298). Tuzin’s 
idea of illusion in religion is better thought of as the magician’s creation of 
experience to generate wonder rather than as Freud’s (1961) cynical emphasis 
on delusion in his The Future of An Illusion. Tuzin emphasises the aesthetic of 
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the magician’s creation of illusion, including the awareness of the Arapesh men 
that they are the ones engaged in the creation of the illusion and that secrecy is 
necessary to pull it off.
Tuzin coupled Vichean dualism with Suzanne Langer’s (1953) approach to 
aesthetics and Charles Morris’s (1938) pragmatism. One of his favourite quotes 
was from Langer’s Feeling and Form: ‘But the status of the unfelt feelings 
that inhere in art objects is ontologically obscure’ (Langer 1953:22). Langer’s 
emphasis on the ontological obscurity of the unfelt feelings in art fits well 
with Morris’s pragmatic dimension of meaning. As Tuzin put it, the symbol ‘is 
apperceived to have intrinsic import’ (1977:197). The apperception is at once 
both an individual process and a collective endeavour. The object of religious 
art, such as the Tambaran spirit house, is an object in the world, but the 
powerful feelings attached to the object are less ontologically clear; are they in 
the object or in the mind? Tuzin adopts a Vichean response to this question; the 
focus on apperception rather than perception indicates an active process in the 
creation of meaning rather than a passive process in the perception of meaning. 
The active process in the creation of meaning involves not simply reaction to 
objects but also the creation of objects—one of Langer’s crucial insights. In 
a statement of Langer’s contribution to his thought, Tuzin wrote that works 
of art ‘are not expressive of actual, untransformed emotion, but rather they 
express the idea of emotion’ (1977:198). For Tuzin, the idea of emotion in the art 
spurs a cultural response through social processes; for Tuzin, who was trained 
in the British social anthropological tradition, this was a Durkheimian rather 
than cultural-constructivist perspective. For instance, the paintings associated 
with Nggwal, the spirits of the highest initiation level in the Tambaran cult, 
are an important meeting place of collective religious sentiment and individual 
expression. The Nggwal involves 43 named spirits in which ‘each individual’s 
relationship with his nggwal is personified in a painting’ (1980:175). These 
paintings are then displayed in the outer sanctum of the spirit house on the wall 
that divides the inner and outer sanctums. Tuzin says of this display: 
By its design the gallery wall elevates the symbolic office of these 
paintings to a higher level. Here, in graphic rendition of the conceptual 
realm, the individual spirit is socially ennobled by virtue of its 
placement in a mosaic which orders while pictorializing the collective 
spirituality of the village. In the logic of the Tambaran, therefore, the 
men are quite correct when they proudly proclaim that Nggwal—the 
image par excellence of the village collectivity—dwells in his house. 
Had the scheme been designed by Durkheim himself, it could not have 




Tuzin’s Durkheimian twist on the combination of Langer’s and Morris’s 
approaches to symbols removes the interpretation of symbols from the strictly 
Freudian realm of the connection of the symbol to the individual unconscious 
and instead places the interpretation of symbols into the nexus of individual 
and collective experience and emotion. 
This raises a contrast between Freud’s post-Enlightenment intellectualism and 
Tuzin’s approach to Arapesh religion; in the former, the uncanny is disruptive 
and in the latter, it is catalytic. Yet, Freud’s suppression is not the only form 
of post-Enlightenment response to the uncanny. The colonial encounter 
created another form of suppression: the uncanny could be dismissed as the 
naive superstition associated with the colonised or uneducated masses. In the 
Caribbean, the uncanny is a prevalent component of representations of the West 
Indies, whether it be zombis associated with Haitian Vodun, obeah or spirit 
possession. Palmié (2002:216) traces how brujeria, Cuban witchcraft, came to be 
seen by Ortiz, a student of Malinowski, as ‘an affliction, not of concrete people 
but of the republican mind; a hybrid formation, not just in the literal sense, 
but also in terms of the way in which it seemed to disfigure the identity of the 
clases responsables of the neocolonial republic’. The uncanny in the Caribbean 
is not denied, then, as Freud does, but is seemingly dismissed as attached to 
a deviant, counterproductive state of mind. Within a Cartesian dualism, this 
dismissal is made possible by transforming the uncanny into merely a state of 
mind. But Constantine’s death still haunts this transformation, not because of 
a state of mind but because of the coincidence of when, where and how he 
disappeared and died. The feral, non-native yams and fruit trees in the forest are 
not a state of mind in the Cartesian framework but a component of the material 
world—observed particulars out of which scientific knowledge should be able 
to be constructed. That is what makes Constantine’s death unsettling—namely, 
the empirically observed particulars that unsettle the analytic ability to dismiss 
cultural efforts at interpretation. Even within the colonial logic, as with Freud, 
labelling the interpretations as irrational or deviant only dismisses them, not 
what ‘actually happens’.
Even before Tuzin explicitly invoked Vico in his work, he expressed concern 
about Cartesian dualism and anthropological concepts. His first book, The Ilahita 
Arapesh: Dimensions of Unity, concluded by revealing ontological uncertainty 
in Lévi-Strauss’s theory of binary oppositions. Tuzin wrote: ‘as it is usually 
presented the theory presupposes a Cartesian metaphysic of Mind—the absolute 
autonomy of “reality” as distinct from “experience”—and once this logical 
Rubicon is crossed, there is no further inquiry which is not either teleological or 
formally meaningless’ (1976:329). Later, he wrote: ‘we must resist an unwitting 
participation in the cosmology we are studying which presumes that both it and 
our own scientific ontology are merely different manifestations of a common 
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Cartesian principle’ (1976:334). The surprising conclusion of Dimensions of Unity 
implies that Cartesian epistemologies possibly pose a challenge to empirically 
grounded ethnographic research. The implication is that theoretical constructs 
that assume distinctions of mental and observable phenomena are ontologically 
dubious. It is difficult to tell whether they emerge out of observed particulars 
or whether they are preconceived categories imposed on observed particulars. 
What, after all, is the ontological status of social structure, or culture? Or, if the 
readers of a volume otherwise dominated by Melanesian studies will indulge 
me, what is the ontological status of the concepts of creolisation and hybridity 
that dominate current discussions of the post-colonial Caribbean? 
As descriptive labels, creolisation or hybridity seem to lend themselves to an 
analysis of the discourses of local politics and jumbies evoked by Constantine’s 
death. In the hands of Caribbeanists, these ideas are constantly deployed to 
discuss the nexus of political action and significance with spiritual dimensions 
that seem to have an African or South Asian origin. In Trinidad, the connection 
between jumbies and political strife can be explained by reference to 
Trinidadian’s long experience of colonially created ethnic divisions and post-
colonially cultivated rancorous politics. There is a rhythm to these tensions 
such that they are heightened during and immediately following parliamentary 
elections, which must occur no later than every five years. Constantine was 
embroiled enough in political debates and died close enough to parliamentary 
elections that the coincidence was an important component of conversations 
to make sense of his death. Jumbies are viewed as specteres whose powers can 
be harnessed through the practice of obeah. Hence, it makes sense that being 
in a place associated with jumbies when one has enemies would be potentially 
dangerous. Creoliszation and hybridity focus on dynamic processes that produce 
this mix, but the mix, like the uncanny, often bridges the Cartesian divide. 
There is a problem, however, with perspectives such as creolisation and 
hybridity. One might label an explanation of Constantine’s death as a form of 
hybridity or as a consequence of creolisation, but this, in fact, bypasses the 
problem that nags Freud. Hybridity and creolisation are concepts that refer to 
the consequences of contact between different peoples, but the place and time 
of Constantine’s death are not determined by such contact. His death might 
evoke a creolised response, but it was not creolisation in the conventional sense 
of the term that brought about Constantine’s death in a stand of feral cultigens. 
There are events that ‘actually happen’ that seem outside the purview of these 
concepts from post-colonial studies, and this limit on these concepts is not 
confined to singular events such as Constantine’s death. In response to these 
events that actually happen, creolisation and hybridity merely serve as labels 
after the fact, not really as a means of explaining what has happened.
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Within anthropology, the challenge of addressing what ‘actually happens’ is 
an important part of the longstanding tradition within the field of disrupting 
Western epistemological complacency, such as Evans-Pritchard’s representation 
of his discussion with Azande about the collapse of an old granary. ‘That it 
should collapse is easily intelligible, but why should it have collapsed at the 
particular moment when these particular people were sitting beneath it?’ 
(Evans-Pritchard 1937:69). Evans-Pritchard admits: ‘We have no explanation 
of why the two chains of causation intersected at a certain time and in a certain 
place, for there is no interdependence between them. Zande philosophy can 
supply the missing link’ (p. 70).
The Planned Uncanny
While the uncanny might refer to anomalies, it does not include only the 
accidental and unexpected. This is implied by Freud’s use of a work of fiction, 
Hoffman’s The Sand-Man. If, as Nietzsche argues in The Birth of Tragedy and the 
Genealogy of Morals (1956), the plot of tragedy is known, and this knowledge 
gives its affective import to the audience, the use of a work of fiction to 
demonstrate and explore the uncanny suggests the possibility that the uncanny 
is expected. Freud equivocates on this when he writes: ‘in the first place a great 
deal that is not uncanny in fiction would be so if it happened in real life; and in the 
second place…there are many more means of creating uncanny effects in fiction than 
there are in real life’ (1976:640, emphasis in original). This equivocation is itself 
based on Freud’s Cartesian distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘fiction’, but, from 
Tuzin’s point of view, this boundary is not as clear as Freud wishes. Tuzin argues 
that the uncanny can be created through ritual practice. The sound created by 
the bullroarer is one such case. In his article ‘Miraculous Voices’, he argues that 
a certain type of naturally occurring sound has a perceptual effect on 
some, possibly many, animal species that is intrinsically mysterious and 
thus anxiety arousing; that this sensation is humanly interpreted and 
its accompanying anxiety cognitively resolved by referring it to the 
mystery that is allegedly inherent in the supernatural realm; and that 
certain kinds of ritual sounds capitalize on this iconic resemblance by 
simultaneously mimicking, as it were, factual and artifactual mystery, 
thereby summoning the senses to bear witness to the noetic truth of the 
sound’s religious meaning. (Tuzin 1984:579) 
In his discussion of the association of the bullroarer with Lefin, the Tambaran 
cult’s second age grade and the name of a Tambaran spirit, Tuzin emphasises 
that ‘the active aspect of Tambaran power, to the extent it can be known, is 
conceived by men to reside in its voice’ (1980:57, emphasis in original). This 
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voice is manifested by the bullroarer. When played, this instrument creates the 
sound of Lefin, a ‘big-mouthed, red-haired dwarf’ (Tuzin 1980:60), crying ‘I am 
a great, great man; I am a great, great man’ (Tuzin 1984:582). 
Tuzin states that the sounds produced by the bullroarers ‘are the cult spirits 
represented in their voices’ (1984:582). He argues that the volume and tone 
of the bullroarer not only are heard but are felt; they create infrasonic waves. 
Consequently, the experience of the sound of Lefin is perceived not only through 
normal auditory perceptual paths but is felt through non-auditory paths as well 
(Tuzin 1984:586), thereby fostering a sonic experience and consequent mental 
state that evoke ‘sensations of the uncanny, the dreadedly obscure’ (p. 587). 
In effect, the sense of mysterium Otto described and which is crucial to the 
uncanny can be created and reproduced. It can be deployed to give significance 
to moments of time.
In this sense, the creation or reproduction of a sense of mysterium can be 
related to Benjamin’s (1969) idea of messianic time—the uncanny disrupts 
homogeneous empty time through the demand that the uncanny be given 
meaning. As Robbins (this volume) states, messianic time connects ‘potential 
emancipation’ with events in the present. But I want to maintain a distinction 
between messianic time and uncanny disruptions to homogeneous empty time. 
Uncanny coincidences provoke the creation of meaning that makes a moment 
unique and significant, but they need not convey any messianic hope. 
What messianic and uncanny forms of temporal disruption share is the co-
presence of a sense of existence beyond the lived moment with the mundane 
sequences of life. Such co-presence is at the heart of Augustine’s discussion of 
memory and time in his Confessions, where he argues that the tension between 
time and change and God’s unchanging eternity is what gives time meaning 
(1997:266–72; see also Ricoeur 1984:5–30). One can also view these uncanny 
times as moments when, as Hauser-Schäublin (this volume) discusses, there is a 
co-presence of the transcendental with the lived moment. Put into a rubric of 
time that echoes Augustine’s discussion of time and eternity, such co-presence 
can be a moment when a sense of eternal or transcendent time intersects with 
the sequences of lived existence. 
In Hauser-Schäublin’s chapter in this volume, one gets a sense of how a logic of 
concealing and revealing in the rituals of initiation into grades of the Tambaran 
cultivates such a co-presence. As Tuzin’s The Voice of the Tambaran showed, 
staging these rituals is not an easy or trivial matter, but involves immense 
preparation; the sense of mystery evoked in these rituals through the play of 
revealing and concealing is therefore anticipated and planned. The uncanny 
disruption of homogeneous empty time can be a staged and planned event. 
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In Trinidad, the seasonal timing of ritual observances of different religious 
traditions is a source of the uncanny because of the coincidences created by 
the intersections of Christian and Hindu calendars. The cycles of holidays in 
calendars from different religious traditions intersect to create moments of 
significance. As in Constantine’s death, the coincidences are what foster the 
sense of the uncanny—of a beyond that is not fully known yet actually there. 
Every year, the Hindu celebration of Divali nearly coincides with the Roman 
Catholic celebrations of All Saints’ Night and All Souls’ Night. Divali involves 
lighting deyas—small clay lamps with a cotton wick; All Saints’ Night involves 
lighting candles outside the home; and All Souls’ Night involves lighting 
candles on the graves of loved ones. During my first All Souls’ Night in Trinidad, 
standing in the cemetery among a crowd of Muslims, Hindus and Catholics 
seeking the graves of their deceased loved ones in order to light candles, many 
of my neighbours impressed upon me the parallels between Divali and All 
Saints’; to them, both represented the victory of light over darkness. Divali, 
in fact, is thought to occur on the darkest night of the year—a new moon after 
the autumnal equinox. How might the coincidence of such different religious 
traditions be explained? The Trinidadian cultural response is to engage in a 
form of creolised ecumenical theology—that the similarities between religious 
events reveal a deeper truth than any of the religions individually. 
This local-level, theological explanation emerges from the contact between 
different groups exploring the similarity in timing of some of their religious 
practices—their effort to create a collective truth. The local explanation is an 
example of hybridity and creolisation, but the materiality of the uncanny—the 
component that ‘actually happens’—indicates something beyond a coincidence 
of religious practice. The way in which these calendars interact is a catalyst for 
creolised interpretations but is not caused by creolisation; colonialism brought 
into contact pre-existing calendars from different parts of the world but did 
not create the calendars. In fact, it is the perception of an independent origin of 
these two calendars that makes their coincidence seem uncanny. 
At least in Hinduism, if one moves from religious practice to the justification of 
the practice, one is confronted with an ethno-astronomical explanation. Divali 
is associated with an event in the night-time sky. Hinduism is fixed on the skies 
in ways that contemporary Christianity is no longer. Hinduism, in particular, 
emphasises the coincidence of celestial bodies as crucial to understanding one’s 
fate and making wise decisions. The Hindu claim that Divali falls on the darkest 
night of the year is not merely a cultural claim but an ethno-astronomical one 
based on the decrease in sunlight after the autumnal equinox and a new (or 
dark) moon after what, in the West, is known as the Harvest Moon—the full 
moon nearest to the autumnal equinox that is reputed to be brighter than other 
full moons. 
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It is possible to step out of the context of creolisation in Trinidad and enter into 
a broad play of the uncanny coincidence of the recognition of autumnal celestial 
darkness, since the American celebration of Halloween also coincides with this 
darkest time of the year, as does the Mexican Day of the Dead (which coincides 
with All Saints’ Day and All Souls’ Day). 
Such ethno-astronomical awareness was once part of Christianity, gave 
significance to some holidays and determined the dates of other commemorations. 
For instance, in an essay attributed to Anatolius of Laodicea in the third century, 
the timing of Easter was described in terms of ethno-astronomical significance: 
[A]s long as equality between light and darkness endures, and is not 
diminished by the light, it is shown that the Paschal festival is not to be 
celebrated. Accordingly, it is enjoined that that festival be kept after the 
equinox, because the moon of the fourteenth, if before the equinox or at 
the equinox, does not fill the whole night. (Anatolius 1926:149)
In 1733, Isaac Newton also suggested a tie between astronomy and religious 
commemoration in Christianity:
They who began first to celebrate [Christian holidays], placed them in 
the cardinal periods of the year; as the annunciation of the Virgin Mary, 
on the 25th of March, which when Julius Caesar corrected the Calendar 
was the vernal Equinox; the feast of John Baptist on the 24th of June, 
which was the summer Solstice; the feast of St. Michael on September 
29, which was the autumnal Equinox; and the birth of Christ on the 
winter Solstice, Decemb. 25. (Newton 1998:143)
But ethno-astronomy goes only so far as a form of explanation. Easter is tied 
to Passover, and Passover is determined by astronomical events. Why is it that 
these events coincidentally occurred around the spring equinox when light 
is ascending? Again, the full moon coinciding with the vernal equinox is a 
coincidence observable in the material world. 
The juxtaposition of discussions of the resonances between Hinduism and 
Catholicism in Trinidad and with de-contextualised examples about the sacred 
dimensions of celestial events from Anatolius and Newton is meant to stir a sense 
of uncanny similarity between societies that are not directly connected. This, 
too, was something that Tuzin explored, in his work with Gregor comparing 
Amazonia and Melanesia (Gregor and Tuzin 2001). The uncanny resemblances 
seem to point to elements of psychic unity and, in the case of the impressive 
sound of bullroarers and the coincidence of autumnal holidays, disparate 
cultures that note repeatable, widespread phenomena that ‘actually happen’ 
but which generate a sense of mysterium. Tuzin’s willingness to broach these 
issues in a spirit of scepticism and openness in fact revives the possibilities of 
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broad-based comparisons of cultures. In Tuzin’s approach, this is not to place 
them in broad classifications but to understand components of the human 
cultural creative process. The origins of the bullroarer are shrouded by time, 
and whether its presence in Melanesia and Amazonia is the result of diffusion 
or independent invention was of little interest to Tuzin. What was of interest 
was how the bullroarer created similar experiences in Melanesians, Amazonians 
and ethnographers, and the fact that the similarity of experience prompted 
cultural interpretation. There is also the recognition that societies differ in 
whether they cultivate planned experiences of the uncanny, and the question 
of how societies accomplish this. In fact, even though it is obvious, it bears to 
be stated: a coincidence between the practices of two societies does not mean 
that there must be a coincidence between the practices of all societies for a sense 
of the uncanny to emerge. After all, Islam does not have a commemoration that 
regularly corresponds with Divali or All Saints’/All Souls’ because the Islamic 
calendar is strictly lunar. It therefore has a year that is 11 days shorter than the 
solar Gregorian calendar and never readjusts the lunar to the solar year through 
an embolismic month, as does the Hindu calendar. Yet, even though Islam is not 
part of the uncanny coincidence of Catholicism and Hinduism in Trinidad—at 
least in my field site—Muslims appear at the cemetery on All Souls’ Night to 
light candles and join in the discussion of how all religions celebrate the victory 
of light over darkness.
Still, the existence of coincidences between cultural practices and the practice 
in many societies of cultivating uncanny experiences allowed Tuzin to plumb 
the depths of common ways to stir the human spirit while leaving open how 
such stirring is culturally employed and interpreted.
Ritual, then, can involve not only the creation of truth in response to the uncanny, 
but also the creation of the uncanny by reference to features of the environment 
that ‘actually happen’. The sonic qualities of Arapesh ritual are not accidental, 
and the coincidence of sound and ritual action is planned and practised rather 
than unexpected or unpredictable. Likewise, the coincidence of Divali and All 
Saints’ is part of the annual cycle of holidays. The uncanniness derives from 
the coincidence of two holidays from two different religions representing very 
different cultural traditions within Trinidad. Examples of an expected uncanny 
experience do not diminish its effect; the uncanny qualities of the sound still 
create a numinous experience in Arapesh ritual, and the uncanny coincidence 
of holidays still spurs theological musings.
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The Uncanny and Anomie
Just as the uncanny can be created in order to stir the spirit and create truth, 
Tuzin provides an account of the uncanny being denied. The Cassowary’s 
Revenge explores an idea that is complementary to Vico’s wisdom: the criterion 
of the false is to have unmade the true. The dismantling of the Tambaran made 
it false, but in The Cassowary’s Revenge there remains scepticism about the 
falsehood of the Tambaran. In this ethnographic description, scepticism ceases 
to be opposed to religion but is opposed to any system of truth/falsehood; and 
the persuasiveness of truth and falsehood is against the ground of scepticism but, 
under the new circumstances, the uncanny does not lead to collective conscience 
but to anomie—a move from Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life (1995) to Suicide (1979) as a source for insight. In fact, Tuzin laments this 
in the last chapter of the book, where he discusses the possible functions of 
men’s cults. Maybe there are here clues to understanding the disruptiveness of 
the uncanny for modernity. In an ontological system that dismantles collective 
responses to ontological uncertainty in favour of individualised ontological 
doubt, the uncanny has little power to mobilise. 
In the case of post-Tambaran Ilahita, this disruption had not led to the re-
establishment of a collective consciousness, although it seems that millenarianism 
has had this outcome in other parts of Melanesia (see Robbins, this volume). 
In this regard, the inability to fully resuscitate ontological obscurity in the 
face of socially sanctioned doubt created anomie. Augmenting Durkheim, 
Tuzin’s approach to anomie merges the problem of social isolation with a 
phenomenological experience of anxiety about reality. In one way, this parallels 
Heidegger’s (1962) treatment of the uncanny as a primordial experience of the 
world and the individualised disruptiveness of the uncanny, but Tuzin does 
not agree with Heidegger’s claim that the uncanny is always an individualised 
experience. Instead, he seems to imply that the individualisation of the uncanny 
is a consequence of social disintegration. The public face of the uncanny had 
no concealed dimension of socially sanctioned secrecy. When it is assumed that 
everything known is revealed then the uncanny is unsettling. The possibility 
of a reservoir of ontological obscurity allows for the creation and cultivation 
of secrets that can be deployed socially. The disclosure of the Tambaran cult’s 
secrets did not dispose of ontological obscurity, only this reservoir of secrecy 
with which the obscurity could be handled.
Tuzin’s The Cassowary’s Revenge suggests that, in the wake of the revelation 
of the Tambaran cult’s secrets, the uncanny is not denied, but there is no 
cultural structure remaining that can adequately address it. As Palmié (2002) 
suggests for the Caribbean, the uncanny is more often disavowed than denied. 
It is much more like the situation that Ewing (1997:163) describes in Pakistan, 
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where ‘[m]any highly educated Pakistanis who regard themselves as modern, 
rational, and professional are…caught between ideologies, inconsistent in their 
self-representations, uncertain about how to articulate their relationships to 
Islam and to modernity. Many are drawn to Sufism and yet avoid identifying 
themselves as Sufis.’ The congruence of Melanesia, South Asia and the Caribbean 
suggests a condition of the post-colonial world. In effect, in the post-colonial 
context, the uncanny reveals the incompleteness of European Enlightenment 
hegemony about being and knowing. Concepts such as culture, social structure, 
hybridity and creolisation serve to deflect attention from the uncanny that 
‘actually happens’. The emphasis is shifted from the uncanny event to the 
interpretation of the event. In effect, uncanniness is split into the materiality 
of what actually happens and interpretation of what actually happens, with the 
materiality ultimately being neglected or dismissed.
The ontological obscurity of the spirits in art, ritual and uncanny events makes 
Tuzin’s work an unusual intervention in understandings of the role of the 
uncanny in anthropology with implications for understanding fissures in post-
colonialism and modernity. The tacit adoption of Descartes’ epistemological 
dualism has led anthropology either to dismiss the uncanny or to assume the 
uncanny and its accompanying ontological anxieties are a disruptive force, but 
Tuzin’s ethnographic discussions lead him to view it as a socially creative force. 
Rather than dismiss or disavow the uncanny, his synthesis of Vico and Langer 
allows him to embrace the ontological uncertainty it creates and the culturally 
creative consequences of this uncertainty based on events that ‘actually 
happen’, which stir the spirit. Cartesian dualism has led to a social scientific fear 
of having the spirit stirred in response to what actually happens. Tuzin had no 
such fear. 
By adopting a Vichean dualism, Tuzin allowed his spirit to be stirred without 
necessarily going down the road to religious faith. He emphasised and celebrated 
scepticism, but his Vichean approach to the uncanny allowed his scepticism 
free rein to include both religion and claims of rationality. Repeatedly, Tuzin 
describes how scepticism about the existence of spirits and sorcery lays the 
foundation for the extraordinary collective experience of spirits and sorcery in 
ritual or in response to unexpected events or strange coincidences; the stirred 
spirit is all the more remarkable when it emerges out of scepticism. For instance, 
he describes one informant who intimated that ‘just as the fiction of a physical 
Nggwal enables men to dominate women, so the fiction of an invisible Nggwal 
enables the senior initiates to dominate their junior colleagues. The lie is itself 
a lie’ (Tuzin 1980:212). Tuzin remarked on the resemblance of this statement 
to certain forms of atheism and existentialism; ‘belief in self replaces belief in 
Nggwal; the human actor assumes the godlike functions of Nggwal’ (1980:213). 
But then, a few days later, this informant had a dream in which he was chased by 
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animated Nggwal statues, and this dream changed his imagination of Nggwal: 
‘No longer the free-wheeling agnostic, he had reverted to an anxious literalism 
that verged on the abject credulity which, in happier moments, he scornfully 
ascribed to women’ (1980:214).
Tuzin’s attention to sensory perception—the sights of the spirit house, the 
terror evoked by the din of bullroarers, the exquisite pain of ritualised penile 
bloodletting—adds a phenomenological dimension to his link between the 
ontology of spirits and the imagination of community. Rather than being 
disruptive of society, the counterpoint of uncanny events, sensory experience 
and scepticism becomes the foundation for Durkheimian social connections.
In Tuzin’s work, then, the uncanny is consistently portrayed as a productive, 
creative force. It is creative in how it prompts the collective imagination and 
creation of truth, and this catalyst of the imagination plays an important role in 
religious experience and, in an interesting, parallel fashion, in anthropological 
methodology. In both cases, the uncanny is something that requires attention—
signifying a moment of potential insight through its unsettling of ontological 
complacency.
Returning to the Caribbean vignettes I have offered, Constantine’s death and 
the congruence of Divali and All Saints’ are uncanny events that, according to 
Tuzin’s logic, must either produce a social response at creating an illusion of 
truth or create individualised anomie. This allows some insight into the Vichean 
problems of post-colonial studies. The social divisions created by colonialism 
and its enlightenment heritage seem to highlight the opposed Durkheimian 
paths to collective conscience or to anomie. For instance, M. G. Smith’s (1965) 
model of cultural pluralism seems to suggest social disintegration except for 
the power of the state. This was a model that Tuzin learned quite well at the 
hands of his undergraduate anthropology professor, Leo Despres, a specialist in 
the study of Guyana who was an advocate of Smith’s cultural pluralism theory. 
Tuzin’s familiarity with this model seemed to breed contempt for it; he was 
utterly unconvinced by the anomic representation of such societies. He was 
more sympathetic towards creolisation, but still regarded it as a grand term 
that probably obfuscated a diversity of practices and ignored points of tension 
and fissure in Caribbean societies. I do not think he would have been much 
more satisfied with hybridity—a label that is often confused with being an 
explanation. From a Cartesian perspective, all of these are models attempting 
to label observed particulars. From Tuzin’s Vichean perspective, they are acts 
of anthropological creation. Cultural pluralism, creolisation and hybridity are 
all models that explain what they themselves create, and in the Caribbean this 
is highlighted by the prevalence of scholars who are also policy makers and 
advisors. Such scholar-politicians use social scientific theory in their policies 
and strategies. In Trinidad, they approach policy making as if cultural pluralism 
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were truth, and in creating institutional structures that treat the social world 
in terms of cultural pluralism, they make cultural pluralism true. Behind the 
imposing pluralist, creolised or hybridised masks are mere humans. 
Conclusion
The social creation of truth to understand the uncanny is, from Tuzin’s 
Durkheimian perspective, a cultural and social process; through the human 
spirits stirred to create a shared vision about the world, there is a creation of 
social connection. In the process, Tuzin’s insights make the ontological status 
of all our theoretical constructs uncertain. They, too, are creations of human 
action rather than objects in the world to be studied, and what is of greatest 
importance ethnographically is to study the process of creation not the reification 
of categories for purposes of objective and objectifying analysis. 
This leads to a significant ontological and epistemological implication of Tuzin’s 
work. From his Vichean perspective, human action is the act of creation, and the 
act of creation establishes truth. The ethnographic enterprise, then, must attend 
to the act of creation, and the ability to create is a common human bond between 
ethnographers and their subjects. If attention is given to the act of creation then 
ethnographers can gain special insight into cultural and social processes that 
approach verum and maybe gain insight into acts of creating new social systems. 
But if attention is given to the study of ossified categories that anthropology 
creates to filter and shape the world the ethnographer studies then, at best, 
one can achieve only a form of certum that is a pale imitation of that in the 
natural sciences and, by privileging the pre-ethnographic conceptual creations 
over what actually happens, develop a Cartesian blindness to the uncanny. In 
mentoring me to study the Caribbean, Don Tuzin encouraged me to observe and 
even participate in creation; that seemed to stir his spirit in our discussions to 
allow us to transcend the distance between Ilahita and Trinidad.
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6. Comparison, Individualism and 




Don Tuzin left a magnificent corpus of work on the Ilahita Arapesh, one that 
presents a compelling analysis of two remarkable transitions in the history 
of a people. His work is also striking because of the sheer range of issues 
on which he focused his fine analytical eye; his work might focus on the 
emotions, dispositions and moral conflicts of particular persons or categories 
thereof (specific elders, initiands, or Christians, men, women) as readily as on 
the structural or historically contingent circumstances within which agents 
must act, and which tend to produce grand historical transformations. There 
are also significant essays that complement both these analytical poles with a 
consideration of apparently general human susceptibilities to certain sorts of 
sensory experience and their relevance to religious life.1 Finally, Tuzin was given 
to posing questions about the relevance of this sort of ethnographic analysis, 
of this sort of society, to broader comparative and theoretical matters in the 
social sciences. He usually did so in the course of an analysis of some aspect 
of Ilahita’s social life, but sometimes he considered such questions specifically 
and explicitly; when he did so, he was liable to proclaim his allegiance to 
‘methodological individualism’. Such statements of position have struck even 
some of his closest admirers as dated or doctrinaire relative to the discipline’s 
orthodox orientation and given the actual breadth of his analytical vision. 
1 Thus, the religious imaginings of Ilahita’s prophet, Samuel (a ‘rather extraordinary individual’ [Tuzin 
1989:187]), and the political significance of the contingencies of birth order in a given family (Tuzin 1991) are 
no less a part of the village’s history than its extraordinarily involuted dual organisation; and the tenderness 
that marked intra-familial relations as well as the moral equivocation—in the context of the burden that 
the Tambaran’s productive demands placed upon women—these induced in senior men (Tuzin 1982) were 
as integral to Ilahita’s political dynamics (Tuzin 1974) as was the competition between exchange partners 
(Tuzin 1976). On a different but wholly complementary tack, Tuzin also considered the work of pre-cultural 
experiences of certain sounds (1984), sights (2002) and smells (2006) in the construction of specifically Ilahitan 
cultural forms, which were thereby identified as cognate with specific forms found elsewhere. Similarly, 
certain Ilahita experiences, and the institutions that they thematise, bespeak the psycho-social qualities 
of human relationships as such, and, therefore, the comparability of culturally prepotent institutions from 
widely dispersed settings (Tuzin 2001).
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I will here consider his methodological commitments in the light, first, of his 
analysis of Ilahita culture and history (which I will suggest changed slightly 
over time) and, second, in relation to what we should make of this doctrine 
today and its bearing on our assessment of the work Don left. 
I shall take it as uncontroversial that Tuzin saw his four books and numerous 
articles as dealing with interlinked dimensions of his project to portray the 
history of Ilahita and the lives of Ilahitans. I shall also take it for granted 
that Tuzin saw his analytical practice and his theoretical or meta-theoretical 
orientations as, at the very least, mutually consistent. Accordingly, I will probe 
Tuzin’s methodological commitment—avowed in his first and his last books—to 
the principles of Popperian methodological individualism (hereinafter MI), in 
relation to the consistency of his analytical vision. I believe it was his sense 
of the complexity of the total human person in a definite historical setting, 
rather than any methodological primacy of ‘the individual’ as such, that drove 
and rationalises his analytical work. I will try to suggest that his strongest 
convictions concerned the depth of the connections at work in what he termed 
the culture–society–individual nexus and, therefore, the interest and legitimacy 
of a very broad range of questions that anthropology might pose of human life, 
in general or in particular. Yet it was important to him that his views be both 
morally and theoretically defensible, which is what drew him to Popperian MI, 
with its twin emphasis on science and liberal values.
Any discussion of MI today has to take account of more recent refinements in the 
discussion of the knot of issues that it involves. The Popperian terms in which 
Don made his methodological claims implicate some daunting conceptual and 
metaphysical issues; they also rather too easily evoke moral-political sensibilities 
associated with terms such as ‘choice’, ‘reduction’ and ‘determinism’. The sort 
of ecumenical project that Tuzin’s corpus represents can now be conceived in 
ways that he himself did not consider, and which have the virtue of avoiding 
certain conceptual difficulties while—in principle, anyway—not provoking 
anyone to mount the theoretical barricades. In short, recent considerations of 
the ontology of social states and processes suggest that some clarity on the vexed 
issues that Don felt the need to address can be achieved. I will introduce one 
effort to make a place for both traditional holist and traditional individualist 
intuitions: Philip Pettit’s is one example of an attempt to differentiate questions 
of methodology and ontology in a way that can connect with the empirical 
practices of social scientists while isolating those moral-political convictions to 
their proper domain. With the waning of the hegemony of deductive models 
of explanation, and a more nuanced consideration of the ontology of social life 
(the sorts of dependencies it involves), old accusations of ‘reductionism’ lose 
their sting; once we make the right sort of conceptual space for psychological 
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and the sociological questions, the narrowness of the opposition between ‘the 
individual’ and ‘society’—which has exercised more influence than any other 
intellectual construct since Durkheim—becomes apparent.
A Complex Science
The historical and social sciences have always been concerned with the entire 
range of features relevant to human life: with persons, nations, and states, with 
personal situations and cultural specificities, and with the idiosyncratic and the 
utterly general characteristics of human sociality across time and space. Tuzin’s 
work as a whole evinces a commitment to the idea that a similarly wide range 
of factors, of different degrees of generality, is relevant to the comprehensive, 
single-case study he undertook. This is for the most part implicit in his different 
books and articles on Ilahita, but it is sometimes stated plainly, as when in 
‘Miraculous Voices’ he indicates his debt to a vision: 
[One] advocated in various contexts by, among others, Freeman (1983), 
La Barre (1980), and Spiro (1978). Skeptical of the deterministic cant of 
much social-science discourse these scholars hold that human behavior 
is constitutive of a cultural, psychological, and biological wholeness; 
that human experience, in its immediacy, is profoundly oblivious of the 
internal partitions that gerrymandering theorists impose on it; and that 
the idea of the ‘psychic unity’ of our species should be treated neither 
as an empty slogan nor as a brief for the judicious neglect of biological 
factors in the study of culture, but as a challenge to engage the unsolved 
problems of the human condition in its most universal expressions. Both 
humane and humanistic, theirs is an anthropology of great moral and 
scientific importance. (Tuzin 1984:580) 
An anthropology ‘both humane and humanistic…of great moral and scientific 
importance’ seems to summarise aptly the deep ambition thematising Tuzin’s 
vision. He later explains that such an anthropology—one principled enough to 
follow an empirical problem wherever it might lead—would have to involve an 
‘interactionalist’ paradigm, in which information from disciplines concerned 
with different aspects of ‘the human condition’ are brought together (Tuzin 
1984:589). Here, and elsewhere, it is clear that Tuzin differs from those who 
see the human condition as defined by some key feature; his outlook on the 
human condition is sensitive to many local and universal factors, which is why 
its study must depend upon the synthesis produced by research perspectives 
in interaction. It might seem, though, that this rather pointedly raises doubts 
about Tuzin’s uncompromising insistence on Popperian MI. 
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I will begin what I intend to be a sympathetic reading of Tuzin’s position by 
setting out some social-science commonplaces concerning persons and the 
societies that encompass them. Doing so will help my case, which suggests that 
we now (perhaps, with the waning of logical positivism, and its hostility to 
metaphysical notions) have better resources for characterising the complexities 
that prompted the old divisions than formerly. 
If we consider in a Searlean manner (Searle 1995, 2010) the enormously 
heterogeneous range of states that a human being might be in (being pregnant or 
undernourished, for example, contrasts in important ways with being the local 
bank manager, under indictment for a crime or in debt to your maternal kin), 
we can see how they depend upon rather different sorts of worldly conditions. 
Similarly, if one contemplates the range of events or processes a person might be 
engaged in (eating a grape versus blessing clan sacra or studying for a driving 
test) or undergoing (fighting a fever versus undergoing initiation or defending a 
thesis) then coordinate differences become obvious. Again, if one thinks about 
the state, event and process terms that could be predicated of the last person left 
on Earth, it seems clear that some would and some would not have a use (being 
injured or afraid or near the beach versus under arrest or close to becoming 
the vice-chancellor or a ranking elder). And under that terrible condition, the 
suite of values, reasons and ambitions (to name just one species of motivation) 
that a person might have and act upon would be dramatically transformed (in 
logic, if not—given the historicity of human being—in psychological fact). 
What these considerations seem to show is not just that many of our most 
definitive characteristics are relational (which is true of many of the non-social 
predicates applying to individuals), but that the relations involve persons and 
their relations with other persons and institutions. (It is worth mentioning that 
this is also true of the social properties of physical objects; what makes a suit 
a police uniform, for example, has nothing to do with the intrinsic properties 
of the material from which it is made. This is even more clearly the case with 
money.)
Less dramatically, but no less clearly, while any one of us was born at the same 
moment as legions of other mammals (think of all those rodents), and in the same 
part of the world as some of them, we acquired immediately a set of identities 
(for they are usually packaged together) that has no counterpart to the events 
and conditions we might use to individuate members of those other species; 
we are identified relationally (by our parents and their families, our clan, our 
initiation class or nation-state, our legal status, and so on), even while we cannot 
identify with those identities. And the significance—constitutive and causal—
of those identities, not only to what I am at that point in time, but also to the 
sort of being I can become, is obvious once one takes thought. The facticity of 
these features of ourselves is shown, among other things, by the impossibility 
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of discounting their relevance to us, whether or not we identify with particular 
identities (pace claims about the ‘performative’ nature of social identities). 
Repudiating those identities, which in any case is possible only later in life, if at 
all, is no less testimony to their facticity than embracing them with pride. And 
if one thinks about the institutionalised settings of much of contemporary life 
(in which one may need to be concerned with—among many other things—
whether one is or is not a citizen of the state, a registered resident of a town, an 
enrolled student or voter, a discharged bankrupt, a licensed driver or dog-owner, 
a member of the union or the gym, the legal owner of what one is consuming 
or using, the bearer of legal tender or counterfeit notes, or even an authorised 
passenger on the train), then it can seem that a great many of the things we 
care about involve states, events and processes that have no counterpart in the 
sad life of the last person on Earth. Finally, if we scrutinise the minutiae of 
our interactions with others, we see other significant factors—Goffmannian, we 
might call them—that have complex dependencies upon conventions, rules and 
practices that also enjoy a facticity with respect to ourselves, yet inflect our own 
actual and potential experiences, by defining the interpersonal setting in which 
we each find ourselves, and, hence, the sense of self we can sustain. Particular 
individuals are rarely in the position to control the definition of a social setting 
or the exact quality of its interactions and their outcomes.
If we change our focus now and consider somewhat broader states of affairs and 
processes, it seems we can make connected distinctions: indexes of economic 
inequality are higher now in the West than a few years ago, as are levels of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere; the world is, apparently, currently undergoing a 
change in climate, but it is also undergoing an economic crisis; the universe is 
expanding, but so are average household debt and unemployment. Corporations, 
classes and clans are subject to the vicissitudes of worldly happenings no less 
than moons, mountains and molehills. Nation-states and Melpa clans go into 
debt, declare war and join organisations of one sort or another. Connected 
with these and other events and processes, values, beliefs and desires undergo 
epidemiological processes that leave individuals and collectivities changed, 
sometimes decisively.
Questions—essentially ethnographic questions—about what is going on, 
and why, can arise about any of the features of social life indicated above; 
accordingly, an alternative way of making the point here would be to follow 
Geertz’s (1973:7–9) discussion of his frequently cited ‘note in a bottle’, which he 
took to indicate the range and heterogeneity of the information relevant to the 
‘thickening’ of the ethnographic story of the Moroccan trader’s misadventures 
(including Cohen’s history and personal characteristics, North African Jewish 
customs, Berber social organisation, mezrag pacts between Sheiks and traders, 
and French colonial history). We should also keep our eyes open to what might 
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be thought of as the complement to Geertz’s point, which is that we could 
invoke Cohen’s particular circumstances to explain why, when the French were 
in charge and safely ensconced in their forts, the mezrag pact was still relevant to 
social events. If, generalising from these particularities, we think through how 
the different questions requiring ethnographic answers interconnect, then we 
can see (along with thinkers as different as Durkheim, Weber and Wittgenstein) 
how ethnography’s significance outruns its role in providing purely local 
understandings. We account, for example, for a woman’s self-sacrifice by 
reference to her determination to save her group’s reputation, which she could 
not achieve in any other way, and to the value of the honour of one’s natal 
group to someone produced by that way of life, which is sometimes sufficient to 
trump the value of life itself. And if someone contemplating the woman’s actions 
cannot see how such values can play so central a role in anyone’s life, then more 
exposure to the thick descriptions that good ethnography provides is all we 
can recommend. Similarly, someone who cannot see how anyone could labour 
fiendishly to amass valuables to give to a rival, rather than enjoy them himself, 
is suffering a very particular blindness. As Geertz always stressed, the questions 
ethnography addresses in small settings are not thereby small questions, and—
as he also stressed—such an interlocutor’s failure to comprehend is most 
importantly in self-understanding.
What has been said so far underlines the complex dependencies that enmesh 
particular lives and their cultural contexts (and while I have invoked Geertz to 
help make the point, I could just as easily have cited Sahlins’ work on historical 
change and continuity in Oceania). Ethnographically, descriptions need to be 
thick and omnidirectional if they are to play a role in answering questions about 
events on different scales. Social-science theorists’ ambitions tend, however, 
to outrun intuitions concerning interconnections between the various orders 
of facts that ethnography and historiography describe. Theorists of social life 
working under very different conceptions of what adequacy amounts to have 
agreed that some verdict must be reached about the fundamental direction in 
which genuinely explanatory dependencies run.
Tuzin also felt the need to enter the lists on these matters, and he did so with some 
passion. I will argue that more recent reflection on them indicates that different 
aspects of Tuzin’s project need to be evaluated separately—in particular, his 
interests in an interactionalist approach to social life and his concern with 
comparison are not particularly well defended by his MI; indeed, they are more 
defensible once his Popper-inspired methodological dicta are set aside. 
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The Account of Ilahita and Methodological 
Individualism
The	Earlier	Works
Tuzin gives his only reasonably extended account of what it means to adopt MI 
in the course of the introductory chapter of his first book, The Ilahita Arapesh, 
where he also defends what might seem to be ‘the arrant parochiality’ of asking 
what made the village become so extraordinarily large and what enabled it to 
maintain its unity (1976:xxi). 
In this first volume, the focus is the complex dual organisation of Ilahita 
village, which Tuzin sees as a structural accommodation to the difficulties—
in particular, the population pressures—caused by refugees displaced by 
the Abelam expansion (see Roscoe, this volume). The book argues that the 
elaborate organisation that resulted is traceable to, and is maintained by, the 
cumulative effects of individual actions of interconnected, culturally similar 
agents responding to the circumstances they face. The complex, crosscutting 
structures of dual classes are detailed and their effects in binding together the 
various segments of this large population demonstrated by the rich ethnographic 
material Tuzin commanded and used expertly. He left for his second volume 
almost all ritual aspects of these structures, but their importance was a constant 
background theme in the first.
Tuzin presents a historical picture in which a local system, made up of a 
social order—with its own ‘inherent dynamic’ that ‘tends to homeostasis’—
is integrated into a more or less constant environmental setting to produce 
something approximating equilibrium. Wider historical forces necessitated 
adjustments in the narrower social process since they presented problems that 
the prior homeostatic system was not required to face (Tuzin 1976:xxii–xxiv). 
The most pressing of these problems relates to Ilahita’s adaptive increase in 
size, which nullified the possibility of ‘remedial changes of residence’ that the 
previously more fluid settlement patterns permitted; ‘the various problems 
chronically infecting relations of proximity, kinship and political rivalry’ 
(which his own ethnographic data document) were not only harder to resolve 
in the new Ilahita, they increased (Tuzin 1976:xxiv). Accordingly, the need 
to ‘manage’ the difficulties and resolve the tensions was great; the response 
was ‘the elaboration of regulatory, integrative mechanisms’. Of particular 
significance was the evolution of the intricate web of complementary identities 
that constituted Ilahita’s highly complex dual organisation, which was ‘[r]eplete 
with cohesive functions’ (Tuzin 1976:xxiv–v). 
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It is at this point—where, so to speak, management needs, responses and functions 
have been rather equivocally invoked—that Tuzin sees ‘yet another processual 
mode’ as being implied, one wherein the components of the dual organisation 
are created and re-created ‘from the lower levels’ of quotidian existence in the 
expanded community. The dual organisation’s many components depend upon 
this input from ‘mundane behavioral spheres’, in their initial development and 
for their reproduction; and, it is important to stress, his account ‘predicates 
the rarefied dual structures on the motivations of individuals operating within 
a changing socio-cultural setting’ (Tuzin 1976:xxv). So the ‘management’ he 
speaks of is not, or not only, to be interpreted as a metaphor for the feedback 
connections within the system, but as something the need for which confronts 
particular people through the problems some of their interpersonal relations 
now represent. As a result of the expansionary pressures of southern groups, 
Arapesh people faced difficulties in their lives—the arrival of refugees, the threat 
of raids, difficulties with subsistence, and so on—to which they had to respond. 
Their responses, grounded in their pre-existing values and beliefs, were what, 
over time, crystallised into the complex structures that had mystified regional 
specialists such as Anthony Forge, who advised Tuzin to conduct research in 
Ilahita.
Notice that Tuzin has used both psychological motivations and social functions 
in explaining Ilahita’s adaptive responses; the ancestors of contemporary 
Ilahitans responded to novel demands on their existing relationships with one 
another by using cultural items to hand (conspicuous among which was the 
regionally characteristic practice of defining social categories in terms of a dual 
organisation [Tuzin 1976:xxv]) to deal with the new social setting. In so doing, 
new conceptions of relatedness and shared identity emerged that proved adequate 
to the new social setting. It is at this point—early in setting out his thesis about 
Ilahita’s growth—that Tuzin refers to Lévi-Strauss for the first time. He does so 
only to stress that he will later argue against the structuralist accounts of dual 
organisation, foreshadowing that his views and those of Lévi-Strauss ‘embody 
fundamentally distinct philosophical orientations, intellectual stances whose 
relevance extends far beyond theories of dualism per se to demarcate alternative 
perspectives on culture, society and the individual’ (Tuzin 1976:xxv). And it 
is here, having referred to the three elements whose relationships constitute 
the ‘central problem of anthropology’ (Tuzin 1976:338), that he tells us that 
his analysis of Ilahita dual organisation ‘will be guided in large measure by the 
principle of methodological individualism’ (p. xxv)—a notion he then discusses 
in rather definite terms.
The most important point—‘the heart of the principle’ (Tuzin 1976:xxvii)—is 
that social structure arises out of what Tuzin, quoting Popper, characterises as 
the ‘“indirect, the unintended and often unwanted by-products” of decisions 
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and actions’, which agents take ‘according to the logic of their situation’; actions 
taken by individuals are represented in MI as the source of both social stasis 
and social change (p. xxvi). The rationale, he seems to suggest, is importantly 
given by its negation, methodological collectivism or holism, which, ‘in its 
pure form’, portrays individuals as ‘a reifying fiction, a walking bundle of 
social rules, statuses, values and similar abstractions’ (Tuzin 1976:xxvi). The 
individuals invoked by MI are not particular historical persons, but anonymous 
agents, each of whom is also ‘presumed to be a competent member of a society, 
steeped in [its] norms and values’, not the mythical pre-social individual 
postulated by reductionist nineteenth-century theorists (Tuzin 1976:xxvii). 
Nevertheless, the norms and values possessed by those competent members of 
society themselves ‘originate in, and are actualized through, the interactions of 
individuals, and, therefore, cannot logically precede these interactions’ (Tuzin 
1976:xxvii). Tuzin later makes the point that the individuals invoked by MI 
might indeed possess ‘holistic concepts’, but these are to be treated as data by 
the analyst (1976:335)—as part of what is to be explained, rather than what 
provides explanatory resources. Although MI holds that the social structural 
effects of actions are unintended and unforeseen by individuals, even when 
they are consciously planning to affect social structure, it does not exclude 
‘rationality or premeditation’ (Tuzin 1976:xxvii). On the contrary, our actions 
are indeed ‘governed by relatively immediate considerations…we apply to any 
given situation a calculus, not only of social prescriptions and values, but also 
of personal strategies, psychological proclivities and other factors which are, 
in principle, determinable’ (Tuzin 1976:xxviii). Once these individual-level 
processes have been analytically identified, it is possible to link them to societal 
consequences. Here Tuzin makes a reference to Adam Smith and his principle of 
individual expediency as the basis for economic institutions (although he does 
not explicitly invoke the ‘invisible hand’).
The strength of MI, Tuzin continues, is that it sets on centrestage the 
individual—an ‘empirically isolable unit of observation’—that is also a 
‘conceptual link’ between the psychological and the sociological sciences and 
‘our guide through many of man’s domains’ (Tuzin 1976:xxiv). Accordingly, 
MI expects (indeed, it ‘celebrates’) variation between individuals and sees 
‘change as an inherent property of human groups’ (Tuzin 1976:xxix, emphasis 
in original). In the context of his account of Ilahita and its increase in size and 
structural complexity, this methodological orientation entails the study of the 
factors impacting upon the population of individuals and their interactions, 
given both what they share culturally—the concepts, norms and values—
and how they differ (with respect to their situations and inclinations). It also 
involves tracking how, under historically new, challenging conditions, what he 
calls the ‘actional field’ becomes constituted by this configuration of responses. 
More generally, Tuzin continues, ‘by deducing the “unintended” repercussions 
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of this actional field’ (emphasis added), we come to understand what Watkins 
called the ‘organic-like’ feature of social systems, wherein a collection of people 
whose actions affect one another ‘mutually adjust themselves to the situations 
created by the others in a way which, without direction from above, conduces 
to the equilibrium or preservation or development of the system’ (1976:xxix–
xxx, quoting Watkins 1957:114). Tuzin then takes Watkins’ final formulation 
for his own purposes: ‘In the present study, the system whose equilibrium, 
preservation and development we are seeking to explain is the social entity of 
Ilahita village’ (1976:xxx).
If Tuzin is emphatic about MI’s virtues, so too is his case for viewing Lévi-
Straussian commitments as empirically inadequate to a comprehensive 
anthropology: structuralism indulges itself with ‘other concerns, such as the 
imponderables of metaphysics and unreconstructable history…the elusive 
objects of pleasurable speculation’ (Tuzin 1976:338–9). Yet the book is 
overwhelmingly concerned with a complex and convincing empirical analysis 
of Ilahita’s social organisation; rereading it and the second volume (Tuzin 1980), 
and reading back over some of his earlier papers, makes it clear how theoretically 
wide ranging Tuzin was; and, despite occasional polemical flourishes and firm 
statements, he rarely seems doctrinaire. I believe that even at this early stage, the 
real attraction of MI for Tuzin was that it provided the sort of meta-theoretical 
orientation that could rationalise the distaste he felt for ‘gerrymandering’ 
theory. It also provided a context for a perspective on cultural order as 
‘processual’ in nature and in complex two-way dependencies with the actions 
taken by individuals and, hence, with their psycho-dynamic characteristics; 
all this he took to be demanded by the unusual empirical situation Ilahita 
presented. His works repeatedly return to the ‘fit’ between processes of cultural 
reproduction and the behaviours generated by the existential conditions of 
individuals’ lives. Strikingly, he insists that the scepticism, deception and 
playfulness that life can induce, as well as the moral tensions generated by 
routine interaction, are as necessary to particular institutional processes as are 
the cultural norms and values that channel them. All of these particular factors 
and their interactions are discussed in terms that are highly sensitive to the 
general historical conditions of cultural contexts and persons. Such a concern 
with the mutual conditioning of factors usually thought of as at different levels, 
and the sensitivity of historical outcomes to the subtlety of that conditioning, 
evokes something like a Weberian perspective on ‘the relationship between 
culture, society and the individual’, as I shall underline later. Be that as it 
may, Tuzin insisted from his earliest works that the conspicuous elaboration of 
ritual and social form in Ilahita is to be grasped as a process, initiated and then 
sustained by historical circumstances, not simply a product of the passage of 
time or an abstract endogenous force: ‘the elaboration and maintenance of [the 
dual] organization is traceable to the cumulative effects of individual actions 
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conditioned by the press of broadly shared circumstances amid the constraints 
of equally shared cultural understandings’ (Tuzin 1980:335, emphasis added). 
I submit that the historical contingency of social processes became analytically 
more central over the period between his first and his last books.
Social	Complexity	in	the	Making
With his later work, Social Complexity in the Making (2001), Tuzin sought to 
reposition his ethnographic findings from Ilahita in relation ‘both to general 
issues of social evolution and, more specifically, to the major transitions 
undergone by Ilahita that have also occurred in many other times and places 
in world history’ (p. xii). He begins, though, with another critique of the 
discipline’s usual orientations. The overreaction of anthropology to nineteenth-
century evolutionism led to the exclusion of history, and a fortiori evolutionary 
history, from the analysis of social forms, in favour of synchronic descriptions 
and a fundamentally typological approach to comparison (Tuzin 2001:2–3). 
Accordingly, anthropology overlooked ‘one of society’s most prominent features: 
incessant change in adaptive response to internal and external contingencies’ 
(Tuzin 2001:4). He adds that it is only when we see this, and take it into analytical 
account, that we can understand ‘social dynamics in the here and now’ as well 
as how ‘historical circumstances selectively affect social systems’ (Tuzin 2001). 
On Tuzin’s account, the search for ways to understand social transformations was 
(luckily) carried on by archaeology, but its models tended to be unconvincingly 
materialistic and/or typological. One might have expected ethnographers 
to offer suggestions that would overcome these problems, but, because of 
anthropology’s own history, few practitioners are ready to think about the 
functional relationship between how population size and societal complexity 
articulate with ‘questions of causality, cognition, agency, and intentionality’ 
(Tuzin 2001:6) to produce historical change significant on a societal scale: 
evolutionary change. Tuzin argues that material and typological models will 
remain inadequate as long as they are uninformed by more subtle understandings 
of the processes through which ideological and social factors are integrated 
with the material, in mechanisms driving changes in social morphology. Such 
changes, whether they occur in a ‘forward, backward or sideways’ direction, 
always occur in a concrete ‘adaptational matrix bounded by space, time and 
population’ (Tuzin 2001:9). He draws a parallel here with organic evolutionary 
theory, which became convincing only once Darwin provided a framework 
(‘descent with modification by natural selection’) that directed attention to the 
dynamic mechanisms of change (Tuzin 2001:7). Real social evolutionary inquiry 
seeks to understand ‘processes of change and the emergence of novelty within 
sociocultural systems’ (Tuzin 2001:8). 
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Tuzin’s analysis of ‘the evolving society of Ilahita village and the external events 
and internal mechanisms implicated in its increasing size and complexity’ 
(2001:10) aims to underscore the poverty of typological approaches that lack 
models of the dynamic mechanisms involved. It sought to show: a) the adaptive 
nature of organisational complexity based on ritual institutions structured 
by dualistic principles; while also elucidating b) ‘the rather severe limits to 
settlement growth and organizational complexity facing societies of Ilahita’s 
type’ (Tuzin 2001:10). If he speaks of ‘types’ here—the very term he has worried 
about earlier—it is because he believes his study will indicate general patterns 
in ‘the movement of simpler, small-scale societies to more complex, large-
scale societies’ (Tuzin 2001:124). To that extent, analysis of societal dynamics 
generates its own, causally relevant types (Tuzin 2001:9), while making room for 
‘unique communal biograph[ies]’ (p. 124).
The book once more tells (with some significant differences in emphasis) how 
nineteenth-century population changes connected with warfare and migration 
posed an urgent question to the traditional socio-cultural forms in one part of 
the Sepik region shared by Arapesh, Kwanga and Abelam populations. Ilahita’s 
Arapesh population suddenly faced an influx of refugees from these other 
groups. The answer to the question could not come from Ilahita’s ‘subsistence 
base or technology’ (Tuzin 2001:17), but was found in the elaboration of a new 
form of the regional ‘cult of war and human sacrifice’, produced by the iteration 
of dualistic ritual categories and resulting in ‘the most complex system of its 
type ever documented’, with eight crosscutting dual categories (and, therefore, 
256 distinct ritual-categorical identities). He stresses, though, that ‘[f]rom top 
to bottom, the dual organisation is cast in ritual terms’; furthermore, because it 
also embraces kin relations, economic activities (production for exchange and 
for consumption) and political competition and conflict (between descent and 
residential groupings), even the most ‘practical’ actions are seen by Ilahitans to 
be mandated by the Tambaran cult and ‘suffused with spiritual meaning’ (Tuzin 
2001:83).
Tuzin emphatically concluded (in rather Weberian tones) that the Tambaran 
cult in Ilahita amounted to ‘the emergence of a rationalised religious ethic—a 
body of doctrine against which behaviour could be compared, evaluated, and, 
if necessary, punished…[and], moreover, which summarized and transcended 
the level of individual clan spirits’ (2001:103, emphasis in original). It featured 
a unique, ‘transcendent’ spiritual patron for the village as a whole, one that 
‘allied itself with the elders of the cult’ (Tuzin 2001:103). These elders—men 
spread across the village’s components—were (also uniquely, in the cults of 
the region) united by a special grade and charged with making the most of 
the politically significant interventions, which they made in their own and the 
village’s interests and with the full moral weight of the Tambaran, whose power 
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was at their disposal. But the cult and its divisions also provided an arena for the 
competition and conflict generated by the rather pervasive intra-village strife, 
so that even social discord acted to enfold the binding, dualistic structure into 
the quotidian emotions of residents. In turn, the dual structures and the ritual 
prescriptions they embodied were reinforced by the interpersonal and inter-
group antagonism that life in this large village engendered (Tuzin 2001:119–20).
Let us now consider some of the new orientations in Social Complexity in 
the Making. In Tuzin’s earlier work, the spirit if not the letter of structural-
functionalist conceptions of ‘system’ were patent; his bifurcated view of the 
process leading up to Ilahita’s increase in size and complexity (described 
earlier)—with a social system having an internal dynamic that tends to 
homeostasis moving through an historical ambience that can usually (but not 
always) be counted upon to remain stable—evokes much of late structural-
functionalist thought, which had still not entirely relinquished its attachment 
to the organismic analogy. Tuzin stressed both ‘the equilibrium, preservation 
and development’ of the ‘organic-like’ social systems and their susceptibility 
to being sustained or transformed by individuals’ actions, even while these 
are themselves ‘conditioned’ by cultural understandings (which tend to be 
shared, of course). In the later works, though, the conditioning and the effects 
of individual actions implicate circumstances broader than those specific to 
the social system, which nevertheless tends to remain the unintended—and 
perhaps rather fragile—outcome of decisions and actions taken by individuals. 
The actors focus on the Tambaran and ‘miss’ the systemic connections that its 
power in their lives presupposed; ‘the [actors] look after the details and the 
system looks after itself’ (Tuzin 2001:83), but the process is ‘non-teleological’. 
The ‘logic of the situation’ of the actors, given the circumstances and other 
factors ‘accidental to the structure of the overall system’, suffices to bring about 
the evolutionary transformation of Ilahita; but it was ‘an emergent property of 
experience: the actions, perceptions, and ideas of individuals in a collective, 
temporal setting’ (Tuzin 2001:84). 
By 2001, then, society’s tendency to ‘incessant change’ is stressed (Tuzin 
2001:4), although Tuzin still cites Radcliffe-Brown on the evolution of systems 
as though the process were endogenously driven, and still sometimes evokes 
1960s theoretical divisions.2 Yet, he also writes of the need to appreciate the role 
of ‘the mechanisms at work in the adaptational matrix bounded by space, time 
and population; for it is only through those mechanisms that societies move’ 
(Tuzin 2001:9, emphasis added). And while, in the next paragraph, he will 
2 Thus, for example, ‘while the dual organization gives the Tambaran structural coherence and social 
effectiveness, the Tambaran infuses the dual organization with cultural meaning’ (Tuzin 2001:14), which, for 
me, very strongly calls to mind the function/meaning duality that thematised the notion of a cultural system 
for Geertz during the 1960s.
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again use terms that suggest a dichotomy between internal social mechanisms 
and external processes, the particularities of historical processes themselves, 
which are as responsible for the reproduction of social systems as for their 
transformation, and which are ‘always already’ open (and can be closed only as 
an analytical strategy), are more securely established as the focus of his concern 
with how cultural systems change. Tuzin, it seems to me, is by 2001 fairly clearly 
thinking about social life and change in terms of contingent, open systems, the 
elements of which are in interaction with one another; local cultural traditions, 
human psychological capacities and the broader environment of the concrete 
population (broadly construed, to include the socio-political as well as the 
physical ecology) are all aspects of the systematicity, or otherwise, of social life.3
I do not want to be dogmatic about the depth or extent of the transformation in 
Tuzin’s views, but I do think he defined more precisely what an anthropology 
grounded in the ‘cultural, psychological and biological wholeness’ of human 
behaviour would involve. And this happened, I think, as he discussed with 
himself and his colleagues (and, at UCSD, he was well located for such discussions; 
see Lipset and Roscoe, this volume) the articulation of cultural, sociological and 
psychological perspectives in accounting for specific ways of life. He also came 
to appreciate how the works of such psychologists as Nicholas Humphrey and 
Elisabeth Spelke, and those of such adventurous, synthesising anthropologists 
as Dan Sperber and Pascal Boyer, related to his own (Tuzin 2002). 
In 1984, Tuzin had already had to defend himself against some rather crude 
charges that his argument about the role of the experience of certain auditory 
properties in religious practices was ‘reductionist’, and he had accepted and 
elaborated upon Michael Young’s suggestion, in the latter’s commentary on that 
essay, that it sought to argue from ‘culture to nature to brain/mind and back 
again’ (Young 1984:594). By 2002, Tuzin was happy to risk ‘anti-reductionist rage’ 
(2002:10) in considering the cognitive basis of intuitive expectations relevant 
to the experience of art in ritually prepotent contexts. I have nothing but his 
texts to go on, but I think that when, through the late 1980s and 1990s, his 
pursuit of his interactionalist paradigm led him into the burgeoning literatures 
in developmental psychology and cognitive science, he came to reconceptualise 
not just how the cultural, psychological and biological were interrelated but 
how each realm was itself constituted. It seems that he came to share the sense of 
incredulity at mainstream anthropology’s lack of interest in widely dispersed or 
universal psychological characteristics that, for example, Sperber had expressed 
in many forms, and which Boyer addressed at length in relation to religion in his 
1994 work (published, perhaps significantly, by University of California Press). 
3 Although I will not deal with his account of the demise of the Tambaran cult (Tuzin 1997) and the 
fracturing of Ilahita’s unity, I think these events, which were contingent on the effects of colonial forces 
within Ilahita’s social fields, acted to confirm Tuzin in his perspective.
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Perhaps he was also persuaded to consider these theorists’ epidemiological, 
processual perspectives on culture, which tend to undermine the very notion 
of social life as a systems-theoretic phenomenon. While, I admit, this line is 
somewhat speculative, Social Complexity in the Making presents formulations of 
Ilahita’s past that contrast with his earlier accounts, and it does so in ways that 
suggest that Tuzin had been influenced by models of social process that involve 
selection on populations of variants over time. While this is not fundamentally 
at odds with his earlier perspectives, the analytical space that he had previously 
assigned to social systems at equilibrium, and to structural explanation, would 
seem to have diminished. Nevertheless, the continuities over the 25-year span 
are very striking. He still, for example, conspicuously invokes Popper and his 
non-Hobbesian individualism, so I now broaden the discussion in an effort 
to show that Tuzin’s analytical commitments are not best supported by such 
invocations.
Individuals, Individualism and Processes
In this section, I will try to detach Tuzin’s interactionalist practice from his 
avowed attachment to Popperian MI. I will briefly discuss Popper’s views and 
those of his most influential followers, such as Watkins and Agassi, mostly to 
suggest that these never amounted to a coherent position. I will then suggest, 
even more briefly, that Tuzin’s analytical ambitions could fruitfully be compared 
with those of Max Weber, as could, perhaps, the spirit of his defence of MI 
and Weber’s views on the matter. Finally, I will say something about more 
recent attempts to set the relations between ontological and methodological 
considerations on a more precise footing, which, for many scholars, have 
resulted in a more reasonable picture of the import of the distinction between 
holists and individualists. 
Popper’s Agenda and Tuzin’s Analysis
Recall that for Tuzin the relationship between culture, society and the individual 
constitutes the central problem for anthropology; on the face of it, this statement 
implies the existence of all three sorts of entity whose relationship is at issue. 
What in facing the matter of their integration led Tuzin to align himself with 
the views of Popper, Watkins and Agassi? First, unlike other approaches that 
proclaim their methodological individualism, Popper’s MI usually insisted on 
the autonomy and facticity of the social (institutions, norms, and so on) no 
less than the agency of subjects. Popper applauded Marx for having shown, 
against John Stuart Mill, that the social sciences must be autonomous of the 
psychological sciences, since the actions of individuals could not be explained 
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without reference to institutions (Popper 2003:100), which ‘set limits or create 
obstacles to our movements and actions almost as if they were physical bodies 
or obstacles’; indeed, they ‘are experienced by us as almost literally forming 
part of the furniture of our habitat’ (Popper 1994:167). Tuzin emphasises 
Popper’s rejection of atomistic individualism of the sort associated with Hobbes 
and repeatedly endorses the connected Popperian view about the crucial role 
of the unintended consequences of actions in human social history. Popper 
came to stress more and more the role of institutions and the responsiveness 
of individuals to the ‘logic’ of their situation, to the point where he gave up 
the term ‘methodological individualism’ (Udehn 2001:206). In their attempts to 
defend the position, Watkins, Agassi and Jarvie responded in contrasting ways, 
bringing out some of the ambiguities of Popper’s original formulations (Udehn 
2001:211–24). 
It is hard, I think, not to have some sympathy for those who felt bewildered 
by the divisions that Popper’s intervention in social-science methodology 
precipitated. What the debates (and their cross-purposes) indicate is the 
instability of the positions the protagonists adopted. Ruben states bluntly that 
‘methodological individualism has never been stated with enough clarity and 
precision to permit its proper evaluation’ (1985:132). In its Popperian version, 
MI presented reasonable arguments against those who postulated a telos to 
local or universal history; and while insisting that human agency (purposes, 
decisions, theories, intentions, and so on) was an irreducible element of social 
life and its trajectories, and therefore of the history of the physical world as 
well, it affirmed the facticity of institutions. This mixture of the repudiation of 
(pre)deterministic doctrines, an insistence on human freedom and the openness 
of historical outcomes (with their unavoidable but causally relevant unintended 
consequences) proved unstable. Popperian MI was historically significant 
just because it addressed major questions in the philosophy of science while 
simultaneously opposing anti-humanist conceptions of society and history. 
With hindsight, it is apparent that the deductive models of explanation (in 
either covering law or falsificationist form) prevalent at the time restricted ideas 
about causal relations and their role in social life. In addition, the association of 
such models with inter-theoretical reduction in science made it rather obvious 
that the unwillingness of Popper and his followers to contemplate reduction of 
human cognitive powers to non-cognitive processes—given their insistence that 
social events (for all the facticity of their outcomes) be reduced to the actions 
of their human participants—was motivated by humanist politics rather than 
methodological considerations. Of course, the instabilities of MI were no less 
apparent in the holist positions that opposed and complemented it (many of 
which were also inspired by humanist political sensibilities), which is perhaps 
why today there are prominent MI defenders of Marx and thriving anti-
individualist currents in mainstream economics.
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In concluding this cursory examination of Popperian MI and its tribulations, 
it is worth stressing that Tuzin’s interest in this orientation stemmed from its 
empirical focus and its presumed capacity to explain both the reproduction of 
and the change in cultural forms, by providing an account of the social dynamics 
at any given time. Under all circumstances, social trajectories are inflected—but 
not set—by the decisions and actions taken by individuals in the face of the 
circumstances they confront.
Tuzin and Weber on Culture and History
This perspective was probably inspired by Tuzin’s reading of Popper and 
Watkins, but it also seems close to the following: ‘in sociological work…
collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization 
of the particular acts of individual persons’ (Weber 1978:13). Weber, though, 
will go on to warn that it is ‘a tremendous misunderstanding’ to think that a 
methodological focus on individuals has anything to do with individualistic 
political values, just as it is to think that a methodological interest in agents’ 
reasons for acting indicates a ‘belief in the predominance of rational motives, or 
even a positive valuation of rationalism’ (1978:18). Weber’s and Tuzin’s views 
imply a demand for transparency in social explanation, and we have this only 
when we can relate social phenomena to how they are understood by the agents 
partaking of social phenomena. To take an utterly mundane example, what 
explains the shopkeeper’s willingness to accept the pieces of paper I give her 
for a basket of good food is only elliptically explained when we refer to the laws 
or traditions of the place. What really explains what she does is her observance 
of the rules or traditions, or her concern about the law; the demand, then, is for 
the social facts and the ‘subjective meanings’ of individuals, for only then is 
the explanation complete (even though it is only rarely necessary to mention 
the obvious like this). Again, even if a decision or action is intimately tied to 
the individual’s position—as a king, say—and motivated by the incumbent’s 
knowledge of the cultural expectations attaching to it, it remains the individual’s 
action, no less than when the king effects some historical coup only through a 
bold move that strategically violates those expectations. 
The rationale for Weber’s methodological focus on the individual is emphatically 
not, then, the political or ethical status of the human being, but the fact that 
it is the individual who takes action, and who is, therefore, the locus of an 
element that constitutes a central explanatory factor in many (but not all) of the 
circumstances of interest to the social scientist or historian. Weber’s (1978:4) 
definition of sociology is predicated on this view. Action (that is, behaviour 
that is ‘subjectively meaningful’ to the agent), including, of course, interaction, 
is what makes for differences in the flow of social life, in cases when change 
is the historical outcome and when it is not. If we want causal understanding 
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of the course of social life, and thereby the capacity to explain particular and 
general aspects of it, looking to people’s actions is indispensable, Weber argues, 
no matter how routine the cultural context is for the agents. To the extent that 
it is action that is causally important, then it is somewhat misleading to think of 
Weber’s methodology as stressing the individual rather than the collectivity, as 
Heath (2008) also points out (see also Ringer 1997:Ch. 4, 2002).
Two further points should be made here (even if they cannot be fully defended): 
first, the interpretation of subjective states relevant to action does not amount 
to a special kind of understanding, although it is a special kind of causal 
understanding; for Weber, we might say, there is no gap between identifying 
why somebody acted as she did, the subjective meaning the action had, and 
what action she performed. Second, the central role that Popper (and other 
methodological individualists, in economics as well as other social sciences) 
assigns to institutions (‘rules of the road, police regulations, traffic signals…
language, markets, prices, contracts and courts of justice’ [Popper 1994:166–
7]) is also a crucial dimension of this Weberian scheme, where they feature 
as an aspect of the action itself (defined relative to its subjective meaning, as 
when I obey the traffic rules in stopping at the red light—or break them in 
an act of defiance) or an aspect of the outcomes the action causes (the anger 
of other motorists or the fine that results when I do not obey the lights) or, 
more usually, both. Together, these two points suffice to indicate something I 
shall return to below—that the Weberian picture set out so far does not amount 
to a psychological individualism of the sort Mill held (and Homans endorsed 
[1982:287]), which asserts that the 
laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws 
of the actions and passions of human beings united together in the social 
state. Men, however, in a state of society, are still men; their actions and 
passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature. Men are 
not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, 
with different properties; as hydrogen and oxygen are different from 
water. (Mill 1882:608) 
For Weber, in contrast, it is clear that the historical and cultural context of an 
action is central to its very identity and therefore to its causal significance (as 
well as to the sorts of ‘human nature’ one will encounter in agents). If one were 
inclined, one could here invoke Geertz’s (1973) account (by his own testimony, 
Weberian) of how our minds’ properties (our ‘moods and motivations’ as well 
as our conceptions of the ‘general order of existence’) radically depend upon 
the historical state of the ‘web of cultural meanings’ we inherit, but it will be 
safer, given Geertz’s mercurial shifts in perspective, to stick to Weber’s original 
accounts. The point is merely to stress that there is nothing in Weber that 
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suggests that what we need in understanding the subjective states relevant to 
socially significant actions should be looked for in the theories and findings of 
(sub-personal) psychology. 
The reason for this (and for the complexity of Weber’s analytical schemes, even 
taking account of his use of ideal types) is that action is constituted by the 
subjective meanings of the agent and these are highly conditioned by particular 
circumstances, so that social outcomes typically depend upon the minutiae 
of the setting. Sub-personal psychological and even biochemical factors are 
sometimes causally relevant to the development of the subjective meaning 
that constitutes an action, but the action itself has to be interpreted—indeed, 
defined—in relation to that meaning. On the other hand, there is nothing at all 
in Weber to encourage those who wish to see the return to centre stage of the 
inscrutable ‘voluntarist’ individual, the uncaused cause of micro and macro-
social trajectories (the ‘intolerably spoilt child’ that the social sciences worked 
so hard to displace [Lévi-Strauss 1981:687]). The meanings in terms of which 
the subject acts, and therefore the actions taken that inflect to a greater or lesser 
extent the course of social(-historical) events, are themselves contingent on the 
social biographical circumstances (which, of course, implicate the institutions 
and social currents of the milieu).
Many of Tuzin’s explicit statements about MI could be read as echoing 
portions of Weber’s methodological writings, but a more telling convergence of 
perspective, as I have already claimed, is revealed by the profile of ethnographic 
studies Tuzin produced—in particular, the variety of factors he held to be 
relevant to the explanation of the growth of Ilahita, the maintenance of its 
social form and then its demise. Of particular significance is his insistence that 
we should focus on individuals, their particularities and their actions because 
of their causal significance for socio-historical processes as factors involved 
in the interaction between the historical traditions of Ilahita culture, the 
population and its environment (construed in the broadest terms). It seems, 
then, that for Tuzin (especially in his later work), as for Weber, societies are 
best conceived as processes. Less speculatively, for Tuzin, as for Weber, while 
society and its cultural forms are unintentionally produced and reproduced by 
acting individuals, their actions are irreducibly dependent upon the culture 
into which they are born. Cultural context, the individual meanings to which 
these are causally relevant (and which are partly constitutive of action) and the 
unintended consequences of agents’ activities are equally indispensable to the 




If, as I have suggested, Weber could have provided Tuzin with better support for 
his interactionalist perspective than the brand of MI he drew upon, it remains 
to answer someone who might be preoccupied with the idea that, nevertheless, 
Popper provided the sort of philosophical or meta-theoretical perspective that 
Tuzin sought in opposing prevailing structuralist paradigms. Well, I think this 
worry can be addressed.
The debates about methodological individualism that took place through the 
1950s and 1960s were deeply affected by the program of inter-theoretic reduction 
intimately associated with the deductive model of explanation, a paradigm of 
which was the reductive deduction of the gas laws from the kinetic theory. 
The difficulties of that program (which stemmed not only from the failure of 
attempts to generalise the paradigm just mentioned, but also from, for example, 
the complex and clearly non-deductive relations between domains within 
biology [Bechtel and Hamilton 2007]) also played an important part in changing 
the focus of debates about MI and, connectedly, in the development of a novel 
construal of the ontology of social life and its methodological implications. For, 
while awareness of the difficulties of the deductive picture of inter-theoretic 
reduction spread (along with broader concerns about empiricist and positivist 
models), it was nevertheless hard to abandon the conviction that there was indeed 
a fundamental relationship between mean kinetic energy of molecules and 
temperature, between the molecular gene and the gene of population genetics 
or, most notably (given the advent of cognitive science), the mind and the 
brain. These and other factors ensured that the search for micro-foundations for 
biological and cognitive phenomena remained important (Bechtel and Hamilton 
2007; Bickle 2008; Oddie 2001). Accordingly, other, more subtle notions of the 
dependency between domains were explored and developed. 
Discussions of such ‘supervenience’ relations and cognate notions pertaining 
to the metaphysics of identity have galvanised the philosophy of mind and the 
cognitive sciences since the 1970s (although it has also been important in ethics, 
aesthetics and the philosophy of science). The term ‘supervenience’ applies 
to the relations between properties in two domains, S and B, and is usually 
expressed by a slogan along the lines of ‘changes in S-properties only if there are 
changes in B-properties’. So, properties relevant to one domain (the mental, say) 
supervene upon those of another (the neurophysiological, say) when the former 
can undergo no change that is not a change in the latter (‘base’ or ‘subvening’) 
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domain. Thus, there can be no change of mental properties without a change of 
neurophysiological properties; it is important to note, however, that changes in 
base properties do not entail changes in the supervening ones.4
The impact of this notion stemmed from its introduction in the philosophy of 
mind, where it seemed to offer the possibility of a non-reductive account of the 
relations between the mental and the physical, while also defining an ecumenical 
space wherein the various particular disciplines (‘the special sciences’) could 
retain their autonomy. Moreover, each could do so without having to commit to 
any process or principle that might bring it into conflict with the fundamentals 
of the picture painted by physics. Accordingly, it was not long before scholars 
began thinking about the relations between the realms of the individual (or 
some more precise notion) and the socio-cultural in terms of supervenience, 
for it seemed to hold out ‘the promise of prizing apart the methodological and 
ontological issues, enabling, for example, both the metaphysical strictures of 
the [ontological] individualist and the methodological dispositions of the holist 
to be accommodated’ (Oddie 2001:12858). This was undoubtedly a liberating 
departure, for it facilitates a realisation that seeing individuals and social entities 
on a model of parts and wholes is metaphysically inadequate. Supervenience 
is, however, a modal notion; it says what is necessary and, therefore, what is 
possible (for the two terms are inter-definable); this means that it is susceptible 
to treatment within the technical apparatus of contemporary modal logic. 
Complexity is also guaranteed by the fact that different kinds of necessity/
possibility can be at stake: ‘necessity abounds’, Fine observes (2005:235), in 
logic, mathematics, metaphysics and nature, and it is no easy matter to sort and 
classify ‘this abundance’. A recent authoritative overview, for example, lists 
six categories of supervenience, each divided into two or four subcategories 
(McLaughlin and Bennett 2008). Rather than even think about introducing 
further discussion of supervenience, I will quickly describe one influential 
attempt to deploy the basic idea in thinking through the issues that preoccupied 
the Popperians, as well as Don Tuzin: Philip Pettit’s The Common Mind (1993).
In this ambitious synthetic work, Pettit links political orders to social orders 
and the latter to human psychological characteristics, at the core of which are 
our powers as intentional, thinking subjects.5 In place of the usual dichotomy 
between holism and individualism, Pettit considers the relations between 
4 Equivalently, identity between two entities (objects, events, states) in their subvening properties entails 
their identity in supervening properties, but not vice versa.
5 On Pettit’s view, developed in the first of the book’s three sections, thinking subjects are a subset of 
intentional beings; an intentional being is one who has states (pre-eminently, wants or aims and ‘beliefs’—
cognitive, truth-evaluable states) appropriately connected to its environment and whose characteristics 
explain its behaviours, while thinking beings also have the capacity to make their first-order intentional states 
the subject of desires and complex sets of beliefs. Briefly, if you and your pet dog believe the snake that just 
reared up before you is dangerous, you, as a thinking subject, will, in contrast with your dog, believe that it 
is true that the snake is dangerous (you will argue the toss with those inclined to doubt it), hold that there is 
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the social and the psychological orders in terms of two distinctions: between 
individualism and collectivism and between atomism and holism. He argues that 
the conflation of these two distinctions has been encouraged by the mistaken 
idea that individual agents stand to the societies of which they are members as 
parts to wholes. He characterises the difference between the distinctions in terms 
of a spatial metaphor: individualists and collectivists differ on the significance 
of the vertical relations between regularities that obtain in domains of social 
life, while atomists and holists differ on the question of the horizontal relations 
between the essential features of agents and those of society: 
Individualists deny and collectivists maintain that the status ascribed 
to individual agents in our intentional psychology is compromised by 
aggregate social regularities. Atomists deny and holists maintain that 
individual agents non-causally depend on their social relations with one 
another for some of their distinctive features. (Pettit 1993:118)
Pettit spends a chapter on each distinction, arguing against the collectivist in 
one and against the atomist in the other; not only is our intentional psychology 
not compromised by aggregate social regularities, it is also necessary for 
them, while our intentional psychology—our status as thinking subjects—‘is 
superveniently dependent’ (1993:228) upon our being members of a linguistic 
community of socially interacting subjects. In sum, Pettit argues for holistic 
individualism, which preserves the insights of romantic and historicist 
philosophers, as well as major social-scientific theorists, while avoiding the 
postulation of ontologies that are hard to reconcile with those of other sciences. 
The separation of ontological and methodological issues central to the discussion 
of supervenience and associated notions offers metaphysical austerity and 
the plurality of autonomous sciences: biological, psychological and social 
phenomena are scaffolded by, but irreducible to, physically fundamental 
processes. As Pettit’s work shows, this powerful vision is naturally extended to 
areas of social and political theory. And while important, connected questions 
about causal relations and the nature of explanation remain for the friends of 
supervenience (as they do for friends of other approaches), the program of non-
reductive physicalism has certainly shown the confusions that attend the failure 
to distinguish between the supervenience of A properties on B properties, the 
reduction of A properties to B, and the elimination of A properties in favour of 
B properties. It is reasonable to expect that if these distinctions became more 
widely available in the social sciences, some of the anxieties (and sloganeering) 
about determinism and reductionism might become things of the past. 
evidence to that effect in the circumstances (which you are prepared to point out to your doubting friend), 
wish, perhaps, that it were false that the snake was dangerous, and so on. His argument that being a thinking 
subject involves non-causal dependencies on social relations is crucial to the remainder of the book.
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The sort of non-reductive individualism that Pettit sets out amounts to the 
replacement of the dualism between the social and the individual with a 
continuum between the macro-social through the meso-social to the micro-social, 
where we encounter particular persons. The most important implication is that 
persons are socio-historical beings, in fact and by metaphysical necessity. (To 
that extent, the continued use of an undifferentiated notion of the individual is 
to be avoided, for it too easily evokes those Hobbesian atoms that are projected as 
only contingently social beings.) So, on the arguments of Pettit and others (such 
as Currie 1984, 1988, 2001), persons are ‘always already’ social entities, for they 
are necessarily defined relationally. Pettit (1993:229) goes on to elaborate a view 
that he (and Frank Jackson) calls explanatory ecumenism, according to which 
‘intentional, structural, historicist and rational choice styles of explanation are 
complementary enterprises’ (see also Jackson and Pettit 1992a, 1992b; Pettit 
1998). Calling them ‘styles of explanation’ does not really do justice to Pettit’s 
conception of the relationships involved in these different areas of endeavour. 
What matters is being precise about the question we wish to pose: are we asking 
about the decisions of this clan leader in that context, or about the context, or 
about the broad institutional setting that defined the context in that way, or 
about the history of that configuration of institutions? 
What makes the sort of ecumenical, ‘interactionalist’ approach Tuzin favoured, 
and Pettit explicitly defends, so important is that it subverts the simple 
individual–society couple that has inflected debate since Durkheim. Pettit’s 
analysis, however, and the considerations upon which he grounds it, also 
undermines Tuzin’s stated MI grounds for his approach. It would be possible—
and for many purposes, desirable—to pursue further the approach Pettit takes 
and the many questions and difficulties it raises. But given limitations of space, 
it seems more worthwhile to conclude by returning to my introductory rehearsal 
of social-science commonplaces.
Concluding Remarks
Those commonplaces indicate that a great many of the states any given person 
is in are defined socially and relationally; so description of a person already 
entails the sort of relations that MI is sometimes aimed at accounting for. Social 
properties are contingently acquired by an individual through the process of 
socialisation (which amounts to ontogenesis), but having a particular social 
property—such as being a citizen, taxpayer, or an enrolled school student, or 
in a particular Arapesh initiation class—is non-contingently dependent upon 
enjoying the right sort of relations with aspects of society (just as what it is for 
something to be legal tender is a matter of its relational history [Searle 2010]). 
Admittedly, a general account of the relations relevant to overall personhood is 
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a difficult ontological question. But there are physical entities and states that are 
defined by their having the right sort of causal historical relations with prior 
events: footprints, skid marks, sunburn, shaving cuts and whiplash injuries 
are obvious examples; but being a tiger or an oak is a matter of causal history, 
while being a thermostat is less a matter of physical constitution than causal 
powers. While these examples are helpfully suggestive, the relations involved 
in someone’s being a divine king, cult elder, citizen, mayor or judge, or for 
something to be a signature or a football field, are more complex still. In fact, the 
relations that matter seem to be between agents and appropriate states of mind 
(Currie 1988)—prior states of one’s own mind (as my currently being under 
contract entails prior actions, and therefore intentions, of mine) and, more 
importantly, states of other minds, recursively linked together, as they are in 
linguistic communication. So not only are social states and processes relational, 
they apparently involve irreducibly mental states—states it is notoriously 
difficult to identify with any non-mental substrate (not least because they too 
are relational). 
Interestingly, once we abandon hope of accounting for aspects of the social life 
of humans in terms that abstract from our status as intentional, social beings 
(which is akin to trying to account for the natural history of sharks in terms that 
abstract from the properties they have as predatory fish), it becomes difficult 
to specify a sense of individual that is not parasitic on the one we use pre-
theoretically. So social relations depend (supervene) on mental states, which, in 
turn, have dependencies on the conventions and practices of social life (in the 
sense that my worrying whether my dole cheque is on its way is a state of mind 
that entails the existence of certain socio-historical conditions). 
All this is not to deny that there is—and necessarily so—some substrate that is 
the possessor of a social property; and it is hard to see how this could be anything 
other than a being with a sufficiently rich psychology (rich enough to permit 
language learning, for example), or something (such as the football field) defined 
as such by beings of that sort. While, though, there are obvious candidates 
for bearers of social properties (human beings), specifying them in ways that 
do justice to typical cases (mature cultural beings) without presupposing the 
socio-cultural is a forlorn hope, as the difficulties of MI indicate. This, in turn, 
means that it makes little sense to think of concrete individuals as basic parts 
of social wholes (Currie 1984, 1988; Pettit 1993, 1998; Ruben 1985). And if 
one thinks carefully about the relations among armies, soldiers and the people 
who signed up, or between the team, the club it represents and the players, or 
between the clan, its subclans and the current members, one can appreciate that 
we are dealing with something other than simple aggregates—like those who 
are waiting right now at the local bus stop. If I am one of the group waiting at 
a particular bus stop, and that group is one of the many making up the larger 
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group of people waiting for buses on the high street, I am a member of the larger 
group, whereas (as Ruben shows), if you are an Australian citizen, and Australia 
is a member of the United Nations, it does not follow that you are a member 
of the United Nations. And whereas the group of people sitting in the café or 
residing in an Ilahita ward changes as persons come or go, neither the library 
committee nor the Afinga clan is transformed when one member is replaced 
with another (even if this has effects on other interpersonal relations, the tenor 
of meetings or the chances of internal disputes, and so on). 
Coping with the complexities of the relations between social entities is, then, 
a metaphysically challenging task, and that makes formulating explanations 
capturing causal relations among them less than straightforward. This state of 
affairs need not worry us, however; we might still think (as Weber did, and 
historians usually do) that there is still much analytical satisfaction to be had 
from showing how, for example, economic depressions, wars or the rise of new 
social classes causally relate to the actions and decisions of individuals and 
identifiable social collectivities, picked out in the usual intuitive terms; or from 
appreciating how certain religious doctrines, which might demand a great deal 
of interpretation on our part, grew and spread through one stratum of society, 
but not others. It was only in this (folk psychological) sense that Weber was 
an individualist; he seems to have crafted his sociology to be ontologically and 
methodologically continuous with history and with our folk psychology. And 
these resources might be all that we need to understand how Ilahita, under 
pressure from expanding populations around them, made accommodations that 
involved, among other things, the elaboration of existing practices and their 
deployment in the novel historical circumstances, and that what eventuated was 
something unprecedented in the area. Of course, we will have lots of questions 
about those practices, their histories, their connections with one another, and 
with human psychology; and when it comes to some very particular aspects of 
events (why the turn to Christianity at that juncture [Tuzin 1997]), we might 
want to know about the personal characteristics of individuals (such as Samuel). 
Usually, however, the characteristics of typical individuals with locally specific, 
shared understandings set in the broader contexts of their human condition 
will suffice. 
Finally, where does this perspective leave Don Tuzin’s interactionalist paradigm 
and his hopes for an anthropology ‘both humane and humanistic…of great moral 
and scientific importance’? I think it leaves it in as good a shape as he might 
have wished for when he began his stunning exposition of Ilahita’s fortunes in 
the 1970s. Indeed, I would argue that it leaves his version of interactionalism 
in a somewhat stronger position than that of prominent others who share Don’s 
interactionalist ambitions, such as Sperber and Boyer. Don could help himself 
to what we might call ‘the anti anti-reductionist’ case that these scholars have 
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made so strongly over the years (see, for example, Sperber 1996) and to the 
openness to integration with evolutionary history that this naturally provides. 
Yet, the sensitivity of Don’s approach to those particular historical features that 
Sperber’s model of culture packages together as ‘ecological factors’ makes it more 
apt than Sperber’s for the single-case historical-ethnographic study. And just 
such studies are the ones prized by those who want anthropologists to continue 
to produce cultural accounts thick enough to warrant Rorty’s description of us 
as ‘agents of love’ (1986), or who think the discipline should remain dedicated to 
addressing what Geertz insisted on calling our ‘moral imagination’ (1983). What 
makes Tuzin’s work so outstanding is that it can appeal no less convincingly to 
both perspectives, even while they see themselves as opposed.6
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7. Stories from Childhood:  
Windows on experience or cultural  
meta-narratives? Evidence from 
Papua New Guinea
Stephen C . Leavitt
Introduction
Childhood stories in personal narratives of Western subjects often convey 
pivotal moments of experience aimed at communicating personal identity. 
Such strategies rely on cultural models that see identity as the product of 
past life events, with childhood experience especially important. But what 
do personal childhood stories reveal in societies with very different cultural 
models of early life’s role in shaping identity? Among the Bumbita Arapesh of 
Papua New Guinea—a group bordering the Ilahita Arapesh—childhood is the 
time of life when a new growing being takes in essential life substance from 
parental nurturing, supplemented by ritual transformation in initiation and 
maturation ceremonies. In their view, childhood experiences do little to shape 
personality; instead, they work to define one’s essential being, in substance and 
position, through nurturing and transactions of food. Individuals’ stories of 
their childhood, then, convey themes of personal identity as refracted through 
local Bumbita understandings of what a person is. 
This chapter draws its inspiration from Donald Tuzin’s ethnographic vision, 
focused as it is on understanding cultural themes as they are expressed in 
individuals’ minds, with all of the contingencies of a life as lived. In his work, 
Tuzin emphasised that one’s cultural views depend as much on the emotional 
conditions of one’s individual experience as they do on the learned cultural 
systems. His paper ‘Of the Resemblance of Fathers to Their Children: The Roots 
of Primitivism in Middle-Childhood Enculturation’ (1990) presents a clear 
example of his point of view. In that work on the psychological impact of beliefs 
in spirits, he looked to the context in which those beliefs were first learned in 
middle childhood. His point is that the experiential context of a child is very 
different from that of adults, and that experience is what shapes the emotional 
valences of adults’ beliefs. He writes: ‘Children creatively interpret received 
cultural elements in such a way as to give substance to their emergent sense of 
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identity, thus establishing an indivisible union between the person, on the one 
hand, and the culture that provides its ideational constituents, on the other’ 
(Tuzin 1990:72).
To understand the emotional framework of beliefs in adults, one needs to 
understand the story told by those beliefs to children, for it was as children 
that those beliefs were first learned and understood. Children learn features 
of their culture from other children (Tuzin 1990:82), and the versions they 
learn are ‘inevitably partial and distorted because they are based on limited 
life experiences’ (p. 84). The process produces ‘childish residues’ in adult 
culture, and in that context some of the more ghoulish elements of adult culture 
make more sense (Tuzin 1990:99). So, in this context, the beliefs of fathers—
formed originally in the context of child-to-child interactions—resemble the 
primitivisms found in children’s beliefs.
By placing beliefs in a specific ethnographic and experiential context, Tuzin’s 
approach is one example of several recent efforts to view cultural beliefs 
through the lens of individual experience. Recent research in anthropology 
and psychology, for example, has shifted its focus to the activity of narrative 
production, arguing that people everywhere build stories that make a point; 
as the linguist Labov (1981) put it some time ago, the stories must answer the 
question ‘So what?’ Individuals use personal narrative to make sense of their 
lives, to negotiate among different versions of self, and to fashion responses 
to dominant cultural discourse. In their review of approaches to the study of 
personal narrative, Ochs and Capps emphasise that by using all these strategies, 
‘interlocutors tell personal narratives about the past primarily to understand 
and cope with their current concerns’ (1996:25). Narratives are thus driven by 
motives with particular, immediate aims. Researchers across a range of analytic 
traditions have put forward new approaches that accommodate narrators’ active 
attempts to use stories to place life events in a desired context. Thus, cognitive 
anthropologists have worked to build models of mental process that can address 
specific circumstances. Strauss and Quinn, for example, draw on a connectionist 
model for mental schemas that can be ‘highly context sensitive’ (1997:53). By 
looking at schemas as embedded in a host of associations networked together, 
researchers can consider specifics, so that ‘the particular features of any given 
event can lead to different outcomes from one situation to the next’ (Strauss and 
Quinn 1997:53). The model allows for greater attention to the ‘directive force’ of 
cultural schemas to better appreciate narrators’ commitments to specific ideas at 
specific times (D’Andrade and Strauss 1992). At the same time, psychoanalytically 
informed anthropologists have looked at the often inconsistent and conflicting 
identities mobilised by narrators to apply to specific situations in giving life 
accounts (see especially, Ewing 1990, 1997). Researchers in cognitive psychology 
have cultivated an interest in ‘taking narrative seriously’ (Chase 1995) as a tool 
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for better understanding mental processes. And theorists of autobiographical 
memory emphasise how memories of the past are mobilised through a narrative 
process with specific aims, so that remembered stories ‘communicate what is 
significant in [people’s] lives’ in such a way as to ‘seek to convince others to see 
some part of reality in a particular way’ (Garro and Mattingly 2000:11).
When stories deal with the very personal topic of one’s own childhood, it is 
likely that the rhetorical strategies for self-presentation will play a prominent 
role in the shape of the story told. The stories almost by definition seek to 
convey something about self-understanding. But stories of childhood also, to an 
exceptional degree, rely on often unarticulated ethno-psychological premises 
about just what a person is, so that they might serve as a particularly effective 
venue for exploring how local cultural forms bear on universal processes in 
narrative production. The challenge for the researcher is to articulate these 
universal features while at the same time avoiding inferences about motives that 
might depend on a Western model of how childhood shapes adult selfhood. So, 
for example, in dealing with Bumbita personal narrative, it might be appropriate 
to infer that a narrator is making an argument about how to understand his or 
her experience, but it would be inappropriate to infer that the narrator aims to 
build a narrative that explains personality traits or emotional preoccupations. 
While the stories from childhood might seek to convey something about ‘who 
I am today’, the cultural forms that underlie that self-assessment might be 
dramatically different across societies. 
I shall use the case of a personal narrative of a Bumbita young man to pursue two 
separate aims. The first seeks to illustrate in a detailed way how basic Bumbita 
assumptions about the nature of personhood define the terms through which the 
narrator presents his stories from childhood. Bumbita conceptualise a person as 
the product of the nurturing activity of parents and others in the community, 
and that nurturing is conceptualised in terms of a literal transfer of substance 
through the activity of cultivating and providing food. Thus, the Bumbita say 
that people age only because their vital strength is continuously being sapped 
by dependents who are consuming food produced by the caretakers. They 
understand the process as a literal transfer of substance between generations. 
One implication is that a person becomes who he or she is only through a process 
of literally ingesting the vitality of parents and other caretakers. The Bumbita 
frame the moral obligations of children to their parents in these terms. You 
must look after your parents in old age, they say, because your own strength 
has caused their weakness. In the Bumbita view, it is not the case that one’s 
personality is shaped by, say, the child-rearing priorities of one’s parents; in 
fact, they see childhood experience as irrelevant in shaping one’s character. 
Instead, they see one’s personal vitality and integration within the community 
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as the products of caretakers’ vigilance in providing adequate transfers of food 
to dependents. I shall show how these themes underlie the narrative structure 
of the young man I have chosen to present. 
At the same time, this young man’s narratives also reveal rhetorical strategies 
that I believe are characteristic of personal stories everywhere. In spite of the 
dramatically different cultural frame for his stories of childhood, he still makes 
an active effort to present himself in a particular way. In this context, the local 
Bumbita understandings of the meaning of childhood become a backdrop 
for a more active, individual rhetorical move to prove a point about what the 
childhood experience means. My second aim in this chapter, therefore, is to 
draw attention to a relatively underdeveloped dimension of the universal 
process of rhetorical argument in narrative production. Specifically, I argue 
that the inevitable rhetorical dimension to telling stories requires us to look 
at the story as making an argument about the experience. Once we look at the 
arguments that underlie a given story, we have to consider also what it is that 
the arguments are mobilised against. In asserting a certain point about how to 
understand a story, the narrator seeks to suppress alternative versions. Those 
‘suppressed meanings’ (Leavitt 1995, 2007) should be integral to our analytical 
approach. The actual meaning of the narrative emerges only by juxtaposing 
the asserted argument against these suppressed meanings. The young Bumbita 
man who talked to me about his childhood transactions of food was at the same 
time constructing an argument about his place in the community. And he was 
building that argument to combat suppressed fears about what he suspected 
was actually a precarious position in that community.
Transactions of Food in Bumbita Childhood 
Stories
During my first weeks in Bumbita, I was struck by how easy it was to ingratiate 
myself with people by simply feeding them. In those early days, I had several 
tasks (including the large one of building my house) that had to be paid for, and 
while the adolescents who helped me were willing to take money for their work, 
I found that they seemed to feel better compensated if I simply offered them a 
meal at the end of the day instead. The deep significance of transactions of this 
kind is a well-known feature of Melanesian social relations. On one level, it is 
not surprising that in exchange-based societies people would see gifts as potent 
declarations of goodwill. In talking about the Kaluli of the Papuan Plateau, for 
example, Schieffelin (1976:150) notes: ‘As human relationships are actualized 
and mediated through gifts of food and material wealth, so these things come 
to stand for what is deeply felt in human relationships.’ Gifts convey concern. 
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To appreciate what gift relations actually mean for Melanesians, it is necessary, 
however, to look as well at how such relations come to participate in people’s 
most intimate sense of being. Marilyn Strathern has described how Melanesians 
see transactions as ways of transporting parts of one’s being in a literal sense. 
She distinguishes ‘mediated’ exchange of valuables where objects ‘circulate as 
parts of persons’ (1988:192) from ‘unmediated’ exchange where the products of 
work contribute directly to the creation of others (such as in the case of parents 
feeding children) (pp. 177–8, passim). In both types of exchange, the essence of 
being is conveyed from person to person through transaction. In the first case, 
the objects themselves determine a temporary state of relations between people 
(as ‘donors’ or ‘recipients’). Over time, as gifts pass back and forth, the relations 
are reciprocal. But in the second case, the unmediated transfer of substance 
means the donor has a direct influence on the minds and bodies of the recipients, 
so their status as recipients is more enduring. As a result, ‘the capacity to have 
an unmediated effect creates a distinguishing asymmetry between the parties’ 
(Strathern 1988:178). This asymmetrical relationship, which finds its prototype 
in relations between parents and children, provides the conceptual frame for 
Bumbita thoughts about their childhood experiences. 
It is not simply that children, in accepting food from their parents and others, 
learn about unmediated exchange of substance; they also come to associate 
those ideas with themes and conflicts that arise from the pragmatics of growing 
up. In the case I present here, the young Bumbita man related to me a series 
of vignettes from his childhood focusing on the theme of his integration into 
a community of peers through transactions with food. His stories draw upon 
Bumbita cultural themes emphasising how transactions of food provided, 
through a literal transfer of substance, a vehicle for integrating oneself into the 
community. He emphasises how, through guile and manipulation, he was able 
to compel older boys to accept him into their social group. His stories argue 
implicitly that he was successful.
The episode was related by Aminguh, a young man in his early twenties. He 
was the youngest son of a powerful village leader who served several years as 
village councillor. The father died when Aminguh was in his early teens. Of 
the informants with whom I conducted detailed personal interviews, Aminguh 
was among the most enthusiastic. Occasionally, he would wake me up to talk 
in the middle of the night, and often he said he had thought a lot between 
sessions about what he wanted to tell me in the next interview. By the time of 
my departure, we were close friends. After one of my early formal interviews 
with him, I told him that the next time I would like him to tell me some stories 
that he remembered from his childhood. I told him just to tell me anything that 
he remembered. He returned the next week and began relating to me a whole 
series of childhood incidents. All together, they took up the better part of three 
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interviews. He seemed to want to entertain me with the humour of a child’s 
plight. He told of cutting himself in his fumbling attempts to learn to use a bush 
knife, of eating food that made him sick to his stomach, of burning himself in 
cooking fires. In taking this perspective, he also sought to capture the feelings 
and thoughts of a young child as opposed to those of an adult. His stories of 
relations with others therefore conveyed his experience with an immediacy 
often lacking in similar stories from other informants. 
He began his rendition of his childhood by relating to me a series of incidents 
involving his attempts to follow along with his classificatory brothers in their 
forays into the bush to find food. Most of his stories shared themes about wanting 
to be included. Because of Bumbita cultural assumptions about defining group 
membership through sharing of substance accomplished through transactions 
of food, Aminguh used the theme of transactions of food to articulate his points 
about being included in the group. By manipulating his brothers into sharing 
food with him, he became a part of their group. What is striking about his 
account from a Western perspective is how irrelevant motives are. Westerners 
would consider acceptance through manipulation as a decidedly unsatisfying 
way of becoming a part of a group. From our perspective, the important thing 
would be whether the brothers wanted to include Aminguh in their group—the 
extent to which Aminguh could, through personality traits or commendable 
personal action, convince his brothers that he should be a part of their group. 
But such issues matter little in Aminguh’s story. The first incident goes as 
follows:
We went to cut the bush. At this time I didn’t wear any trousers [he was 
about ten years old at the time]. When we cut gardens, we would work 
at night, with the moon full. Sirimbom, Rengur and some others, we 
would work at night, cutting the bush. I was just a kid so I just sat and 
looked at them [as they worked]. One morning [my ‘brothers’] went off 
to find eggs from wild fowl. I wanted to go with them, but they pushed 
me away, pushed me away, so I just sat down [to wait for them]. Then 
they came back to cook, in the afternoon, to cook the eggs and wild fowl 
they had caught. I got up and walked very quietly and sat at the back 
of Ohitum [‘eB’]. I sat there and they talked among themselves, saying, 
‘Hey, you all eat in a hurry, the kid’s going to come back soon!’ They 
started to eat and I sat at the base of a tree and then hit a piece of sugar 
cane against the tree. They turned to see me and then they got up to hit 
me now! Mangen [‘eB’] and the others chased me up the hill, but I didn’t 
go away. I just waited for them to go back so I could come up and they 
would have to give me a piece of meat. I came up and Sirimbom [‘yB’, 
but older than A.] gave me some and then told me to leave, and I said, ‘I 
am going to tell my father, say that they are eating wild fowl’—you see 
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they had forbidden them from eating it because they had already done 
[their initiations]. I said that I’d go tell them and they started cajoling 
[‘grisim’] me, telling me not to. They sat there and gave me a piece of 
meat—Sirimbom had given me some before—but now [the two others] 
gave me some and they said, ‘You can’t go and tell them, just keep quiet 
about it.’ We ate together, finished, and we came on up. 
There are two avenues that I wish to pursue here in explicating this incident. 
The first is to assess Aminguh’s characterisation of the people’s motives and 
interactions as an indication of his general view of human behaviour as framed 
by Bumbita understandings about the significance of transactions of food. 
The second is to identify the social predicament his story works to fortify him 
against and to address what suppressed meanings might motivate him to frame 
his stories in the way he does.
Aminguh’s immediate goal here, as he presents it, is to finagle some food out 
of his ‘brothers’. But the details he selects indicate that for him there is an 
association between getting the food and being a part of the group—that is, 
if he gets the food, that means he is one of them. He begins by saying, ‘We 
would work at night’, implying that he remembers being one of this group of 
classificatory brothers. But then he immediately establishes a narrative tension 
by throwing his affiliation with the group into doubt, stating that when they 
went off on that cherished social activity of boys, finding food, ‘They pushed 
me away’. When the brothers return, he hides from them in order to overhear 
them conspiring to keep from him the food they have caught. He includes this 
sequence in the story to verify that their hiding the food from him is an active 
exclusion, not simply an oversight. For him, that situation is intolerable. He 
reacts by getting them to share the food with him. It is only then that he can 
feel included. 
In telling how he managed to get them to share, Aminguh reveals his 
understanding of human behaviour in such situations. First, his brothers do not 
have any prior inclination to share with him despite his being their kin. They 
try to eat in a hurry in order to avoid having to give him some. He characterises 
them as being self-interested, excluding him so as not to have to share. Second, 
they respond to his efforts to reveal them. He first distracts them so that they 
will know that he has heard them trying to eat behind his back, and then, after 
they chase him, he continues to come back because he knows that if he comes 
back, ‘They would have to give me a piece of meat’—even though they were 
capable of sending him off completely, using their fists. His message here is 
that people will not share unless they are forced into doing so. And even then 
that is not sufficient since they only give him ‘some’—that is, not an equal 
portion. Getting the equal portion requires further manipulation. Here he uses 
the threat that little boys often use, the same threat that keeps them from being 
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included in the group to begin with: he says that he will tell their parents that 
they are eating forbidden food. This last manipulation produces the desired 
results. Suddenly, the older boys take him in and give him his proper share of 
the food, and they all go off together back to their camp. Aminguh sketches here 
a pattern of interaction that shows individuals acting in their own interests at 
the expense of others but at the same time responding well to manipulation and 
to the threat of being exposed. Through this manipulation, Aminguh gets his 
food and at the same time is included in the group.
Aminguh’s act of manipulation raises another theme to his story, one that is 
implicit but important to identify given his position as the son of a deceased 
village counsellor and leader. He gets his way through artful manipulation, and 
successful manipulation is in the Melanesian context a measure of personal 
power. For example, Bumbita yam growers manipulate ancestral spirits through 
their yam magic, coercing them to help the yams grow. Similarly, successful 
leaders manipulate others into doing their bidding. In Melanesia, ‘status in 
the local community is achieved through processes of political manipulation. 
Through these manipulations a man becomes a big man. Successful big men 
become village councilors’ (Barnett 1979:770). Missing are the negative 
connotations associated with political manipulation in the Western context. 
Aminguh’s stories here are clearly success stories. He manages to manipulate his 
‘brothers’ into sharing with him, and in so doing he shows himself to have some 
of the ingenuity recognised as characteristics of village leaders.
It is important to note here that once he does get them to share with him, he 
sees the conflict as resolved and the previous rejection as nullified. It is this 
characteristic of the story that makes it seem so peculiar when looked at 
through Western assumptions about what it means to belong to a group. To a 
Western audience, such a story would convey at best a tenuous resolution to 
the predicament of social belonging. Aminguh’s having to resort to guile and 
manipulation would be seen as a sign that he had failed in a fundamental way 
to resolve the issue. It would be tempting to view his story as an appeal to 
sympathy due to an unfortunate, even tragic, instance of social rejection. But 
Aminguh attaches no such meanings to his story. For him, the story is a success 
story about exercising leadership in becoming a part of his group of brothers. 
What matters is the actual transaction of food; how the food was obtained 
is not an issue for him. In fact, the dynamic that Aminguh presents from his 
childhood recapitulates Bumbita understandings of prototypical negotiations 
between children and parents over food. According to Bumbita understandings 
of child-rearing patterns, when children are young, they learn that conflicts 
with their parents can be resolved by demanding food, that eventually their 
parents will ‘feel sorry’ for them and give in to the demands. Parents regularly 
describe their own behaviour as eventual acquiescence to persistent pestering. 
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Westerners regard such patterns as evidence of some kind of failing on the part 
of parents. Manipulation of parents by children is part of the Western model 
of what might go into ‘spoiling’ a child. But in the Bumbita view, guile and 
manipulation to obtain the transaction of desired food are a fundamental part 
of the process of transaction. Young children do it with their parents, and once 
they reach older childhood they extend this model of interaction to relations 
with peers, describing more subtle methods of manipulation. This manipulation 
becomes a basis for exercising leadership among men. 
An appreciation of local Bumbita understandings of transactions over food is 
therefore pivotal in understanding the significance of Aminguh’s story. Only by 
looking through the local cultural lens can one see the story’s heroic features. It 
is a story that begins with a rift in social relations causing feelings of rejection, a 
manipulation of others through guile and persistence, and a successful resolution 
of the conflict through the proper sharing of food even when done grudgingly.
Suppressed Meanings
Anthropologists might at one time have used a story such as Aminguh’s to 
illustrate prevailing features of local cultural models or schemas. But in recent 
years attention has shifted to identifying some of the contingencies of personal 
narrative that might shape how it appears at any given point in time. Personal 
narratives present an understanding of the self, but they do so through a 
rhetorical process that seeks to foreground certain themes and suppress others. 
Psychologists following the pioneering work of Jerome Bruner have sought 
to articulate some of the activities involved in presenting a particular version 
of the self. Bruner writes, in fact, that ‘[r]hetoric is as pervasive a feature of 
Self construction as narrative itself, and though we tend to dismiss it on moral 
grounds as mere “self-justification”, such dismissals fail to recognize to what 
degree the concept of Self (and autobiography itself) is a form of apologia’ (Bruner 
1994:49). Researchers, he argues, have to recognise that such self-justification is 
a fundamental characteristic of how people everywhere think about themselves. 
Behind the activity of self-justification lie alternative scenarios, what I have 
called ‘suppressed meanings’, which contribute to the shape of the story. As 
Susan Chase (1995) puts it, any asserted story of self contains a ‘submerged’ story 
that might point to a ‘feeling of inadequacy’. She argues that ‘as interviewers 
we need to attend to submerged stories and invite their telling’ (Chase 1995:17). 
So what possible submerged story or suppressed meanings might we infer from 
Aminguh’s stories of his childhood? Without a detailed account of his entire life, 
I can only hint at suggestions, but there are clues even in the accounts that he 
presents here. First, it is important to point out that the themes articulated in the 
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story above appear over and over in his stories about his childhood. Establishing 
a sense of belonging to the peer group was a preoccupation. His other stories of 
childhood show what he experienced there as part of a more general pattern. 
So, for example, after relating the incident above, he went on to talk about the 
time his friends and ‘brothers’ caught some fish and another bird. Aminguh 
again tried to tag along, saying that they sent him off, ‘They always got rid of 
me’. When they spied him following behind them, they rubbed stinging nettles 
on him and threw him into the water. When they caught a bird, he says, ‘They 
left me behind, they didn’t think of me, just thinking of their bird. I walked 
along [he imitates sniffling] as if I were about to cry.’ Afterwards, they prepared 
to cook the bird but did not show it to him, lying to him and keeping an eye on 
him so that he could not see what they were cooking. But by astutely looking 
at the materials they used for cooking, he surmised that they must have caught 
something substantial. When they offered him some fish and told him to leave, 
he said, ‘No, I want to see what it is that you are planning to bake’, and he 
told them again that he would tell their parents if he did not get some. So they 
included him, saying, ‘Sit down, sit down, sit down’, and they all ate together.
In a third incident under similar circumstances, his ‘brother’ sneaked a pigeon 
to Aminguh before the others returned and told him to hurry and eat because 
otherwise ‘[w]hen they come they’ll see that you’ve already eaten and they’ll 
say that you’ve already had enough’. He cooked and ate the bird in a hurry 
and then received a small share of the catch of the others when they returned. 
After receiving his share, he said, ‘Hey, give me another one!’ and they said, 
‘That’s enough for you!’ He then went on to describe how in the morning they 
discovered the feathers from the first bird he had eaten and thus saw that he 
had manipulated them into sharing when he had already eaten a large portion 
on his own. He portrays himself here as being as selfish as the others by trying 
to get more than his share. After he had related all of these incidents, I ventured 
the question, ‘Why were they always trying to get rid of you?’ He responded:
Because they said I was just a kid. It wouldn’t be good if I were to tell on 
them, tell the women and the other kids, saying, ‘These guys here are 
guys who hide and eat meat’, to shame them, so that the women would 
say, ‘Hey, we don’t like these guys who eat meat’, it’s like that. 
Here the question of who trusts whom runs the other way around. Before, 
Aminguh could not trust them to share the food because of their greed. Now, he 
says that they could not trust him to keep their eating a secret. The implication 
is that one should not expect to be able to trust other people; he portrays himself 
as unreliable as well. In Aminguh’s view, it is the inability to trust others that 
lies behind the difficulties people have in accepting others. And, of course, 
Aminguh’s subsequent manipulation only reinforces that view among his peers.
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These stories carry some persistent patterns, and Aminguh consistently 
presented them to me through constructing a version of himself as a child, a 
version he wanted me to see and accept. He invited me to share in his childhood 
frustrations at being shunned by his brothers and peers and then presented for 
me a ‘childhood Aminguh’ who, through his skill at guile and manipulation, 
was able (temporarily at least) to overcome the exclusion he felt. These vignettes 
cannot accurately reflect Aminguh’s overall childhood experience, but they can 
reflect his interpretation of important features of that experience and identify 
enduring issues of conflict. Taken together, they suggest that, for him at least, 
being outside the group, excluded by others, was a problem that he felt he 
needed to address. The tension in each incident derives from his setting himself 
in opposition to the group. In each case it is Aminguh versus ‘them’, with the 
‘them’ being a solidified group of peers. Their exclusion of him makes him 
feel hurt so that he ‘sniffles’ or murmurs stoically to himself, ‘It’s all right, it’s 
nothing’. And each time he eventually responds by revealing that he knows 
they are hiding food from him and by eventually manipulating them into letting 
him join them. 
Taken together, the series of vignettes does not imply a deeply psychological 
defence structure against unacceptable meanings. But they do have a coherent 
set of points—likely cultivated in his own private reflections on his past 
experience—that insist on a particular interpretation of the events described. 
The central argument is that he, through his own individual initiative, was 
able to coerce his brothers into accepting him into the group. In the Bumbita 
cultural context, transfers of substance, through the sharing of food, imply a 
fundamental sharing of being that Aminguh accomplishes through his own 
initiative. Once his argument is understood in that context, it is possible to 
infer the alternative scenarios that might be suppressed. The critical issue is 
what he can actually accomplish through individual initiative. Lurking behind 
the stories is the possibility that personal initiative is not in fact sufficient for 
becoming a part of the group. In fact, the Bumbita cultural model of substance 
transfer implies that individual initiative is not sufficient. All Bumbita are 
fundamentally dependent upon the nurturing activities of others.
It turns out that, in Aminguh’s case, the premature death of his father left him 
with a profound sense of dislocation that he was wrestling with throughout our 
interviews together. As he understood it, maturing without a father entailed 
the risk that he would not be able to acquire the substance and knowledge that 
would make him a complete adult. While the vehicles for the transfer of vitality 
are primarily those of food and energy spent on the cultivation of food, the 
Bumbita tend to see other transfers, such as ritual knowledge, magic and wisdom, 
as a form of nurturing essential to the proper relationship between father and 
son. In the case of ritual knowledge and magic, the scrupulous secrecy and the 
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competitive uses of such things require that one learn about them from just a 
very few sources, and the most important is one’s father. Certain techniques of 
yam magic, for example, are highly individual and are passed from fathers to 
their sons. Such magic is regarded as essential to harvesting abundant crops. 
The importance of acquiring knowledge from one’s own father is also reflected 
in the magical potency of heirlooms such as axes, nets for hunting pigs, and 
curing packets. These objects are imbued with the essence of clan ancestors so 
that they are not effective if used by anyone besides an appropriate heir. Young 
men also rely on more informal practical wisdom about how to live with women 
and how to succeed politically. The Bumbita feel that anyone else besides their 
own fathers will be unwilling to impart such knowledge. Aminguh, in his 
interviews with me, communicated a profound anxiety over being able to take 
his father’s place in the community without his father’s guidance and continued 
transfer of substance. Here is an example of how he talked about his position 
when lamenting the death of his father:
I am here and…there is no other ‘father’ to come and teach me things. I 
know, each father must teach his own children about everything. If he 
goes wrong like this, his father will say, ‘You must do it this way.’ That’s 
how it is, so I think of this all the time. I think, ‘Why did he die like 
that, he didn’t want to wait until I was big, like I am now, so that he 
could teach me first and then later go ahead and die?’
He starts by saying that his clan fathers (all of whom have died) might have 
taught him had they lived, but then reflects that really it is only his own father 
who would have been likely to do so consistently. Clan ‘fathers’ have their own 
sons. Aminguh’s feeling of loss is accentuated by the ideology that parents create 
adults out of their children through a transfer of substance, vitality and energy. 
Here he speaks only of ritual knowledge and wisdom, but his understanding 
of relationships between generations leads him to see the loss of his father’s 
teachings as leaving him incomplete in some fundamental way. When I asked 
him if he thought that he would be like his father, he said, ‘I want to become 
like him, I think that way. I think, will I become like him or not? If I had gotten 
some stories from him, then I could be like him. But I have missed out, so I can’t 
know.’ 
What is striking about these comments is the explicit fear that he will not, 
through his own initiative, be able to take his proper place in the community. 
What he is unsure about is whether he has already acquired enough of what it 
takes to be an effective adult man. In his mind, the jury is still out; he says, ‘I 
can’t know’. Masculine vitality is for Bumbita men a fundamental feature of self-
assessment. Men learn to gauge their own effectiveness as males by observing 
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the products of their own individual initiative. If a yam crop yields abundance, 
a man can infer that he has the requisite vitality to cause that result. The proof 
lies in the results of individual initiative.
It is in this context that his stories of guile and manipulation take on a new 
meaning. In being successful at getting the young men to include him, he is in 
essence re-enacting an activity appropriate for village leaders, for people like 
his own father. His stories are of a heroic nature, with the young Aminguh 
successfully getting his way. In framing his stories in this way, he is suppressing 
the doubts that we otherwise know concern him, that the loss of his father has 
meant he has lost the training necessary to become a village leader himself. The 
stories are a way for him to indirectly play out the role of a successful leader, 
who, through manipulation, gets others to give him what he wants and becomes 
a part of the community in the process.
Aminguh’s stories of his childhood, when understood now in the context of 
a preoccupation with masculine vitality, become narratives through which he 
seeks to prove to himself that he already has enough personal effectiveness to 
integrate himself into the group without the continued guidance from his father. 
He understands that he now depends on the same community of classificatory 
brothers that he successfully manipulated in his stories about their childhood 
interactions. His stories of success fortify him against fears that his own personal 
initiative will be insufficient to make him a successful adult.
Thus, by understanding Aminguh’s childhood stories as active attempts to 
define reality in a particular way, we can better appreciate the fundamental 
issues that define his experience. 
Conclusion
I have used Aminguh’s case material to illustrate the value of attending to 
the active rhetorical dimension of narrative construction. I have deliberately 
chosen stories that do not call attention to their argumentative dimension. It 
was not the case that Aminguh insisted to me that I must understand these 
stories in a particular way. He was not aware of building any strong argument. 
Nevertheless, the stories do reveal a consistent set of themes pointing to 
a particular interpretation of childhood events. I have tried to show that an 
appreciation of Bumbita cultural understandings of the process of development 
in childhood is essential to the interpretation of themes from childhood stories. 
Without a sense of those understandings, Aminguh’s stories, as stated, make 
little sense. But at the same time the stories illustrate universal features of the 
narrative process that I argue should be applied to narrative constructions 
across cultures. Appreciation of Aminguh’s experience requires attending to 
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psychologically based motives that contribute to the structure of his stories. 
He presents a particular version of events in an effort to convince himself of his 
own personal effectiveness in manipulating and ultimately relating to his close 
relatives. The version he presents is a fortified one, built to defend against an 
alternative suppressed version that would leave his personal effectiveness in 
doubt. Those suppressed meanings emerge in other contexts, such as when he 
invites my commiseration over his predicament of having to grow up without a 
father. Aminguh’s childhood stories, then, do rely on cultural meta-narratives, 
but they also—when viewed with their rhetorical intent as a part of the 
analytical calculus—provide a window on experience.
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8. On Messianic Promise
Joel Robbins
Introduction
I have learned many things from Don Tuzin’s books. One of the formative texts 
of my education, as a graduate student interested in religious secrecy, was The 
Voice of the Tambaran (1980), and I poured over The Ilahita Arapesh: Dimensions 
of Unity (1976) just as carefully. Later, The Cassowary’s Revenge (1997) became a 
guiding light for me during the process of writing my thesis on Christianity and 
cultural change among the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea. As it has for many 
of my generation, this book has been a condition of possibility for my own 
work—a book from the pen of a major figure of what we might call traditional 
Melanesian ethnography that provided proof that anthropologists could take 
Christian revival movements and the cultural changes they wrought seriously 
as objects of study and could, in doing so, produce ethnographies every bit as 
rich and satisfying as those of the past. A work of exceptional subtlety and 
rigorous, inventive argument, The Cassowary’s Revenge was, to many who read 
it, a classic from the moment it appeared. I mention all this by way of saying 
that Don Tuzin, the writer, has been with me almost from the beginning of my 
engagement with Melanesian studies, and his work has been a major presence 
at every stage of my intellectual development.
And in 1998, Don Tuzin became my colleague and mentor. In those capacities, 
he taught me much more than I can begin to recount here. But I want to dwell on 
one lesson I learned from him that has been important to me and that bears on the 
argument of this chapter. That lesson is that people can be close and supportive 
colleagues even in the face of important intellectual differences as long as they 
are willing to argue those differences out whenever they come up. Don taught 
me this lesson because although he and I agreed about a great many things—
not least the importance of Melanesian ethnography—deep down we favoured 
very different kinds of anthropological theory. As he laid out clearly in the 
opening pages of The Ilahita Arapesh, Don was a methodological individualist 
and, correlated with this, a nominalist (Tuzin 1976:xxv–xxx). Put very roughly, 
for him the world was created anew at every instant by individuals acting in the 
situations in which they found themselves. I, on the other hand, am much more 
comfortable in the other camp—a camp that is harder to name (Tuzin 1976:xxvi–
xxvii), but that tends to be labelled holism or realism. Trained as a structuralist, I 
focus in my own work on standing cultural complexes, which I take to be real in 
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some meaningful sense, and on their power to shape the way social life unfolds. 
Broad theoretical distinctions such as those between nominalists and realists are 
always too blunt, and I can point you to realist-looking parts of Don’s work (and 
in fact he was a great ethnographer of what I would call cultural structures) and 
to nominalist-looking parts of my own. But it was still the case that in the midst 
of my and Don’s many long intellectual conversations—a genre of interaction 
of which Don was a master—often the areas of disagreement would run along 
these nominalist/realist lines, with him wanting to privilege individuals in one 
way or another and me wanting to privilege cultural structures. Don taught me 
how valuable it was to keep revisiting such recalcitrant issues as friends and as 
colleagues, even when perfect agreement is not on the horizon. This was one of 
the many important lessons in how to be an intellectual and a colleague that I 
learned from Don, a man who excelled in both roles.
I bring up this particular lesson here because the split between nominalism and 
realism bears on the topic I want to address in the rest of this chapter—that of 
messianism. Ever since I read The Cassowary’s Revenge very soon after it came 
out (see Robbins 1998), I sensed that this was the book of Don’s that fitted my 
own theoretical predilections most closely. For a long time, I thought this might 
just be because Don’s methodological individualism had mellowed a bit with age, 
but now I am inclined to think that the drawing closer of our two outlooks that I 
see in this book also has to do with its focus on messianism as a kind of cultural 
change. For if we take messianism to aim for (even if it never fully achieves) 
change that is deliberate, rapid and radical then the kinds of cultural spaces 
messianism opens up are ones in which even realists will have to attend to how 
concrete individuals bring about momentous change—how they, as Don puts it, 
take ‘history into their own hands’ (Tuzin 1997:36). At the same time, inasmuch 
as messianic periods are ones in which all manner of cultural resources are in 
play—periods in which ‘culture, history and psyche unite to create a “mythic” 
moment in which the barriers separating metaphysical domains are lifted’ 
(Tuzin 1997:67)—even nominalists will have to attend to the kinds of cultural 
structures messianics shatter into the fragments they then redeploy to make a 
new life. Don made just this kind of cultural turn in The Cassowary’s Revenge. 
This is evident both in his consideration of how the Nambweapa’w myth shaped 
historical action in Ilahita and in his complex argument about the way in which 
a central contradiction of Ilahita culture ‘pressed for its own resolution’ in the 
messianic Ilahitan destruction of their men’s cult (Tuzin 1997:65).
Because my own theoretical interests and those that preoccupied Don come 
together so nicely around issues of messianism, I want to devote this chapter 
to some thoughts on what we might call the messianic promise: the possibility 
that messianism always holds out that life might be lived otherwise. Some of the 
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theorists of messianism I discuss in what follows were not ones who interested 
Don much, but I am convinced that the spirit of this inquiry is in line with some 
of the main issues that animated his own work.
On Hearing the Messianic Promise
What does it mean to hear the promise of the messianic? If I were to answer 
that question on the basis of self-evidence, I would have to refer to several 
experiences: taken in order of occurrence, these would be encountering 
anthropology as a young student in the late 1970s and early 1980s; reading the 
literature on millenarianism in Papua New Guinea and later doing fieldwork 
with a group of people in that region who were adept at listening for the 
messianic promise; and, finally, reading and rereading Walter Benjamin’s (1969) 
‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’. In this chapter, I want to try to make 
these experiences speak to each other in a way that might be productive for 
anthropological practice, or at least for my own anthropological practice. In 
order to work towards that goal, let me proceed in reverse personal experiential 
order, starting with Benjamin (and addressing Derrida along the way), moving 
on to Papua New Guinea and finally to anthropology.
One might say that Benjamin’s theses need no introduction among contemporary 
academics, but of course they always do. They are cast in a writerly style that 
demands that they be received as an event in the lives of their readers, and to 
say anything interesting with or about them you have to put your reading on the 
table. Mine has always focused most on time but has in the past few years also 
taken up Benjamin’s related critique of progress. I start with time here and come 
back to progress in my conclusion. The crucial point about time on my reading 
of the theses is that messianic time arrests another kind of time. Homogeneous 
empty time is Benjamin’s historically grounded name for the kind of time the 
messianic interrupts, but perhaps we can include workaday linear causal time 
here as well so as not to exclude from consideration the messianism of those 
who have never lived in the homogeneous empty time of modernity. Benjamin’s 
images of how the messianic arrest of linear time occurs are justly famous: the 
messianic makes the continuum of history explode; it pulls the emergency 
brake on the locomotive of history. But what does this arrest of time establish? 
Here Benjamin refers to historical memory, suggesting that messianic arrests 
happen when the past flashes ‘up at a moment of danger’. This is to say that 
critical to the construction of messianic now-time is the effort to read history 
as a repository of some moments of potential emancipation that shine through 
the gloomy muck of its record of oppression, suffering and disappointment. 
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When such moments resonate with what is happening in the present the two 
can form a fusion that happens to time, not just in it, and opens up radically 
new possibilities for action.
How do we listen for the promise of the kind of messianism Benjamin has in 
mind? On this topic, Benjamin is not so strong. Certainly, he tells us to approach 
history differently, attending more to its unrealised potentials than to its linear 
unfolding. And we can argue that he himself has modelled this kind of listening 
for us in his own raising up of an old tradition of Jewish messianism in these 
theses written in the aftermath of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. But still, there is 
something Benjamin is not telling us about how to live what he calls in the notes 
to the theses a critical ‘organized pessimism’ that does not foreclose hearing the 
messianic call (Benjamin 2003:404). And this, I think, is where Derrida comes in.
In Specters of Marx, Derrida (1994:180–1) first introduces the concept of ‘the 
messianic without messianism’ in a footnote on Benjamin. He will in a later 
essay distance his idea of the messianic without messianism from Benjamin, but 
this initial conjunction—no matter how hedged and cautious—ought not be 
ignored. For I think Derrida has taken just the kind of step towards specifying 
what it would mean to listen for the messianic promise that one needs to take if 
one is to answer the questions about living messianically that Benjamin leaves 
largely unaddressed in the theses.
‘Messianicity’, Derrida tells us, is a ‘universal structure of experience’ (2008:248). 
It is a stance of ‘waiting for an event, for someone or something that, in order to 
happen or “arrive”, must exceed and surprise every determinant anticipation’ 
(Derrida 2008:251). It is an openness towards, or even an expectation of, 
an unexpected future. This, on Derrida’s account, is the messianic. The 
‘messianism’ Derrida would have us do without is a tethering of the messianic 
to any kind of traditional content of expectation that would see the future as 
determinate (1994:59). Most often this content comes from a religious tradition 
and is represented by the figure of a known messiah, but of course Marxism and 
other post-Enlightenment political ideologies can supply it as well. Those who 
adhere to a messianism with determinate content too easily try to make progress 
towards realising it by shutting down other options. In the face of this danger, 
Derrida enjoins us to keep the structure of experience he calls messianicity in 
its pristine openness and to be vigilant in guarding against the messianism that 
would rob it of its ability to allow the event of a messianic cessation of time.
As an aside, I would note that though Derrida worries that Benjamin has fallen 
into the trap of tying his messianicity to a particular messianism—in his case a 
Jewish one—I am not sure this really is a trap or, if it is one, that Derrida has 
himself avoided it. As Jacoby (2005) has recently reminded us in quite eloquent 
terms, the tradition of Jewish messianism has always under-specified the future 
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in just the way Derrida demands. Starting from the prohibition on making 
images of the absolute, it has proffered what Jacoby calls iconoclastic utopias 
(or in our case, eschatons), rather than ones based on blueprints for what is 
to come. Derrida’s epoché of messianic content would thus not place him as 
securely outside Benjamin’s tradition as he might imagine.
But more than perhaps entangling him in a Jewish tradition of messianism 
without the messianic that predates his coinage, Derrida’s insistence on 
openness—on the disavowal of messianic content—also leaves him vulnerable 
to the question of whether or not anyone can really live this way. Can one listen 
for the messianic promise without listening for something specific? Would 
this reduce, as Eagleton (2008:87) remarks in a hostile response to Derrida, to 
something as unfortunate as harbouring ‘a perpetual excited openness to the 
Messiah who had better not let us down by doing anything as determinate as 
coming’? My argument in the next part of this chapter is that we can learn from 
Melanesian millenarians that messianicity without messianism need not lead to 
this kind of absurd, unliveable stance.
On Messianic Living in Melanesia
We arguably have more detailed ethnographic accounts of lived millenarianism 
from Melanesia than from anywhere else in the world. A huge literature on cargo 
cults and a more recent one of Christian millennialism in the region combine to 
give us an unusually rich archive of materials bearing on this topic. We can 
and have quibbled about whether we have the categories right—whether the 
notion of cargo cult in particular shelters too many disparate kinds of social 
phenomena under its capacious canopy to be a useful concept. But there is little 
doubt that messianicity and messianism are both well documented in the region 
in contemporary as well as in earlier works (Jebens 2004a; Robbins 2004b).
The main focus of the Melanesianist writing on millenarianism is well known. 
It is trained on recognisable social movements, generally organised around an 
intensified ritual life and aimed at achieving fairly well-articulated goals such as 
acquiring manufactured goods, ridding one’s territory of foreigners or achieving 
Christian salvation. In the terms we have borrowed from Derrida, these 
movements represent messianism—an attempt to bring about a determinate 
future. But the Melanesianist literature is also marked by a more subterranean 
theme. Most groups that engage in full-scale millenarian movements do not do 
so constantly, or even for particularly long stretches of time. Instead, periods 
wholly devoted to ritual performance focused on achieving clear goals alternate 
with quieter periods in which people live in workaday linear causal time. But 
anthropologists have found—and this is the key point here—that even when 
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they live outside full-scale millenarian movements, many Melanesians live with 
a kind of millenarian openness that maps well on to what Derrida is calling 
messianicity. In these quieter times—times of what I have called elsewhere 
everyday millenarianism—people go about their normal business but remain 
ready for unexpected change, anxious to hear a messianic promise should it be 
made (Robbins 2001).
Even as anthropologists have not accorded everyday millenarianism the kind 
of attention they have given to full-scale millenarian movements, they have 
sometimes tried to describe it. In their accounts, we see both Derrida’s openness 
to the event and Benjamin’s hope that the unappreciated aspects of the past might 
sometimes knock the present off the tracks that its more appreciated aspects 
have laid down. Hence, for example, Burridge (1995) has talked about the myth-
dream that proceeds and then underlies cargo cults as the rolling development of 
what Lindstrom (1993:49) nicely calls an ‘unarticulated aspiration’ for a future 
different from the present. Jebens (2004b:64), pointing to something similar, 
talks about the openness of much cargo language, a language in which it is quite 
possible to repeat phrases of the kind ‘something will happen’ without being 
heard to talk nonsense (see also Robbins 2004a:165–8). And while everyday 
millenarianism remains open to the future in just the ways Derrida would ask 
for, it also scans the past incessantly for elements that might find a place in a 
coming now-time, just as Benjamin would hope. As Don shows in his powerful 
analysis of the way a traditional myth came to legitimate a radical Christian 
revival movement that aimed to sweep all other aspects of tradition aside among 
the Ilahita Arapesh, during this millennial period, ‘distinctions of past, present, 
and future dissolved’ in a way that allowed a wholly new cultural configuration 
to arise (Tuzin 1997:128).
I hope to have at least indicated in somewhat abstract terms that there are riches 
to be gleaned in the Melanesian literature by those looking to learn what living 
a messianicity without messianism might look like. Before concluding, I want to 
give one more extended, concrete example of this kind of living. This is a very 
humble example from my own fieldwork among the Urapmin of Papua New 
Guinea.
The Urapmin are a group of 390 people living in West Sepik Province. They 
converted en masse to a charismatic form of Christianity in the late 1970s and 
since that time have been waiting intently for Jesus’s return. Sometimes they 
feel sure that His coming is imminent, and they drop everyday life altogether for 
a week or more at a time and in classic millenarian-movement fashion devote all 
their time, day and night, to performing Christian rituals. More often, however, 
they accommodate their millenarian attentiveness within the bounds of their 
daily routines, constantly looking for and talking about the possibility of 
dramatic change but doing so while they garden and hunt. During these times, 
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their millenarian hopes encompass, among other things, not only Jesus’s return 
but also the possibility that mineral prospecting on their land might lead to the 
development of a major mine like the one that was built during the 1980s in 
Tabubil, a town on the land of their neighbours five days’ walk to the south.
One day during one of these quieter periods, a young man arrived at my door 
rather breathless to ask if I had bought gardening gloves recently. This was a 
reasonable question, since after picking up a scorpion-like spider while clearing 
a garden about a month before I had told my companions I needed to get some 
of these gloves the next time someone went to Tabubil, where I knew they were 
sold in the supermarket. But no one I knew well had gone to the mining town 
since then, so I had not bought any gloves yet. I told my visitor this, and he 
expressed some agitation. He told me that a pair of gloves had turned up in the 
bushes by the main path people follow to make the six-hour walk home from 
the nearest airstrip where one can fly to and from Tabubil. People thought the 
gloves were mine. But if they were not, what could their appearance in Urapmin 
mean? Not sure what to answer, I followed my visitor to the area in which the 
gloves had been found. A small crowd had formed, and when I told them the 
gloves did not belong to me, they collectively began to ponder the significance 
of their appearance. Gloves were white-people things, they noted. Could this 
mean a mine would be built and Urapmin would become a white town like 
Tabubil? Could it mean that Jesus—Himself white—was finally returning to 
gather the faithful? Open-ended speculation along these lines developed apace, 
and, as people’s excitement rose, they sent an emissary to consult a powerful 
Spirit man—a housebound man capable of consulting the Holy Spirit to learn 
about things that might happen in the future. For some time, all of us waited to 
hear what he would say.
Let me interrupt this narrative momentarily to point out that it would not have 
been that difficult for people to provide a simple, locally sensible explanation 
for the appearance of the gloves. First of all, they were in a recognisable 
yellow bag emblazoned with the Tabubil Supermarket logo, so there was no 
mystery as to where they originated (it seems that, even when one operates 
the only electrified full-scale supermarket within several days’ walk of any real 
competition, branding is still important). They were also stashed along the main 
path one would use when coming home after flying to Tabubil. And finally, 
people often stash things they are tired of carrying in the bush by the side of 
the road, to come back for them later. It is true that no Urapmin had bought 
gardening gloves before, or at least not that anyone could remember, but people 
were always picking up new bits of modern life they could afford and bringing 
them home to try out, so it was not out of the question that someone would take 
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a chance on gardening gloves in this respect and leave them by the side of the 
road to pick up later. At least for me, this line of reasoning rendered the gloves 
comprehensible.
But my main point here is that no Urapmin chose to take this line of reasoning. 
Instead, they took the appearance of the gloves as a chance to stop and listen 
in case they might be making a messianic promise—a promise about a future 
in which the gathered Urapmin people were not sure what to expect except 
that it would be different from the present. As it happened, about an hour into 
waiting for news back from the Spirit man, Deni showed up. Deni is a man in his 
mid-thirties who is very ambitious and who likes to accumulate as many fancy 
modern accoutrements as he can; he is one of the few Urapmin, for example, 
who often wears sunglasses. He had heard about all the commotion and had 
come to tell us all the gloves were his. His young daughter had got tired of 
carrying them home from the airstrip and had set them in the bushes to come 
back and get later. His announcement ended all speculation. In light of it, I 
guess I had been right. This time around, the gloves were making no messianic 
promise. But then again, had they been making such a promise, I would have 
missed it, and the Urapmin would not have. In this minor passing incident, as 
in many others, they showed they were ready quite quickly to let time stop and 
to organise around such a promise should it be made. The differences between 
myself and the Urapmin in this regard bring me to anthropology by way of 
conclusion.
On Messianism and Anthropology
In many ways, this chapter is inspired by two recent articles: one by Guyer 
(2007) and the other by Bialecki (2009). In both of these articles, the authors 
deploy ethnographic work on evangelical Christian messianism (in the Derridian 
sense of an anticipation of a determinate future) as a mirror for anthropological 
relations to time and event. For both, those who hold to schemes of Christian 
messianism lose their ability to plan for and act towards the near future in 
politically potent ways. Guyer’s argument lays this out clearly, and Bialecki 
builds on it to demonstrate that in addition to eliding the time frame of 
meaningful strategic planning, left-leaning North American charismatics also 
foreclose political action by assuming that any meaningful transformation will 
come as a miraculous rupture and that, if they themselves work to bring about 
a change, the very fact of their effort will ensure that whatever it produces 
cannot be the millennial transformation for which they hope. For both Guyer 
and Bialecki, there are lessons in their ethnography for anthropologists, who are 
8 . On Messianic Promise
191
equally vulnerable to losing sight of the near future and to focusing on notions 
such as hope that attenuate their focus on the ways human beings actually bring 
about change.
These pieces have inspired me to ask here if there is not a kind of millenarianism 
worth living for anthropologists—a kind that might allow for the efficacy 
Guyer and Bialecki are seeking in anthropological practice and that, we should 
not forget, the anthropologists, sociologists and historians who first made 
millenarianism a major topic of contemporary study in the 1960s hoped to find 
in their subject matter. I have sought to find that kind of liveable messianism 
in this chapter in Benjamin’s notion of moments in which homogeneous empty 
time stops and the present ceases to govern one’s sense of possibility, and in 
Derrida’s specification of messianicity as a structure of experience that stands 
open to the possibility of an other-than-present beyond current expectations. I 
presented material from New Guinea by way of suggesting that it is possible to 
live in the ways Benjamin and Derrida promote.
As a student in the 1970s and 1980s, I encountered an anthropology that I 
found saturated with what I, at least, thought was just this kind of messianic 
impulse. It was an anthropology committed to ethnography as at least possibly 
an encounter with an otherness it did not predefine, and in figures such 
as Mead and Benedict it had a history of making reports of such otherness 
effective at home in ways that on occasion interrupted homogeneous empty 
time by appearing as an event. After a long period of productive and necessary 
self-critique, anthropology has almost wholly lost this messianic openness to 
otherness. I cannot recount that history here, and we all know it in any case. 
But we should also recognise that without that openness to otherness, we now 
often adopt the linear time line of progress Benjamin so adamantly attacked; 
we are now much more about seeking means of amelioration in a world of 
stably defined goods such as human rights, health, political participation and 
economic wellbeing than we are about listening for messianic promises that 
might explode the progressive time line along which these goods are arrayed. 
In saying this, I want to write carefully. I recognise that anthropologists are 
led by their current preoccupations and temporal sensibilities to do good and 
necessary work. But—to use a phraseology that belongs wholly to models of 
time oriented to progress—I worry that this work keeps us so busy that, unlike 
the Urapmin, and, I would argue, unlike earlier anthropologists, we would have 
trouble stopping to listen when, in the field or at home, a messianic promise 




As a methodological individualist (see Gardner, this volume), Don Tuzin was 
always interested in the ways people made their own worlds. They might not 
always realise the kinds of worlds they are making, he was quick to note, but 
unless social life goes very wrong they are always free agents making their lives 
by choosing how to respond to the situations that confront them. A holist or 
realist, I am always in contrast more apt to stress the weight culture brings to 
bear on the acting person even if he/she construes his/her life largely in terms 
of individual choice. But when it comes to examining moments of messianic 
fervour, I have tried to suggest here, we need to attend to acting individuals—
those who choose to hear the messianic promise—at least as much as we attend 
to the cultural structures from which they hope they are about to become dis-
embedded. In the study of the messianic, I have suggested, the theoretical 
opposition that Don and I so often explored in our conversations tends, like so 
many other oppositions, to at least attenuate itself, if not collapse.
Don often made verbally a point I cannot recall ever seeing him put in print. 
Melanesianist anthropology, he liked to argue, had probably produced 
proportionally more major anthropological theories and theorists than any 
other region of the world. It punched above its weight in this way, he liked to 
suggest, because Melanesianists knew that they would never be able to claim the 
discipline’s interest on the basis of the geopolitical importance of the countries 
they study or on the sheer numbers of people who lived in them. Instead, to 
be listened to at all, Melanesianists have always known they had to strive to 
address issues of very general interest in theoretically novel ways. I would not 
claim to have accomplished such a lofty goal here, but in Don’s memory I did 
want to try to move in that direction, and that is why this chapter has addressed 
a topic of general interest at the moment (millenarianism), has tackled it in 
broad theoretical terms, and has tried to ground its argument in at least some 
discussion of Melanesian ethnography. Don excelled at this kind of complex, 
multi-voiced writing, and he enriched Melanesian studies immeasurably by his 
work. I hope to have been able to evidence a little bit of what both Don and his 
work have meant to me in my own effort here to follow his lead.
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9. Klein in Bali and Ilahita:  
A reflection on cultural fantasy and 
the deep unconscious
Michele Stephen
Although many anthropologists would not even accept the existence of a deep 
unconscious such as outlined by psychoanalytic theory of various persuasions, 
the ethnographic data often provide examples of cultural constructs that seem 
such vivid realisations of themes described in psychoanalytic practice that 
one can only stand amazed. If there is no ‘unconscious’, from whence do these 
extraordinary visions emerge and how is it they have such constancy across 
cultures? In this chapter, I employ Melanie Klein’s work on gender, fantasy and 
psychosocial development as a framework for comparing Balinese and Ilahita 
imaginings of the feminine and the maternal.
If Freud’s insights concerning the region of the unconscious were unpalatable to 
many—dethroning as they did reason and consciousness as the sources of human 
motivation—Melanie Klein’s theories might be considered truly repellent. At 
least Freud’s theories put the father figure and patriarchal authority at the 
centre of unconscious conflict. Klein, however, was bold enough to declare that 
the real lynchpin of all emotional development was the relationship with the 
mother. Prior to the unconscious guilt attached to a fantasised patricide went 
envy and paranoid fears aroused by a fantasised matricide. Masculinity and 
femininity were shaped against a mother image of such terrible power that both 
genders felt themselves to be damaged as a result of the struggle. In Klein’s 
view, human life began in pain and suffering; it was not an optimistic view 
of the human condition. Yet she believed that it was only in relationships that 
emotional life developed and she emphasised that guilt, envy and fear were 
balanced by an equally strong positive urge to make reparation.
Contemporary feminist theorist Julia Kristeva (2001:15) observes: ‘Melanie Klein 
ranks amongst those who have done the most to further our understanding 
of our being as an endemic state of ill-being in all its diverse manifestations: 
schizophrenia, psychosis, depression, mania, autism, delays and inhibitions, 
catastrophic anxiety, fragmentation of the ego, and so forth.’
Although Klein took psychoanalysis in new directions, she did so within the 
framework of Freudian thought. Kristeva (2001:11) notes: ‘Klein successfully 
introduced a new approach to the theory and practice of the unconscious 
without ever abandoning the fundamental principles of Freudianism 
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(which distinguishes her from Jung and from the other “dissidents”).’ Her 
significance for anthropology is perhaps only beginning to emerge, especially 
as anthropology’s comparatively recent interest in gender directs new attention 
to the maternal in cultural fantasy (Gregor and Tuzin 2001). I do not expect 
that my readers will find Klein’s ideas more intuitively persuasive than Freud’s; 
quite the contrary. Yet I contend that she has much to offer anyone who seeks to 
explore the extraordinary images of the maternal found in Bali and Melanesia.
The inspiration for this chapter goes back several years to when I first began to 
take an interest in Kleinian theory. Don Tuzin commented to me at the time that 
his mentor at The Australian National University, Derek Freeman, always said 
that the Hindu goddess Durga was a Kleinian fantasy par excellence. Later, when 
I came to work in Bali, Indonesia, I began to understand why, and I promised 
myself that one day I would attempt a Kleinian interpretation of Durga. It thus 
seems especially fitting that I should offer this essay as a tribute to Don’s wide-
ranging psychoanalytic and comparative interests. In the process of writing, 
I began to realise that Klein’s ideas not only threw new light on my Balinese 
material but also strongly resonated with Don’s own work on masculinity and 
femininity among the Ilahita. I had previously published a piece on male cults 
in the New Guinea Highlands from a Kleinian perspective (Stephen 2003); I 
began to wonder how the same approach might work with respect to Sepik 
male cults. Engaging with Don’s analysis of the Ilahita cult enables me to 
identify significant points of similarity and difference with Balinese imagery 
of the ‘Terrible Mother’, pointing to the ways in which cultures deploy to 
different ends, and with different consequences, imagery drawn from the deep 
unconscious. My Kleinian framework also brings me to challenge some aspects 
of Don’s analysis of the male cult, as will be explained later. In doing so, I seek to 
honour the fertile and stimulating qualities and the breadth of Don’s theoretical 
reach.
This chapter is not offered as ethnography but as an interpretation that draws 
upon extensive bodies of ethnographic work, sketching in with bold brush 
strokes links and parallels leading to reflections upon the nature of masculinity 
and femininity as shaped by culture and the unconscious. My arguments and 
conclusions do not pretend to be conclusive but aim to draw new attention to the 
mystery of the maternal, especially its negative aspects, in cultural imaginings. 
I begin with the horrific imagery of the Balinese Durga1 and then turn to a 
consideration of the role of similarly Terrible Mothers among the Ilahita of New 
Guinea. 
1 I have elsewhere described the Balinese goddess Durga (Stephen 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006), but have not 
previously attempted a psychoanalytic interpretation of her iconography, except to the extent that it is 
connected to the witch figure.
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Klein and Durga in Bali
 The Divine Mother has many refractions in Hinduism, and Durga is one of 
the most prominent. In Indian iconography, Durga is a warrior goddess, her 
10 arms each carrying a weapon, riding on a lion into battle. Yet, though she 
is bloodthirsty, and offerings to her consist of meat and blood, she is usually 
depicted as young and beautiful in form. She is addressed as ‘Ma Durga’—
Mother Durga—and praised as defender and saviour by her followers. She 
seems to stand midway between gentle and benign forms of the goddess such as 
Sri and Sarasvati, and horrific forms such as Camundi and Kali (Kinsley 1988). 
Durga is defined thus in the Rider Encyclopaedia of Eastern Philosophy and 
Religion:
‘[T]he unfathomable one’; one of the oldest and most widely used names 
for the Divine Mother, the consort of Shiva.
Her ten-armed figure, standing on the back of a lion, symbolizes the 
great power that the Vedic texts describe her as wielding, either to 
punish or to confer grace on human beings. She destroys the demon 
of ignorance, nourishes the poor, and confers blessings of love and 
knowledge upon all those who strive for God-realization. (Schumacher 
and Woerner 1999:96)
The Balinese Durga2 differs from her Indian counterpart, although both figures 
might be said to be recognisable as variations on similar themes. Indian traditions 
seem to emphasise Durga as a warrior goddess.3 She is revered as the slayer of 
terrible demons—in particular, the buffalo demon, Mahisha. In this form of 
demon slayer, and thus as the saviour of gods and humans, she is usually depicted 
as a young and beautiful woman. Durga, the slayer of the demon Mahisha, is 
known in Bali, and her image is found in old Javanese sculpture. A famous statue 
of Durga at Pura Kedarman in Bali depicts the goddess in human form,4 but the 
Balinese Durga is more usually depicted very differently. Her iconography more 
closely resembles the Indian goddess Kali, a horrific manifestation of Durga. 
2 The relationship between Balinese Hinduism and Hinduism (in its many varieties) as found in India has 
been the topic of much scholarly debate over many years, with some scholars arguing that at best Hinduism 
in Bali is but skin deep, and others that it is much more deeply rooted (see Stephen 2005). I do not intend to 
re-enter that debate here but to describe the imagery of the Terrible Mother as encountered in its specifically 
Balinese cultural forms. My aim is not to compare the Balinese and Indian variants of the goddess—a project 
well worth undertaking but one that could not be contained within the limits of a single essay. Emigh 
(1996:89) suggests that the iconography of the Balinese Durga/Rangda might be derived from several different 
Indian goddesses. Overall, his exploration of the Balinese Rangda clearly demonstrates the ways in which she 
encapsulates many aspects of the Shakti traditions of India.
3 Variations in the role of goddess over time and in different regions of India are, however, noted by Kinsley 
(1988:96, 114–15).
4 See Bernet Kempers (1991:32) for an illustration; compare with Mookerjee (1988:48).
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As the Divine Mother, Kali is usually represented as dancing or in 
sexual union with Shiva. Whereas Shiva represents the transcendental 
aspect, Kali symbolizes the dynamic aspect, primal energy…Kali wears 
a belt made of dismembered arms and a necklace of skulls; of her four 
arms, the lower left hand holds the bloody head of a demon, the upper 
left wields a sword. With her upper right hand she makes a gesture of 
fearlessness, while the lower right hand confers benefits. She destroys 
ignorance, maintains the world order, and blesses and frees those who 
strive for the knowledge of God. Kali is the symbol of dissolution and 
destruction. (Schumacher and Woerner 1999:170)
Kali is usually shown with staring eyes, a red, lolling tongue, sharp fangs and 
fierce expression; her skin is black and her hair long, matted and wild (see 
Mookerjee 1988 for illustrations). When she appears with Shiva, her spouse, she 
usually stands or sits astride his recumbent body.
The Balinese Durga is depicted in temple sculpture and paintings as a kind of 
female monster or ogress, the body large and heavy, with emphasis on pendulous 
breasts and belly, the head like that of a wild beast. She is gigantic in size, as is 
the mother in respect to the infant. With great bulging eyes, a pig-like snout, 
huge curved fangs and a great gaping maw opened to release a flaming red 
tongue, her face is that of a terrifying animal. A mass of matted, tangled hair 
cloaks her back and sides, reaching to the ankles. Her feet and hands have the 
huge claws of a beast of prey. Entrails, bones and dismembered human body 
parts constitute her necklaces, earrings and various ornaments. How does such 
a hideous figure come in Bali to represent the Divine Mother?
Balinese mythic representations reveal that Durga is the terrible form taken by 
the gentle and beautiful goddess Uma,5 wife of Siwa (Shiva). As Siwa’s sakti, 
Uma is the active creative principle that gives rise to the physical world and 
all its contents. She is the Divine Mother as creatrix; however, myths recount 
that having created the world and human beings, Uma suddenly turned upon 
her creations in anger and, taking the terrible shape of Durga, began to destroy 
them. The Purvaka Bhumi, a Balinese text explaining the origin of the universe, 
describes the goddess’s horrific transformation thus: 
The Goddess then looked upon Her Self
And full of wrath She then became.
Her urge was then to eat mankind;
She screamed, and like a lion roared.
Her teeth were long and sharp, like tusks,
Her mouth an abyss in between,
5 ‘Uma’ is more common than ‘Parvati’ as the name of Shiva’s divine consort in Bali, while ‘Shiva’ is usually 
pronounced and spelt ‘Siwa’ or ‘Ciwa’.
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Her eyes shone, they were like twin suns,
Her nostrils, deep and cavernous.
Her ears stood like two thighs, straight up,
Matted and twisted was her hair;
Her body was misshapen, huge,
There was nothing that broke its height.
It pierced The Egg of the Universe,
Reached to the centre of the Sky.
Such then, was the Goddess Durga,
That was the name that She then bore. (Hooykaas 1974:64–5)
The myth continues with the god Siwa (Shiva) also taking the form of the terrible 
god Kala. Together, Durga and Kala create all manner of hideous creatures, and, 
residing in the graveyard, they begin to feast on humankind:
Could then the Goddess have been seen,
She was arising from the Deep,
And with her was the God Kala,
What was the aspect She had then?
With blood, as ashes, She was smeared,
And garlanded with human skulls,
Intestines were draped over Her,
She wore a scarf of red and black.
Her minions were escorting Her,
The creatures of the God Kala,
With all their brood attending them.
Then in the graveyard She did dwell.
In the graveyard of the infants,
Uncanny trees, branches drooping,
Where the God Kala’s creatures dwelt,
The frenzied Dremba ate mankind. (Hooykas 1974:71)
Various myths recount how Siwa provoked Uma’s anger, causing her to descend 
to the Earth as Durga and wreak destruction upon its inhabitants (Stephen 2002, 
2005:64–71). Other myths attribute to her the origin of disease and of witchcraft 
(Stephen 2006). Human beings who aspire to obtain destructive occult powers 
(pengiwa) must pray to Durga in the cemetery in order to obtain them, and all 
human witches are said to be her followers and servants. She resides in the Pura 
Dalam (one of the three temples found in every Balinese village), where the souls 
of the dead awaiting cremation also stay. Clearly, she is associated with death, 
disease, witchcraft and destruction. 
Durga is the inspiration for various sacred dances/dramas in which two 
formidable monsters, Barong and Rangda, confront each other, apparently 
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in battle, but one in which no side is ever victorious. Rangda is danced by 
a single performer wearing a long wig of matted hair, a fearsome mask and 
striped bodysuit representing a grotesque female form. Her opponent, Barong, 
is danced by two performers, one carrying the front and the mask, the other 
the rear end with its long, arched tail. The body of the Barong is covered with 
long black, and sometimes white, hair and gives the impression of a great 
hulking beast, yet he has about him an air of both the ludicrous and the playful. 
I have elsewhere interpreted these two figures in detail to reveal their mystic 
significance as the goddess Durga and her spouse, the god Siwa, in his terrible 
form as Siwa Kala (Stephen 2001, 2005). Their ritual encounter in dance depicts 
the occasion quoted earlier in which Durga and Kala meet on Earth to create all 
terrible and destructive entities. As the PurvakaBhumi explains, in their divine 
forms, the goddess Uma and the god Siwa create the world, human beings and 
all good and useful creatures, then in their terrible forms as Durga and Kala 
they create fearsome and destructive entities. The aim of human ritual, while 
recognising the negative aspect of creation, is to ensure that Durga and Kala 
never again devour mankind but instead are persuaded to assume their benign 
forms as Uma and Siwa and to return to Heaven. The PurvakaBhumi tells that 
human beings were taught how to make the offerings necessary to satisfy the 
terrible hunger of Durga and Kala and their minions:
And then a covenant they made:
That mankind in the Middle Sphere,
At full of moon and when at new,
Should not by Kala be accurst,
Should not by Durga be accurst.
God Kala shall not eat of him,
The Goddess Durga eat him not;
…
Gone is the form that They then had,
To their first form They have returned;
God Kala, Guru has become,
And Durga, Uma has become. (Hooykaas 1974:75)
The aim of Balinese ritual is to ensure that the capacity for divine forces to turn 
destructive is balanced by the return to a positive state. Through ritual action, 
all negative, coarse and dangerous forces and entities can be transformed back 
into the positive entities from which they originated (Stephen 2002, 2005). 
The dangerous and disruptive entities created by Durga and Siwa Kala—the 
bhutakala—can be transformed from enemies into protectors and guardians. 
Furthermore, since Durga and Kala gave rise to these entities, they control them 
and thus in terrible form can provide protection from them. The masks of Rangda 
and Barong used in the sacred dance dramas are kept in the village temples, 
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along with other sacred symbols. Collectively, these items are referred to as the 
‘sesuhunan’.6 The Rangda and Barong masks are brought out and displayed on 
various occasions, and are revered as the protectors and guardians of the village, 
although not all people are aware of their mystical significance as emanations of 
Uma and Siwa. One hears much more of Durga in Bali than of Uma, her benign, 
gentle form, and her ferocious images are much more evident.
Kleinian Perspectives on the Terrible Mother
Durga/Kali, as found in India or Bali, is such a repellent image that one can 
only imagine how colonialists from Britain and Europe must have shuddered 
at such strange expressions of religious fervour (Urban 2003). What could be 
more disgusting, more alien—an ultimate manifestation of ‘otherness’—for 
nineteenth-century European minds? No wonder even today the very name 
Durga tends in the popular imagination to conjure images of blood-soaked 
temples and thuggery. There is little or nothing here to overtly suggest 
commonality across cultures, so repellent is Durga/Kali that she surely must be 
the creation of a specific cultural logic, or fantasy. Ostensibly, she provides a 
case in point for the anthropological perspective that only an elucidation of the 
cultural webs of significance in which such a figure is enmeshed could provide 
any understanding of it. Intuitively, we can see no common ground with such 
a figure. Why should the Great Mother, the cosmic principle of creativity, be 
described in such extraordinarily ambivalent terms? Why in Bali is the tender, 
nurturing beautiful Mother equally a hideous monster who devours her own 
young and wreaks disease, havoc and destruction on all? What in these cultures 
might give rise to such horrific images of the feminine and place such emphasis 
on the hideous and grotesque in the maternal figure?
Freudian approaches lead to the assumption or argument that Indian child-rearing 
practices give rise to the splitting of the mother figure, and more specifically to 
the horrific image of Kali.7 Are we to assume that the same arguments might 
explain the Balinese images? Some very famous anthropologists have certainly 
thought so, and have attempted to explain the figure of Rangda as a product of 
Balinese child rearing (Bateson and Mead 1942). But can child-rearing practices 
alone account for the sheer horror and force of such imaginings? 
If we turn to the pages of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein (a younger contemporary 
of Freud), we can find descriptions of the fantasies of Western individuals 
6 The sesuhunan are sacred objects representing divine powers, including masks and other items, belonging 
to the village temples.
7 Freudian interpretations of Kali have been extensively explored by Jeffrey Kripal (2003:196–222).
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concerning the mother figure that closely parallel, in all their grotesque detail, 
the Balinese iconography of Durga. A Kleinian perspective thus might lead us to 
give more weight to unconscious sources of such cultural imagery.
Klein’s psychoanalytic theories of emotional development came to focus on 
the persecutory anxieties and fears experienced by the human infant from its 
earliest moments from birth onwards. She argued that the first six months of 
the child’s life were dominated by what she came to refer to as the ‘paranoid/
schizoid position’, which then gradually moved into a phase she referred to as the 
‘depressive position’ (Klein 1993a:2–4). These two crucial developmental phases 
were what in Klein’s view determined all later and adult emotional adjustment. 
Furthermore, failure to move through each phase satisfactorily became the basis 
for neurosis and even psychosis in later life. 
In the paranoid-schizoid phase, the infant is exposed to an external world of 
experiences totally beyond its capacity to control or understand. In its relation 
to its primary care giver—usually the actual mother—the infant is totally 
dependent on her to satisfy all its basic needs. This first ‘other’ is initially 
experienced by the infant as a series of pleasurable, satisfying and comforting 
sensations—as when fed or held at the breast, and touched and handled in 
a comforting manner—and a series of painful, frightening and frustrating 
sensations, when the infant is hungry, wet, cold or in pain. Thus, in Klein’s 
view, a sense of a good, satisfying external object is built up on the one hand, 
and on the other, a bad, frustrating and persecutory object. At first, due to its 
emerging cognitive capacities, the infant does not understand that the ‘good 
object’ and the ‘bad object’ are parts of the one person, the mother. Klein refers 
to this process as ‘splitting’ and to the ‘good breast’ and the ‘bad breast’ as the 
two objects or images that form in the infant’s mind. Only later, as the child 
reaches the depressive position, does it begin to realise that the two are aspects 
of the one person. 
‘Splitting’ along with projection and introjection become important defence 
mechanisms against anxiety during this early phase and later. Through 
projection, the nascent ego is able to rid itself of badness and danger, and, 
through introjection, it is able to incorporate the good object within itself (Klein 
1993a:6–7). By splitting, the ego is able to keep the good object, the ‘good breast’, 
totally separate from the bad, frustrating breast, thus not only are the two kept 
widely apart but the very existence of the bad can be denied (at least for a time). 
In other words, the initial ambivalence in which experience of the mother is 
grounded also serves to protect the infant ego from realising that good and bad 
sensations emanate from the same external source. The infant ‘phantasises’8 the 
8 In Kleinian theory, the term ‘phantasy’ is employed to indicate unconscious imaginative processes 
taking place outside conscious awareness, as distinct from ‘fantasy’, which takes place in consciousness. See 
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destruction of the bad breast while still being able to keep intact in its mind the 
good object. Thus, the complex process of introjection of good, and projection 
of the bad, can take place. Klein points out, however, that projecting the bad 
has its costs as it also involves denial and annihilation of a part of the ego—that 
part from which the bad feeling towards the object emanates (Klein 1993a:7).
Overwhelmed by its fears of the persecutory object—the ‘bad breast’—the 
infant comes to hate it and wishes to destroy it by whatever means possible. 
Accordingly, it begins to picture, in the imagery thought that is all that is 
available prior to the development of language, retaliatory attacks upon the ‘bad 
breast’. These attacks take the form of biting, chewing and burrowing into the 
‘bad breast’, tearing into it with nails and teeth and sucking out all its contents. 
Klein (1993b:63) explains:
If we consider the picture which exists in the infant’s mind—as we can 
see it retrospectively in the analyses of children and adults—we find 
that the hated breast has acquired the oral-destructive qualities of the 
infant’s own impulses when he is in states of frustration and hatred. In 
his destructive phantasies he bites and tears up the breast, devours it, 
annihilates it; and he feels that the breast will attack him in the same 
way. As urethral- and anal-sadistic impulses gain in strength, the infant 
in his mind attacks the breast with poisonous urine and explosive faeces, 
and therefore expects it to be poisonous and explosive towards him. 
The details of his sadistic phantasies determine the content of his fear 
of internal and external persecutors, primarily of the retaliating (bad) 
breast. (Klein 1993b:63)
Klein recognises that this picture of a terrified infant trying to defend itself 
against a hated persecutor who is none other than an internal representation 
of its mother seems scarcely credible given our assumptions about the angelic 
innocence of babies. Nevertheless, she argues that the evidence is undeniable 
for those familiar with the clinical data:
The idea of an infant of from six to twelve months trying to destroy its 
mother by every method at the disposal of its sadistic trends—with its 
teeth, nails and excreta and with the whole of its body transformed in 
phantasy into all kinds of dangerous weapons—presents a horrifying, 
not to say an unbelievable picture to our minds. And it is difficult, as I 
know from my own experience, to bring oneself to recognize that such 
an abhorrent idea answers to the truth. But the abundance, force and 
multiplicity of the cruel phantasies which accompany these cravings are 
displayed before our eyes in early analyses so clearly and forcefully that 
Hinshelwood (1991:32–46). In my discussion of Klein, I shall follow this usage throughout this chapter.
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they leave no room for doubt. We are already familiar with those sadistic 
phantasies of the child which find their culmination in cannibalism, and 
this makes it easier for us to accept the further fact that as its methods 
of sadistic attack become enlarged so do its sadistic phantasies gain in 
fullness and vigour. (Klein 1994:130)
These escalating sadistic trends in turn give rise to more and more horrific 
images of the persecutor and what might be expected in retaliation. Thus, as the 
child begins by desiring to attack the ‘bad breast’ by sucking and scooping it 
out, then later by tearing into it with teeth and nails, and finally with explosive 
excreta and burning urine, so it expects to be annihilated by the ‘bad breast’ in 
exactly the same manner. Eventually, these desires move to the mother’s body as 
a whole, which the infant desires to pierce open, burrow into and rob of all its 
desired contents—that is, those things the child assumes she is withholding for 
her own pleasure: milk, excrement, babies, and, by this stage, the father’s penis. 
So the child comes to imagine a Terrible Mother figure that desires to rip open, 
suck dry and devour him. Klein (1993b:62) stresses the dominance of oral greed 
and aggression in this situation. 
As the child develops, however, it begins to fear that, in its imagined attacks 
upon the bad breast/mother, it might have injured or destroyed the ‘good breast’ 
on which it depends for every comfort and need. This fear ushers in the next 
phase of development: the ‘depressive position’, where remorse and guilt over 
damaging or killing the ‘good mother’ prevail over paranoid fears of attack by 
the ‘bad mother’. In order to deal with the feelings of loss that now emerge, the 
child must engage in reparative phantasies in which the damaged, wounded or 
dead mother is put back together and returned to life. The depressive position 
comes into play somewhere towards the beginning of the second half of the first 
year of life. 
The first year of life begins with phantasies concerning sadistic attacks upon 
the bad mother and, in turn upon the self; then, as the child begins to realise 
that the good and bad breast are aspects of the one person (the mother), it is 
dominated by fears of loss, guilt and remorse. The splitting of the experience 
of the mother is determined at first by the infant’s limited mental capacity, as 
it seeks to attach sensations—pleasurable and painful—to imagery. But as the 
child develops, the splitting begins to serve as a defence mechanism, shielding 
the child from recognising that the two are actually one.
From a Kleinian perspective, we see that the child’s emotional life is dominated 
by the mother imago—that is, the internal image generated in the child’s mind. 
All pleasurable and negative experiences are linked to aspects of this figure, 
and dealing with the love, hate, fear, remorse and guilt that it evokes not 
only constitutes the earliest challenges the child faces but also the foundation 
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for later emotional life continuing into adulthood. In Klein’s view, failure to 
negotiate satisfactorily the first two phases—the paranoid/schizoid and the 
depressive position—sows the seeds of adult neurosis and psychosis. The key to 
emotional life—the mother imago—is inherently ambivalent and furthermore is 
the subject of horrific sadistic and paranoid phantasies. 
A Kleinian approach thus suggests that the unconscious basis of the Durga/Kali 
image lies in the early experience of every human infant. The radical splitting 
of the Great Goddess into totally benign, nurturant figures such as Uma/Parvati 
and demonic figures such as Kali/Rangda closely correlates with the primal 
experiences described by Klein. This ambivalence, we have seen, is inherent in 
the very nature of the infant’s early experience of the mother. Furthermore, the 
terrible Devouring Goddess, who turns upon her own creations and devours 
them, is equally prefigured there. The iconography of the Balinese Durga—the 
emphasis on fangs, lolling tongue, sharp talons, and the frequently depicted 
casual gnawing on an infant—emphasises the central theme of oral greed. The 
ornaments—earrings, necklaces and garlands of dismembered body parts: heads, 
skulls, chopped off hands and arms, strings of entrails—evoke the phantasy 
attacks on the mother’s body and its contents, and the retaliation expected in 
kind. The infant does not simply want to kill the mother; it wants to rip her 
apart with teeth and nails, and suck and scoop out all her body contents. The 
huge body of the goddess, with its heavy breasts and belly, depicts the mother’s 
body full of milk, excrement, babies and all that the child desires to grab for 
itself, but now this treasure house of riches becomes a looming monster about 
to obliterate the child.
We do not need to look to cultural factors to interpret these images; they are the 
unconscious phantasies described by Klein writ large. Yet they are also clearly 
cultural forms. The basis for such forms lies dormant in all human beings, we 
might assume, but the question for the cultural analyst remains: why have such 
horrific images been worked into culturally elaborated symbols?
The Goddess and the Witch
I have argued elsewhere that the universality of the image of the witch owes its 
origin to the phantasies of the Terrible Mother described by Klein. The Balinese 
Durga’s link to witches and witchcraft has already been noted. Yet while many 
cultures have beliefs in witches, how often do we encounter Devouring Mothers 
as goddesses? The witch, I have argued (Stephen 1999), is in essence a projection 
of guilt and anxiety—a projection of the ‘bad breast’—and is a figure provoked 
in times of loss and bereavement.
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A Terrible Devouring Goddess, who is not merely some kind of minor symbolic 
figure but explicitly an important aspect of the Great Goddess, creatrix of the 
whole physical universe, is clearly significantly different from a witch figure. 
She brings into consciousness something most of us, and probably most cultures, 
would prefer to deny: the deep ambivalence in our most primal experience 
of love and nurturing. Encountering this terrible aspect of the goddess is to 
face the very roots of our emotional being. It expresses a fundamental truth 
about human nature and the very nature of embodied existence. In terms of its 
spiritual significance, it brings the seeker after truth to recognise the inherently 
conflicting nature of human love: its origins in fear, anxiety and guilt. This, 
however, is not a cause to reject human love but to seek that which transcends it 
and thus to move beyond the dualities of love and hate, good and bad, positive 
and negative, creative and destructive that limit the operations of the mind, 
as we find in the philosophical teachings of Tantrism (Avalon 1974; Feuerstein 
1998).
At a more mundane psychological level, we can see that whereas the witch is a 
product of unconscious ‘splitting’, the goddess is rather an attempt to bring the 
unconscious identification of the mother as the bad breast/object into awareness. 
The image of Durga involves recognition of the deep ambivalence that human 
beings have towards their first love object: the mother. As such, this cultural 
image surely serves to bring into awareness both sides of the ambivalence, thus 
resolving it for those who engage deeply with the symbol. By openly stressing 
and exploring both positive and negative aspects of the unconscious mother 
imago, these cultural forms enable the undoing of the unconscious splitting of 
the feminine and thus avoid the need to project the ‘bad mother’ onto actual 
women.
Of course, it might also be that the image of the Terrible Mother can be 
employed in a defensive manner, enabling the worshipper to identify (projective 
identification) with the Terrible Mother, as in Balinese witchcraft and sorcery 
(Stephen 2006), so that the victim becomes the persecutor. On the whole, 
however, at least in Bali, the cultural imagery that vividly depicts both sides of 
the ambivalence attached to the mother imago helps to foster cultural attitudes 
towards women that recognise both their gentle, nurturing and loving capacities 
and the awesome power they hold. Woman indeed is an embodiment of Sakti, the 
power of the material world, and deeply revered as such. In relation to woman, 
the male represents spirit rather than matter, but just as Shiva is powerless to 
bring the physical world into being without Sakti—his creative energy—so the 
human male is powerless without his consort.
Although I would not want to make such the proof of my arguments, the position 
of women in Balinese culture—both in the past and today—tends to support 
my position. Balinese women are respected and valued, and value themselves, as 
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females in a way that is quite different from Western cultures, where the women 
who are respected are those who have succeeded in a man’s world. In a book 
first published in 1937 and still in print, Miguel Covarrubias (1973:44–5) noted 
the high status of Balinese women, their role as sellers and moneychangers, their 
dominance of local markets and their economic independence in general:
A woman has definite rights; the income she derives from the sale of 
her pigs, her weaving, or the garden produce she sells in the market is 
her own, and she may dispose of her belongings without the knowledge 
of her husband. Most women are not only economically independent, 
but contribute to the expenses of the household. A woman’s debts are 
her own and her husband is not liable for them. The women keep the 
finances of the family and control the markets. (Covarrubias 1973:83)
He also observed in family life ‘a strong feeling of equality, of politeness, and 
friendly frankness in the relationship between husband and wife’ (Covarrubias 
1973:155). Although Balinese have definite ideas about the type of work 
appropriate to the different sexes, Covarrubias explains that this by no means 
meant that women were confined to the home and domestic duties only. Indeed, 
they routinely undertook such labour as ‘transporting building materials, 
carrying coconuts…delivering charcoal, or obtaining broken coral from the 
beach to make lime’, and even house painting and masonry work (1973:82). 
These remarks are as apposite today as they were more than 70 years ago. As 
any visitor to the island can observe for themselves, Balinese women still work 
as labourers on the roads and building sites, and in the rice fields; they are still 
active as traders and sellers, and many are taking advantage of new opportunities 
available in business, tourism and government service.9
Well-known Balinese author, public commentator and psychiatrist Luh Ketut 
Suryani (2003:42–9) observes that Balinese Hindu women are not taught to think 
of themselves as weak or as of less strength and ability than men, as are females 
in many other—including Western—cultures. On the contrary, she points out, 
Balinese Hindu women are deeply respected and honoured as mothers, as the 
source of creativity and nurturing, indeed as emanations of the great Mother 
herself, while their propensity for materialism, greed, destructive anger and 
jealousy is equally recognised. The beautiful, gentle human mother quickly 
takes on monstrous form if not given her due. In Bali, the power of the Mother 
is the basis of all life, activity and success—and of all destructive and negative 
forces as well. In a study of contemporary Balinese artist Ketut Budiana, I have 
described his most compelling inspiration as ‘the power of the Mother’: 
9 Nineteenth-century travellers and explorers made similar observations concerning the high status of 
Balinese women. See Geertz (1980:93) and Vickers (1989).
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Budiana’s works reveal that the Goddess, in her many refractions, 
can take forms both beautiful and terrifying. She is the tender loving 
mother who gives birth to and nurtures all beings; she is the hideous 
ogress who devours and destroys all in her path. This dual aspect of the 
Goddess/Mother is central to knowing and understanding the nature 
of her power. Indeed in Budiana’s works, as in Balinese religious art 
in general, monstrous figures of the divine mother predominate over 
the gentle and benign. The Mother is not only the origin of life; she is 
also the origin of death, and womb and tomb are often equated. In the 
womb, material elements are brought together to form a body that is 
the vehicle for a new life…Life and death are part of a continuous cycle 
of transformations of physical substances into different forms. (Stephen 
2005:48)
The unconscious imagery is there for all to draw upon, but how that imagery 
is employed by different cultures links, I believe, to cultural ideas concerning 
gender identity—and to misogyny and violence towards actual women in real 
situations. 
Women also fear the mother imago; indeed, they have especially strong guilt 
related to phantasised attacks upon the mother’s body. Female psychosexual 
development, in Klein’s view, involves a deep-seated fear that they have been 
wounded or maimed by the mother, in return for their attacks upon her. I have 
argued in more detail elsewhere that this unconscious belief leads to a sense of 
inherent badness or weakness, which results in women feeling themselves to be 
inferior (Stephen 2003). They thus become vulnerable to, and easily convinced 
by, cultural images that portray them as inferior beings to men. Where men 
introject the good aspect of the mother imago and project the destructive and 
inferior aspects onto women—as we can see vividly depicted in many male 
initiation cults—women come to accept this projection as it meshes with their 
own unconscious phantasies of being damaged by the mother. 
Carl Jung (1980:37), who believed that the Mother Figure constituted 
an archetype in the human unconscious, also drew attention to the deep 
ambivalence attached to this figure and to the many symbolic representations of 
the Terrible Mother, including Kali. He argued that in patriarchal religions, such 
as Christianity, the removal of all feminine figures results in an impoverishment, 
and a failure to engage with the fullness of those symbols of the sacred that arise 
naturally in the human mind. 
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Klein and Vengeful Mothers in Ilahita
In their important comparative study Gender in Amazonia and Melanesia, 
Gregor and Tuzin (2001:338) observe that gender distinctions play a key role as 
organising principles in Hindu Tantrism, as well as in the male initiation cults on 
which they focus. My argument in this chapter has been that the Tantric figure 
of Durga in Bali, although it is based on ‘splitting’, serves as a cultural symbol to 
undo the split and its defensive consequences. I have argued elsewhere (Stephen 
2003) that male initiation cults in the New Guinea Highlands can be understood 
as classic Kleinian defences against the guilt and terror provoked by the splitting 
of the mother imago. Gregor and Tuzin’s comparative work enables me to apply 
my arguments more widely to include the cultures they examine, and thus to 
elaborate on the differences with Balinese Tantrism.
Male cults, as Gregor and Tuzin point out, are prevalent not only in Amazonia 
and Melanesia but also in Aboriginal Australia, and echoes of them remain 
even in Western culture in exclusively male clubs and organisations. Their 
psychoanalytic interpretation clearly identifies the defensive nature of the 
cults and the insecure masculine identity that they serve to defend. A Kleinian 
perspective, which Tuzin (1997:122) acknowledges as especially pertinent to his 
data, can help, I think, to elucidate yet further the nature of the unconscious 
desires and phantasies involved in the cult rituals. I will focus my discussion on 
six important features Gregor and Tuzin identify as central to the cults found 
in ‘Melazonia’.
1 . The Matriarchal Myth 
The ‘myths of matriarchy’ that characterise the cults are summarised by Gregor 
and Tuzin thus:
The myths tell of a time when the women discovered, invented, or 
possessed the cult objects, bullroarers, flutes, or trumpets that are the 
central symbols of the men’s cults. These objects permitted the women 
to dominate the men or at least to live apart from them…Banding 
together, the men forced or tricked the women into giving up the sacred 
objects, resulting in their possession of the generative powers of the 
flutes, the reordering of society, and, in some case[s], the establishment 
of patriarchy. (2001:310)
The primal unconscious phantasy that the Mother is possessed of all good and 
desirable things, and the infant’s desire to rob her of them, is clearly reflected in 
this mythic structure, which, like a dream, provides the fulfilment of the wish. 
The desire to rob the Mother is now realised, but with this satisfaction come 
Echoes	of	the	Tambaran	
212
guilt and fear of the Mother’s terrible retaliation. These ‘myths of matriarchy’ 
reflect in barely disguised form the central phantasies that constitute what Klein 
refers to as the ‘paranoid/schizoid position’ described earlier in this chapter. 
2 . The Importance of Body Imagery 
There is much acceptance in anthropology that the body provides a natural 
symbol for society and many other things as well (Gregor and Tuzin 2001:339), 
although why certain substances and structures should be privileged over 
others is not so clear. Few anthropologists, however, consider the unconscious 
significance of the body. From a Kleinian perspective, the body that provides 
the template for unconscious phantasy is the Mother’s body. The maternal body 
is believed to contain every good thing the child desires: milk, food, babies, 
excrement and the father’s penis, all of which the Mother is thought to be 
withholding for her own enjoyment. Klein observes:
I have found that aggressive impulses and phantasies arising in the 
earliest relation to the mother’s breast, such as sucking the breast dry 
and scooping it out, soon lead to further phantasies of entering the 
mother and robbing her of the contents of her body. Concurrently, the 
infant experiences impulses and phantasies of attacking the mother by 
putting excrements into her. In such phantasies, products of the body 
and parts of the self are felt to have been split off, projected into the 
mother, and to be continuing their existence within her. (1993c:142)
Such nightmarish combinations of body parts, male and female genitals, and 
body substances are just what form the symbolic material elaborated in male 
cults. Gregor and Tuzin observe: ‘The detachability of genitals from their 
owners anticipates their mutability as male and female organs. Penises, clitorises, 
vaginas, anuses, breasts, mouths, noses and tongues are symbolic permutations 
of one another. They condense, merge, and differentiate’ (2001:313).
The Mother’s body containing the Father’s penis is a key Kleinian phantasy, 
and the core of the figure of the combined parental imago (Klein 1993b:79). The 
Father’s penis is also equated with babies (and faeces) contained in the Mother’s 
body (Klein 1993b:78), providing an exact parallel with the apparently bizarre 
idea of the Gimi people of Highlands New Guinea that ‘fetuses are conceived of 




3 . Reproduction and Procreativity 
Male cults, as Gregor and Tuzin (2001:314) observe, typically focus on concerns 
with reproduction and creativity in general, asserting that both are the exclusive 
province of men. This is clearly a defence against male fears of precisely the 
opposite, and correlates with the primal envy inspired by the Mother’s body. 
According to Klein, the phantasy image of the ‘good breast’ is the prototype of 
all creativity:
I would not assume that the breast is to him [the infant] merely a 
physical object. The whole of his instinctual desires and his unconscious 
phantasies imbue the breast with qualities going far beyond the actual 
nourishment it affords.
We find in our analysis of our patients that the breast in its good aspect 
is the prototype of maternal goodness, inexhaustible patience and 
generosity, as well as creativeness. It is these phantasies and instinctual 
needs that so enrich the primal object that it remains the foundation for 
hope, trust, and belief in goodness. (Klein 1993d:180)
Thus, in unconscious phantasy, the Mother is the source and prototype of not 
only sexual and reproductive power, but of all cultural creativity as well, and 
thus the focus of intense envy.
4.	Women	and	Projective	Identification	
In an article entitled ‘Male Mothers and Cannibal Women’, I have argued at 
length that male initiation rites in Highlands New Guinea are cultural fantasy 
systems involving a splitting of the mother imago into exclusively good and 
bad parts, the former being appropriated symbolically by men, the latter being 
projected on to actual women (Stephen 2003). Thus, men ritually assert that 
they give birth to and nurture if not all human beings, then certainly the most 
important: men. Women on the other hand are seen as dangerous, polluting and 
weakening to males, and capable of producing only unimportant females—or 
indeed, if we look to the beliefs of the Gimi people, as inclined to devour all 
offspring unless subject to the controlling influence of men! 
Similar if not identical phantasy processes of splitting, appropriation (projective 
identification) and projection of the mother imago are evident in the broad 
spectrum of cultures that Gregor and Tuzin consider. Male cults ‘project a 
view of women as dangerous and powerful’, while men take on the procreative 
powers of mothers for themselves (Gregor and Tuzin 2001:321).
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5 . Secrecy, Vigilance, Terror and Violence
Having, in unconscious phantasy or myth dream, successfully stolen all the 
desired things the maternal body is felt to contain, the culprit is then consumed 
by paranoid fears of the Mother’s retaliation. In order to ward off the Mother’s 
revenge, secrecy must be preserved at all costs, but the fears are by no means 
abated; indeed, the more intense the activities of the cult, the greater are the 
fears of revenge by the Mother. It is not simply men’s insecurity in relation to 
their masculinity, though there is that of course, but their guilt concerning the 
theft of the Mother’s power, and their intense fear of her revenge, that charges 
their emotional investment in the cult with such force. Guilt and terror, not 
merely insecurity, provide compelling motivation. ‘Secrecy’, ‘vigilance’, ‘terror 
and violence’ (Gregor and Tuzin 2001:316, 318, 319) are the hallmarks not only 
of these male cults but also of the paranoid/schizoid position described by Klein.
6 . Phallic Aggression
The desire to attack, destroy and control from within the maternal body is 
central to the Kleinian paranoid-schizoid position:
From the beginning the destructive impulse is turned against the 
object and is first expressed in phantasied oral-sadistic attacks on the 
mother’s breast, which soon develop into onslaughts on her body by 
all sadistic means. The persecutory fears arising from the infant’s oral-
sadistic impulses to rob the mother’s body of its good contents and from 
the anal-sadistic impulses to put his excrements into her (including the 
desire to enter her body in order to control her from within) is of great 
importance for the development of paranoia and schizophrenia. (Klein 
1993a:2)
The cultists’ phallic aggression against women—be this rape or murder (Gregor 
and Tuzin 2001:320)—might thus be understood as an acting out of unconscious 
phantasies of destroying the Mother.
The	Demise	of	a	Cult:	Opportunity	for	reparation?
From the Kleinian perspective argued here, the ‘anguish of gender’ identified 
by Gregor and Tuzin (2001) is generated by men ritually embracing the 
paranoid-schizoid phase of emotional development, splitting the Mother and 
appropriating for themselves the characteristics of the ‘good breast’ while 
projecting on to actual women the ‘bad breast’. No wonder the cults have 
myths of an original theft from the Mother; this is precisely the nature of the 
phantasies Klein describes. The fears of the men that women will find out are 
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fuelled by the paranoid fears of retaliatory attacks from the Mother. The cults 
serve to provide a defence against envy and fear of the Mother, but they come 
at the price of continuous paranoia. By dismantling the cults and admitting 
their sins, as occurred in the case of the Ilahita Tambaran cult (Gregor and Tuzin 
2001:326–8; Tuzin 1997), the men, it seems, might now be able to enter the 
reparative stage, which begins in mourning and loss but at least provides the 
opportunity to attempt to repair the damage done in phantasy to the Mother.
The paranoid/schizoid position moves into the depressive position as the 
child begins to fear that, in his attempts to destroy the bad Mother, he has 
injured, damaged or even killed the good Mother. A growing sense of loss and 
depression can be overcome only by the repairing of the dead or dying Mother 
imago so that she is restored in phantasy as a good inner object. This process of 
reconstruction Klein terms ‘reparation’, and in her view it is crucial to normal 
emotional development. The child unable to make reparation remains locked 
in the paranoid/schizoid position and this provides the basis for psychosis in 
adult life.
Tuzin (1997) describes the cultural disintegration and sense of mourning and 
loss that followed the deliberate unmasking of the Ilahita Tambaran cult. For 
him, the disintegration of the cult, with all its admitted abuses and even horrors, 
led to cultural chaos and a worsening of actual relationships between men and 
women in Ilahita society. He concludes from this experience that the Tambaran 
cult had served in a positive manner to provide men with ‘sanctuary’—a ritual 
space wherein a painfully acquired sense of masculinity might find shelter. He 
argues that male gender identity is more difficult to achieve than female, which 
is based, it would appear, on women’s natural physiological attributes and the 
comparative psychological ease with which girls might identify with mothers 
(Tuzin 1997:191–2, 228). At this point, however, a Kleinian perspective would 
challenge his argument.
Masculinity, Femininity, and the Mother
As Tuzin himself points out, in examining male cults, we are not simply dealing 
with gender relations as such; rather, we are dealing with the unconscious 
relationship to the first object, the Mother.
What men did not realize was that while the Tambaran may have 
engendered fears at one level, it dissipated fears on another. Those 
fears, older and more primitive than the Tambaran, were not really fears 
about women at all, but about Mother—though, of course, it was and is 
women who suffer because of them. (Tuzin 1997:177)
Echoes	of	the	Tambaran	
216
In turn, this primal relationship determines how gender identities are formed 
and what is considered to be the proper relationship between genders.
But is masculine identity more difficult to achieve, as Tuzin suggests, than 
female identity? I have argued elsewhere (Stephen 2003) that women are more 
prone to see themselves as damaged and inferior, especially if subjected to male 
ideology along these lines. Freud’s notion that women in unconscious phantasy 
picture themselves as castrated men has, understandably, not been popular 
with feminists. Yet I think there is a truth in Freud’s insight that women feel 
themselves to be wounded—a truth that is developed and clarified by Klein, 
who shows that female gender identity is much more complex than usually 
assumed. The girl has her own pressing fears and guilt concerning her phantasy 
attacks on the Mother. The unconscious belief that the inside of her own body 
has been damaged in retaliatory attacks is, according to Klein (1994:225–7), 
confirmed by the onset of menstruation—a fear that is not overcome until she 
bears a healthy child of her own, and sometimes not even then. According to 
Klein, the girl’s progress through the oedipal phase is in fact more difficult than 
the boy’s, since the male child eventually returns to his original love object, his 
mother, while the girl has in the end to reject the mother, her first love object 
also, and turn to the father and other males:
There are great differences in the Oedipus complex of the girl and boy, 
which I shall characterize only by saying that whereas the boy in his 
genital development returns to his original object, the mother, and 
therefore seeks female objects…the girl to some extent has to turn away 
from the mother and find the object of her desires in the father and later 
on in other men. (Klein 1993e:252)
We can see from this perspective that female identity and relationship to the 
mother are much more problematic than is recognised by some feminist theorists 
such as Chodorow, as quoted by Tuzin (1997:228). I think any argument that 
male identity is more problematic than female needs qualifying. Rather, both 
genders founder on the reef of the Terrible Mother, but in different ways: male 
envy and fear of retaliation, female envy and the fear girls have that they have 
already been attacked and wounded. Thus, unconscious female fears that the 
insides of their bodies have been damaged easily mesh with male insistence on 
female ‘badness’ and inferiority. Such fear reinforces the practical circumstances 
of child-bearing and nurturing that tie women to these tasks. Men are indeed 
fortunate to be able to convince women that all they are fit for are the menial 
tasks of caring for children, when really it is men’s control of cosmic or cultural 
forces that constitutes real creativity—be this making money or ritually ensuring 
fertility and procreation. As technology comes to free women from the slavery 
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of child-bearing and nurturing, or at least gives them the choice, the question 
of who will produce children becomes critical—much as Tuzin’s Ilahita Arapesh 
men feared. Who will willingly choose the drudgery of women’s labour? 
If men continue to attempt to appropriate the Good Mother for themselves, while 
trivialising and demeaning women by projecting onto them the Bad Mother, 
gender relations will continue to be dominated by unconscious fears of, and 
actual violence towards, women. Evidently, this is a situation that prevails far 
more widely than the male cults of Melazonia, including contemporary Western 
societies. Klein’s insights suggest that both men and women need to become 
more aware of the unconscious power of the Mother imago. Where women are 
culturally encouraged to identify with both negative and positive aspects of 
the mother figure, as in Bali, I think they will seek to realise their identity as 
mothers. Nor is it enough to assure women that they are only really fulfilled as 
mothers; how can they accept that when everything associated with women 
and children is in actuality trivialised? All they are good for then is second 
best. Is it possible, as some believe (McDermott 2003), that Western women 
can successfully identify with the goddess? This clearly will depend on how 
Western men can respond to such identification.
Defences Against Primal Envy
Gregor and Tuzin point to male envy of women as a theme of central importance 
in the ritualisation of male gender identity. Yet why should men envy women? 
As Tuzin (1997:120) notes for the Ilahita Arapesh, the mythic cassowary maiden, 
Nambweapa’w, was tricked into an ‘artful bondage’ in which she relinquished 
her freedom for ‘the captivities of childbirth, motherhood, sexual slavery, food 
getting drudgery, and all the rest’—in short, the traditional female role.10 It is 
obvious that at a conscious level there is very little in women’s roles in these 
cultures to envy, but as Tuzin (1997:177) notes, Ilahita Arapesh fears (and envy) 
of women are not really to do with women at all but concern the Mother.
Primal envy of the Mother and all she is believed to possess and be keeping 
for her own pleasure is, according to Klein, a key factor in early emotional 
development. She identifies several defences used to deal with that envy: 
splitting, projection, introjection, denial, and idealisation. All, I believe, can be 
identified with specific cultural attitudes to women: splitting, projection and 
introjection in Melanesia and Amazonia, denial in modern Western culture, 
idealisation perhaps in medieval ideals of courtly love and the cult of the Virgin 
Mary. In contrast, in Hindu Bali, as we have seen, there is a conscious recognition 
10 Strathern’s (1990) work on women’s labour and domesticity might also be considered here.
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in religious symbolism of the ambivalence held by the mother figure, and a 
deliberate honouring of the double-sided power held by women in their role as 
mothers. 
Might not the Balinese Durga still be the product of child-rearing practices? Do 
teasing, frustrating or aggressive mothers give rise to images of Durga/Kali, as 
argued by Bateson and Mead (1942)? Although the figure of Durga in Bali can be 
understood as a product of ‘splitting’ the mother imago into good and bad aspects, 
the fact that she is honoured and worshipped in terrible guise—with the aim of 
returning her to her benign aspect—reveals that cultural rituals actually serve 
to undo the splitting. The equal emphasis on both benign and terrible aspects 
underlines the point that both are aspects of the same figure: the mother. In this 
way, I believe, unconscious processes are brought into consciousness and the 
deep ambivalence to the mother figure is made the subject of conscious reflection 
and indeed spiritual insight. This contrasts dramatically with Melanesian and 
other cultures where male cults serve to perpetuate the split, appropriating the 
good aspect of the mother imago for men and projecting the bad on to women. 
The Balinese Durga, I suggest, provides both men and women with a means of 
dealing with their ambivalence towards the Mother imago, the results being that 
men respect women as the embodiment of the Great Mother, in both her aspects, 
and women are able to identify with both powerful and nurturing aspects of 
the Mother. Certainly, men are still able to assert superiority in this scheme 
of things, since female equates with material substance and physical power, 
whereas masculine equates with spirit, consciousness and transcendence. Yet 
the two are utterly interdependent and the necessary basis of all existence. It 
might of course be that such clearly demarked categories could be used as the 
basis to enforce even more rigid cultural notions of gender inequality, yet this 
is not the case in Bali.
In my view, Tantrism reflects the opposite of the Melanesian gender situation; 
in Melanesia men deal with their envy and fear by attempting to ritually 
appropriate the good aspects of the mother figure (not just female in general, 
but as Mother). In Tantrism, envy and fear are overcome by bringing into 
cultural consciousness the negative and acknowledging and honouring both 
aspects of the powers held by women. The Tantric hero, the vira, is a hero as he 
is able to confront his own ambivalence.11 But this, of course, does not apply to 
all men—only to the Tantric adept. The esoteric symbols are there available for 
those who wish to engage with them but, for the majority, defensive responses 
to the Mother imago, and her carriers, will probably still prevail.
I would expect that certain kinds of child-rearing practices do in fact tend to 
elicit or favour cultural emphasis on images of the Terrible Mother but that the 
11 My view of the vira contrasts with Kripal’s (2003) Freudian interpretation.
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psychic images themselves are an inherent part of the human condition. All 
cultures must deal with them in some way—even if it is to simply repress and 
deny them, as we find in modern Western cultures—but they then find outlets 
other than religion; for instance, in the popularity of violence and monster 
figures in film and entertainment, but that is another argument.
The question remains why do particular cultures elaborate on particular 
defensive fantasies? Why do cultures in Melanesia, Amazonia and Aboriginal 
Australia possess such strikingly similar male cults, while Hindu cultures 
worship Terrible Mothers? I can do no more than raise the question here and 
make a few final comments. In small-scale, technologically simple societies, 
unconscious phantasy themes seem to emerge in more direct, less disguised 
forms, and to be closer to their unconscious roots. This emerged as a major 
finding from a survey study of the Oedipus complex cross-culturally (Johnson 
and Price-Williams 1996:7). This finding also applies to the male cults, where the 
direct parallels with Kleinian phantasies are no less than astonishing. Although 
the terrible goddesses of Hinduism also seem very direct representations, and no 
less confronting, a difference emerges in the way the phantasies are culturally 
employed. 
Along similar lines, Obeyesekere (1990:60–1) has pointed out that in cultures 
such as the Sambia of Melanesia, symbolic systems seem to remain tied to 
unconscious themes and conflicts, while in Hinduism (and Buddhism) the 
symbolic systems follow a different trajectory, moving away from primal concerns 
to link to more refined concepts and understandings. His insights seem relevant 
to my arguments here about terrible goddesses providing the symbolic means to 
transcend the unconscious splitting of the mother figure, whereas the male cults 
provide a defensive reaction against the splitting. As we see in Tuzin’s (1997) 
account of the demise of the Ilahita Tambaran cult, circumstances can change, 
however, and the defensive mechanisms of the past might no longer suffice, 
bringing about internal as well as external revolutions. In these circumstances, 
new cultural systems will eventually need to be developed that can provide the 
opportunity for reparation to the damaged Mother. It is perhaps too early yet to 
know how the Ilahitans might achieve that transition, but Tuzin’s unique study 
has captured precisely for us the moment of change.
Conclusion
Psychoanalytic perspectives of whatever persuasion inevitably direct our 
attention to what is common to the human condition. As Donald Tuzin has 
extensively argued in his own work, comparative perspectives in anthropology 
are essential unless the discipline is simply to wither into relativist trivia; 
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a truly human science must engage with what it means to be human cross-
culturally. The Kleinian approach I have taken in this chapter can, I believe, add 
to Freudian insights concerning the nature of unconscious phantasy processes. 
Freudian concepts of ambivalence, anxiety and repression—used to powerful 
effect by some cultural analysts—can be sharpened and given more explanatory 
force in view of Klein’s understandings concerning the primal forces shaping 
emotional life. The phantasies she describes, in all their bizarre detail, are to be 
found in our ethnographies, and the richer these are, the clearer are the parallels 
with Klein, as I have found with the Ilahita cult and the Balinese Durga.
Critics of psychoanalysis have often maintained that it is demeaning to claim 
that the religious beliefs of other cultures reflect the fantasies of children 
and the insane in Western culture. Such arguments, I believe, involve a false 
reading of psychoanalytic theory, which suggests not that cultural products 
such as religious beliefs are no different from infantile fantasy or the delusions 
of the insane but rather that the unconscious mind provides a common stream 
of fantasy thought on which different cultures draw and then elaborate, 
and which also emerges in raw, unworked form in the fantasies of Western 
individuals. The Balinese Durga is a culturally mediated construct, the subject 
of complex philosophical reflections, mythological elaborations and rich artistic 
formulations in dance, drama, sculpture and painting. She is quite specific to 
Balinese culture and yet she encapsulates and crystallises in a very specific 
cultural form what are also universal themes of the deep unconscious. The same 
observations equally apply to Ilahita male cults.
The match between the ethnographic data discussed here and the phantasies 
identified by Klein seem just too specific and too striking to ignore in my view, 
yet anthropologists in the main rarely bother themselves with psychoanalytic 
theory, let alone the Kleinian variety.12 Perhaps the confronting ‘otherness’ of 
such images, stemming as they do from primal experience not usually available 
to adult consciousness, prevents us from recognising the recurring patterns 
cross-culturally. Donald Tuzin was an intrepid explorer of these twin dangerous 
seas of psychoanalytic theory and the comparative method. We who follow in 
his wake will sorely miss his brave and fair-minded leadership.
12 Witness the complete overlooking of Klein’s work by Kripal (1998, 2003) in his groundbreaking 
psychoanalytic studies of Kali. The recent edited study Encountering Kali: In the Margins, at the Center, in the 
West (McDermott and Kripal 2003) does not so much as list Klein in its index or bibliography. Fossey (2008:4) 
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10. Hierarchy and Equality in Fijian 
Kindergartens
Karen J . Brison 
Introduction
In 1983, when I was a graduate student, Donald Tuzin changed the course 
of my career by writing a National Science Foundation grant, part of which 
funded my dissertation research among the Kwanga of the East Sepik Province 
of Papua New Guinea. Tuzin proposed an ambitious comparative study of four 
neighbouring Sepik cultures. He argued that an important part of socialisation 
came through experience with other children. Among the Ilahita Arapesh, boys 
tell each other fearsome stories about cult spirits, and even though they later 
learn that these stories are just lies designed to frighten women and children, 
they continue as adults to have frightening dreams of cult spirits (Tuzin 1987). 
The same belief system, Tuzin argued, might have quite different personal 
meaning for individuals depending on how children were positioned in society 
and on the nature of their early experiences with these cultural beliefs. Even 
though the Ilahita Arapesh and three neighbouring groups had very similar 
male initiation cults, he continued, the personal meanings of these beliefs for 
individuals could be different in the four groups if children’s early exposure to 
the belief systems differed.
My PNG research did not end up focusing on children’s peer groups, but I was 
intrigued by Tuzin’s ideas and realised, when I later put together courses on the 
anthropology of childhood, religion and other topics, that he was ahead of his 
time in suggesting that children internalised many of their assumptions about 
self and culture through interacting with other children. Kulick (1997), for 
instance, argues that children of Gapun village in the East Sepik lead the shift 
away from bilingualism to monolingualism in Tok Pisin—one of the two PNG 
lingua franca. Adults want their children to be bilingual but child caretakers 
generally use Tok Pisin with younger children in an effort to enhance their own 
authority by drawing on the associations of Tok Pisin with reason and wisdom. 
More generally, Corsaro (1997, 2003), Harris (1999), Tannen (1990) and many 
others all suggest that children are not directly socialised by adults. Instead, 
children understand from an early age that they are children, and they form 
their ideas about appropriate behaviour and values by internalising routines 
and assumptions in a world of peers. One peer culture gives way to other peer 
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cultures as children grow up, but our understandings of self and society are 
acquired through this succession of peer cultures rather than through adult 
instruction. 
In 1997, when I began new fieldwork in Fiji, my research agenda was shaped 
by Tuzin’s ideas about peer socialisation. I argued that Fijian children—
relegated to the bottom of the status hierarchy in a culture that ranks everyone 
by age, gender, lineage membership and other criteria—internalise many of 
their assumptions about self and society through playing with other children, 
because they are excluded from many adult activities and spend much of 
their time in the company of other children while higher-status adults pursue 
important communal activities. In this chapter, I compare the ways urban and 
rural Fijian children enact and interpret hierarchy and equality in their play in 
order to revisit another of Tuzin’s insights: that the same cultural system can 
have very different meanings depending on the ways that children experience 
those beliefs.
In Fiji, as in neighbouring Samoa (Ochs 1988) and Tonga (Morton 1996), low-
ranking people must obey and accommodate those further up who are thought 
to be wiser and to have a greater capacity to understand and act for the good 
of society. This principle structures interactions from the way adults talk to 
infants (Ochs 1988) and the fostering of children to meet the needs of adults, 
to interactions among siblings where the older siblings are expected to take 
care of younger siblings, who owe deference and obedience in return. In rural 
villages, a large part of children’s experience of hierarchy comes from spending 
their lives in mixed-age peer groups where they both obey older children and 
discipline younger children. I shall argue that children’s experience of the 
cultural principle of hierarchy is quite different in urban areas where they spend 
much less time in mixed-age groups and a great deal more time in the same-age 
cohorts favoured by educational systems all over the world (Anderson-Levitt 
2003). As a result, they interact with a large group of unfamiliar equals—their 
classmates—and experience hierarchy as a binary opposition between those 
with authority, the teachers, and those without, the children. In contrast, rural 
children are part of a world of kin where no-one is equal and differences in rank 
are gradual and continuous, starting with the child one month one’s senior and 
extending through to the oldest grandfather. 
I suggest that the new experiential world of children is changing the way they 
internalise understandings of self and society and that these differences are 
reflected and reinforced in play. Rural children experiment simultaneously with 
being higher and lower in rank in their mixed-age play groups. Urban children, 
on the other hand, develop strategies for negotiating their way through a world 
of equals by strategically defining in-groups and out-groups. They experience 
themselves as being powerless in the face of powerful adults and play a variety 
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of games, such as pretending to be monsters, superheroes and other powerful 
figures, which allow them both to defy authority and to play at being powerful. 
Such play is similar to that of children in American and European schools, who 
are faced with a similar situation of being powerless in a world where they 
will some day be required to be autonomous adults (Corsaro 2003; Jones 2003; 
Paley 1986). These games reflect concerns and assumptions of self and society 
fundamentally different from those in the games of rural children, who always 
see themselves as ‘dividuals’ embedded in a community, neither powerless now 
nor destined to be powerful in adulthood, but always high with respect to some 
and low with respect to others. Moreover, the experience of rural children in 
shifting their behaviour from context to context—depending on the age of the 
other children present—causes them always to think of themselves as playing 
roles in a larger communal structure rather than as individuals whose unique 
characteristics determine their relationships.
Hierarchy in the World of Rural Children
Cultural assumptions about hierarchy and the correct relationship between 
adults and children were largely similar in rural and urban areas, but the 
experience of children was fundamentally different. Morton (1996) and Ochs 
(1988) note strong cultural assumptions in Tonga and Samoa that children are 
born foolish, wilful and selfish and only gradually develop the capacities to 
reason, to think of others and of communal good, and to curb their impulses. On 
the one hand, these assumptions lead to authoritarian parenting strategies; since 
children have a limited capacity to reason and are naturally naughty, adults must 
be firm, in control and often need to use a bit of corporal punishment to impress 
upon children the right way to behave. On the other hand, since adults are of 
high status, they should not spend their lives accommodating children’s needs; 
instead, adults are often distant, assigning much of the work of caretaking 
to older children. Children should not be underfoot, distracting adults from 
important communal work, and they must accommodate the needs of adults 
by, for instance, doing manual labour. These cultural assumptions shaped the 
behaviour of rural Fijian parents (Brison 1999) and also urban kindergarten 
teachers (see below), but the experiential worlds of urban and rural children 
were rather different because urban children spent more time in schools and less 
time in neighbourhood and extended kin groups.
In the rural area of Rakiraki, four and five-year-olds lived almost exclusively 
in a world of kin. I kept track of 13 children between three and five years 
old over a period of several days in 1997, noting what they were doing and 
who they were with at random intervals. They were almost always found with 
members of their own families, most often in the company of their own siblings 
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or closely related children. Rakiraki children in general were discouraged from 
wandering far from their own homes and from entering the compounds of 
other lineages, unless visiting relatives from those lineages. In 2003, a small 
kindergarten opened in the compound of the lineage with which I lived. Visits 
to the kindergarten, however, revealed that it was frequented primarily by 
children who were closely related to each other and knew each other already, 
since there was another kindergarten at the other end of the village serving 
children there. Children in the kindergarten also ranged in age from three to six 
since parents liked to send siblings to school together.
One consequence of these patterns was that children were almost always part 
of a kin hierarchy since they were seldom away from siblings and cousins. At 
home, there were generally few enough children in any one lineage that all the 
children—from two-year-olds to teenagers—often ended up playing together. 
In such a world, children experimented with being both a higher status and a 
lower status person (Brison 1999; see also Morton 1996), and the lived experience 
of hierarchy was one of a continual gradation of closely connected individuals. 
Children’s focus on relative rank was apparent, for example, in one interaction I 
observed involving two four-year-olds, Mere and Tukana, who lived near each 
other and often played together; Minroti, a six-year-old boy; and two three-
year-olds, Merioni and my son, Jeffrey (Brison 1999). Mere and Tukana were 
pretending to be soldiers until they saw Merioni and Jeffrey climb on to the 
foundation of a new addition to a house. The two older children showed their 
internalisation of age hierarchy when they immediately headed over to get the 
two younger children off the foundation, saying, ‘Jeffrey, forbidden, you are a 
baby’, and then chasing Merioni off, counting as they had heard adults doing: 
‘Quickly, four, five you have to be missing from here!’ The children were then 
joined by the slightly older Minroti who now assumed the authoritative role, 
telling Tukana not to hit smaller children when Tukana tried to frighten Merioni 
off the foundation. On other occasions, I saw Minroti, who was the youngest in 
his sibling set, being ordered around by his older siblings. On these and other 
occasions, rural children experienced hierarchy as a continuous gradation. 
Children continually moved from being high to being low as the composition of 
groups changed; they lived in a world where no-one was equal but where there 
was no clear dichotomy between power and powerlessness either. They also 
took seriously their responsibilities to supervise younger children and to defer 
to older children.
I suggest here that one consequence of this situation was a relative absence of 
‘monster’ play or other kinds of play that involved working through relationships 
with remote, powerful others. Corsaro (2003) observed monster play in both 
American and Italian preschools. One child would assume the role of monster, 
and the others would first sneak up on the monster and then run away shrieking 
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in mock terror. Jones (2003), Lanclos (2003), Paley (1986) and others have argued 
that such play helps children who are sociologically small and weak but know 
they will grow up to be independent adults experiment with power. They work 
through fears of a dangerous outer world in safe ways by ‘killing monsters’ 
and, conversely, they assume powerful monster or superhero roles to gain the 
experience of being powerful and venting aggression in safe ways. 
Fantasies of power were not common in rural Rakiraki children’s play. Rakiraki 
boys of ten or older did sometimes imitate superheroes. I once watched two boys 
both pretending to be Jean-Claude Van Damme (Brison 2007). But there was no 
clear villain nor was power over others much emphasised; instead, the boys 
imitated a scene from a movie that had recently been shown in the community 
hall in which Van Damme struggled to prevent a jeep from pulling away. Each 
boy took the role of the jeep driver making engine noises so the hero–villain 
opposition from the original was lost. Relative power was also not emphasised in 
a game of house I witnessed played by four small children (Brison 2007). ‘Mum’ 
and ‘Dad’ were significantly absent from this game with each child taking the 
role of an adult visiting with friends.
In short, I suggest that for Rakiraki children there is no clear dichotomy 
between adult power and childhood powerlessness in a world where children 
are sometimes high and other times low in peer groups. Like the perfect ‘socio-
centric’ self described by Becker (1995) and Mead (2001), rural children always 
think of themselves as playing a role vis-a-vis others, in a ranked community, 
alternately taking responsibility for lower-ranking people and deferring to 
higher-ranking people. Children are constantly reminded when the composition 
of groups changes that expectations of them are linked less to their unique 
personalities than to the position they occupy in the group of the moment.
Hierarchy in Fijian Kindergartens
Suva kindergartens were shaped by the same assumptions about rank that 
moulded rural parenting. But the experience of urban kindergarten children 
was much different because classrooms contained a large cohort of unrelated 
children of the same age who were all relatively powerless in contrast with 
teachers.
Suva kindergarten teachers clearly had beliefs about the need for wise adults 
to have firm authority over foolish children. Corporal punishment was not 
allowed in Fijian schools, but most teachers felt that using corporal punishment 
would have been helpful since children lacked the capacity to reason so time-
outs had limited impact. Assumptions about rank also moulded teaching 
strategies. Teachers insisted that learning was a matter of listening to adults; 
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if you did not understand it was because you had not listened. One teacher, 
for instance, routinely contrasted ‘clever’ children who listened obediently 
with ‘naughty’ children who failed to pay attention on the implicit assumption 
that learning was a process of allowing your foolish mind to be guided by the 
higher wisdom of an adult. One outcome of these ideas was what one teacher 
called ‘parrot teaching’—a popular strategy where the teacher would tell the 
children a piece of information and then have them repeat it. For instance, when 
one teacher read her class the story of a sheep, Wooly, she read each line and 
then repeated it back omitting some key word: ‘On this farm there was a sheep 
named Wooly. On this farm there was a sheep named_______?’, waiting for the 
children to obediently repeat back the information after every sentence. When 
teachers asked more open-ended questions, they often had a single correct 
answer in mind. One teacher, for example, told me that her goal was to make 
her kindergarten children independent. This meant, she continued, that they 
should learn in kindergarten what they were expected to do so that they could 
just do that without being told. She assumed there was a correct way to think 
about things and that being independent involved grasping that correct way 
so one could do what the teacher wanted without being told. For example, 
teachers often reminded children that near the end of the school year, or even 
midway through, they should not need to be told to sit quietly, sweep floors, or 
wipe tables; they should already know that these things needed to be done and 
do them on their own initiative. Similarly, when another teacher told me that 
her main goal was to make children confident, she elaborated by explaining that 
confidence involved knowing the right thing to do in each situation so that one 
could feel sure one was behaving correctly.
Equally evident was the influence of cultural assumptions about the importance 
of children accommodating adults. For example, many kindergartens comprised 
large groups of 30 to 50 children rather loosely supervised by two or three adults. 
Teachers often left children to sort out their own problems, only occasionally 
intervening, and to play as they chose while teachers talked with each other or 
to visiting parents and so on. 
While cultural assumptions moulding interaction between adults and children 
were similar in rural and urban areas, children’s experience of hierarchy was, 
in practice, different. Rural children experienced hierarchy as a continuous 
gradation where one was sometimes high and other times low and often not 
around adults at all. But urban kindergarten children were unambiguously low 
in a school hierarchy that involved a clear binary division between teachers 
and children. The home world of many urban children also had this character 
since urban children were much more likely to be kept within their own house’s 
compound than allowed to play with mixed-age neighbourhood groups of 
children. For example, the two children in the household I lived with in Suva 
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were generally in their own house, watching TV or playing together. There was 
always an adult present, and the older child was never encouraged to supervise 
the younger child. Under these conditions, children experienced their social 
world as consisting of a large cohort of relatively powerless equals who stood in 
opposition to powerful adults. These conditions encouraged two kinds of play 
that I seldom saw in Rakiraki—that is, routines for controlling peers by defining 
in-groups and out-groups, and fantasies involving either exercising arbitrary 
and often negative power over others or acting out against oppressive authority 
figures. 
Corsaro (2003), Jones (2003), Lanclos (2003), Paley (1986) and others observed a 
great deal of ‘power’ play among American and European children. One child 
assumed an exaggerated authority role, and the others would resist or act out. 
Children experimented both with getting out their aggression against authority 
figures and with being powerful in a world where they were generally powerless. 
Jones (2003) argues that such play helps children vent frustrations in safe ways 
and also alleviates anxieties about powerlessness by assuming powerful fantasy 
roles. In short, this kind of play is typical of children who feel powerless in 
society and will be expected at some time to become autonomous.
Playing with power was frequent in Suva’s urban kindergartens. An obvious 
example of this kind of play was the game of pretending to be a teacher, which 
I observed in two or three preschools. In one small preschool, for instance, the 
teacher often threatened misbehaving children with a yellow plastic belt, which 
she referred to as ‘my yellow friend’. One day when she was in another room, 
preparing for lunch, one boy, Christopher, who was frequently threatened with 
the ‘yellow friend’, grabbed the belt and started pretending to be the teacher, 
wielding his authority over the anthropologist (KB), and his classmates Ryan, 
Richard, Ethan and Aaron. From my notes: 
Christopher is holding the yellow belt, and says ‘Enough you two! This 
yellow flend!’ hitting at KB. Ryan grabs at the yellow belt. Richard looks 
at KB and says, ‘Lasu Lasu’ (liar liar) for no apparent reason, and two 
others take up the chorus. They all run to Aaron who is giving away 
lollypops, usually doled out by the teacher as rewards…Ethan now 
grabs possession of the belt and hits Richard while Christopher yells at 
Ethan (a chubby child), ‘Fatty booma!’ Ethan then hits the floor with 
the belt, and Christopher gets up on the table and walks right over the 
colouring books of a group of girls. The teacher now comes back in and 
orders them all into the other room. Aaron comes running in with a blue 
ruler the teacher sometimes uses to threaten children, and the teacher 
says ‘Oh my blue friend! Who wants my blue friend?’
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On this occasion, the children, in a rare moment of freedom from adult 
supervision, ‘cut loose’, doing all sorts of forbidden things such as calling the 
ethnographer a liar, walking on tables and on colouring books, insulting others 
for being fat and so on. They also assume autocratic adult roles, threatening 
each other gleefully with the teacher’s ‘yellow friend’ and ‘blue friend’, and 
doling out forbidden treats. These behaviours all reflect a world with a clear 
dichotomous hierarchy. Rural children are often unsupervised; they are often in 
situations where they must guide and direct younger children; they do not act 
out against authority but instead take on responsible adult roles in the presence 
of younger children. Urban kindergarten children, in contrast, are used to 
being controlled by adults and are seldom put in charge of other children. They 
experience themselves as powerless in the face of teachers; when given the 
chance they play gleefully at being autocratic authority figures and at acting 
out against such figures in the safe context of play with peers who will not 
punish them.
Similar themes were evident in another urban kindergarten, when a group of 
boys started playing teacher and students after the teacher had left the room 
to go talk on the telephone. That morning, during story time, the teacher had 
threatened to swat a couple of the boys over the head with her book for talking 
and moving around while she was reading. When she left the room, one of the 
boys in the class sat in her chair and started imitating her while his friends lined 
up on the floor in front of him, assuming the role of children in the class. From 
my notes:
Epeli sits on the teacher’s chair holding a book while a group of five 
boys sit on the mat facing him, where the class would usually sit. One 
of the boys in the ‘class’, says ‘Teacher, teacher somebody play here.’ 
Another boy in the ‘class’ keeps pointing to the books saying, ‘Monkey, 
monkey there!’ Epeli waves his arms and says, ‘Move back! Move back!’ 
as the teacher often does with her class. Epeli slaps one of the boys on 
the head with the book, and they all move back grinning. The boys grin 
and move forward toward the teacher and he grabs the teacher’s ruler 
and threatens them…Epeli says, ‘Listen to Teacher! Hear that story.’ The 
boys in the class take turns getting up and standing in front of Teacher 
Epeli and saying, ‘Teacher’, and being pushed back down. Epeli now 
starts pushing his chair backward, and the boys follow him sliding 
forward on their bottoms. Epeli swats one of them on the head and then 
starts sliding his chair forward, and they all grin and start crawling 
quickly away from him. Epeli gets up and walks away, and three of the 
boys race for his chair and then turn giggling and run away when he 
comes back. One of the boys gets up and hands the book to Epeli and 
says, ‘Teacher, a book’, and then starts dancing around in front of Epeli 
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daring him to hit him. Epeli grabs the teacher’s ruler and starts chasing 
the boy, and then picks up the books and starts chasing his ‘class’ with 
it. The boys run away giggling.
Again, the boys here are having fun assuming the role of arbitrary and abusive 
power and then acting out against an authority figure, reflecting the concerns 
of children who feel powerless, and experimenting both with defying authority 
and with assuming power. 
Experimenting with power was also evident in another sequence in the same 
preschool where Melea, Sera and Amy were playing house. Rakiraki girls playing 
house had imitated friends going to visit each other. There were no parents 
and no apparent power differences in their game. In the urban kindergarten, 
in contrast, Melea became ‘Mum’, ordering the other children around and 
wielding a ruler against misbehaving boys, who baited her. From my notes:
Sera says to Melea, ‘Mom, Mom the baby is crying.’ Melea and Amy 
ignore her. Two boys come into the house corner, and Melea swats them 
with the teacher’s ruler. Melea points her ruler and says to Sera, ‘Make 
the baby a drink.’ Sera feeds the ‘babies’ (three teddy bears) who are 
‘sleeping’ on the lower of two tables stacked one on top of the other. 
Sera then brings Melea a cup, and she pretends to drink tea and eat a 
biscuit. Melea notices three boys have gone under the table, disturbing 
the babies, and swats one of them with her ruler telling them to get out. 
The boy looks surprised and then calls her name ‘Melea, Melea’ and 
purposefully reaches in to disturb the sleeping babies. He runs away as 
she starts hitting him with the ruler. He laughs, and she yells at him to 
stay out of the house. The three boys sneak toward the house chanting, 
‘Melea, Melea’, and she chases them with a ruler until she corners one 
of them and hits him until he starts crying.
Here, house play became a game of power. The friends visiting each others’ 
houses in the rural game are replaced with an authoritarian mother who orders 
her children to feed the babies and to make tea and then punishes children for 
misbehaving. The children experiment both with being an aggressive, powerful, 
adult authority figure (the Mum) and with acting out against such an authority 
in the (relatively) safe context of play with other children.
Children’s superhero play also had a different character than that of the rural 
children. The rural boys each emulated Van Damme with no clear opposition 
between hero and villain. Urban kindergarten boys, on the other hand, clearly 
focused on wielding power over others. From my notes: 
Christopher is sitting on the first floor of the playhouse with Peter. They 
have toy airplanes. Richard says, ‘Me got the DVD [title inaudible].’ 
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Ethan says, ‘I got the video game,’ and Christopher says, ‘And I got 
big video; it’s X Man and Batman, Superman, X Man.’ Peter: ‘Me got 
da Superman DVD.’ Richard says, ‘You know, that be my Nemo DVD.’ 
Christopher says, ‘And I got Nemo DVD.’ Richard: ‘You know, shark, 
shark him got bite.’ Christopher: ‘Me a Power Ranger.’ Richard picks 
up one of the airplane parts and Christopher takes it away saying, ‘No, 
no, no.’…Christopher gets up and says, ‘And Superman can punch the 
building.’ Richard: ‘And Batman can beat the balloon.’ Christopher: ‘No 
he can’t; he only can punch the car and punch the robot and punch 
people and punch Peter and punch Ethan, but he can’t punch me 
because I’m stronger!’ Ethan: ‘And I’m X Man’…Ethan to Christopher: 
‘I can punch your face.’ Christopher: ‘No I can punch my brother, cut 
my brother to pieces, and I can cut you to pieces.’ Richard, ‘And me 
can.’ Peter: ‘Me can do,’ he makes a judo stance; ‘Teacher I can punch 
my brother.’ Richard, ‘And I can punch my Daddy.’ Christopher, ‘No!’ 
Richard, ‘Me can punch my Daddy! Look, look, look me can punch mine 
Daddy! Yes me can, me can punch my Daddy!’ Christopher, ‘I’m going 
to be Batman. I’m going to change into Batman. I have to be the Daddy. 
I am Batman and I can spray light!’
Here the boys were clearly concerned with relative power. As in the interactions 
described above, these boys saw power as extreme, aggressive and somewhat 
arbitrary. Again, I suggest that this comes from the typical experience of 
children in urban society of being relatively powerless in a world dominated by 
adults—a condition not experienced to the same extent by rural children who 
inhabited a world of mixed-age peers. The boys’ conversation also reflects the 
desire of urban kindergarten children to establish their place in a world of equal 
and unrelated peers. Each wants to establish his power relative to the others. 
This concern was much less pressing for rural children who were generally in 
the company of relatives and for whom relative status was ascribed by age. I turn 
below to urban children’s attempts to define their relationship with classmates 
and the influence of this kind of play on their views of self and society.
Friendship in Urban Kindergartens
Urban kindergarten children moved from home situations where they were 
closely monitored by adults to large classes where they had to negotiate their 
way through a group of unfamiliar peers of equal status. In many kindergartens, 
children were only loosely supervised by adults and therefore needed to develop 
strategies to protect themselves from aggressive children, to develop predictable 
routines and relationships, and to protect these from incursions from other 
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children (see also Corsaro 1997). The absence of any clear hierarchy among the 
children created a situation where children had to come up with strategies to try 
to control their peers and establish some kind of predictable social order. 
Corsaro (2003) demonstrates that Italian and American preschool children 
establish social order among their peers through friendship routines, and 
I observed a similar preoccupation with friendship among urban Fijian 
kindergarten children, who used friendship to define who was in and who 
was out in particular situations to transform chaos into predictable routines. In 
more controlled kindergartens, children used friendship to develop some kind 
of autonomous identity and social structure in situations largely dictated by 
teachers. 
All over Suva, I encountered the ritual of the ‘friendship thumb’. One child 
would extend his or her thumb towards another in friendship, who would 
respond by pressing it with his or her own thumb to confirm the friendship. 
Children also tried to establish in-groups through carefully sharing only with 
select others, even though teachers resisted this, encouraging children to share 
with everyone. Bonds were also forged through establishing points of similarity. 
For example, I observed one boy who had joined a kindergarten late in the term 
frequently pointing out similarities between his lunch, his clothing and so on 
and those of other children by calling out, ‘Eh look, same-same!’ 
The use of friendship to try to establish social networks was evident during 
lunch period at one kindergarten. From my notes:
Christopher opens his lunch box revealing pieces of birthday cake 
neatly wrapped in tin foil. Aaron immediately holds out his hand asking 
for some. Christopher, takes a piece, breaks it in half, and offers some to 
Aaron and some to Richard. Ethan and then Aaron reach across the table 
and offer their thumbs to Richard who presses each in return. Aaron 
then tells one of the girls, Seini, to offer her thumb to Bessie, another 
girl sitting across the table, and the two girls press thumbs together. 
Richard holds up a roti (flatbread) in front of his face like a steering 
wheel, making car noises and then bites a hole through the middle and 
looks at the other boys near him giggling. Christopher points to Anil, a 
two-year-old sitting next to Richard, and says, ‘He doesn’t like it. He’s 
scared.’ But then Christopher picks up his own chicken bone and holds 
it in front of his eye like a telescope looking first at Anil and then at 
Richard. Ethan has been watching and offers a friendship thumb to 
Richard, who accepts, and then to Aaron, who pushes Ethan away and 




Here, the children manoeuvred quietly at lunch to define who was in and who 
was out by sharing food, pressing thumbs and engaging in each other’s games, 
while the teacher exhorted them to eat their lunch and not to talk and otherwise 
socialise. ‘This is eating time! NO talking!’ Christopher carefully doled out his 
birthday cake to most of the boys but to only one of the girls, the daughter of a 
national rugby star and the single girl the boys routinely played with. When the 
teacher suggested that Christopher give some cake to me and to a girl who had 
forgotten to bring her lunch that day, he ignored the suggestion, using his cake 
to define his circle of friends. He also quietly suggested that boys were friends 
with boys and girls with girls when he suggested that Bessie and Seini press 
thumbs but did not offer his own thumb to either of them. These friendship 
routines reduced the chaos potentially present in a large group of children by 
defining who interacted with whom and what they played—as when Richard 
and Christopher joined together in using their food as devices to look at other 
children. These routines are also used to resist the teacher’s authority since most 
teachers insisted that all of the children should be friends, that they should 
focus on the teacher not on other children, and that mealtime in particular was 
supposed to be a quiet activity. The children also used offers and rejections 
of friendship to control their peers, as when Aaron refused Ethan’s proffered 
friendship thumb to express displeasure at some unknown cause. 
In more highly structured schools, children’s use of friendship to resist too 
much control by teachers over their lives was particularly apparent. In one 
such preschool, one of the few occasions when children had any control 
over their companions was when they chose tables for eating their snacks. In 
this preschool, the children carefully manipulated table choice to establish 
friendships. On one occasion, a girl called Emma told another, Lani, not to sit 
next to her because that chair was for her ‘friend’. But when Emma’s friend 
came in and sat somewhere else, Emma called first one boy and then another 
girl to sit next to her, trying to keep the seat for a friend. Lani, in the meantime, 
came and told me that her friend was Kenny and went and sat next to him. In 
this way, children established alliances and a sense of independent identity in a 
world where the teacher controlled much of what they did.
Children also used friendship to try to control each other. At one preschool, 
for instance, one of the boys was from Bangladesh and had a British mother. 
This child, who was clearly not used to local school conventions, routinely 
interrupted the teachers to tell long stories about Bangladesh and got up and 
wandered around the room while the other children sat quietly. He also often 
insisted on being chosen when the teachers were picking out children to do 
some favoured activity. The children reacted to this behaviour by implicitly 
refusing to be his friend. One day, when he walked in after retrieving his lunch 
bag and sat down, all the other children got up and moved to another table. As 
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more children filed into the room, they avoided the boy alone at his table and 
filled up other tables until the teacher came in and told two boys to sit with the 
Bangladeshi boy.
Corsaro (2003) argues that children use friendship to try to establish control in 
unfamiliar environments with no clear social structure, and this seemed to be 
the case in Fijian kindergartens. Friendship among equals, however, is a rather 
different kind of social principle than the age hierarchies of rural children, all of 
whom know each other well and whose relationships to each other are clearly 
defined. When urban children form friendships, they look for those who are 
similar in some way, often focusing on some principle not particularly important 
in the adult world. For instance, in one kindergarten, the children routinely 
compared lunches, hitting upon chance similarities in the colour of juice bottles 
and so on to form friendships. From my notes, as the children come in with their 
lunchboxes and chose table companions for lunch:
Tevita sits next to Martin: ‘Hey, us two!’ Martin: ‘Us two! Hey, same-same 
bag!’ (pointing to their lunchboxes). Tevita: ‘Us two! Us two Martin!’
Martin, to a third boy, Simon, who enters with his lunch bag: ‘Us two, 
all of us!’
Simon to Martin and Tevita: ‘Us two!’ At another table, Ana and Sera sit 
down together and compare their juice bottles: Ana: ‘Eh, same-same!’
Sera: ‘Eh, same-same!’
In these examples, children establish and cement relationships by finding 
common ground. Rural children interact mostly as occupants of fixed roles in 
larger kinship structures. In contrast, urban children interact as autonomous 
individuals each trying to control his or her own environment. In the process, 
not surprisingly, they often define their identities in terms of consumption, 
commenting on clothes, lunchboxes, toys, or, as in the superhero conversation 
among Christopher and his friends, possession of DVDs and computer games. 
This suggests a clear shift in children’s sense of self, consistent with the 
preoccupation with autonomy and power evident in much of their play. These 
children internalise distinctively Fijian assumptions about hierarchy in an 
experiential world that prompts them to think of themselves as autonomous 
individuals who must control their world.
Conclusion
Tuzin was ahead of his time in suggesting that the same cultural beliefs can 
take on different meanings for people depending on the ways that these beliefs 
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impinge upon their experiential world in childhood. Male cult secrets were 
carefully guarded from women and children among the Ilahita Arapesh, and 
children were tricked with stories of dangerous and aggressive cult spirits. 
When children tried to understand their world and contemplate its dangers they 
told each other fearsome ghost stories that continued to shape their emotional 
reactions to religious beliefs even after they learned that these stories were lies 
told to trick women and children. To understand people’s conceptions of self, 
society and culture, one must examine not only the belief system itself but also 
the ways that it is experienced by children, who are in general distinctively 
positioned in society and exposed to cultural beliefs and social principles in 
different ways than are adults.
Tuzin’s ideas—similar to models since developed by Corsaro, Tannen, Harris and 
many others—give us new kinds of insight into contemporary Fiji. Indigenous 
beliefs about rank and human nature continue to shape the ways that adults 
treat children at home and at school. But the distinctive social experiences of 
urban children, particularly in kindergartens, transform the ways that these 
assumptions are internalised by children so that, I suggest, Fiji’s urban children 
will grow up to think of themselves as autonomous individuals in a larger social 
hierarchy that is not necessarily god-given but could, in fact, be contested.
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11. The Torments of Initiation and the 
Question of Resistance1
Thomas	A.	Gregor
We are told that in certain happy regions of the earth, where nature 
provides in abundance everything that man desires, there are races 
whose life is passed in tranquillity and who know neither compulsion 
nor aggressiveness. I can scarcely believe it, and should be happy to 
meet these fortunate beings. 
— Sigmund Freud, Letter to Albert Einstein, ‘Why War?’
The Problem
In 1982 Donald Tuzin published a short but trenchant article titled, ‘Ritual 
Violence Among the Arapesh: The Dynamics of Moral and Religious Uncertainty’. 
The work probes a question of broad human significance. The Ilahita Arapesh, in 
the course of their long initiatory cycles, terrorised their children and subjected 
them to excruciating ordeals. Tuzin self-consciously ascribes the word ‘brutal’ 
to these acts, partly because many of the Ilahita themselves so saw them, but 
also because we, if we are honest with ourselves, do so as well. Ilahita ritual 
(which no longer takes place) was particularly disturbing in that it was at the 
sacred core of the society. 
Rituals of initiation, which encompass many discomforting practices, are the 
centrepiece of religious life among many Melanesian societies. It is in the course 
of initiation that young men learn the deepest secrets of the men’s cults, that 
they come to possess its most sacred symbols, and that they learn the most 
profound values of the society. When we consider that initiation can last many 
years (in the case of Ilahita, it is a 50-year cycle), we only hyperbolise slightly 
when we say that ritual, in many Melanesian societies, is initiation. What does 
it mean when such ritual encompasses the cruelties that Tuzin and others have 
documented? How, Tuzin asks, can such ‘good people do bad things to one 
another?’ (1982:323). Consider, as an example, the Ilahita custom of laf, or ritual 
killing. During one of the stages of initiation, wearers of certain ritual masks 
who are possessed by the spirit of the men’s cult, may kill people with impunity: 
1 This material was based partly upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 
0650859. The article has also benefited from the comments of Warren Shapiro.
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‘nothing can vacate a hamlet so quickly as one of these spooks materializing out 
of the gloom of the surrounding jungle.’ The ‘heaviness’ of the mask transforms 
its wearer into a compulsive killer: ‘his own child or brother would not be 
spared if he came upon them’ (Tuzin 1980:50).
Are we dealing with social pathology, and, if so, how can a relativistic discipline 
such as ours, especially one that, as Tuzin put it, ‘make[s] no provision for affect’ 
(1982:320), even begin to describe it?
Ritual violence is not wholly strange to us in that religious violence is familiar 
territory. It is responsible for the deaths of millions, and it confronts us in each 
day’s news. But religious violence is invariably, in terms of its ideology, defensive 
in nature. Hence those who die in its service are martyrs to the cause, destined 
to a place in heaven, as in the case of jihad in radical Islam or the crusaders 
during the eleventh century. Seen from the point of view of the perpetrator, 
such violence defends the religion against its external enemies. 
Religious violence might also turn inward, as in the persecution of heretics. 
There are abundant historical examples in Western Christianity, culminating in 
the Inquisition. But here, too, looked at from the perspective of the inquisitors, 
we find the religion defending itself, albeit by turning upon the enemy within. 
Ritual violence, unlike religious violence, neither guards the periphery of 
religion nor assures the purity of its core. Our only experience with it, as Tuzin 
points out, is in highly sublimated versions such as those associated with the 
Eucharist. Violence directed against the self—as in self-mortification described 
in Catholic liturgy—comes closer, but it too, while discomforting, is largely 
alien territory. 
Tuzin suggests that, as anthropologists, we practice our own sublimations, 
in that ritual violence becomes an unexamined part of the background of 
ethnographic accounts. To be sure, the ethnography is plain enough, but the 
moral and emotional implications of the violence are often rendered nearly 
invisible by theoretical frameworks that anaesthetise us from feeling (Tuzin 
1982:322). ‘One problem entailed in studying the literature of an ethnographic 
area such as New Guinea’, he writes, 
is that the reader risks being desensitized—losing his cultural distance 
and with it his ‘fresh eye’. Penile incision is reported often in the New 
Guinea ethnography. The resulting contempt-bred-of-familiarity takes 
the form of coming to view this practice as ‘just another’ customary 
observance equivalent in most analytic respects to members of the 
culture brushing their teeth with coconut husks or marrying their 
cross-cousins. (Tuzin 1980:67) 
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There are exceptions among ethnographers—notably Tuzin himself, but also 
Read (1954, 1965) and especially Gilbert Herdt, who writes of his own ‘shock, 
fear, anger and sorrow in the rituals’ (Herdt 1981a:7). More normally, such 
reactions stay well separate from the accounts. Although Tuzin does not state 
it, this is useful in that it permits description free from extraneous judgment. 
But it comes at a cost in that it numbs us to the reactions of those we study. Are 
they so different from us that they do not perceive the violence they perpetrate 
as cruel? And if so, why do the tormented eventually turn upon their children 
and pass the suffering to the next generation? 
My intention is to examine these questions from the perspective of research in 
Melanesia, which offers many relevant examples. The reader is warned that my 
focus is primarily on a few societies where the data are rich, and the level of 
ritual pain is extreme. The question I will address is that of resistance. Is there 
evidence that those who perpetuate the torments of initiation question what 
they are doing? Do they feel remorse for what they have done or shame for its 
effects? The puzzle of ritual violence and the possibility of resistance reflect on 
our capacity to love and empathise, on broad issues of ethical relativism and on 
the universality of human values.
The Background of Ritual Violence:  
Male initiation in Melanesia
Male initiation is about making men out of boys. Ritual violence, therefore, occurs 
in a larger sexualised context. Roger Keesing (1982:6–13) and Gregor and Tuzin 
(2001) summarise the characteristics of male initiation rituals, many of which 
can be reasonably extended to cultures beyond Melanesia. The most salient fact 
is that in ritually violent cultures males and females are different kinds of beings 
in their physiology, their bodily fluids and their essences (Keesing 1982:7). 
These contrasts radiate outwards so that the mythology, folk medicine and 
expressive culture are themselves, in Shirley Lindenbaum’s (1987:222) useful 
phrase, ‘gender inflected’, so that ‘the polarities of male and female articulate 
cosmic forces thought to be located in the human body’. Outside Melanesia, the 
pattern is less marked but still vivid. The most cosmic example of which I am 
aware is in Amazonia, where the Tukuna regard the phallic sun god as being in 
permanent copulation with the womb-like under layer of the cosmos, which is 
constantly being fertilised by his semen in the form of the sun’s rays. 
The primary symbolic currency of the initiatory symbolism is formed by sexual 
body parts and fluids. They appear not as rooted in different sexual natures but 
as permutations, one of the other. Penises, clitorises, vaginas, anuses, breasts, 
mouths, noses and tongues condense, merge and differentiate. Among the 
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Sambia, semen is equated with breast milk: ‘the milk of women is the same as 
milk of men’ (Herdt 1981a:186–7). The penis, as the source of milk, is referred 
to as the ‘glans-breast’. 
The initiatory systems we will examine are ‘pseudo-procreative’ (Hiatt 1971) in 
that men coopt women’s capacity to gestate and give birth to new life. Growth 
and manhood are achieved through giving birth to initiates, through injecting 
them with life substance, especially through the oral ingestion of semen. The 
concept of pseudo-procreativity is literalised most vividly in the practice of 
subincision among the Australian Arunta (Arrernte), wherein the initiators 
drip ‘postpartum’ blood from their newly opened subincision scars, which are 
called vaginas, and the blood is identified as postpartum blood (Hiatt 1971). 
Among the Iatmul, ‘male initiators are identified as “mothers” of the novices’ 
and the doorway to the initiatory structure is literally the ‘clitoris gate’ (Bateson 
1958:282). A similar pattern is repeated among the Wogeo in the form of male 
‘menstruation’ and in many other Melanesian and Amazonian contexts, albeit 
in slightly less intense and elaborate forms (see, for example, Gregor 1985). A 
logical corollary is the disturbing possibility of male pregnancy, which is a fear 
expressed by Sambia (Herdt 1981b:237) and the Awa (Newman and Boyd 1982). 
There seem to be few limits to the ingeniousness of initiators in claiming the 
generative capacity of women (see Bettelheim’s [1954] more general treatment). 
These ideas are images of dreams, the stuff of primary process thought. As 
relativising anthropologists, we rarely say it, but they are factually wrong, they 
are based on ‘error’ (Keesing 1982), and they are, in fact, objectively ‘preposterous’ 
(Hays 1988). Nonetheless they have real consequences for initiates, for women 
and for the moral systems they infuse. Thus, the men who utilise feminine 
symbolism in the creation of initiates are not grateful. Women are dangerous. 
They and their menstrual blood are contaminating. The overwhelming burden 
of the ideology of the initiating cults is that women are inimical to masculinity 
and, in Tuzin’s words, ‘the bane of a peaceful society’ (1980:106). The process of 
initiation strips away all that is feminine from boys who have been too long in 
association with their mothers, through rituals that purge female influence from 
their skin, blood, intestinal tracts, words and thoughts. 
In a few cultures, the opposition and uneasy relationship of men and women 
spill over from initiation to appear in other areas of social life, with women 
often being the victim of male aggression. Among the Nama, as described by 
Read (1954:22–3), ‘women suspected of adultery have sticks thrust into their 
vaginas…fights are staged at marriages, when, characteristically enough, a 
man is required to shoot an arrow into the thigh of his future wife’. Sexual 
violence itself is encompassed in an atmosphere where aggression is a norm. 
Again following Read (1954:33), ‘punishment for wrongdoing characteristically 
includes public beatings and vicious humiliations…self-injury and mutilation 
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are customary ways of expressing sorrow and loss…dominance and submission, 
rivalry and coercion are constantly recurring themes, manifest alike in day-to-
day contexts and in ceremon[y].’
The Torments of Initiation
The ideology of masculinity and sexual opposition sets the stage for ritual 
violence within the cycle of initiation. Boys are not simply roughly treated. 
Rather they are systematically terrorised. Let us look at the process from the 
perspective of the novices.
Lack	of	Preparation	or	Explanation	
Initiates are often unprepared for what will happen to them. Cruel treatment, 
once explained, becomes bearable, and initiation has a high purpose of making 
men from boys. But, as I read the literature, the explanation often comes after 
the torment. Hence among the Awa, ‘the sequence of male initiation begins 
when these boys are forcefully taken to the men’s house…The boys are surprised 
by this abduction’ (Newman and Boyd 1982:247). Adult men, recalling the 
experience, describe themselves as unprepared: ‘they cried and shook when 
taken away to the men’s ground’ (Newman and Boyd 1982). Further along in 
the process of initiation, the boys have learned to expect abuse, so much so 
that anticipation itself becomes anguish. Recalling such a moment, one of the 
men says: ‘There was something else besides washing. We heard that, and we 
all started to shake’ (Newman and Boyd 1982:253). Similarly, Tuzin (1980:94) 
describes the novices as ‘wondering what will happen’ just prior to being forced 
to run a gauntlet in which they are rubbed with nettles and clubbed, some 
knocked unconscious. 
On the occasion when children are prepared for the ritual, the story might be 
even more terrifying than the reality. Sambia boys are told ‘the spirit wants to 
get you, she wants to kill and eat you!’ (Herdt 1981a:110). Among the Ilahita, 
prior to having their penises lacerated, the boys are told that the Tambaran 
spirit will force them to ‘slide down the spiked trunk of a falanga sago palm, and 
thus rip open their bellies’ (Tuzin 1982:338). From a child’s perspective, these 
stories are genuinely terrifying. The events associated with them must seem 
unpredictable, catastrophic and lethal.
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Separation from Mothers 
We must keep in mind that the initiates are boys as young as six or seven, who 
will be separated from their mothers in seclusion camps or villages for periods 
of months or years. The tears of mothers as their sons are led away to initiation 
are thoroughly justified. Among the Sambia, after the boys learn (for the first 
time) that they must have oral sex with the bachelors to consume semen, they 
are marched in front of their mothers as novice warriors. This is the last time 
they will see their mothers and sisters for more than 10 years. Herdt explains 
that a boy loses his mother totally. Physical contact, commensality and even 
direct gaze are forbidden. Having learned the secrets of the cult, he is forbidden 
this warmth ‘for fear he might reveal these secrets’ (Herdt 1981a:112). In other 
cultural settings as well, the long process of initiation and the barriers between 
men and women seem sufficient for sons to ‘forget’ their mothers. When their 
mothers might see them again, they will have been forever changed.
The	Novices	Are	Guilty	
The first explanation the novices might receive for their torment is that it is their 
own fault: initiation is punishment for real and imagined misdeeds. Among the 
Sambia, Herdt notes that this is a formal part of the justification for the ritual: 
‘first-stage nose bleeding is a punishment for insolence’, and the more defiant 
the child is to the initiators, the more he is tormented. The sense of retaliation 
is explicit, in that, in the words of a Sambia initiator, ‘for those acts we now 
pay you back’ (Herdt 1982:225). Among the Awa, the men harangue the boys 
for their purported misconduct and blame them for the deaths of warriors who 
were killed when they were too young to have participated in their defence. The 
men’s anger at the boys is genuine: ‘So great is [the patriclansmen’s] hostility 
towards the boys that they are not allowed to be directly involved in the 
purging ritual lest they handle a nose bleeder, vomiting cane or bamboo blade 
in such a manner as to cause serious injury on their relatives’ (Newman and 
Boyd 1982:283). Ilahita Arapesh initiators are equally furious at their charges, 
explaining to them that they are guilty and will be punished. 
Terrorisation: Staging
Beyond separation is psychological terror, which is deliberately inflicted on the 
initiates. Among the most violent of the initiators, the Marind Anim ordeals 
included ‘submitting them to an ostensible headhunt attack so realistic that most 
of them fainted’ (Knauft 1993:150). Terror is enhanced by deliberate staging 
designed to produce fear, including frightening masks, strange sounds and 
seclusion enclosures with moveable walls. Herdt writes that among the Sambia 
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the boys are tied on the backs of their sponsors so that escape is impossible. 
They then ‘confront a massive vibrating wall of thick green foliage’. There is a 
bedlam of ‘eerie sputtering sounds’, shaking walls, and what seems to be blood 
dripping from the vegetation (Herdt 1981a:141). The boys are terrified and cry 
out for their mothers. Tuzin writes of the Arapesh: 
What cannot be conveyed in a short space is the full emotional force 
of this violence: it is one thing to be thumped in the head or have 
your penis lacerated, but when these attacks are staged in a dramatic 
atmosphere of weird customary, unearthly sounds, and frenzied 
stomping, screaming and singing by scores of armed warriors, each 
of whom seems madly intent on your destruction, the experience is 
transformed into nightmarish horror. (Tuzin 1982:337)
What comes across in the literature is that the terror is not a by-product of 
necessary procedures, which are, regretfully, frightening. Often terror itself is 
the objective.
Pain
It is easy to inflict excruciating, unbearable pain. Pressure, heat and blows are 
sufficient. A device as simple as a water board can make it unbearable. But 
there is something quite different about ritual pain. It seems designed, often 
ingeniously, to violate self-boundaries, to humiliate and to induce terror and 
fear of death. Hence the torments focus on bodily orifices and boundaries—
usually the neurally most sensitive and intimate tissues, including the nostrils 
and nasal cavity, the mouth, throat and oesophagus, the genitals and, with 
somewhat less frequency, the eyes and the anus. The overwhelming theme is 
that of penetration and laceration, using sharpened canes, bamboo rods, tiny 
stone arrows and similar devices. A full catalogue of techniques is the stuff 
of nightmares. Alan Morinis, who has examined pain in initiatory rites, lists 
‘being beaten, starved, incised, scarified, pierced, tattooed, terrified, mutilated, 
circumcised, infibulated, cicatrized, bound, and subject to removal of parts of…
bodies, especially teeth and fingers’ (1985:151). 
In Melanesia, it appears that initiators are more than commonly imaginative, 
in that they add such techniques as cane swallowing, nose bleeding and being 
rubbed with and forced to swallow nettles, and, at least among the Sambia, 
being forced, in the dark, without preparation, to have oral sex with strange 
adult men. 
Of these ordeals, cane swallowing deserves special note. A photograph of Awa 
cane swallowing subtitled ‘a man forces the vomiting cane down an initiate’s 
throat’ can be found in Newman and Boyd’s (1982) article ‘The Making of Men’. 
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The canes penetrate more than a foot inside the throat and oesophagus, and they 
are intended to produce defecation and vomiting. Herdt (1981b:224) quotes an 
informant: ‘This is for removing food belonging to the mother’, which is the 
sweet potato, hence the term for ‘cane swallowing’ translates as ‘sweet potato/
food; elimination’. Cane swallowing also is designed to induce defecation, which 
eliminates not only maternal food but also maternal symbols: ‘Out with the 
feces pass the depreciating “words” of the mother’ from which the boy must be 
separated (Herdt 1981b).
Closely associated with cane swallowing among the Sambia is nose bleeding 
(the term translates as ‘cleansing and expulsion’), which is regarded as the most 
painful act. It is performed upon the boys ‘without warning’ in an assault so 
violent that it constitutes physical and psychical trauma (Herdt 1982). The 
boys’ first experience with nose bleeding is horrific, and they cry out for their 
mothers. Adults recalling the experience are ‘virtually unanimous in expressing 
the feeling that they believed they were to be killed on the spot’ (Herdt 1982:225).
In all of the groups I have reviewed, the physical attacks on the boys inevitably 
turn to an assault on the genitals. One example is sufficient. Among the Ilahita 
Arapesh, the men make a surgical instrument ‘by sharpening a piece of bamboo 
to a razor’s edge’ (Tuzin: 1980:69), which, when decorated, is the incisor of 
a ritual pig. The ‘pig’—one of the initiators—is a ‘balefully weird creature’, 
his skin painted black. A mask covers the face. He lies in wait beneath the 
floor of the initiation chamber until called by the boys’ sponsors. In the midst 
of shouting and singing designed to terrify the initiates and drown out their 
screams for their mothers, the pig suddenly appears ‘to bite them’. The pig 
delivers ‘deep cutting strokes on their glans penis’ (Tuzin 1980:71). Younger 
boys, who watch in horror, are also attacked. They are ‘held down while their 
penes and scrota are vigorously rubbed with singing nettles’ (Tuzin 1982:338). 
Then all of the boys are thrown in a pool previously filled with stinging nettles 
(Tuzin 1982). 
Beatings, cane swallowing, nose bleeding and assaults are often combined with 
each other and with still more excruciating patterns of abuse. Hence Van Baal 
reports that among the Marind Anim, initiates were the targets of anal rape 
and that they ‘had their mouths, noses and eyes smeared with excrement that 
had been mixed with semen…they were forced to lie in seclusion until maggots 
appeared on their befouled faces’ (Knauft 1993:150).
Death
Several ethnographers note that initiation is extremely dangerous for the 
boys, and some in fact die. Cane swallowing is known to be particularly risky 
in that it can cause internal haemorrhaging. We do not know how frequently 
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boys actually die in the course of initiation, but it is not infrequent. Campbell 
(1983:144) reprints a historical photo from Arnhem Land showing the corpses of 
seven young initiates who died as a consequence of being ‘exposed to a broiling 
sun and to a torment of stinging insects’.
Explanations	of	the	Torments	of	Initiation
Ethnographers’ explanations often focus on the role of initiation rituals in 
creating solidarity among the boys who have together survived the ordeal 
and their subordination to the power of the senior males. Initiation entails 
secrecy and gradual revelation of cult knowledge—a period of many months, 
years or even a lifetime, as in the case of the Ilahita. Those who breach the 
secrets may be put to death. The unity of men—held together by secrets and 
the common bonds of shared torment—is crucial in communities at war, which 
is traditionally a chronic state of affairs. Perhaps the logical extreme in this 
process is reached among the Sambia, who force the boys to have sex with the 
bachelors and thereby create homoerotic bonds among them. Pacification, as 
Herdt (1981a:210) predicted, brought the initiatory cycles to an end, and along 
with it aggression towards women. 
More psychologically oriented approaches emphasise the peculiar role of pain 
in establishing solidary relationships (Morinis 1985), the repetitive compulsion 
in which trauma is mastered by inflicting it on others, and, specifically in the 
Melanesian context, ‘flash-bulb memory’, by which pain intensifies and engages 
the initiate with ritual experience (Whitehouse 1996).
Resistance
Resistance 
The term ‘resistance’ has been overworked in the postmodern literature, and 
it rolls too easily off the tongue. Michael Brown (1996), in a perceptive essay, 
‘On Resisting “Resistance”’, points out that a primary function of the concept 
has been to establish the user’s moral bona fides as an objector to oppression. 
Brown notes that in the world of cultural studies, ‘cross dressing, tattooing, 
women’s fashions, dirty jokes and rock videos are routinely held up as examples 
of cultural resistance’. In the context of this essay, my use of the term is more 
literal. ‘Resistance’ to ritual violence consists of efforts to escape; scepticism and 
disavowal; discontinuance of custom; and remorse and shame. We shall find all 
represented in the literature, though less than might be expected, and less than 
we, while wearing our humanitarian hats, might wish.
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The Clash of Values and the Origins of Resistance 
Standing against the opposition of men and women and the extremes of ritual 
violence are domestic relationships. In the case of the Ilahita Arapesh, domestic 
relationships are positive. Tuzin describes the ‘extraordinary warmth and 
affection’ between a man and his sister and between husband and wife. In 
marriage, there is a sense of spiritual harmony that begins with a new couple’s 
‘pledge of eternal love and fidelity’ (Tuzin 1982:329–30). The contradictions of 
domestic values and those of the men’s cult are likely to be especially serious 
in this setting, and we shall see that it is just those values that seem to explain 
the scepticism and alienation that Ilahita men have from their own initiatory 
system.
Among the Sambia, however, marital relationships are strained to the point of 
disintegration. Women come from enemy villages; they may be ‘stolen’ or traded. 
‘Sex’, Herdt writes, ‘is fraught with anxiety. Physical fights are common…
Sambia wife beating occurs and it is an ugly stain on the tenor of village life’ 
(1981a:174).
But even among the Sambia, marriage confers a lifelong bond and has at least 
a measure of happiness. One of Herdt’s informants notes: ‘When a couple walk 
together from the forest, and everyone sees you returning from the gardens, 
your family and friends are happy for you’ (Herdt 1981b:189). Following Herdt, 
‘joy is undeniably there for a moment’ (1981b). At minimum, even in the most 
polarised of the Melanesian societies, men are bound to women for their own 
identity: ‘only a wife and children bring full manhood’ (Herdt 1981a:34). 
Primary relationships stand in stark contrast with the ritual violence associated 
with the cults. The affection of husbands and wives and parents and children 
is incompatible with the extremes of initiation. Conflict within the family 
expresses the disjunction, in that the world of men is partly rejected by both 
boys and their mothers. Hence, among the Sambia, boys almost always side with 
their mothers in marital conflicts: ‘Boys express anger and fear towards their 
fathers over this abuse of their mothers. I have seen boys try to hit their fathers 
in defense of their mothers’ (Herdt 1981a:174). 
The love of mothers for their sons spills over into the sacred territory of 
initiation rituals. Sometimes their resistance is symbolic in that they might put 
up a pretence of shielding their sons from masked initiators. But at other times 
it is a serious battle. Herdt describes an altercation of more than an hour as 
mothers ‘attempt to extract their sons from the crowded dance ground…there 
are scuffles and arguments. Several times men angrily curse the women, who 
move back only to approach again…the atmosphere is tense enough for a brawl.’ 
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The men respond by attacking the women; ‘more startling is the treatment of 
the mothers who are hit even harder by the men…some are hit hard enough so 
that they fall on the ground’ (Herdt 1981a:137).
Efforts	to	Escape	
The most unmistakable signs of resistance are the efforts of the initiates to flee. 
They scream, shout and cry and try to run away. The most dramatic examples I 
have found are Herdt’s sensitive observations of the Sambia: 
A boy refuses to be hoisted on his sponsor’s back…it takes three men 
to do the job. His mother approaches…he grabs hold of her bamboo 
necklace…tears wash down his face as he repeatedly cries ‘No, no,’ and 
‘Mother, mother.’ The poor woman…is nearly in tears herself…the men 
severely swat the boy with blow after blow. (Herdt 1981a:137)
One of the boys ‘struggles fiercely, so four men lift him off the ground, he is 
forcibly nose-bled…the smell of blood and fear sours the air’ (Herdt 1981a:143).
Herdt further documents that boys sometimes actually do escape, albeit briefly. 
When they do, search parties are sent out, and when the boys return they are 
beaten and treated more severely as a consequence. The central point that Herdt 
makes is ultimately obvious to the boys: there is no escape. All boys must be 
initiated. The fact that they resist at all, however, forms essential data. Despite 
the obvious rewards of maturity, they do not enter manhood gladly.
Shame
Men’s cults—with their clash of domestic and cult values—are inherently 
unsteady edifices. One of the markers of instability is shame in perpetuating 
them. Among the Sambia, the men are deeply ashamed of their homosexual 
relations with one another and of forcing their sons to fellate the bachelors. The 
matter was a deep secret, revealed at pain of death.
Tuzin also describes the shame of the men in deceiving both the women and 
the initiates: 
Aware that much of what passes for religious ‘truth’ is nothing but 
artifice, cult members are placed in the embarrassing position of having 
to confess to initiates that they—the initiates—have been systematically 
deceived…[They] openly admit that they feel deeply shamed at having 
their true role revealed to their sons. (Tuzin 1982:349) 
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For fathers, the gulf between the cult and reality is so wide that they seek to put 
off the inevitable day when their sons learn that by their father’s own standards, 
the voice of the Tambaran cult spirit is a fraud.
Rationalisations 
A ‘rationalisation’ differs from ‘an explanation’ in that it is an intellectualised 
defence from guilt or remorse. The data are not always sufficiently fine-grained 
to make this claim. Thus, indigenous explanations of initiation emphasise the 
separation of boys from women and the magical techniques needed to make 
men of them. Following Herdt, ‘[m]en are doing boys a favor in initiating 
them’. The torments ‘are directed at the boys’ contaminated innards, which, 
alas, must be violently penetrated to cleanse them’ (Herdt 1982:225–6). Is this a 
rationalisation or an explanation? I believe it is the former, in that the torments 
inflicted on the initiates are extreme, and the men’s anger towards the boys 
is visceral. I have already described how the men tell the boys that they are 
being punished (which does not fit the prevailing ethos of making men out 
of boys), and they must at times be restrained from doing permanent physical 
harm. Tuzin captures the implicit sadism of the rituals when he notes that even 
if the torments are intended positively, they are also acts ‘of raw aggression 
and dominance assertion’ (1980:74). Moreover, ‘the ordeal is carefully and 
successfully designed to inspire maximum horror on its victims’ (Tuzin 1980). 
In the case of the Sambia, we learn that when ‘the boys are carried through a 
gauntlet of men with whips…the men take delight in it. Most of the initiates 
cry’ (Herdt 1981a:137).
Among the Avatip (a middle Sepik society), men scarify the boys to purge them 
of female blood. But they claim that the boys have been ‘gored by spirits, whom 
they portray as anthropomorphic beings with tusks’ (Harrison 1985:418). 
Harrison (1985) directly interprets this as a ‘concession to the values prevailing 
outside the ritual sphere’. It is certainly that, but that such concessions are 
needed at all suggests the fragility of the enterprise and the real possibility of 
shame and guilt, which are but one step away from active resistance.
Scepticism and Disbelief
Donald Tuzin’s work is unique in that he closely explored the scepticism and 
moral uncertainty that marked the Ilahita cult. The cult persisted in its island of 
secrecy but was everywhere else challenged by positive domestic relationships. 
These erode certainty about the contaminating nature of women and ultimately 
subvert masculine ideology. Tuzin writes that 
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more than once it was intimated to me that just as the fiction of the 
physical [spirit] Nggwal enables men to dominate women, so the 
invisible Nggwal enables the senior initiates to dominate the junior 
colleagues. The lie is itself a life. Astonished upon hearing this I asked 
my informant, ‘What, then, is the truth about the Nggwal?’ to which he 
replied ‘Nggwal is what men do’. (Tuzin 1982:348)
How did the cult persist in the face of such scepticism? Tuzin argues that the 
men’s cult is ‘a cultural addiction, in which the pain of continuing these ritual 
customs is exceeded only by the pain of relinquishing them’ (1982:350).
Disbelief is surely an example of ‘resistance’. Herdt, however, objects. He 
suggests that Tuzin’s perspective is culture bound and not that of the Arapesh. 
He argues that the apparent guilt really reflects a post-colonial world, in which 
the heart of the cult has been eaten out by the pressures of evangelism and 
social change (Herdt 2003:205–7). The statement that the Tambaran is ‘what 
men do’ suggests that faith in Nggwal is at the end of a process of cultural 
change and ‘the dissolution of collective ritual into alienation’ (Herdt 2003:207). 
Had the Ilahita men’s cult been in full flower, presumably Tuzin would not have 
observed this scepticism, which, like the underlying guilt, would seem to be a 
sentiment ‘reminiscent of Western middle class emotional constraints’ (Herdt 
2003:195).
Tuzin might respond that primary relationships and men’s cults are in chronic 
disequilibrium. The imbalance among the Ilahita Arapesh leads to a degree of 
reflection and eventually to disenchantment and alienation. It is inherent to the 
system; ‘there is no reason to suppose that these reservations are not as ancient 
as the beliefs themselves’ (Tuzin 1980:315).
Herdt’s argument is more complex and sophisticated than we can do justice to 
here. But I would argue that scepticism is normal in human affairs, that doubters 
and local atheists are recurrent features of all social landscapes. Melanesian 
men’s cults, however, would appear to be fertile ground for scepticism in that 
the values of the cult are in such radical conflict with primary relationships. 
Secrecy, as Herdt (2003) convincingly documents, makes it possible to sustain 
both in their separate compartments, but it surely saps faith and credibility. 
To an extent, even the Sambia recognise this. Hence, by the logic of equating 
semen with breast milk, fathers should inseminate sons to make men of them, 
just as mothers nursed boys. But of course this does not occur, despite its 
theoretical plausibility. And in no case of which I am aware do fathers inflict the 
most painful initiatory torments on their sons. There is, therefore, a separation 
between domestic life and the cult, and from this space might grow resistance 
to the formal system.
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Scepticism and ambivalence might therefore be more than the bitter fruits 
of culture contact, force-fed by judgmental officials, police patrols and 
missionaries. Societies are not homogeneous and individuals are reflective even 
if their voices are drowned out or actively suppressed by the chorus of believers 
and enforcers. There are simply too many losers in the Ilahita, Sambia and other 
initiatory systems for them to go without dissent. Surely, throughout initiatory 
societies, there are mothers and fathers who would prefer that their sons opt 
out, and I am quite sure the same thought has regularly occurred to the initiates 
themselves. Senior men might be beneficiaries, but not women, not children, 
not initiates manqué, not ‘rubbish men’ and not others who were marginalised 
by the system. 
Finally, we note the rapid collapse of such systems, as occurred among the 
Sambia with the suppression of war. Herdt (Email, 14 December 2010) informs 
me that not only has initiation ceased, but also the entire men’s cult is a thing 
of the past. Tuzin’s (1997) own account of the spontaneous self-destruction of 
the Ilahita men’s cult makes the same point just as dramatically. Men’s cults 
are fragile, if dark, institutions, narrowly adapted to overwhelming need for 
masculine solidarity. But they are fraught with contradiction, which we can 
observe even while the system is in place.
Conclusions
Why does the suffering of the initiates disturb us, and why are we motivated 
to seek resistance to it? I began this chapter by suggesting that we have no 
true analogue to ritual violence. The closest approximation we have is that of 
torture—a deeply evaluative word that anthropologists avoid in describing the 
ordeals. We can, however, find many superficial resemblances between torture 
and the ordeals in their exquisiteness, their technology and their intuitive 
understanding of how to violate the human self. As Tuzin says of Ilahita, the 
cult ‘engenders acts that are physically, emotionally, or, indeed, fantastically 
terrorist’ (1982:347). But if we grant some resemblance, it shifts the direction 
of the question: why is torture repugnant? The answer would seem to lie in 
the intentionality of the act, the physical closeness of the torturer and the 
victim and the relationship of the two. What torture violates is the fundamental 
human capacity for empathy, upon which all morality is ultimately based. Ariel 
Dorfman, a Chilean essayist, wrote: ‘Torture…requires, it craves the abrogation 
of our capacity to imagine others’ suffering, dehumanizing them so much that 
their pain is not our pain.’ In other words: ‘Torture obliges us to be deaf and 
blind and mute’ (Dorfman 2007).
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The fact of resistance shows that initiators are hardly indifferent. But at times 
the raw sadism of many of the acts, in which the higher purposes of the ordeals 
might not even be explained to the victims, point in another direction. What 
overwhelming rage can nourish such an institution so that it was not only 
invented and enacted, but also perpetuated by those who suffered at its hands? 
This question takes us in a different direction. We might invoke the reasons 
offered by Whitehouse and Morinis in their discussion of pain, and the need 
to create a firmly bonded group of men. The psychological mechanisms that 
facilitate this process such as identification with the aggressor and its association 
with traumatic stress disorder might also be part of it. But does this suggest 
that the pattern is pathological, and that the society itself, is, by extension, 
emotionally disturbed? Many anthropologists are uncomfortable with such 
judgments because we lack a clear standard for diagnosing a society’s mental 
status as opposed to that of an individual. In the present instance, the sum total 
of behaviour associated with men’s cults has the look of pathology but does it 
have its substance? Freud, who did not hesitate to read culture and behaviour 
as if they constituted a single personality, was himself aware of the danger of 
conflating the two. Hence, he noted that the striking resemblance of taboos and 
the obsessive-compulsive neurosis ‘may be no more than a matter of externals, 
just as the branching structure of trees and crystals are essentially unrelated’ 
(Freud 2004:31). 
Are men’s cults therefore simply unusual cultural scripts, or, in Tuzin’s terms, 
‘cultural addictions’, but not reflective of individual personality? I am inclined to 
believe otherwise. The ego-dystonic nature of the cults, with their concomitant 
rationalisations and sense of shame, is all too suggestive. The fact that the cults 
might collapse from the internal weight of moral ambivalence (as in the case of 
the Ilahita), or with a relatively gentle external nudge (as in the instance of the 
Sambia), is further evidence. Finally, the inventive nature of the sadism, and 
the extraordinary brutality towards initiates, is surely deeply rooted in primary 
process thought. 
For the moment, however, it is enough to say that the participants in the cults 
are not themselves of one mind. Ideology and conduct are sufficiently disjoined 
so that some do object. They distance themselves from the initiations, they 
disbelieve, they resist. This does occur—less frequently than we might wish, 
but often enough to at least partly dispel Freud’s bleak view of the human 
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12. Talking About Sex:  
On the relationship between 
discourse, secrecy and sexual 
subjectivity in Melanesia
Gilbert	Herdt
All human societies are concerned with the regulation of sexuality—a truism 
of anthropology. And all of them, past and present, exert cultural, political, 
economic and even psychological controls over how people talk about sex: 
when, where, with whom and why—not why they are motivated, but why they 
must be stopped from sexual discourse. These barriers to sexual communication 
are created for a variety of reasons—notably, gender power, the strictures on 
childhood sexual and gender development, the regulation of the development 
of pleasure, the social control of adult morality and the inhibition of sexual 
behaviour that violates norms in such fundamental areas as premarital and 
extramarital sex and same-sex relationships. The form that sexual objectification 
takes in a particular society reflects, refracts and reproduces these conditions of 
discursive control.
Of especial interest to this comparative essay on the Sambia of Papua New 
Guinea is the fundamental issue: who is sexually objectified in the course of 
development and why? Among the Sambia, it was the male body that was 
objectified, and ritual secrecy was critical to its success. These are the issues that 
inform this chapter, which I offer in honour of the late Don Tuzin, friend and 
colleague for more than three decades and someone from whom I learned much 
about these issues in regard to masculinity, male cults and the utopian aspiration 
of men to seek what he called a ‘safe haven’ in their dealings with the world. 
Don was long interested in the scope and meaning of sexuality in Melanesia, 
and his great ethnography The Voice of the Tambaran (1980), as I have suggested 
elsewhere (Herdt 2003), was both an inspiration and a source of puzzlement in 
elucidating these issues. In Don’s subsequent work The Cassowary’s Revenge 
(1997), I believe that he found a partial solution to the question of the social 
regulation of sexuality and discourse, and I will return to this point at the end 
of this chapter. 
Pre-colonial Melanesian societies influenced sexual talk in myriad ways that 
suggest desires are socially constructed at most times, for most people, in all 
of these societies. Ironically, I was reminded of this still-radical claim when 
reading Michael Young’s (2004) brilliant biography Malinowski: Odyssey of An 
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Anthropologist, wherein we find a young Omarakana-resident Malinowski, 
horny, a hypochondriac and a linguistic genius, describing how Trobriand 
Islanders inserted sexual discourse into their everyday lives such that he 
could blush (see, for example, Young 2004:404–5). Ironic because, of course, 
the Trobriand Islanders were matrilineal in ideology and companionate in 
their attitudes towards women, creating high-status female roles unknown to 
Highlands Papua New Guinea. Trobriand sexual desires were commonly folded 
into social relations, and their expression, while carefully metered by custom, 
ritual and taboo, was more permissive and fluid than in middle-class American 
mores even today, especially as pertains to childhood sexual development (Herdt 
2009a). I think Margaret Mead (1928) made a similar point about Samoa.
The Sambia people of Papua New Guinea, with whom I have lived and worked 
since 1974, were traditionally much more restricted in their sexuality.1 Their 
culture, however, structured these tendencies into sexuality, social organisation 
and speech through the mechanism of ritual secrecy—a high form of utopian 
male culture that produced sexual hierarchy and exaggerated gender differences. 
War and what I shall variously refer to as conditional masculinity as well as 
the sexual politics of marriage were root causes. Day in and day out, Sambia 
were compelled to talk about their sexual roles and fears; but by doing so, 
they created a language of desire and transgression hidden from the public. 
They did this through the institution of boy-inseminating rituals—their way of 
avoiding the intimacy of male and female interaction—but especially through 
the exquisite secrecy that could screen, hide and manipulate even raw sexuality 
in the presence of children and women. The emotionality of these actions 
suggests that they were not simply political tactics but rather deeply motivated 
subjectivities.
These dynamics among the Sambia created a lifelong hidden discourse of 
repression and sexual objectification, and I shall try to reveal them through 
conversation with the two greatest theorists of sexuality in the twentieth century: 
Freud and Foucault. Contra Freud (1904), who believed that sexual repression 
was a universal developmental pattern, and contra Foucault (1980), who argued 
that sexual discourse was inherently a historical reality of state control over 
individuals in the transition to a modern sense of selfhood, I will argue that 
among the Sambia the implementation of ritual secrecy actually created the 
sexual objectification of the male body. Among the Sambia and their Anga 
neighbours, the social practice of ritual homosexuality or boy-insemination was 
the means to this form of male objectification, whereas elsewhere in Melanesia 
1 The focus of this chapter is ethnographic research up to 1993; subsequent fieldwork reports on the 
conditions of radical change.
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ritual secrecy resulted in myriad forms of homo-sociality that were not explicitly 
homoerotic (Herdt 1993). In both cases, however, ritual secrecy ensured a form 
of male agency that would not otherwise have prevailed. 
Why did the Sambia—and, by implication, a variety of other Melanesian 
peoples like and unlike them in the practice and meaning systems of their sexual 
cultures—take such great pains to regulate, manipulate and otherwise inhibit 
talk about sex? So desperate were they to control sexual speech, they actually 
created a world of secrecy and hidden desires that sometimes foiled their own 
designs. 
Like many Melanesian sexual cultures, the Sambia institutionalised a rare and 
fragile mechanism of social regulation of thought, speech and action unknown 
to modern society: secrecy—that is, ritual secrecy to be precise—implemented 
through the embodiment of ritual initiation, the modus operandi for psycho-
cultural regulation in their society. How can we understand the impact of this 
set of complex, situated, discursive and power relationships on the development 
of sexual subjectivity for individuals? These are questions explored in my 2003 
book, Secrecy and Cultural Reality, but here I shall attempt to go a bit further 
in contrasting why neither Freud nor Foucault is adequate in explaining the 
phenomena.
While not exactly Foucaultian inspired, my interrogation of sexual control, 
power and the harnessing of sexual speech on behalf of the reproduction of 
total systems does engage the way in which the French thinker Michel Foucault 
(1980) worried over the means and ends of power, state manipulation of bodies 
and minds, and the creation of what has come to be known as ‘bioforce’, 
which might transcend these constraints. Foucault’s perspective on these 
issues suggested that discursive state control of sexuality in the modern period 
became the primary means of how societies imposed new norms of intimate 
relationships, identities and citizenship more broadly. 
In fact, Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1995), as is well known, took as its 
brief the notion that the advance of modernity in the regulation of individuals 
was made possible in part by the creation of the ‘norm’ as a fundamental 
category in human development and social life. Ritual secrecy is to the norm 
what Westerners today experience as self-censorship.
Beginning in the 1960s, and terminating with his death in 1981, and most 
importantly, with the publication of The History of Sexuality, Foucault built a 
compelling and powerful counter-hegemonic discourse following upon nearly 
a century of sexology and the domination of Freud over the central question: 
why do we talk about sex? Note, however, what a curious thing it is that 
Foucault’s book really is not about history at all; it tells very little about sexual 
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subjectivity, it virtually ignores gender, it defuses the study of power relations, 
and it invents and then rejects what Foucault calls the ‘repressive hypothesis’ of 
Freud. To paraphrase him, not only was ‘sexual repression’ assumed by Freud to 
be a universal psychic reality, but the more the individual, innate dispositions 
were studied, the less were power and society even considered relevant to 
understanding the nature of sexual repression. The doctor could diagnose what 
was wrong with the patient but ignore the social reality of the person’s real-
world frustrations and social life. Freud’s model suggests an individual process 
impervious to social change, making the changing meanings of sexuality 
impossible or at least irrelevant. Never mind that The History of Sexuality—so 
much based upon bourgeois nineteenth-century France—is no better informed 
by anthropology than was Freud’s Totem and Taboo, from 1913.
Nevertheless, just as everyone of my generation had to confront the genius of 
Freud and many of us were psychoanalysed, for better or worse, Freud’s too-
mentalist, patriarchal legacy strongly influenced anthropological and sociological 
studies of sexuality for decades. Indeed, in the field of sexuality today, it is hard 
to imagine the counter-discourse without Foucaultian theory, with its concerns 
about sexuality and the reproduction of social inequalities—both at home and 
in the colonies—of a society. Foucault’s critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’—
that is, Freud’s assertion that sexual wishes and conflict, often over oedipal 
strivings, understood by the triangulated drama of father/son/mother—lay at 
the heart of the developmental story of the child about age five, and his final 
subjectivity. 
It was stupendously wrong as a theory, Foucault claimed; for what Freud had 
taken to be a psychical reality—sexual drives to compete with the father in order 
to possess the mother and destroy the rival—was not contingent upon person, 
time, culture or conduct. But how could that be so, Foucault asked? History had 
determined this repression and its contents—in fact, very recent history: the 
kind that was closely tied to the schizophrenia of Victorian gender and sexual 
politics in Freud’s patients, as well as moral panics about masturbation, social 
movements that promoted the creation of the new identity of homosexuality 
about 1870, and a concomitant range of social things we anthropologists would 
call ‘local culture’ (Herdt 2009a).
And I would like to add that ‘sexuality’—while being an umbrella term that 
conveniently covers such divergent areas of subjectivity as love, desire, sexual 
orientation, relationships and communities—seldom is defined in everyday 
discourse; and rarely does it communicate precision of meaning in general. It 
is far more effectively described and interpreted locally, in terms of the moral 
conventional system of particular beliefs, rules and meanings, also known as 
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culture. This is especially true of sexual pleasure. Or, to paraphrase the immortal 
Tip O’Neil, all sexuality is local, none more localised than the actual meanings 
and expressions of pleasure.
Of course, much like Freud, Foucault did not have a burning interest in local 
culture, regarding ‘civilization’ as a means to an end (individual repression 
or freedom). Where he fell short was in his emphasis—some might say his 
obsession—on a rarefied sense of sexuality as discourse (Herdt 1999). The sense 
of agency, of individual subjectivity, is largely missing from Foucault’s work; 
but that of course is not what the French scholar was primarily concerned about 
(Halperin 1995). Here, Freud is more firmly grounded, as he understood that 
the sexual was but one manifestation of a deeper set of embodied meanings, 
which discourse could disguise, transpose and hide. Was it not Freud who 
famously concluded Totem and Taboo with these lines: ‘For the neurotic, as for 
the primitive, inthe beginning was the deed, not the word’ (1955:164)—actions, 
not talk. 
Thus, sexuality for peoples such as the Sambia, in Freud’s grand theory, 
revealed a counter-tendency to act out passion, rather than to repress it, prior 
to the historical paradigm of Judaeo-Christian codes that narrated how, in 
the beginning, through God, was the Word, the Old Testament, breathing life 
into human existence, differentiating animal from the human; and how, with 
this creation, came the invention of sin, morality and the Oedipus complex. 
Culture from nature, Lévi-Strauss has said. In other words: a sexuality suited to 
civilization is one rooted in words.
I am reminded of a colleague from Thailand who once impatiently argued against 
American and Australian researchers—in a conference on HIV now 15 years 
ago: ‘You Westerners only talk about sex—we do it! But we never talk about 
it—it’s too embarrassing; and what’s the point?’ It is the gap between these 
two civilizations—between the talking versus the action of sex—that creates 
differential power relations, pleasures and risk. I will argue that this is part of 
the problem: in this void, we far too easily imagine that society is stable and 
cultural reality a given. 
Nothing could be further from the truth for the Sambia. The harsh political 
facts of war and its destabilising effects upon their social organisation impinged 
upon them and made the mediation of ritual secrecy a tool in stabilising 
relationships, including the dangers of sexuality; secrecy was essential to the 
active and wilful creation of cultural reality. And with it came an intentional 
creation of sexuality—one that was not natural or normal at all in the modern 
sense of these terms. The Sambia thus were driven to repress some desires while 
producing and expressing others. Yet unlike Freud’s prediction, Sambia sexual 
development continued the repression and the expression of what we would 
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consider forbidden desires long past the age of five, and not within the oedipal 
triangle as Freud imagined it. Moreover, the Sambia did this through a system of 
power relations that made ritual its own engine for the production of desire and 
pleasure. Men were as much its victims as its victors on the level of discourse, 
though they had the upper hand with women and children, and the degradation 
of women, including the terrible manifestations of this in terms of wife-beating 
and other real-world violence, was cold and cruelly present in everyday life 
(Herdt 2006; Stolpe 2003).
The Sambia required married men and women to live together in small, round 
huts, internally divided into male and female spaces, as was common in New 
Guinea. Men, however, slept for long stretches in the men’s house away from 
their families during wartime and ritual initiations (Herdt 1989). Strategically 
centred in the village were men’s houses where initiated boys and older bachelors 
lived, while on the periphery and just below the village were menstrual huts. 
Secrecy surrounded two of the three abodes; only the married couple’s house 
was a public space. And there, as Foucault might have predicted, the regulation 
of sexual talk was intense. 
Traditionally, there were three different types of Sambia discourse: public talk 
(iyun-gacheru yungalu, lit. ‘free talk’), secret talk (ioolu yungalu, lit. ‘hidden 
talk’), and private talk (no marked category). Public discourse defined daily 
village gab and was associated with domestic situations in women’s houses 
and casual gatherings on the plaza of a hamlet. Local meetings shaped how 
Sambia now used the Pidgin concepts tok publik (public talk) and tok hait (secret 
talk), because all ritual is tok hait. It caused them to refrain from talking about 
men’s-house activities and especially homoerotic relations between younger 
and older boys, as well as the most secret of rituals, such as the nose-bleeding 
instrumentalities. In contrast, a married couple’s own erotic relations were taboo 
but private, not secret, always to be hidden from children. Heterosexual coitus 
was a thing of the deep night, whenever everyone else was asleep; better yet, 
it belonged to the garden periphery, away from prying eyes. But all the adults 
knew of it and imagined its effects, always. 
In the men’s house, secrecy was instilled and reached its apex through six age-
graded initiations that created among males the ritual status distinction between 
younger and older, between the ritual elders at the top and the young adepts, 
aged seven or eight, at the bottom. The degrees of knowledge, regulation of 
transmission of secrets to the next grade, hiding of sexual relations with women 
from younger boys, and shame that younger boys felt and were made to feel in 
the presence of their fathers, elders and male kin were emotionally intense—a 
broader oedipal circle. Beginning at an early age, then, boys were not to know of 
their parents’ sexual lives, had hidden from them until initiation the homoerotic 
relations between older and younger initiates, and graduated into the status 
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of hegemonic adult only after successive initiations during a 15-year period 
that brought them to marriage and fatherhood. Sexual feelings among boys 
and girls were strongly inhibited through a traditional culture as prudish as it 
was preoccupied with war. Thereafter, the nature of oedipal strivings went in 
different directions for the genders, as they do for us; but here, to engage Don 
Tuzin’s theoretical interests, I shall discuss only the development of male sexual 
subjectivity through ritual.
A boy’s development begins with subordination and repression but then 
transitions to a cultural reality that allows the creation of desires and their 
expression secretly. A youth must give up the receptor role and become the 
dominant player who bestows the gift of semen to younger initiates. But does 
the youth have enough semen and is his phallus sufficiently close to the image 
of being a warrior that he will not be silently mocked by the younger initiate 
who will drink his semen? 
This question hangs in the transitional space from being the subject who desires 
penetration by the older male to becoming the bachelor who desires to inseminate 
a younger boy. The older youth also begins to anticipate sexual and marriage 
arrangements. A key informant, the youth Moondi, for instance, once told me 
how he began to fantasise about inseminating a favoured younger initiate soon 
after his third-stage bachelor ceremony. Until that time he had perceived himself 
primarily as an object, not as much as a subject, in the mythopoeic and secret 
practice of being male. He began to have wet dreams—first of inseminating 
boys and then of girls. Within the year, though, he began for the first time 
to consciously desire women, specifically a younger woman betrothed to him, 
whom he eventually married. 
Thus is duty transformed into pleasure. Secret obligation assumes the intimacy 
of a community of believers who yearn for support from each other and a mode 
of self-rationalisation in all of the meanings of their public actions. Where 
the boys begin actively resisting separation from their mothers’ bodies and 
yearn to return to their fold, years of living in the men’s house and learning 
ritual teachings of women’s pollution actively transform the boys’ desires for 
renunciation into active fear of menstrual blood, with its traces on the female 
body. Merely to think of menstrual blood, or the public metaphor for it, is to 
produce compulsive spitting by a man, since he has taken the thing (menstrual 
blood) in his mind and mouth and must eliminate it (Herdt 1982). Beginning 
at puberty for boys, and at first rather awkwardly performed, this spitting has 
become by the time the agent is an adult an experience, if not in fact a desire, that 
contains the pleasure of taking in and eliminating that which is so dangerous. 
Underlying the ritual teachings is a sexual subjectivity that becomes explicit 
with development. For example, the growth of the penis, in the men’s ritual 
Echoes	of	the	Tambaran	
266
pedagogy and practice, suggests the notion that the inseminations result in an 
elongation of the phallus as a ‘pure product’ of semen. The sense of this ‘growth’ 
is forever constitutive of a man’s subjectivity of virility and masculinity as he 
approaches sexual relations with boys and then later contemplates the dangers 
of sex with women. This sense of timelessness pervades the formation of male 
subject/object desires and subjectivity in the lifelong practice of ritual secrecy. 
Adult men cannot do without the barrier of ritual secrecy that separates 
them and enables their agency in sometimes tense and challenging situations, 
requiring deceit and manipulation on a personal level. In short, the subjectivity 
of secret maleness calls to mind the ideology of Maurice Godelier’s Great Man, 
instilled through a split image, the public adult warrior’s mature phallic body 
on the one hand, and the secret subjective body that is still ‘growing’ as if he 
were a boy, on the other. This is how the Sambia embodied the objectification 
of the male body. 
As I have often written, there is a sexual paradox in Sambia society. The men 
have the semen, they are the warriors, they hold the power, and they are the 
stakeholders in a patriarchal society where descent and property flow down 
the male line. And yet in Sambia sexual scripts, males are the objects of sexual 
attraction—that is, they lack agency and are objectified. How is it possible, in 
such a highly male-dominated, patriarchal culture, that men would be treated 
as the poster objects? Why would they want to be the desired sexual objects 
anyway? 
As Godelier (1986) has remarked in discussing the neighbouring Baruya, the 
idealised and preferred sexual object and the object of beauty and attraction in 
many Melanesian cultures are not the female but the male. Not only is the male 
the most sexy and ornamented person, but also to desire him is normal and 
natural—for both genders. The Sambia Great Man is a warrior-hunter—strong, 
potent and powerfully erotic. He can take many wives and kill many men—a 
prominent theme in male folklore. It is a kind of glamour that is prestigious, 
intentional and performative; if you can do it, you are rewarded with sex and 
power. To bluff, to intimidate, to aggress and to attract are all linked. 
The sexual objectification of Sambia males thus arises from two fundamental 
sources: 1) being more marginal, being subalterns, boys, not women, are the ones 
truly lacking a voice in their society until they are grown up—women are more 
powerful then men actually grant; and 2) men’s power—that is, masculinity—
is conditional and highly permeable, beginning with the awkward and very 
cumbersome creation of a secret form of masculinity through insemination. It 
is this permeability of male power that ritual secrecy protects. What is hidden 
from public discourse is the secret ritual understanding that, to become potent 
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and masculine, an adult man has to be inseminated by many men as he grows 
up. ‘Desire’ in this sexual culture is thus the product of, and is dependent upon, 
ritual secrecy and the cultural control of masculinity in the men’s house. 
Of course, it will easily be seen that public discussion of this idea would subject 
the men to scepticism and a variety of forms of accusation of exploitation and 
manipulation of women and younger boys. Men themselves acknowledge this 
when they say that they are ‘bomwalyu’ men—middle men—situated halfway 
between sex with the boys and sex with women, a reality they must hide from 
both sides. Ritual secrecy obviously protects this bisexuality from interrogation 
all around. But we should not doubt for one moment that the men are genuine, 
not cynical, in the belief that their inseminations make the boys into strong 
warriors, since they explain their own personal development in this same way. 
Cynicism is a luxury of the modern period that a people at war can ill afford.
What men are reproducing is their own (hegemonic) reality, a script that 
includes repackaging the desires and fears of the subaltern boys. The control 
of sexuality discourse was absolutely essential to this production. Secrecy was 
fragile; the material means of social regulation were limited; social arrangements 
were easily destabilised. Ritual secrecy within the institution of initiation was 
profound, but it required a violence and necessary brutality to create the desires 
and controls men needed. The terrible weakness in this system was that boys 
could not be trusted actually to accept or hold onto the secrecy, the rituals or 
the cultural reality that depended on it. And that worried the men, always. 
The new initiate—before he has been socialised into the men’s beliefs and 
practices—is not trusted and is to be feared because he might be an unwitting 
agent of destruction. He might unintentionally transmit pollution from his 
mother into the men’s house. Likewise, he might unwittingly spill secrets and 
give away the military plans of his men’s house should he enter into intimate 
relations with children or his mother. The anxiety of trust becomes part of 
all male development and all subsequent sexual subjectivity in adult men; no 
doubt this early trauma is reflected in the fear of men and fathers alike when 
they ponder the question: can we trust this boy?
Here again, the boy-initiate’s compliance with the demands of the men’s society 
to be inseminated by older adolescent bachelors serves as a general proxy for 
how the men assess their ability to trust a particular boy. One who agrees, who is 
objectified, who is thought to obey but also to intentionally follow the necessary 
taboos and ritual rules—such a boy is on his way to having authority in public 
affairs. The men gradually gain in their confidence of him, and his status rises. 
Perhaps he will become a Great Man, perhaps not. Thus, the rise in male agency 
is a direct expression of the boys’ agreement with the men to be entrusted by 
them with their secret reality.
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Among the Sambia, the excitement of homo-sociality and boy-insemination 
drew upon both its fragile secrecy and the devotion to such privilege. Thus, 
the exclusion of women creates an idealised and fetishised Woman/Other, 
whose nature precludes understanding the ontology of being objectified in 
the homoerotic development of the male (Strathern 1988). Surely, we might 
think of this as a permanent misogyny, concomitant to conditional masculinity, 
which stems from too much liminality and too much gender segregation via 
permanent armed camps—harmful effects of a world at war. Sambia women 
are therefore sexual objects in a way very different than are the boys; they are 
denied sexual subjectivity and the status of equal social agents, for their role is 
but to reproduce a system that remains beyond their discursive control. Even 
more so, they could never understand its male purity and its male pleasures. 
I have attempted in this chapter to reconsider our view of pleasure and sexual 
objectification, remembering the critical voices of Freud and Foucault, in the 
evolving understanding of sexuality, desire and social action in our society. 
If sexual repression and frustration, as Freud argued, include both fears and 
fantasies then the Sambia were right up there, with their institutionalised nose-
bleeding that imitated women’s periods, homoerotic fellatio that symbolised 
breast feeding, and semen that was equated with mother’s milk. These symbolic 
equations on the level of individual subjectivity enact a kind of sexual desire 
and expression unknown to our culture, while on the collective level these 
same ritual practices, in the logic of sexuality discourse, represent a deeper set 
of contradictions in the power system that cannot be named. In this cultural 
logic, boys were sexually objectified—meaning that a boy was developmentally 
obliged to hold in, to suppress feelings and probably wishes as well—that is, 
he was repressed. And it was ritual secrecy that institutionalised these controls, 
built up through ritual measures of power—a kind of domination control. The 
subaltern in this view was granted, by ritual, private experiences and secret 
relationships formative of a new self—not the selfhood of American middle-
class society, with its constant talking about sex, but an incipient ritual agent 
increasingly empowered by an erotics of expression, and an expression of 
erotics, talked about in secret.
And these sexual dialectics were a package of ritual pleasures, both social 
and erotic, that Freud could never understand, as is clear from his remarks 
about the ancient Greeks. Pleasure can be a product of cultural things, of social 
arrangements meant to control sexuality, and even power relations that are not 
as hegemonic as Foucault imagined. After all these centuries, do any of us truly 
understand what happened in the formation of the cultural genius and the 
polymorphous, perverse erotics of Attic-culture Greece (Halperin 1990)?
I think it has always been difficult, in the history of culture and science, and 
lately in the social sciences in particular, to describe pleasure. We stand in awe 
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of Freud that he took the project on in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(1904). His questions still intrigue us: are men bisexual? Can women fall in love 
with other women and still be heterosexual? Can children experiment sexually 
with masturbation or the same sex and still be normal? Today, however, we 
must insert our own Euro-American questions: can we allow discussion openly 
and frankly about what pleasure is without feeling the fear, shame and silence 
that surrounds the topic in so many communities? And why does the P-word 
(pleasure) remain so threatening, not just to male authority but to the middle 
class in general? These are questions of a postmodern society in transition, 
Internet savvy and no longer as sure a territory for discursive control as was 
nineteenth-century bourgeois France in Foucault’s project. 
A recent survey study of more than 11 000 people in 29 countries by renowned 
sociologist Ed Laumann and colleagues (2003) from the University of Chicago has 
a surprising and counterintuitive finding, though it probably would not have 
surprised Freud: sexual satisfaction is inversely correlated with social power. 
The more patriarchal a country, the more controlling men are in a culture, the 
less sexual satisfaction men and women experience. And men in such controlling 
societies have much lower sexual satisfaction than their peers in more egalitarian 
societies. Shades of the Trobriand Islanders in the time of Malinowski! Power 
does not always breed pleasure, and powerful discursive controls over sexuality 
provide the least pleasure for men and women alike. I wonder what Foucault 
would have said to that?
In Secrecy and Cultural Reality, I suggested that anthropologists avoided taking 
seriously the power of ritual secrecy in its culture-building and developmental 
sexual effects, as per Freud, and its discursive effects in regulating social power, 
as per Foucault. I have posited that there was not only a colonising tendency to 
treat Melanesian ritual systems as ‘child’s play’—silly, unreal or symbolic, in the 
metaphor of the late Ian Hogbin (Herdt 2003). Concomitantly, there was another, 
more deeply avoidant tendency in the heterosexist and masculinist positionality 
of white male ethnographers to feel uncomfortable with these male Melanesian 
secrets. They were uncomfortable with male intimacy and homo-sociality in 
general and might have avoided anything that smacked of homoerotic events 
or settings (Herdt 2003:230–1). It sounds like an accusation, but it is meant to 
be more of an observation that situates each of us in our own time and place 
(Hammar 2010). 
I believe that Don Tuzin’s last book on the Ilahita men’s society, The Cassowary’s 
Revenge (1997), did respond to this implicit concern, when he suggested that 
Ilahita men were aware of their problematic position of both loving and fearing/
hating women. He went on to say that they needed a psychological outlet for 
their fears, which they found in the ‘safe haven’ of the men’s cult house and its 
masculine sociality. Ilahita initiation allowed an objectification of males that 
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substituted ritual scarification and fetishisation of female roles and tasks in 
secret settings, but without ritual homosexuality (Tuzin 1980). This last was 
seemingly a violation of masculine standards in Western society at the time and 
is notable in its own right. 
By sexual and gender standards right up to the end of the 1980s, the period when 
Tuzin was writing, there was a terribly powerful and stigmatising attribution of 
disease, immaturity, sin, marginality and effeminacy to our cultural conceptions 
of homosexuality. Anthropology did not escape this medicalising tendency in the 
analogies, discursive metaphors and models that were selected for representation 
of same-sex relationships in the non-Western world (Herdt 1999). Freud was 
responsible for some of this pathologising, and Foucault was the reactor to 
it. All of us—male and female ethnographers alike—feared being identified 
with pariah states and categories; and male ethnographers could not quite see 
that our masculinity, as much as our friends, in New Guinea, was conditional 
and required the rejection of all things un-masculine: being dependent upon 
another man, being attracted to him, being in love with him (Herdt 2003). These 
discourses are experiences of anthropological unreality because there were no 
words, and no identity categories, to capture these personal meanings until 
very recently. It is too easy to retroactively make such interpretations from the 
perspective of the twenty-first century, though we can see how far the field has 
come in the kinds of ethnographies and the greater understanding of sexual 
diversity that they represent across cultures (Herdt 2006). 
Let me close by returning to make a fundamental point about the relationship 
between the description of sexuality in our ethnographies and the understanding 
of how sexual discourse is regulated, even by the ethnographer. The self censors 
itself in modern society; in pre-colonial times among the Sambia, the self was 
symbolically censored by ritual secrecy. Contemporary sexuality remains 
censored and regulated, even in a society such as ours that is saturated with 
sex—that is, packaged sex—all the time. It seems impossible that it could be, 
but that part of Foucault’s thesis was correct. The trouble we experience with 
this cultural barrier to free expression is different from what was imagined in 
Freud’s time, when society and sociality were more stable, if less enlightened. 
And it is even different than in Foucault’s time, since his tragic death from AIDS 
signified a new risk to sexual freedom unimagined before. Sexuality continues 
to test society, and probably always will, because it contains the possibility of 
the greatest liberation and the greatest oppression for the individual in the social 
contract that is culture. But I think that Freud and Foucault, while disagreeing 
on many things, were at least in agreement about that potential in sexuality for 
human development. 
When societies such as the Sambia and kindred others in Melanesia placed 
so much social and psychological investment in secrecy, they were signalling 
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their supreme discomfort with allowing individual choice in matters of desire, 
sex, love and marriage. The comparison with our own recent history—with its 
stigma and moralising and secrecy surrounding homosexuality, not to mention 
current controversy over same-sex marriage—is in the same league, though at 
a different level (Herdt 2009b). As our own society becomes more comfortable 
with these issues, we might expect the controversy to subside, with the resulting 
deregulation of sexuality, at least in certain domains. Secrecy, in this way, was 
never a friend of humanity, being the mother of invention in politically unstable 
societies, and ritual secrecy was a tremendously powerful albeit primitive way 
to thwart freedom in human development.
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13. Courtesy and Method in 
Ethnography1
Alexander	H.	Bolyanatz
Although I did not ‘believe’ the story, courtesy and method naturally 
obliged me not to try to disabuse them of their belief. (Tuzin 1997:96)
Don Tuzin was, among his many other virtues, unerringly gracious and 
polished. Those fortunate enough to have known him will have their favourite 
anecdotes about how he gently corrected those in error or deflected indignity 
from a deserving target. The denizens of Ilahita village were no strangers to 
Tuzin’s magnanimity. This is evidenced over and over in The Cassowary’s 
Revenge (1997), his poignant memoir of his return to Ilahita in 1985 after a 13-
year absence. 
In this book, Tuzin weaves a remarkable account that begins in 1969 when he 
first arrived at Ilahita, moves through an interlude in (mostly) the United States, 
and concludes back at Ilahita in the mid-1980s. Perhaps ‘conclude’ is not the 
right word here. If Revenge teaches anything, it holds the lesson that sometimes 
stories, and their mythopoeic meanings, are amenable to continuous revision—
what Tuzin refers to as ‘the fluid nature of living myth’ (1997:131). When I 
first met Don Tuzin a few months after his final return from Ilahita, it was 
certainly true that the meaning(s) of his fieldwork in Ilahita—both instances—
was consistently analysed and plumbed for deeper and more meaningful 
insights. So ‘conclude’ is a rather inadequate—if not downright inaccurate—
way of describing the extensive Tuzin–Ilahita association as represented 
through the final page of Revenge. Like the ‘unfinished’ (Tuzin 1997:96) story of 
Nambweapa’w, told and retold, interpreted and reinterpreted, The Cassowary’s 
Revenge does not really end. Like the story of Nambweapa’w, in which new 
elements were added to fit contemporary realities, so The Cassowary’s Revenge 
has a reality beyond its last page—a reality that is relevant for anyone engaged 
in the ethnographic endeavour.
I should explain myself. I conducted doctoral research under Don’s auspices 
among Sursurunga speakers at Tekedan village in New Ireland Province, 
Papua New Guinea, from late 1989 until early 1992. I returned six years later 
for several weeks during the summer of 1998. My reading during that stint of 
fieldwork included the then-recently published The Cassowary’s Revenge. In 
1 This chapter has benefited greatly from the comments of Kevin Birth, Mardelle Fortier, David Goldberg 
and Marie Tenzinger and two anonymous reviewers. Remaining shortcomings can be traced to me.
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many respects, in the same way that Nambweapa’w shaped Don’s experiences in 
Ilahita and beyond, The Cassowary’s Revenge has affected the way I understood 
(and continue to re-understand) myself in relation to the Sursurunga-speaking 
folks on southern New Ireland and the ethnographic endeavour during that 1998 
field trip and the six field sessions I have conducted since then. Don’s notion of 
prophecy as ‘insight’ (1997:99 ff.) in relation to the Nambweapa’w story has 
never really been absent as I think about how I relate to the Sursurunga, and 
they to me.
Before moving on, I should ensure that my references to the story of 
Nambweapa’w and The Cassowary’s Revenge are meaningful to the reader. My 
recap begins with the story of Nambweapa’w2 and its cultural counterpoint: the 
secret men’s cult known as the Tambaran.3
Nambweapa’w was a cassowary who was tricked into living as a human female—
wife of the first man, and mother of all humanity. Years later, she discovered that 
she had been duped and, in an act of vengeance, murdered her husband, the first 
man. The youngest child of their union—a son—was believed to have been the 
only one not to have squandered the good life that Nambweapa’w had created 
for her offspring. He came to be understood as the font of the United States 
(‘America’) and all its wealth. The Ilahita Tambaran men’s cult (like the myth 
of Nambweapa’w, a nineteenth-century import into the area) was something 
of an ideological antithesis to Nambweapa’w. The Tambaran manifested male 
dominion over women that was rooted in women’s not knowing (ostensibly) that 
the eerie sounds—and the concomitant legitimacy of male hegemony—coming 
from the spirit house were in fact merely man-made. 
As the influence of the Tambaran waned in the face of Western education and 
the influx of cash after World War II, power and prestige hierarchies were 
scrambled. Exogenous social movements came and went, some finding the soil 
of Ilahita too parched or filled with weeds to take root. One movement that did 
take root was a form of charismatic Christianity—led primarily by women and 
known as the Revival—prior to Tuzin’s second stint at Ilahita. Months before 
his return, a number of men caught up in the Revival ‘spilled their guts’ about 
the Tambaran (conceptually reconstituted as the work of Satan), effectively 
killing the Tambaran—an act mythopoeically foreshadowed by Nambweapa’w’s 
act of homicide. The end of one secret resulted in Nambweapa’w’s husband’s 
death; the end of another constituted the death of the Tambaran. The twin male 
defeats were noteworthy.
2 The complete version of the story can be found in Tuzin (1980:1–8). A synopsis can be found in Tuzin 
(1997:69–71). My account here is thus a synopsis of a synopsis.
3 Following Tuzin’s convention, I capitalise Tambaran throughout.
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Don’s reappearance just months after the Great Disclosure was laden with local 
meaning(s) tied to the now-emasculated Tambaran. For one thing, his return 
had been the subject of a deathbed prediction on the part of an Ilahita villager 
named Gidion three weeks before the arrival at Ilahita in 1984 of a letter Don had 
sent informing everyone of his intention to return in 1985. For another thing, 
his interest in and appreciation of the Tambaran had been unmistakable 13 
years earlier. And was he not the scion of Nambweapa’w removed to America, 
finally come to take all of his distant cousins who were stuck in exile at Ilahita 
into a New World? In his words, the peculiar combination of events included 
the suspicious coincidence of [my return] with the collapse of the 
Tambaran, the supercharging of Ilahita’s atmosphere with millenarian 
expectations, the death of Gidion, and the coming to life of 
Nambweapa’w’s old tale of retribution and masculine woe. It was not so 
much my original arrival in Ilahita that had stirred apocalyptic thoughts 
(at least not for long); it was my return from America…amid the agitated 
conditions of the moment, that created all of the commotion. (Tuzin 
1977:132, emphasis in original)
The commotion Don refers to is one that any ethnographer would just as soon 
avoid if given the choice. After all, the point of ethnography is to report salient 
cultural events, not create them, let alone star in them—again, if given the 
choice. The besetting quandary of ethnographic fieldwork is that such a choice 
is rarely, if ever, offered. Tuzin summarises:
With each retelling, Nambweapa’w’s story remolds itself to changing 
circumstances, churning itself into a remarkably coherent jumble of older 
and newer meanings. The detail of the youngest brother’s departure ‘for 
America’, with its millenarian overtones, dates from the period of World 
War II. But it was apparently not until my first arrival in 1969 that the 
significance of a mythic connection with America began to be realized. 
And it was not until the announcement in 1984 of my return, that the 
significance of the original visit was realized. Prophecy works that 
way—by remembrance and revisitation. Today’s events fold back upon 
memories of yesterday and, by a Proustian alchemy, transfigure them. 
Isolated fragments from the past become realized as significant objects 
of intentional meaning, animated and integrated with the present. At 
the core of this process of remembering is an aesthetic illusion: both for 
individuals in their ways and cultures in theirs, it is the illusion of the 
self finding itself in memory. (Tuzin 1997:156)
‘The illusion of the self finding itself in memory’ is a provocative turn of 
phrase. I take it to mean (not that this is its only meaning) that one’s sense 
of continuity—the connection between the past and the present—is the 
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fabrication of the selective use of memory. In other words, one’s selective, 
filtered, contingent memory of yesterday gives the impression that there is a 
permanent link between those memories and one’s experience of today. And, 
it goes without saying, the memories are not necessarily shared by others. This 
generates a matched set of questions: who am I to others; and who are others 
to me? For a cultural anthropologist, these are important considerations, since 
interaction with people who are profoundly ‘Other’ approaches a sine qua non. 
Clearly, Don’s new insights about his recollected experiences at Ilahita fit these 
questions, as do the local understandings of the events surrounding Don’s 
return.
This seems like a good place for a short hiatus in which to examine Don’s sense 
of his own significance vis-a-vis the collapse of the Tambaran. In some respects, 
there is little reason to doubt Don’s overall sense of things as reported in Revenge, 
since those who knew him would find a concocted narcissistic fantasy to be 
simply unimaginable. But there is another reason to assume that Don’s portrayal 
of his own centrality is not inaccurate: a tendency (not unique to Melanesia, but 
certainly well represented there) to explain phenomena in terms of the unusual, 
the atypical and the anomalous. Examples are easy to find. In the early 1990s, a 
trio of Australians was sea kayaking just a bit offshore from Tekedan. After they 
had departed, I was asked if I thought war was imminent. Stunned by the non 
sequitur, I asked my aged interlocutor about the source of his question. He told 
me that just prior to the Japanese invasion in 1942, three boats appeared briefly 
offshore, heading in the same direction as the kayaks had. An ethnographer in 
a Melanesian community is an anomaly if there ever was one, so it should be no 
surprise to read Joel Robbins’ account (this volume) of an incident in which a 
pair of new gloves found in the forest was assumed either to be his (they were 
not) or to portend a bright new future. Given the import of the Tambaran—
we are way beyond the scale of a pair of gloves here—in Ilahita life, it is not 
outrageous, to me at any rate, to imagine that Tuzin’s report of his own salience 
is not exaggerated.
So, when it came to understanding that confluence of events in 1985 Ilahita, 
local eschatologies varied, and different people drew different conclusions, 
but the upshot is unmistakable: ethnographers, whether they know it or not, 
and in ways they cannot predict or control, become part of local lore. And 
now, finally, I can point to the epigraph for this chapter. It was the story of 
Nambweapa’w that Tuzin did not ‘believe’, and it was his own decency, along 
with his anthropological instincts—‘courtesy’ and ‘method’, respectively—by 
which he explains his letting pass the opportunity for refutation.
Since I am going to allude to courtesy and method often in this chapter, it is 
worth taking a moment to look more closely at them. ‘Courtesy’ here is really 
just a kind of civility, which is to say a reticence to draw attention to another’s 
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deficiency. This is not quite the same as the philosophical notion of ‘charity’, 
since that stance requires one to assume truth and rationality on the part of the 
other and Don is clear that he does not assume this for Nambweapa’w. Indeed, 
he notes that he ‘would have to be crazy, credulous, or exorbitantly relativistic’ 
(1997:100) to presume a face-value truth and rationality when it came to the 
Nambweapa’w account.
By ‘method’ here, I refer to the ability to gather data—to have access to people 
and to events—and to the openness of people when talking to the anthropologist. 
Together, the two constitute a significant segment of that slippery notion: 
rapport. Clearly, Don was mindful of the fieldworker’s awareness that ‘how much, 
or how little, to disclose…affects relationships with informants, especially in 
cases where full disclosure would expose a clash of values’ (Ranson 2005:110). 
A closer reading of the phrase might almost make courtesy and method seem 
joined, as in ‘courtesy-and-method obliged me not to disabuse them of their belief’. 
Such a usage implies that the boundary between the two is indistinguishable 
or at least irrelevant. Indeed, that is how I first read them: politeness creates or 
allows opportunities for gathering information. Likewise, a lack of politeness 
is almost certain to limit opportunities for gathering information. The strong 
positive correlation between the two, and the intuitive causal connection, 
certainly makes them seem, as far as how they operate in the field, fundamentally 
the same, and this conflation of the two was how I used to think about my own 
fieldwork in 1989–92 and then again in 1998. I no longer, however, see these 
two—courtesy and method—as inextricably linked.
Courtesy and method have become detached for me as the answers to the 
questions ‘who am I to the Sursurunga people?’ and ‘who are the Sursurunga 
people to me?’ have changed. Here is how I used to think about it: when an 
anthropologist is civil and polite to people at her or his field site (even to the 
point of not wanting to disabuse people of their beliefs) then one is truly an 
ethnographer. This is because in order to be an ethnographer, one has to be civil 
and polite—to my mind. It is almost as if I signal that I am in a data-gathering 
mode when I exercise courtesy; or that by exercising courtesy, I maintain the 
possibility of data gathering in the future. When I am short-tempered and rude, 
or, less extremely, when I speak my mind, even if it rejects what a local person 
thinks, what am I then—a poor ethnographer or not an ethnographer at all? 
And if not an ethnographer at all, how then should I see myself when I am on 
New Ireland? More to the point, how do they see me? From both perspectives, 
when courtesy—in the form of not wanting to disabuse others of their beliefs—
is in short supply, the question is: what have I become? Since first reading The 
Cassowary’s Revenge, I have come to recognise that my answer to that question 
has changed since I first set foot on New Ireland in 1989.
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A significant chunk of Revenge is Don answering the what-have-I-become 
question. What he had become, of course, was the result of what courtesy and 
method had inadvertently and serendipitously set in motion—or at the very 
least, failed to eradicate: the besetting ‘commotion’ that struck Ilahita in the 
mid-1980s. And what he had become had spun wildly out of control, at least 
from his own perspective.
There is no blame here. This sort of thing happens when and where cultural 
anthropologists work—very much an occupational hazard. The irony is, of 
course, cloying; courtesy and method—which in Tuzin’s case meant being a 
decent chap and a crackerjack anthropologist—generated a seriously sticky 
situation. Imagine for a moment if Don had said, immediately upon hearing the 
tale of Nambweapa’w, ‘Folks, that is just the silliest thing I have ever heard. 
Only a nitwit would believe such nonsense.’ There would, of course, have been 
no perfect eschatological storm years later. And there probably would have 
been no Ilahita in the ethnological consciousness of anthropology either. We 
go, we work, we interact. And we are incorporated—that is, memories selected 
from the past create an anthropologist in the minds of members of the local 
community that might not, in fact probably cannot, be the anthropologist’s 
own sense of self in relation to that community. The opposite is also true: the 
returning anthropologist’s selective memories of people and events shape how 
subsequent fieldwork unfolds. It goes without saying that the anthropologist 
who does not return never has to deal with these issues. In the context that we 
are discussing here, making no attempt to debunk other people’s beliefs is good 
fieldwork and virtuous humanity. But upon returning, the consequences of this 
omission when it comes to the questions of ‘who am I to them?’ and ‘who are 
they to me?’ can be profoundly unpredictable, as Revenge chronicles.
I left New Ireland in March 1992 in order to write and defend my doctoral 
dissertation (Bolyanatz 1994). At that time, I expected to return; I was not sure 
when, but I did not want my relationships with many of the Sursurunga speakers 
I had come to know to be terminated. As evidence to others—and myself—that 
I did expect to return, I purchased a piglet and asked Towor (like most of the 
names in this chapter, a pseudonym) to raise the pig for me. I gave him some 
money for expenses and told him that I would compensate him later for any 
other costs, and he agreed. My plan was to use the pig as a springboard to 
become involved in the exchanges that culminated in the sequence of mortuary 
feasts (see Bolyanatz 2000). I imagined that I would visit New Ireland many 
times over the rest of my life, and I hoped that my involvement in the network 
of pig exchanges would compensate for the infrequency of my visits. 
Towor had become a neighbour over the final year or so of my initial (1989–92) 
fieldwork, having moved from his natal village, 15 minutes or so away, to mine. 
Married to a woman of the matriclan into which I had become ‘adopted’, he was 
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my ‘father’ and I his ‘son’. He became one of my primary sources of information 
as I delved more deeply into the sequence of feasts in honour of the deceased. 
More than most people, Towor made frequent requests (for matches, soap, 
tobacco, kerosene), which, while mildly annoying, seemed not unreasonable to 
me given the fact that I relied on him more than I did most people. 
When I returned in 1998, I discovered that Towor had returned to his natal 
village. ‘He stole your pig’, I was told shortly after my return by Tohom, who 
was, in many ways, my closest friend on New Ireland. Tohom was Towor’s wife’s 
sister’s son, my Tokbol matriclan ‘brother’. When I asked Tohom for elaboration, 
he told me that Towor had—following local convention—sold the pig for cash 
to a group that needed one in order to sponsor a mortuary feast. Tohom reported 
that he had reproached Towor, reminding him that he (Towor) had been serving 
as the pig’s custodian on my behalf. But Towor had a reputation as something of 
a sorcerer, so Tohom felt that he could not push my case very far, knowing that 
I—as a waitskin (‘European’) and therefore virtually impervious to sorcery—
could escalate the protest if I wanted to.
Towor’s penchant for sorcery was something of a revelation to me. When the 
subject had come up, he had named others as sorcery adepts, and I had no 
record of others naming him in the early 1990s. But I cannot say that I was 
shocked upon hearing of his reputation in 1998. Six years’ worth of perspective 
had made me realise that Towor was not, in spite of his helpfulness to me, what 
anyone would call a ‘nice guy’. He had at times been, in fact, a rather nasty sort. 
This realisation—crystallised for me as Tohom reported Towor’s malfeasance—
generated a number of questions about my final months those half-dozen years 
earlier. Why had no-one ever mentioned Towor’s reputation to me? How could I 
not have known this before? (What kind of ethnographer was I, anyway?) Or was 
this just Tohom’s convenient way of dodging an uncomfortable confrontation? 
At the time the questions that I did not ask (the reading of Revenge being perhaps 
too proximate to glean important lessons) were ‘who has Towor become to me?’ 
and ‘who have I become to Towor?’. Memory was re-filtered and revision took 
place. I probably understood him and his fundamental meanness better in 1998, 
but I needed to understand him as benevolent in 1991–92.
I stopped by Towor’s house within a couple of days of getting back. We caught 
up with each other; I showed him pictures of my family—everyone six years 
older than when he had last seen them—and he commented on how the kids 
had changed. I had a feeling that he was not going to bring up the pig. And I 
knew that it would be rude for me to mention it directly. Courtesy and method, 
I guess. I waited for the conversation to move towards a related subject but it 
never did. Thus ended my reunion with Towor. 
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In the ensuing days and weeks, I proceeded with my work. I wanted to revise 
my dissertation into a publishable monograph on mortuary feasting and there 
were some gaps to fill and some clarifications to make that could only be done 
on site. And there were the usual happenings that will be no surprise to any 
fieldworker. Topakta, an influential leader, had died several weeks before my 
arrival; the feud over where he was to be buried was still echoing, and I found 
myself caught up in that. I discovered and explored a new (to me) means of 
resolving disputes by means of an extravagant offer of food that, in principle, 
compels an antagonist to abandon her or his quarrel. I passed through Towor’s 
village now and then, managing to avoid his house for some time.
After nearly three weeks, I had a chance conversation with one of Towor’s sons, 
and he mentioned that Towor wanted to see me. Even though Towor’s house 
was only 15 minutes away, it was another couple of days before I found the time 
to walk over for a visit. I was not necessarily proud of myself for engaging in 
that sort of gamesmanship, but who was he to summon me? He could wait until 
I got around to it. Then again, my debt to him was surely incalculable? With 
significant help from his insights, I had been able to later write and defend a 
doctoral dissertation. I had a comfortable academic job. Why was I being so 
difficult? Courtesy and method, indeed. Was he going to mention the pig? Was 
an apology forthcoming? Had gathering data somehow become secondary to 
another agenda? And had I so marked that change by a decline in courtesy? 
What had I become: a poor ethnographer or not an ethnographer at all?
When I arrived, we sat outside the house and chatted briefly before he told me 
that since he did not know how long I was going to stay, he wanted to make 
sure that he saw me before I left so that he could give me what amounted to a 
shopping list: reading glasses, a shirt, and a pipe. I said that I would see what 
I could do, mentioned that I was not sure of exactly when I would be back, 
and that my suitcases were usually overfull anyway. He said he understood and 
mentioned, as I stood up to leave, that his matrilineage was sponsoring a small 
mortuary feast the day after next, and that I should be sure to come and bring 
my video camera.
As I walked back to Tekedan village, I realised that this was about as close as I 
was going to get to compensation for my pig. At significant cost to him, I was 
going to be able to participate in another feast and get some footage of it.4 I 
discovered afterwards from others that the planning for this feast had occurred 
in a rush, and it became clear that the situation between us had accelerated the 
timing of this feast. I also realised that his request for reading glasses, a shirt and 
a pipe was not just a shopping list; he did want to know when I was going to 
leave, but only in order to make sure that I would still be there on Saturday and 
4 In fact, I had trouble with the microphones and ended up with soundless footage, to my great frustration.
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that he should go ahead with the feast. He had orchestrated a return to a better 
time for us by precipitating a feast while I was still there. Memories of those 
halcyon days of 1991–92 rushed back—for both of us, I daresay. Courtesy and 
method? I was not as courteous as I might have been, but I had not pushed on 
the matter of the pig, so I was, I suppose, courteous enough, and courtesy and 
method were certainly at the core of the adjustment of memory for both of us. I 
was still an ethnographer. I was still gathering data.
It was five years before I made it back to New Ireland again—this time, in 2002. 
Although they had been a year earlier, the attacks of 11 September were on 
the minds of many people when they saw me, and it was often the first thing 
people wanted to talk about. Was I near any of the destruction? (No.) Did I 
know anyone who had been hurt or killed? (No.) Had America captured Osama 
bin Laden yet? (No.) Did I know any Muslims? (Yes.) Was I afraid of them? (No.) 
The primary purpose of this field trip was to procure data that were part of 
an explicitly comparative project—on perceptions of physical attractiveness 
(Fessler et al. 2005). It was the first of a series of large-scale comparative 
research efforts that I have joined in which Sursurunga speakers of New Ireland 
constitute but one of many data sets. More salient in some ways, however, were 
the conversations I had with Tohom, who was becoming very sick.
Just a couple of years older than me, Tohom had lost a lot of weight and looked 
terrible. He said that he had seen many doctors, and no-one seemed to be 
able to help. He wondered aloud whether he had been ensorcelled by Towor, 
his ‘father’. Indeed, Tohom said that he no longer slept in the same place on 
consecutive nights so that Towor’s supernatural powers could not find him. I 
nodded sympathetically. Courtesy and method? Not really.
It was here where I began to see courtesy and method become decoupled. I 
said nothing to Tohom about the rationality of his fears (courtesy) but not 
because I necessarily wanted any information from him (method). Indeed, I 
found myself not wanting to gather data on this case; it was hard to hear about 
Towor’s malevolence as well as about Tohom’s anxiety—not to mention Tohom’s 
debilitating illness. I had been courteous but not for the sake of method; and 
clearly, in my reticence when it came to gathering data, I was being a poor 
ethnographer in this case.
I did not see Towor in 2002; he was engaged in wage labour at a plantation 
elsewhere in the province. But I found that some ambivalence towards him 
resurfaced as memories filtered back and I reconstituted him in my mind yet 
again. Tohom would suspect him as the source of his illness only if there were 
some sort of problem between the two of them—real or imagined. And because 
I liked Tohom, I mentally defaulted to his side of whatever conflict there might 
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be. I asked him what he might have done to provoke Towor’s antipathy and he 
responded that he was innocent of any wrongdoing when it came to Towor. 
Towor was, after all, his ‘father’; therefore, he could only do such a thing 
because he (Towor) was, at his core, a bad guy.5 I could not, of course, disagree, 
and my concurrence had little to do with either courtesy or method.
In 2003, I returned to New Ireland as part of another project, in which economic 
experimental games were played cross-culturally (see Barr et al. 2009; Berbesque 
et al. In press; Bolyanatz 2010; Henrich et al. 2006, 2010; Marlowe et al. 2008). 
Tohom was not any better, but he was no worse, so at least the downward 
trajectory of his health had been mitigated. Towor was back from the plantation, 
but I did not have much reason to see him. In the middle of 2003, the ubiquitous 
topic of conversation around the area was vanilla. Vanilla was going to be the 
cash crop to put the area on a solid economic footing. Copra was always going to 
be there, even if prices were down. And coffee had failed.6 Cacao was currently 
king, but most people did not have the kind of extensive cacao holdings that 
would bring in a significant amount of cash. Besides, smallholders had to 
compete with large plantations just to the north, so cacao was not going to be 
the long-term answer. 
Vanilla, however, was to be the way out of economic stagnation. Apparently, 
in early 2003, an agricultural expert had visited the region, taken soil samples 
and proclaimed that southern New Ireland was ideally suited for producing 
commercial-grade vanilla. Consumer concerns in industrialised countries over 
cholesterol had significantly affected copra prices a generation earlier, leaving 
copra with its depressed prices and cacao as the best—really only—ready 
sources of income. Vanilla stems, though, could be purchased for next to nothing, 
and vanilla orchards began to spring up. Vanilla vines require some shade and 
trees to climb, and they have to be watered regularly, especially when young. 
My 2003 survey showed that nearly two-thirds (16 of 25) of the households 
at Tekedan village had planted at least some vanilla. The median number of 
vanilla plantings for all households—including the nine that had not jumped 
onto the vanilla bandwagon—was 10. Of those households that did begin to 
cultivate vanilla, the mean number of plants was 164. Vanilla prices had soared 
just recently, and the passion was palpable.
The enthusiasm over vanilla seems to have engendered other enthusiasms. The 
expected economic boom made some folks look at the big picture. New Ireland, 
5 Grammatically, Sursurunga has three noun classes, each of which takes different kinds of possessives. A 
person’s character or true being is one’s ninsán (the á in Sursurunga is the schwa sound), and is in the same 
noun class as consanguineous kin, body parts and intrinsic features such as shadows. Nouns in this class are 
immutable. So when Tohom refers to Towor’s ninsán as bad, he implies that he always was and always will be 
bad.
6 See Bolyanatz (1998) for a history of cash cropping in the Sursurunga region.
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relative to other provinces in Papua New Guinea, was not poor, and was going 
to get richer. New Irelanders held important posts in other parts of Papua New 
Guinea, which was taken as evidence of a burgeoning elite. Indeed, a former 
Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, hailed from Huris village, just a 45-minute walk 
from Tekedan. And yet, people said, New Ireland’s wealth was being squandered 
on the rest of Papua New Guinea: more money, people and resources such as 
gold from the mine at Lihir were going out than were coming in. Perhaps it was 
time for New Ireland’s independence. At first, I did not take the secessionist 
talk seriously, thinking that this was just one more men’s house conversation 
that drifted off into hyperbole as it wound down. But by the third time the 
topic came up, it was quite clear that, as unrealistic as it might be, there were 
some people who imagined a nation-state comprising the Bismarck Archipelago. 
The relative merits of including Manus and/or Bougainville were debated. The 
transition of the local constabulary into an army was discussed. At some level, 
I realised that my presence in a conversation like this might make it difficult for 
the National Government to feel comfortable issuing me another visa. Ever. But 
that was crazy; nobody was going to report this conversation to anyone in the 
National Government, least of all me. Method. Courtesy? 
I could not help myself. Fellas, I said, the Government of Papua New Guinea is 
not going to let New Ireland go just because a majority of people vote to leave, 
even if it ever got to a vote. The mine at Lihir alone is worth an awful lot to them; 
they are not going to just abandon all claims to it. ‘Armed rebellion, then’, one 
man countered. I shook my head. So much for courtesy. What about method? 
Who were they to me now? Tough economic times (the value of the kina was 
about one-third in 2003 of what it had been in 1992) and the prospects of vanilla 
had made for radical, high-risk/high-reward thinking—or if not thinking, then 
reflexes. Who was I to them now? Well, when it came to conversations in the 
same secessionist vein, it was clear who I was to them: party pooper. And what 
had I become? Could I, in that moment, have been considered any kind of 
ethnographer by anyone?
In 2005, I returned to find out that the Great Vanilla Project had not turned out 
well at all. Apparently, buyers had little interest in the first vanilla harvests—
something about the soil’s acidity. Vanilla vines still received some attention, 
but the thrill was gone. I was disappointed, too. What little I knew about vanilla 
was consistent with the idea that it would be a successful cash crop on New 
Ireland, and I had been excited about the possibilities. As I mentioned above, 
this was not the first local cash-crop expectation that had gone bad, so the local 
response was fatalistic acceptance.
Reports of the disappointment with vanilla were immediately followed with 
hope for the next venture: soya beans. At a men’s house at nearby Nokon village, 
one man carefully unwrapped a soya pod from a dirty handkerchief and proudly 
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showed me his ticket to economic freedom. It had cost him K5 (about US$2), but 
it was a small price to pay, he said, given what the eventual pay-off would be. 
I was able to stifle a laugh—courtesy (barely), but method? My amusement at 
this man’s gullibility quickly gave way to irritation. Who had exploited this 
poor guy’s naivety? Probably some other unlucky schnook, I imagined.7 Others 
agreed that the future, with soya, was bright, and that they planned on planting 
some seeds—once the price of seeds went down.
That is a bad idea, I said. I told them that I had seen extensive soya bean fields in 
the United States and that farmers in the United States grew far more soya beans 
than they could ever sell in their own country and that they exported them all 
over the world. No way, I said, could New Ireland soya beans compete in such 
a global market. Perhaps in someone’s lexicon somewhere, my efforts to warn 
people away from cultivating soya beans as a cash crop could be construed as 
an instance of courtesy, but that is a stretch. Reading disappointment on some 
faces, I did hurry to add that as far as I knew, soya beans were very nutritious 
and that, if they were able to flourish in the local soils and climate, they should 
make a very nice contribution to the daily diet. 
Another significant moment of the 2005 field trip took place en route to Tekedan. 
Riding in the back of a truck with my wife, Pam, who was able to join me for 
this trip, I was told that my friend Topiknat (not a pseudonym) had died a few 
months earlier. While he was clearing trees for a new swidden, there was an 
accident in which a tree trunk had somehow kicked back and struck him in the 
chest, killing him instantly, according to his widow. 
Topiknat was a weekend neighbour at Tekedan village in 1989–92 and 1998. 
He worked as a tradesman for the Department of Public Works at the town 
of Namatanai, a couple of hours’ drive north. At that time, he stayed in town 
during the working week, but retired in 2000 and returned to village life, and 
we enjoyed many pleasant conversations in 2002 and 2003. Affable, smart, well-
educated and universally well-liked, he had begun to fill the leadership vacuum 
caused by the deaths of the two most respected male leaders in 1998 (Topakta, 
mentioned above) and 1999. His death was a profound setback to his family as 
well as to Tekedan village—and to me. In 2003, at a farewell gathering on the 
evening before my departure, he gave a short speech that was something of a 
7 I do not want to give the impression that the folks on New Ireland are simpletons. In 1991, a men’s house 
discussion at Tekedan about the dramatic political and economic changes occurring in Eastern Europe took 
place. The conversation was centred on whether, and the degree to which, the change to capitalist economies 
would eventually result in greater amounts of disposable income for the citizens of those countries. Increased 
disposable income would almost certainly be used to purchase more chocolate, the argument proceeded, 
which would increase cacao prices. The question was how many more cacao trees should be planted tomorrow 
and next week in order to have an increased number of bearing trees a few years from now when these 
economies hit their stride, Notice that the ‘chocolate futures’ conversation took place a decade before the K5 
soya bean purchase, so one cannot conclude a greater economic expertise over time.
13.	Courtesy	and	Method	in	Ethnography
289
tribute to me—I was one of Tekedan’s own he had said, like a kinsman who lived 
in Port Moresby and whose return trips to the village were all too infrequent 
but always sure and welcomed. I was flattered and carefully inspected the tops 
of my own feet as he spoke. I could not know, of course, that it was the last time 
I would ever see Topiknat.
Protocol in the wake of someone’s death required a gift of food to Topiknat’s 
widow, Eriel. We walked to the house and Pam, long since assigned to Topiknat’s 
matrimoiety, sat with Eriel and the two keened as they would have had we been 
present for the funeral months earlier. My role as a male was to sit nearby and 
look sad—simple enough; courtesy and method were together again, but not 
in the usual way. Here, method had provided, over the years, a familiarity with 
what was expected of me. This led to an easy-to-follow set of expectations for 
what constituted courtesy in that situation. Who was I to Eriel? Who was she to 
me? What had I become? Was I an ethnographer in that moment? Clearly, having 
been an ethnographer there made my expressions of grief locally appropriate. 
Method had contributed to courtesy rather than, as I had often imagined it 
previously—and as Don meant it?—the causal arrow pointing the other way. 
Either way, courtesy and method were becoming more and more unrelated the 
more time I spent on New Ireland. I could identify times in which I found myself 
courteous but devoid of method, while at other times engaging in ethnography 
but with a brusque frankness never far from the surface. I do not remember 
myself having been that way in 1990. Did they?
Tohom died in December 2008. I am sure that he died believing that Towor 
was behind his illness. I had hoped to be in the field for a mortuary feast in his 
honour, but I was not able to make it back until after the second and largest feast 
in the sequence had taken place. As his ‘brother’, I would have been expected 
to contribute to the cost of that feast. This would probably have cost me at 
least a couple of hundred dollars, but I would have wanted to do it. Courtesy 
and method were irrelevant as I contemplated the activities surrounding that 
feast, and the concerns of who I was to them and who they were to me were 
blunted by grief over the loss of my friend. That loss was felt ever so much more 
profoundly when I was there in 2009. 
In 2009, I arrived back on New Ireland a month after Towor and his wife died—
on the same day. This coincidence was quite salient locally and people talked 
with me as if it had happened just days earlier. In a world where there are 
perceived to be very few coincidences, these twin deaths were considered to 
have significant meaning. What that meaning might have been was still being 
discussed. Towor’s reputation as a sorcerer was, naturally, central to many 
of the interpretations, but now Towor’s wife, my ‘mother’, was also indicted 
posthumously as someone who used this sort of knowledge for ill. I felt obliged 
to defend Towor out of some sort of respect-for-the-dead protocol, but I knew 
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that my protestations would ring hollow. After all, waitskins do not really 
understand how sorcery works, so what I said did not matter much. Although 
I was motivated to say only positive things about Towor, I cannot say that that 
motivation had much to do with concerns of either courtesy or method. Even 
as I write this, I wonder about who I had become to Towor in our estrangement. 
And in a final irony, one of the last things I did during my 2009 field trip was 
attend the mortuary feast for Towor.
One New Ireland morning in January 2010, I was greeted by Tinkai, who, with 
her husband, often brought me a kettle of heated water so that we could sit and 
drink coffee. ‘You don’t sleep with your windows open, do you?’ she asked. 
When I said that I do, she then asked if I had seen the sirmát the previous 
night. It took me a moment or two to remember that a sirmát is a long-haired 
female forest spirit that sneaks into villages at night. She is not dangerous, but 
she does things such as seduce men and put her own infant next to a nursing 
mother in order to have her child fed well. Tinkai related how her twenty-
five-year-old son, Tohol, spent half the night chasing a sirmát through Tekedan 
village. As if on cue, Tohol stopped by and regaled me with the account of how 
he went, flashlight in hand, from this house to that, occasionally catching a 
fleeting glimpse of her. 
Now, Tohol has completed Grade 10 and has worked at the Lihir mine, so he 
is not a rube. I had already started thinking about and writing this chapter 
and it was no great epiphany to wonder if this was my Nambweapa’w. While 
a sirmát is no Nambweapa’w in terms of cultural salience, here was my chance 
to be courteous and not disabuse, as well as to utilise the opportunity to 
learn more about sirmáts. Instead, I sceptically grilled Tohol on whether he 
had actually seen anything, whether the moon had set by the time he began 
conducting his search, and if anyone else had seen anything. He was unaffected 
by my doubt—indeed, he might not have even noticed. In the aftermath of 
that conversation, I felt a sadness. Who was I to Tohol and his family? And 
what kind of anthropologist actively works to undermine a belief in sirmáts? 
This kind of wistfulness is different, however, from the grief that 20 years of 
acquaintance with the Sursurunga people has engendered.
I grieve about the leadership vacuum at Tekedan caused by Topiknat’s death. 
I fret about what will take the place of soya beans in the latest get-rich-quick 
scheme. I worry about the implications of the talk of secession. I think about 
my friend Tohom’s debilitating illness and death, as well as Towor and our 
estrangement. I reflect on who else’s death I will hear about when I arrive.
I puzzle over why I feel more free to give my views about things nowadays—that 
is, why, in some respects, I seem to exercise less courtesy than I did in the past on 
New Ireland. Perhaps it is one of the signs of the onset of a cantankerous dotage. 
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Clearly, I am not the rookie ethnographer of 1989 with his young family in tow, 
and I wonder whether all fieldworkers experience the life cycle in the same way 
that I have vis-a-vis a community in another part of the world. It is obvious that 
the demographic profile of an anthropologist in the field affects the nature of her 
or his experience—and therefore of the results, but this is a different question. 
Things have changed between them and me, and I know that it is not only the 
perception of things, but also the memories—mine as well as theirs—of what 
has transpired between us. James Clifford might have captured it when he writes 
that ‘[i]n ethnography, what was previously understood in terms of rapport—a 
kind of achieved friendship, kinship, empathy—now appears as something 
closer to alliance building. The relevant question is less: “What fundamentally 
unites or separates us?” and more: “What can we do for one another in the 
present conjuncture?”’ (1997:87, emphases in original). While this represents 
Clifford’s understanding of the historical change in the epistemological stance 
of the fieldworking anthropologist that occurred during the second half of the 
twentieth century, it also captures the ontogenetic alteration in the character of 
my relationship with the Sursurunga people of southern New Ireland. Perhaps 
the former question had been wordlessly, implicitly answered and on both 
sides the relationship had moved to being characterised by the latter question. 
Certainly, this goes a long way towards describing the difference, but it does not 
explain how it happened, nor does it shed any light on whether the movement 
from one question to the other occurred simultaneously on both sides. Tuzin’s 
phrase ‘the self finding itself in memory’ captures the phenomenon as well as 
any other, with the reminder that memories are contingent and continuously 
reformulated. The people of the area on New Ireland where I work first became 
acquainted with me before I became middle-aged, which is how they know me 
now. Who have they become to me? The answer is many things, but one thing 
that can be said is that they are no longer players in a civility-for-data exchange. 
Who have I become to them? That is impossible to say, but I do know that to 
myself, I have become someone for whom courtesy and method are no longer 
linked. Or at least no longer linked in the way they used to be.
There is something else to courtesy, method and the ever-shifting understanding 
of an anthropologist on the part of a community and vice versa. Perhaps it is 
the kind of thing people say that determines an appropriate (lack of) response. 
In 1969, Tuzin’s response to the Nambweapa’w tale was to say nothing, as was 
mine many times, including to Tohom when he told me of his fear of Towor’s 
prowess when it came to sorcery, and how he never slept in the same place on 
consecutive nights. Local ideas of political or economic content, on the other 
hand, seem to invite, perhaps by their very nature, an interlocutor’s engagement 
in a way that local ideas about the unseen world do not. Just maybe, my input 
on secession was desired, and my advice on soya beans was wanted. But did 
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my misgivings about the sirmát cross an invisible line? Or does that line exist 
only in my head because of what I take to be le pensée sauvage, and distinguish 
between that and those matters in which I believe myself more experienced?
There are, certainly, other features of a long-term relationship between an 
ethnographer and the community to which she or he returns that I have not 
attended to. And the metamorphosis in courtesy and method that I have 
described in the relationship between myself and the people in and around 
Tekedan village must necessarily depend on many factors including changes 
in the answers to ‘who am I to them?’ and ‘who are they to me?’. But Don 
Tuzin’s experience as described in The Cassowary’s Revenge represents just 
how enmeshed—Herzfeld uses the more morally charged term ‘complicit’ 
(2001:25)—an anthropologist can become in local affairs. 
Don’s entanglement in Ilahita’s events can, in some respects, be viewed as 
utterly inadvertent, and yet it is clearly his show of uncritical acceptance of the 
Nambweapa’w account back in 1969 that set in motion—or maybe better said 
kept from being stillborn—the events of 1984–86. It was his attention to and 
concern for courtesy and method that made him responsible for the eventual 
denouement of the Tambaran. He could have done nothing else, of course. 
And he was no more ‘complicit’—although in some ways, yes, ultimately 
responsible—than were Wilbur and Orville Wright for 11 September. 
When I think about my next departure for New Ireland, I think about these 
changes in courtesy and method as well as the way in which the folks on New 
Ireland are continuously reinvented in my mind, just as I am certain that I am 
reinvented in theirs—if not right now then surely when I arrive. Throughout 
this essay, I have signalled, with Tuzin’s phrase, my sense of what I have become 
to—or, perhaps better, how I fit into—the people and events of New Ireland. At 
times in the course of my fieldwork, I left things unsaid, feeling now and then 
mildly thwarted because I wanted to say something but knew that probably 
I should not. At other times, though, I was glad to have the twin excuses of 
courtesy and method to keep my thoughts to myself since I was not sure what was 
appropriate anyway. And of course there were times when attention to courtesy 
and method—at least that kind demonstrated by Don upon first hearing the tale 
of Nambweapa’w—was in short supply, as with sirmáts. Through all of this, I 
have been inadvertently constructing a set of memories of me on New Ireland, 
sometimes quiet and acquiescing to what is being said while at other times—
more and more, seemingly—serving as a wet blanket to hopes and dreams, and 
as a purveyor of heterodoxy. 
Consideration for courtesy and method certainly facilitates the ethnographic 
endeavour—perhaps almost by definition, at least at the outset. But with time 
and repeated interactions and the reconstruction of memories, this can also move 
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the ethnographer towards a category that is different from the one occupied 
upon first arrival. Examples of this movement—and it will not be inaccurate 
to refer to them as method—are that talk of soya beans and talk of secession 
were not data—nor was sirmát scepticism. To me, these conversations were 
not ethnographic moments, and I did not treat them as such. I cannot say (but 
wonder) if local people saw me in a profoundly different way, as having become 
someone or something else—not as an ethnographer—and whether they have 
meaningful memories of me as someone who has forsaken courtesy and method.
To be sure, courtesy and method are not what they once were for me. When I 
am on New Ireland, I speak my mind more than I used to, but I do not think I 
have been rude. And I have conversations that are not ethnographic, yet they 
appear here in this chapter as evidence used to corroborate points I try to make. 
Kevin Birth (Personal communication) suggests that another way to express 
the transformation experienced by ethnographers who keep going back is to 
paraphrase Tuzin’s concept of ‘self finding itself in memory’ by noting that an 
ethnographer returning to the same community over a long period is a matter of 
‘the self finding itself in relationship to methodology’. 
Perhaps this is the best way to say it. An anthropologist who keeps returning to 
the same group of people (although, like Heraclitus’s river, it cannot ever really 
be the same) becomes something very much more than a mere ethnographer. 
Tuzin’s experience in Ilahita is an extreme case, but it is no different in kind 
from what anyone experiences in returning. What an anthropologist eventually 
becomes vis-a-vis a community is the result of a negotiation with method. How 
one conducts oneself in the course of ethnographic fieldwork produces—in 
ways that are unpredictable and often unknowable—who one becomes.
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14. The Anthropologist’s Voice: 
Margaret Mead and Donald Tuzin
Diane Losche
This chapter is dedicated, as is this book, to the memory of Don Tuzin, a great 
anthropologist who studied the Arapesh-speaking village of Ilahita in the Sepik 
region of Papua New Guinea. If I seem, at times, to be a wayward admirer, 
critiquing as well as giving homage, I hope that this will be taken in the spirit 
meant—as an essay presented in the absence of a great talk with Don, usually 
a brief time out from the chatter of professional meetings when, for a few 
moments, two voices might be heard speaking animatedly, sometimes hesitantly, 
grasping for the right word, seeking meaning, striving to comprehend a point, 
a parrying engagement of two individuals who have something to say and much 
in common—a dialogue. I did fieldwork only a few miles from Ilahita in the 
Abelam-speaking village of Apangai. This proximity meant that I engaged with 
Don’s work in a terrain where similarities and differences in cultural forms could 
be, at times, closely compared. I, and the rest of us in this volume, will not 
have that conversational dialogue again; the text might remain, but the voice 
disappears, except in fragile memory—much to my great sadness.
The work of Don Tuzin (1976), as well as that of Anthony Forge (1966, 1970), 
cast a long shadow over my own fieldwork and subsequent writing (Losche 
1989, 1997, 2001) about Abelam ethnography, not very far from where both 
men had carried out research before me. My own sense of the field varied so 
much from the canonical, magisterial textual accounts such as those of Tuzin 
(1976) that I faltered in confidence. I embodied, when I went to the village 
of Apangai in 1976 to do PhD research, a zeitgeist of doubt—almost entirely 
self-doubt. Having read the texts of those who had preceded me—great names 
of ethnography such as Gregory Bateson (1936) and Margaret Mead (1935, 
1938, 1940), as well as Phyllis Kaberry (1941), Anthony Forge (1966, 1970) and 
Donald Tuzin (1976)—I was rendered almost paralytic with anxiety that the 
place in which I found myself seemed, as I phenomenologically experienced it, 
completely different, indeed almost estranged from, in no way commensurate 
with, the texts I read. So that those reading do not jump to the conclusion that 
I was entirely witless, I should mention that I was aware, even in my paralysing 
doubt, that the distance between the field as experienced and the text was 
great. The memories of those early moments have never left me, because I 
simply did not realise how remarkably long, arduous, and destructive as well 
as constructive was the transformation from field to text. The devil is in the 
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details as we all know, and in many cases it takes months, sometimes years—I 
now know through my own experience—to transform these experiences into 
written texts called ethnography.
The authors of these memorable ethnographies about the Sepik are not to blame 
for my uncertainties, for in the beginning I made a basic methodological error: 
comparing my experience with these polished, finished works. I learned the 
error of my ways only painfully, slowly, by my own experience of transforming 
field experiences to text, realising only then the enormous distance between 
the one and the other. Once, as I lamented the slow pace of my transformative 
efforts, a great teacher of mine, Robert Murphy, made the observation that 
the process of going from fieldwork to text took much effort and time because 
the process involved a form of ‘forgetting’—enough forgetting (perhaps the 
word would be better framed as synthesis) to see, as he put it, the forest for 
the trees, the form in the huge mass of detail. As the field of anthropology 
developed through the twentieth century, the emphasis put on the brilliance of 
the analytical framework grew and the conceptual distance between field and 
ethnography grew proportionately.
The narrative known as ethnology is at the core of anthropological activity, 
as any undergraduate major can tell you; it is that from which many other 
interpretations derive. It has also long been known to be fraught with 
interpretative problems. There are two moments of interpretative angst in 
anthropology, from both of which I want to distance my concerns—not so much 
because they were not useful debates in their time but rather because they 
have tended to involve the repetitive recitation of now banal insights, which, 
if they were once fresh and useful, are, by now, trite and clichéd. The first 
was of the sort embodied by the almost mutually contradictory descriptions 
of a Mexican village in the ethnographic work of Oscar Lewis (1960, 1963) 
and Robert Redfield (1930) and the far better-known imbroglio of the so-called 
Mead–Freeman (Freeman 1983) debate. If one has done fieldwork, one quickly 
tires of the simplifications to which the debates about these opposing pictures 
of a place, people and time descend. In this first moment, the question was 
not of the type of interpretation; rather the ethnography was subjected to a 
pseudo-scientific notion of a transparent reality, which must be found because 
it is there to be found. Here it is assumed that whatever the descriptive style of 
the author, somehow core truths of the social should emerge from the reality of 
the situation, and if one ethnographer challenges another then it is a matter of a 
truth versus a falsehood, as was belaboured ad infinitum in Freeman’s critique of 
Mead’s work in Samoa. Is ethnography description or interpretation? Patently 
it is both.
I also want to distance the concerns in this chapter from a second, more 
contemporary moment—that of the interpretative turn in anthropology, 
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embodied in essays looking at the rhetoric of ethnographic description laid out 
in volumes such as Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986). This particular 
phase of rhetorical investigation has a gladiatorial edge, and I am thinking here 
very much of Vincent Crapanzano’s text ‘Hermes’ Dilemma: The Masking of 
Subversion in Ethnographic Description’ in Writing Culture (1986). Here, the 
analyst seems to cling to some ideal of description that is never spelled out, 
and the analysis of allegorical moves in texts is seen as somehow undermining 
some utopian, but undeclared, transparently descriptive model. Identification 
of the gaps in the texts of other ethnographers seems to be a eureka moment for 
the rhetorical analyst, as if, using Occam’s razor, one could not as easily subject 
their own text to the same form of destructive interrogation. 
Both these moments have limitations imposed by the particular methods used 
to interpret the texts. In many of these analyses, a particular ethnographic text 
is lifted from a whole set of texts written by an ethnographer and dissected. 
Although lip-service might be paid to the fact that most ethnographers realise 
that many of their descriptions are somewhat provisional, nevertheless, each 
ethnographic description is simultaneously treated as a stand-alone project. In 
all of this contestation over the truth value of texts, nuances of interpretation 
are absent, and in this chapter I try to get at one such. I call it the voice of the 
anthropologist and suggest that we can look at texts as if they contain voices, 
which are like one particular tone that can suffuse a painting, adding a certain 
unifying hue to all of the many colours that make up the painting’s palette. 
In the same way, I suggest that a certain voice can permeate entire sections of 
material, colouring, with one tone of voice, the many different types of cultural 
forms that an ethnographic work describes. 
The characterisation of individual style has long been recognised, and some 
anthropologists, such as Clifford Geertz (1988) and Margaret Mead (1935), are 
well known for their brilliant individual styles. At the same time, this style 
is often greeted with some ambivalence, and brilliant stylists often attract 
particular attention, critical as well as admiring—as seen, for example, in 
critiques of Mead and Geertz (Crapanzano 1986; Lutkehaus 1995; Worsley 1957). 
The point is that style rests ambivalently in the anthropological endeavour, with 
its roots in the urge to be a science rather than humanity. There is little training 
in the writing of ethnography as writing per se in anthropological education, 
while there is much emphasis on the analytic frameworks needed to synthesise 
the vast quantities of material spewed forth in everyday life (for example, the 
structural analysis of ritual and myth). The problem with this lacuna is that 
there seems to be little understanding of the complex relationship between the 
field experience and the final texts produced by an ethnographer. 
In this chapter, I want to complicate the notion of style and suggest that style is 
not simply a mode of writing across a range of texts that identifies an individual 
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author but that different moods or tones can occur in different texts of the same 
author. These moods often vary according to the circumstances and contexts 
in which the work is produced. I characterise this as a type of voice, and just 
as the voice of a person varies with context, so too can the mood of different 
ethnographic texts by the same author. I chose the term voice, as slightly different 
from style, to ‘open up’ the notion of textual stylistics, to allow for variability 
of tone in the texts of the ethnographer and to allow me, at least in this chapter, 
to move away from the analysis of ethnographic style as necessarily entwined 
with truth value and often at odds with it, as has often been done before. Here 
I want to liken the stylistic tone of texts to the voice of the anthropologist, 
as I remember the voice of Don Tuzin, in dialogue, as perhaps an unfinished 
conversation. As in conversation, the voice of the anthropologist is not the same 
in all texts, and it changes according to many circumstances including new 
knowledge, who is speaking, to whom one is speaking and a variety of other 
circumstances. Identifying voice allows new characteristics of texts to emerge 
and avoids the false idealism of some objectivity embedded in the distinction 
between description versus interpretation, literature versus science, and it will, 
hopefully, allow space for ethnographic writing to emerge as a genre separate 
from other written forms, with its own distinct characteristics.
In this chapter, I am seeking a particular kind of voice, one in which the author 
opens up his or her text and reveals doubt and uncertainty about the nature of 
the fieldwork that the author has already carried out. I sought out these texts 
not for the sake of critique itself but rather because such texts are extremely 
valuable, for they bear traces of that remarkable but usually suppressed 
process by which fieldwork becomes ethnography. This search is motivated 
certainly by my initial shock at the extreme distance between the experience 
of fieldwork—with its chaos, anxiety and uncertainty—and the finished text. I 
often wondered if there was any way to write so as to simultaneously present a 
powerful synthetic analysis and reveal traces of the process of transformation. 
At the same time, I sought these traces in the texts produced by others working 
in the same field. I have chosen to examine texts by Donald Tuzin (1980, 1997) 
and Margaret Mead (1935, 1938, 1940). Both were compelling writers, with 
extensive works about the Arapesh language group of the Sepik region. 
Mead’s style has often been commented upon (for example, Geertz 1988; 
Lutkehaus 1995; Worsley 1957), including by Tuzin himself (Tuzin and Schwartz 
1980), in a somewhat awkward obituary piece attempting to characterise her 
work on the Sepik as a whole, and I am aware that Mead’s celebrity/notoriety as 
well as her voluminous output can swamp other materials. Tuzin’s work on the 
Arapesh is itself voluminous, however, and the juxtaposition of these two very 
different writers illuminates characteristics of what I call the ‘voice’ of the text. 
In this case, I want to compare Mead’s much less known and cited work on the 
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Arapesh in ‘The Mountain Arapesh’ (1938, 1940) with her description of the 
Arapesh published in Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935). 
Donald Tuzin’s tone in The Voice of the Tambaran (1980) is compared with that 
of The Cassowary’s Revenge (1997).
Mead described Sex and Temperament as ‘her most misunderstood book’ (Mead 
1950:Preface) and, like Coming of Age in Samoa (Mead 1961), it has been subject 
to scrutiny, criticism and doubt (Lutkehaus 1995). Critics have suggested that 
her description of three Sepik groups was ‘subjective’ and exaggerated certain 
features of the three—the Arapesh, the Tchambuli and the Mundugamor—
specifically to illustrate elegantly her thesis that what she called ‘sexual 
temperament’, as differentiated from sex roles, varied in spectacularly different 
ways in the small but linguistically diverse region. In Sex and Temperament, 
Mead describes Arapesh culture in global, holistic terms, as the following quote 
from the beginning of Chapter 2, ‘A Cooperative Society’, demonstrates:
Arapesh life is organised about this central plot of the way men and 
women, physiologically different and possessed of different potencies, 
unite in a common adventure that is primarily maternal, cherishing and 
oriented away from the self towards the needs of the next generation. It 
is a culture in which men and women do different things for the same 
reasons. (Mead 1935:15)
And this is how she describes their political organisation: ‘There are no political 
units. Clusters of villages are grouped into localities and each locality and its 
inhabitants have names’ (Mead 1935:16).
Mead—once again glossing the Arapesh as a culture—goes on to suggest that 
one factor in the lack of political organisation is the Arapesh temperament: ‘The 
whole emphasis of their economic lives is that of participation in activities others 
have initiated, and only rarely and shyly does anyone tentatively suggest a plan 
of his own…This emphasis is one factor in the lack of political organization’ 
(1935:22).
As the above quote illustrates, Mead’s voice is a very authoritative one in this 
work. Her descriptions of landscape are vivid and her portraits of individuals 
compelling. There is also a decisive clarity to her description and analysis; 
indeed, one of the strengths of the work is that the description itself embodies 
her interpretation so that every environmental, social and cultural feature is 
described in a way that adds to the cogency of her overarching theme about 
variations in sex and temperament. So vivid is her picture of place and people 
that the descriptive passages add to the convincing nature of her premises. This 
method is familiar in literature, especially fiction. This brilliant, unforgettable 
description is achieved, however, not only via precise descriptions of individuals 
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and the environment but also by broad glosses of large amounts of complex 
materials into succinct sentences, which by their very nature can only be broad 
generalities such as ‘a lack of political organization’.
Sex and Temperament is not the only text in which Mead describes the Arapesh. 
Her more voluminous ‘The Mountain Arapesh’ was published in 1938, three 
years after Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies. What is striking 
about ‘The Mountain Arapesh’ text in contrast with Sex and Temperament is 
the scrupulosity of Mead’s statements and the care she takes in revealing the 
limitations of her research, text and methods. The volume opens with a section 
titled ‘Method of Presentation’ in which she sets out the limiting conditions of 
her text: ‘The arrangement of any monograph is in itself a statement of method, 
but may be influenced by a large number of conditions extraneous to the 
author’s methodological intentions’ (Mead 1938:148). 
She suggests that there were three such limits. The first was that this was part 
of a joint expedition with Reo Fortune, her former husband. What follows from 
this is that she will not be including material on issues such as men’s initiation 
or language, both of which were covered by Fortune. A second limitation was 
the previous publication of Sex and Temperament, and she suggests she will be 
leaving materials covered there out of the Arapesh monograph (Mead 1938:149). 
Most interesting is Mead’s caveat in her regional discussion about the influence 
her subsequent fieldwork among the Tchambuli and the Mundugamor had on 
her comparisons: ‘The intra area comparisons are drawn, not from those cultures 
where they would be most illuminating but from those for which some details 
are at present available. This is a very important distinction in all comparative 
work, often ignored by advocates of the historical method’ (1938:149).
Mead characterises the disproportionate amounts of material she has about the 
Arapesh compared with the Tchambuli and Mundugamor as a ‘disharmony’ 
and suggests that because of this, ‘I have frequently overstepped the strict 
methodological requirements of the historical method’ (1938:149).
In her introduction, Mead once again clarifies the necessary limitations of her 
discussion: 
In cultures in which there is some correspondence between political 
and cultural boundaries and a degree of interchange within the area, 
permitting some degree of standardization, it is possible to write about 
their characteristics as if the observer stood outside and looked down 
upon a well-defined social system. Among the Arapesh, as among 
so many New Guinea peoples, this condition does not obtain. The 
individual Arapesh does not see his culture as a whole, nor does he 
distinguish the customs of his linguistic group from those of the adjacent 
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language group, if indeed he clearly notes his linguistic boundaries. Each 
local community, sometimes only a hamlet, sometimes several hamlets, 
occasionally three or four villages, presents an aggregation of widely 
diffused traits peculiar to it. From this narrow vantage ground each 
individual sees the behavior of members of neighboring communities 
as becoming steadily more diversified from his own as the distance 
increases between the communities involved. The ethnographer…who 
gathers every object found in an area and records the series of non-
material traits observed among a people who speak the same language, 
and publishes these results as the ‘culture’ of the people who speak such 
and such a language, is doing great violence to the actual conditions. 
(Mead 1938:151)
Mead’s text here—in contrast with Sex and Temperament—has a very 
careful voice, one that expresses doubt, hesitation and awareness of how her 
circumstances and methods affected her knowledge. Furthermore, she takes 
great pains to alert the reader to these limitations. Throughout this text comes a 
most refreshing sense of a person who is somewhat unsure of her ground, with 
as many questions as answers, trying to present answers but hedging these with 
questions. This exploratory and somewhat hesitant text is one that summons far 
more those doubts, hesitations and uncertainties that characterise the ‘field’ and 
those processes that are involved in the transformation to text.
In many of her other texts—both before and after this great work of Sepik 
ethnography—Mead seems to ignore her painstaking caveats about the 
difficulties of making generalisations about the area. Many of them fashion 
materials that, as she cautions against in The Mountain Arapesh, do seem to 
stand outside and look down on the system. Indeed, Mead herself had done this 
three years before The Mountain Arapesh, in Sex and Temperament, where, as 
we have seen, she glossed Arapesh culture with seemingly no concern for those 
important characteristics that make it so very difficult to gloss Arapesh culture.
We would be in a large company if we, like so many others, critiqued Mead 
for these apparent contradictions between one kind of text and the other, 
both based on the same field materials. There is no doubt, however, that 
Mead was quite aware of the very great differences in her two portraits. As 
Nancy Lutkehaus (1995:189–90) points out, Mead was one of the most self-
aware of writers, one who paid careful attention to the differences that she felt 
were required in writing texts for different audiences. Mead herself would 
undoubtedly have pointed out that one text, Sex and Temperament, published 
in the United States by William Morrow, a major publisher of fiction and non-
fiction for a large and so-called general audience, was a different proposition 
than writing a text published by the American Museum of Natural History, a 
small press that published monographs by scientific staff of the museum aimed 
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at a small, professional audience. What strikes me is how easy it still is to find 
Sex and Temperament in libraries and bookstores while The Mountain Arapesh 
has almost disappeared, even from academic libraries. Perhaps what ought to 
give us pause for thought is that, even in academic circles, Mead’s The Mountain 
Arapesh is seldom referred to, analysed or quoted, while Sex and Temperament 
is often cited and critiqued. It has become part of her infamous celebrity-like 
profile, her signature and style, while her other texts about the Arapesh, which 
would challenge this view, are largely ignored. My point here is that not only 
authors create texts that establish the author’s authority and command via 
cultural glosses and the suppression of all sorts of uncertainties; academia also 
institutionally privileges, especially via citation and critique, canonical texts. It 
was not Margaret Mead who turned Sex and Temperament into a canonical text 
but rather the volume’s reception and institutionalisation. 
Nor was it only Mead who ignored her own caveats about the Sepik area; so 
too did most subsequent anthropology of the area. By 1941, Phyllis Kaberry’s 
early descriptions of the area around Maprik (a subdistrict headquarters of the 
Sepik region) glossed the area as home to the Abelam tribe with little caveat 
(Kaberry 1941). By the 1960s and 1970s, ethnographies such as those produced 
by Forge (1970) and Tuzin (1976) would routinely gloss certain areas as Arapesh 
and Abelam with little attention to variations within, or boundaries between, 
these groupings. I am not so much criticising this move as pointing out that it 
is the common ground from which texts arise. Indeed this crucial glossing of 
an area into ‘cultures’ defined according to linguistic criteria was, and remains, 
a crucial step in allowing communication between anthropologists—that is, 
the transformation of the inchoate into objects or units for comparison, study 
and analysis. That this involves seldom examined and intuitive transformations 
from field experience to text is an outcome, I suggest, of the peculiar conditions 
of ethnographic practice in the twentieth century, at least in the Sepik region. 
Ethnographers had to try to make sense of quantities of material gathered 
from particular, small populations against a backdrop of the relatively few 
comparative studies of the region that appeared sporadically and irregularly, in 
different languages and frameworks, and with almost no systematicity. Indeed, 
any apparent systematicity only grew out of the articulation of units, such as 
Abelam and Arapesh, which allowed anthropologists to speak to one another. 
Much of Donald Tuzin’s work, like most ethnography of the Sepik, including my 
own, thus ignored Mead’s caveat against standing outside, and looking down 
on, the system—but for very compelling reasons!
Thus, by the 1970s, when Don Tuzin began producing his major ethnographic 
texts on the Ilahita Arapesh (1976), the practice of glossing one’s field experience 
into a unit was already well established. Tuzin’s ethnographic writing glossed his 
experience, which was based in one uniquely large village of some 1500 people 
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called Ilahita, as a text about the ‘Ilahita Arapesh’ or ‘Arapesh’, and most of his 
writing stands outside and surveys this unit, little troubled by the doubts about 
method that Mead had voiced in her The Mountain Arapesh material. Tuzin 
was a writer who could equal Mead in creating a compelling text, although his 
‘voice’ is very different than either her careful, almost uncertain voice in The 
Mountain Arapesh or her more seamless texts such as Sex and Temperament. 
Tuzin’s textual voice is often magisterial, authoritative and very dramatic, 
creating a sense that we are in a grand narrative of great historical moment. 
With one exception, his texts seldom introduce caveats, unanswered questions 
or doubt. These absences, as well as the magisterial tone, create a canonical 
text about a cultural system. Here as elsewhere, Tuzin writes with a compelling 
narrative urgency that, as much more commonly in fiction, leads the reader to 
want to find out what happens next. 
In The Voice of the Tambaran (Tuzin 1980), his second full-length ethnographic 
work, which describes the Ilahita Arapesh initiation structure, Tuzin begins each 
chapter with a myth—a device that operates as a code or key to understanding 
aspects of the initiation system discussed in the chapter. The opening chapter 
begins with the famous myth of Nambweapa’w. It takes up eight pages, and 
Tuzin provides two alternative endings. He does not explain the reason for 
including these alternative endings, nor does he specify who provided the 
particular version included in the book. In a footnote, he refers to ‘The story 
teller’, as if the storyteller were a single person, but this is not elaborated on 
(Tuzin 1980:7). Having conducted fieldwork in a nearby but different language, 
and having gathered a similar though truncated story, I have methodological 
questions that are seldom answered in Tuzin’s book. How many people tell this 
exact version of the story? How widespread is the knowledge of this particular 
story? Is this a gloss of many versions or one of the longest versions? 
Following the myth of Nambweapa’w, Tuzin continues to create a seamless 
cultural gloss and to make broad generalisations about the Ilahita Arapesh:
Nambweapa’w crystallizes for the Arapesh a sense of themselves 
in relation to (and in mythic priority over) a larger humanity. The 
Tambaran, largely by virtue of its participation in the same array of 
existential themes, likewise serves as a summary symbol of Arapesh 
cultural identity. When the two images are brought together under ritual 
auspices, the complex wedding of male and female, past and present, 
creation and destruction—all raised to mythic proportions—yields a 
transcendent meaning of supreme cultural value. (Tuzin 1980:10–11)
This characterisation of Tuzin’s technique of broad glossing is not intended as 
critique, for indeed I have done the same myself and not as well as he did. 
Indeed, his text is an extremely good example of the type of ethnographic text 
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exciting to other anthropologists, as was Mead’s Sex and Temperament, because 
of an elegant aesthetic, compelling narrative structure and bold synthesis. It 
might not address questions that would be raised in postmodern discussions 
of ethnographic texts (Clifford and Marcus 1986), but Writing Culture was 
published six years after The Voice of the Tambaran (Tuzin 1980). My point is 
that Tuzin’s is an outstanding and inspiring example of an ethnographic text of 
its time, as brilliant in its style as was Mead’s, and like that volume it ignored, 
for purposes of the aesthetics of exposition, issues that would obscure what the 
author considered his most important points. Like Sex and Temperament, Tuzin’s 
texts create a powerful synthesis from the motley assembly of field experience, 
deliberately putting aside some of the fascinating questions raised by Mead in 
The Mountain Arapesh. Many of Tuzin’s texts on the Arapesh reflect this seamless 
quality, where the singular eye of the anthropologist sweeps up irregularities, 
limitations and variations into summary statements. There are many who would 
claim that such synthesising activity is the most important aim of ethnography. 
It was only in the 1980s that some of the concerns voiced by Mead in the 1930s 
began again to be aired in anthropology. As Lutkehaus (1995:190) has pointed 
out, Mead’s concern with writing led her to observations about narrative styles 
and audience reception that predate recent critiques of ethnographic texts. 
Like Mead before him, Tuzin, in one of his ethnographies, has a voice strikingly 
different than that in the others. This is his final book-length ethnography 
of the Ilahita Arapesh: The Cassowary’s Revenge (1997). This volume, like his 
earlier Ilahita Arapesh work, is also a compulsively readable narrative with an 
extremely dramatic tone. The Preface introduces the drama:
This book is about something that happened in Ilahita, a village in 
the interior lowland of northeastern New Guinea. The year was 1984. 
The event was a murder, not a senseless anonymous killing, but a 
conspiratorial act carried out by men with a purpose. The assailants 
had known their victim all their lives and most of the time regarded him 
with profound respect, possibly even love.
The shocking truth is the killing was a parricide. (Tuzin 1997:ix)
In the book, Freud and the Old Testament are summoned as interlocutors, and 
Greek models, such as Oedipus, hover over this story of the destruction of the 
men’s cult by Ilahita villagers, adding to the drama and sense of the historical 
importance of the events being described. 
Tuzin, however, enters this ethnography as a character, as he finds his own, 
very personal fate has become entwined with the story of the destruction of the 
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cult of the Tambaran in Ilahita. In his Preface, Tuzin not only opens up for the 
reader a gap created by his own involvement but also frames this involvement 
as necessitating a structure of multiple narratives:
The third narrative is awkward to tell, for it is about my return to Ilahita 
after an eventful absence of thirteen years and my disturbing, uncanny 
involvement with the recent collapse of the men’s cult. Swept into 
the current of events and fantasies, this return encounter rewrote the 
significance of my original visit, merging it into a stream of prophecy 
to which the ethnographer was now a reluctant, hapless contributor…
The telling of what happened in Ilahita requires then, three different 
arguments, three different voices, three different domains. (Tuzin 1997:x)
The Cassowary’s Revenge makes for compelling reading particularly because 
of the shock with which Tuzin recounts how his earlier fieldwork had been 
incorporated, very prominently, into the history that led to the downfall of 
the men’s cult. He confesses to his own stake in the men’s cult during 13 years’ 
absence from the village, during which his own professional activities were 
heavily invested in describing and analysing it, with his volume The Voice of the 
Tambaran entirely given over to it: ‘The intervening thirteen years of writing, 
lecturing and nostalgizing added up to an emotional investment in all that the 
villagers were seeking to destroy’ (Tuzin 1997:5).
Much of Chapter 1, titled ‘Going Home’, describes the circumstances of this 
unwitting involvement in the demise of Ilahita’s Tambaran cult. This is a 
complex story in which Tuzin’s own cancer (Hodgkin’s disease)—diagnosed 
while preparing his PhD subsequent to his first period of fieldwork (Lipset and 
Roscoe, this volume)—became known to villagers through letters, and along 
with the later death of a close informant also from cancer became entwined 
with the demise of the Tambaran. In describing these events, Tuzin broaches 
the complexities of ethnographic fieldwork in terms much more familiar to 
contemporary anthropologists than Mead’s earlier angst over the limitations of 
her observations, trying to conceptualise his particular difficulties about the 
ethnographer’s involvement in a particular place and to make important points 
regarding the nature of the ethnographic enterprise:
In all the recent attacks on ethnographic objectivity, no one as far as I 
know has remarked on the difference between going to the field for the 
first time and returning there after a lengthy absence…Both situations 
may involve observer bias, but returning to the field entails a larger, 
more complex hazard because it means tampering with a relationship 




Tuzin not only narrates the story of his role in the events he describes, he 
also conceptualises and comments on the processes involved in the rethinking 
necessary when the unexpected causes one to reframe earlier work, producing 
a meta-theory about the processes of long-term fieldwork in an area:
Rediscovering, restarting, revisiting, reconsidering, folding back—these 
are the convolutions of symbolic process, and therefore these must be 
the apparatus of understanding. Ethnographers return to the field and 
modify the meanings of previous facts in the light of intervening events; 
cultures return to their mythic charter and unwittingly edit it to accord 
with historical experience; individuals return to places of precious 
memory, thinking to capture some fragment of the experience—never 
to succeed. (Tuzin 1997:xi)
The lodestone that Tuzin suggests for conceptualising the problems of his own 
experiences is memory—a recent and powerful entry to the arsenal of analytic 
frameworks used to conceptualise historical change at an institutional and 
individual level. He suggests that memory will be the touchstone that unites his 
three narratives—personal and collective—and that will provide the framework 
for analysing the problems made evident in his earlier understandings of Ilahita, 
made evident only on his return after 13 years:
Always one must go back, searching for what things of the past ‘really’ 
meant as a clue to present realities. Going is never the same as going back. 
Going is mundane, going back is mythic, because it confronts the self in 
memory. Indeed, in a curious way that poets understand, it is through 
memory that past and present are finally reconciled, finally realized, and 
the future is made possible. Individuals relate to themselves in this way, 
and so do cultures. (Tuzin 1997:xi)
Here, in a most poetic voice, Tuzin is suggesting a methodological solution to 
the problem of the very disparate pictures that emerge when one does long-term 
research in an area.
In The Cassowary’s Revenge, Tuzin returns to the story of Nambweapa’w, the 
cassowary myth that occupied such a central role as a charter for the Tambaran 
in his earlier volume. He acknowledges some of the difficulties (not explored 
in the earlier text) he had with conceptualising the role of the Nambweapa’w 
story in The Voice of the Tambaran: ‘The truth was that I did not know what to 
say that would do justice to the story’s intuitive importance. Additional years 
and events have clarified and, in curious ways that this book tries to explain, 
realized and fulfilled those intuitions’ (Tuzin 1997:71).
Three chapters of The Cassowary’s Revenge are devoted to the Cassowary myth, 
and in these Tuzin is far more meticulous in outlining the questions of variation 
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that the myth, as deployed in The Voice of the Tambaran, had raised for me. I 
suggest that the involvement of his personal narrative in the events described 
in The Cassowary’s Revenge also sensitised him to give greater attention to issues 
of irregularity, variation and uncertainty in a variety of the cultural phenomena 
found in Ilahita.
The point of this chapter has been to suggest that, rather than lifting particular 
texts out of an entire body of work and arguing the validity of a particular 
ethnographic point vis-a-vis the facts of a particular field site, we look across 
the entire body of work of an ethnographer, giving attention to a variety of 
circumstances surrounding the production of different kinds of texts, which, as 
I have tried to demonstrate here, vary in mood, tone and voice. These tones cast 
particular cultural phenomena into remarkably different kinds of forms, from the 
nature of the social units under discussion and how broadly the anthropologist 
can generalise from a very small sample, which troubled Margaret Mead, to the 
variations in myth that Tuzin took as a central issue in The Cassowary’s Revenge. 
In the introduction to this chapter, I mentioned two modes of analysis from 
which I distanced the concerns of this chapter: the critique that privileges de-
contextualised social fact, and the interpretative turn, which ignores the issue 
of the truth value of social facts but critiques the rhetorical narrative modes 
by which the author of a text constitutes him or herself as an ‘authority’. Both 
these forms of critique, I have suggested here, ignore the complexities of both 
fieldwork and ethnography, including the many ‘moments’ of this arduous and 
often lifetime venture. As Donald Tuzin suggested, going back is quite different 
from going. I suggest that in ‘going back’ to the texts of anthropologists who 
have gone before us we listen to the questions they raised in their own ‘going 
back’. The insights that both Mead and Tuzin gained from their own revisions 
are some of the most valuable of their contributions to the ethnography of this 
area, and they provide glimpses of that arduous process by which the ‘field’ 
becomes the ‘text’. This chapter has examined two authors who produced texts 
that bear the marks of uncertainty and hesitation—characteristics that, under a 
variety of compelling professional forces, are often lost. It is intended as homage 
to those works, with all their caveats and hesitations, for they bear the trace of 
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